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LICENSE 
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International 
License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0. 
 
Under this CC BY-NC license, you’re free to: 
• Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format 
• Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material 
 
As licensor, I can’t revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms: 
• Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if 
changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests 
I endorse you or your use. 
• NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes. 
 
Notices: 
• You don’t have to comply with the license for elements of the material in the public domain or 
where your use is permitted by an applicable exception or limitation. 
• No warranties are given. The license may not give you all of the permissions necessary for your 
intended use. For example, other rights such as publicity, privacy, or moral rights may limit how 
you use the material. 
 
This non-commercial work also contains some copyrighted materials, the use of which I believe 
constitutes fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act. I’ve included these materials because 
they provide valuable insights to students, scholars, and researchers, without profit to anyone involved. 
The materials serve educational and research purposes, especially by shedding light on historical realities 
behind particular legal decisions and helping people whose learning improves with visual aids.  
The copyright status for each image in this work is noted on the page where the image appears, unless 
an image is in the public domain. While I’ve included images for educational and research purposes, some 
images might be subject to different rights restrictions if used for other purposes. If you wish to use 
copyrighted material for your own purposes, you’re responsible for determining and satisfying any rights 
restrictions, including obtaining any necessary permissions from the copyright owner. If you believe I’ve 
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INTRODUCTION  
A tort is a wrong. In a tort suit, the plaintiff demands a remedy by alleging that the defendant wronged 
them. Tort law determines what counts as a tort, how plaintiffs may establish their claims, when 
defendants may avoid liability, and which remedies plaintiffs may seek. Simply put, tort law is about civil 
legal protection of bodily autonomy, emotional integrity, property rights, and dignitary interests.  
This casebook explores tort law’s practice, structure, and theory by examining a range of torts. The 
cases range from mundane and amusing disputes to serious and shocking situations. I expect you’ll find 
that some outcomes make sense as a matter of justice, some make sense as a matter of policy, some make 
sense as a matter of history or politics, and some make no sense at all. The best way to learn torts, I think, 
is to study a broad set of cases, thinking critically about nuanced and controversial concepts like harm, 
duty, consent, and causation. Tort law isn’t static—in many areas, the doctrine’s past and present are both 
connected and divergent. Shifting social norms, new technologies, and changes in other legal regimes can 
all shape and be shaped by tort law. I love this class, and I hope you’ll enjoy it too. 
THE CASEBOOK 
Torts is a mandatory class in every law school that I know. It’s taught all around the country, year 
after year, usually with substantial similarity in the topics—and even the cases—that professors cover. 
This makes a good deal of sense. After all, tort law is a key part of every bar exam and one of the building 
blocks of American legal education, so it’s unsurprising that Torts syllabi don’t budge much over time. 
Pedagogical consistency can be a virtue. 
But despite the stability of the classic Torts curriculum, students must usually buy extortionate 
casebooks. I say this from a position of personal experience and culpability: my professors made me buy 
pricey books for my doctrinal classes as a student, and I demanded the same of my students when teaching 
for the first time last year. This ancient law-school tradition creates huge financial burdens during a time 
when many students are already shouldering colossal debt to pay for tuition and living expenses.  
A few hundred bucks for a Torts casebook might seem paltry compared to the overall costs of a legal 
education, but the expense can still pose significant financial hardships for individual students. And when 
the costs are aggregated, the numbers are staggering. The book I used last year costs $298, meaning my 
students would collectively spend nearly $20,000 on Torts alone (used copies, oddly, cost $320 at the 
moment). Multiply that by six to cover the standard first-year doctrinal curriculum, and that’s over 
$110,000 for the sixty-five 1Ls I teach. Expand it to the entire 1L class, and it’s closer to $350,000. That’s 
over $1 million across the three years of students currently enrolled at my school. All that for mandatory 
first-year casebooks that look remarkably similar to the tomes I bought as a 1L nearly a decade ago. 
It’s true that some students recoup a bit by reselling books. But this partial remedy again produces 
inequities. The need to find willing buyers creates uncertainty in how students can use their casebook, 
limiting their ability to highlight, annotate, or engage with the material in ways they find educationally 
beneficial. Only students privileged enough to keep their old books can do as they please. Renting books 
presents similar constraints, as does relying on the free library copies that some students feel compelled 
to use. And to cap it all off, the resale market is regularly disrupted by the publication of new editions. 
I don’t mean to be naïve or one-sidedly critical of traditional casebooks (and that’s not just because 
they’re used—and even authored—by many of the people who’ll judge my tenure file in a few years!). As 
I’ve found, making a casebook is taxing and time-consuming work. Not everyone has the support or 
interest to make their own materials. It’s tempting, and indeed understandable, to rely on the expertise 
and work of generations of professors who’ve created resources of great value. But if there’s a path to 
making legal education less daunting and more inclusive, I believe we as teachers should pursue it. 
 My goal in creating this casebook is to do my part to make legal education more affordable, accessible, 
and adaptable. That’s why I’m making the book available to all for free. By using a CC BY-NC license, 
I’m also inviting others to adapt these materials for their own use, so long as they adhere to the non-
commerciality and attribution terms. (Anyone interested in “remixing” this book for their own purposes 
should feel free to contact me at tek@uga.edu, including if you’d like a more adaptable non-PDF version.)  
You’re welcome to print any part of this casebook if you want a hard copy to accompany the digital 
version. If you do print it, I ask that you please be environmentally conscious by using double-sided pages. 
Because the digital version can be easily searched, it contains no index or other finding aids that are 
conventional for printed books. You should also be able to enhance your experience with the digital 
version by highlighting text, adding comments, and annotating it in other ways you find helpful. 
To see the syllabus accompanying this casebook, please visit www.thomaskadri.com/torts. 
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GIVING BACK 
If you use this casebook, I hope you’ll consider donating some of the money you’ll save to one of the 
following causes (or another cause of your choosing): 
• Project Safe, which works in and around the Athens community to tackle domestic 
violence. Project Safe’s executive director is also a Georgia Law alum! 
• Project South, which seeks to combat racial and economic injustice by cultivating social 
movements in the South. The organization has deep ties in South Atlanta, where it’s 
empowering communities to respond to COVID-19 and structural racism. 
• Tem Gente com Fome, which distributes food, personal hygiene items, and cleaning 
products to families in Brazil who face hunger, poverty, and human-rights violations, 
especially during the pandemic. The campaign reflects a simple mantra: “If there are 
hungry people, give them something to eat.” 
• Union of Concerned Scientists, which relies on science to solve our planet’s pressing 
problems. The group of nearly 250 scientists and experts is combatting climate change 
and developing sustainable ways to feed, power, and transport ourselves. 
EDITING 
Throughout this casebook, I’ve prioritized readability over strict loyalty to the original texts. For 
example, I liberally removed or amended some citations, quotation marks, headings, ellipses, brackets, 
and footnotes. While I used ellipses to indicate my own substantive omissions, I didn’t always mark other 
edits. The casebook is designed as a pedagogical resource; if you wish to engage with the materials for 
other purposes, I’d recommend consulting the original sources. 
I’ve tried to include content warnings throughout this casebook, recognizing that certain topics are 
especially likely to induce trauma or distress. While I’ve done my best to flag these particularly unsettling 
materials, tort law regularly challenges us to confront difficult and disturbing issues in ways I can’t always 
predict in advance. If you ever feel that a content warning would’ve been valuable to you but was lacking, 
I welcome that feedback. Indeed, I welcome any reactions to this casebook, so please reach out if you 
think important perspectives are missing or if you find errors or typos. I surely have blind spots in the 
way I present some topics, plus I lack a professional editor to catch my linguistic blunders. You can 
contact me at tek@uga.edu with any constructive criticism. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I created this casebook with support from a University of Georgia Provost’s Affordable Course Materials 
Grant. I owe huge debts of gratitude to Sarah Burns, Courtney Hogan, and Noah Nix—their work has 
been invaluable, and I thank them for their care and brilliance. I truly couldn’t have published this edition 
without them. For licensing advice and assistance in gathering source materials, I thank Stephen Wolfson 
and Tiffany Au at the Alexander Campbell King Law Library. Enrique Armijo offered generous tips in 
selecting defamation and privacy cases, while Margo Schlanger graciously let me adapt her materials on 
the “reasonable woman” standard. My thanks also to James Grimmelmann, whose own affordable 
casebook, Internet Law: Cases and Problems, was inspirational to me.  
My approach to teaching tort law is also shaped by the casebook I used as a student—Tort Law: 
Responsibilities and Redress, now co-authored by John Goldberg, Leslie Kendrick, Anthony Sebok, and 
Benjamin Zipursky, whose approaches to torts pedagogy and scholarship I greatly admire. When I taught 
this course for the first time, I also greatly benefited from the advice and materials I received from 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Rebecca Crootof, Woodrow Hartzog, Claudia Haupt, Don Herzog, Douglas 
Kysar, Andrew Selbst, Jed Shugerman, Elizabeth Weeks, Mike Wells, and John Fabian Witt.  
Lastly, I’m immensely grateful to Scott Hershovitz, who made me love Torts as my professor in 2012 
and then guided me as I taught it for the first time.  
 
           Thomas Kadri 
           October 2021  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTENTIONAL TORTS  
A. Battery 
ALCORN v. MITCHELL 
Supreme Court of Illinois (1872)  
Sheldon, Justice: ã 
The ground mainly relied on for the reversal of the 
judgment in this case is, that the damages are excessive, 
being $1,000. 
The case presented is this: There was a trial of an 
action of trespass between the parties, wherein the 
appellee [Andy Mitchell] was defendant, in the circuit 
court of Jasper county. At the close of the trial the court 
adjourned, and, immediately upon the adjournment, in 
the court room, in the presence of a large number of 
persons, the appellant [William Alcorn] deliberately spat in the face of the appellee. 
So long as damages are allowable in any civil case, by way of punishment or for the sake of 
example, the present, of all cases, would seem to be a most fit one for the award of such damages. 
The act in question was one of the greatest indignity, highly provocative of retaliation by force, 
and the law, as far as it may, should afford substantial protection against such outrages, in the way 
of liberal damages, that the public tranquillity may be preserved by saving the necessity of resort to 
personal violence as the only means of redress. 
Suitors, in the assertion of their rights, should be allowed approach to the temple of justice 
without incurring there exposure to such disgraceful indignities, in the very presence of its ministers. 
It is customary to instruct juries that they may give vindictive damages where there are 
circumstances of malice, wilfulness, wantonness, outrage and indignity attending the wrong 
complained of. The act in question was wholly made up of such qualities. It was one of pure 
malignity, done for the mere purpose of insult and indignity. 
An exasperated suitor has indulged the gratification of his malignant feelings in this despicable 
mode. The act was the very refinement of malice. [Alcorn] appears to be a man of wealth; we can 
not say that he has been made to pay too dearly for the indulgence. 
We have carefully looked into the instructions given and refused, and do not perceive any 
substantial error in respect to them…. Judgment affirmed. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: Should Alcorn have to pay Mitchell $1,000? 
Why or why not? 
2. Angry Alcorn: The court mentions that Alcorn spat “deliberately” and with “malice.” 
Do his intent and motivation really matter? Should they? 
3. Spit for Tat: What do we accomplish by making Alcorn pay Mitchell? 
 
ã Woodley Wonder Works, No Spitting, No Smoking (CC BY 2.0). 
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LEICHTMAN v. WLW JACOR COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio (1994) 
Per Curiam:ã 
The plaintiff-appellant, Ahron Leichtman, 
appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his 
complaint against the defendants-appellees, WLW 
Jacor Communications (“WLW”), William 
Cunningham and Andy Furman, for battery, 
invasion of privacy, and a violation of Cincinnati 
Bd. of Health Reg. No. 00083. In his single 
assignment of error, Leichtman contends that his 
complaint was sufficient to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted and, therefore, the 
trial court was in error when it granted the defendants’ Civil Rule 12(B)(6) motion. We agree in part. 
In his complaint, Leichtman claims to be “a nationally known” antismoking advocate. 
Leichtman alleges that, on the date of the Great American Smokeout, he was invited to appear on 
the WLW Bill Cunningham radio talk show to discuss the harmful effects of smoking and breathing 
secondary smoke. He also alleges that, while he was in the studio, Furman, another WLW talk-show 
host, lit a cigar and repeatedly blew smoke in Leichtman’s face “for the purpose of causing physical 
discomfort, humiliation and distress.” 
Under the rules of notice pleading, Civil Rule 8(A)(1) requires only “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” When construing a complaint for failure 
to state a claim, under Rule 12(B)(6), the court assumes that the factual allegations on the face of the 
complaint are true. For the court to grant a motion to dismiss, it must appear beyond doubt from 
the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery. A court cannot 
dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(B)(6) merely because it doubts the plaintiff will prevail…. 
Leichtman contends that Furman’s intentional act constituted a battery. The Restatement of the 
Law 2d, Torts (1965), states: 
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if 
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the 
other…, and 
(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results[; or] 
[c] an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.  
In determining if a person is liable for a battery, the Supreme Court has adopted the rule that 
contact which is offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity is offensive contact. It has defined 
“offensive” to mean “disagreeable or nauseating or painful because of outrage to taste and 
sensibilities or affronting insultingness.” State v. Phipps, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (Ohio 1979). Furthermore, 
tobacco smoke, as “particulate matter,” has the physical properties capable of making contact. 
As alleged in Leichtman’s complaint, when Furman intentionally blew cigar smoke in 
Leichtman’s face,… he committed a battery. No matter how trivial the incident, a battery is 
actionable, even if damages are only one dollar. The rationale is explained by Roscoe Pound in his 
essay “Liability” [1922]: “In civilized society men must be able to assume that others will do them 
no intentional injury—that others will commit no intentioned aggressions upon them.” 
Other jurisdictions also have concluded that a person can commit a battery by intentionally 
directing tobacco smoke at another. We do not, however, adopt or lend credence to the theory of a 
“smoker’s battery,” which imposes liability if there is substantial certainty that exhaled smoke will 
predictably contact a nonsmoker. Also, whether the “substantial certainty” prong of intent from the 
Restatement of Torts translates to liability for secondary smoke via the intentional tort doctrine in 
employment cases as defined by the Supreme Court in Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 
1991), need not be decided here because Leichtman’s claim for battery is based exclusively on 
 
ã Mendhak, Why Have You Abandoned Us? (CC BY-SA 2.0). 
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Furman’s commission of a deliberate act. Finally, because Leichtman alleges that Furman 
deliberately blew smoke into his face, we find it unnecessary to address offensive contact from 
passive or secondary smoke under the “glass cage” defense of McCracken v. Sloan, 252 S.E.2d 250 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979), relied on by the defendants. 
Neither Cunningham nor WLW is entitled to judgment on the battery claim under Rule 12(B)(6). 
Concerning Cunningham, at common law, one who is present and encourages or incites commission 
of a battery by words can be equally liable as a principal. Leichtman’s complaint states, “At Defendant 
Cunningham’s urging, Defendant Furman repeatedly blew cigar smoke in Plaintiff’s face.” 
With regard to WLW, an employer is not legally responsible for the intentional torts of its 
employees that do not facilitate or promote its business. However, whether an employer is liable 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior because its employee is acting within the scope of 
employment is ordinarily a question of fact. Accordingly, Leichtman’s claim for battery with the 
allegations against the three defendants in the second count of the complaint is sufficient to 
withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6). 
By contrast, the first and third counts of Leichtman’s complaint do not state claims upon which 
relief can be granted.… In his first count, Leichtman alleged a tortious invasion of his privacy. A 
claim for invasion of privacy may involve any one of four distinct torts. The tort that is relevant here 
requires some substantial intrusion into a plaintiff’s solitude, seclusion, habitation, or affairs that 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Leichtman acknowledges that he willingly entered 
the WLW radio studio to make a public radio appearance with Cunningham, who is known for his 
blowtorch rhetoric. Therefore, Leichtman’s allegations do not support his assertion that Furman, 
Cunningham, or WLW intruded into his privacy. 
In his third count, Leichtman attempts to create a private right of action for violation of 
Cincinnati Bd. of Health Reg. No. 00083, which makes it illegal to smoke in designated public places. 
Even if we are to assume, for argument, that a municipal regulation is tantamount to public policy 
established by a statute enacted by the General Assembly, the regulation has created rights for 
nonsmokers that did not exist at common law. Therefore, because sanctions also are provided to 
enforce the regulation, there is no implied private remedy for its violation. 
Arguably, trivial cases are responsible for an avalanche of lawsuits in the courts. They delay cases 
that are important to individuals and corporations and that involve important social issues. The 
result is justice denied to litigants and their counsel who must wait for their day in court. However, 
absent circumstances that warrant sanctions for frivolous appeals under Appellate Rule 23, we refuse 
to limit one’s right to sue. Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution states, “All courts shall be open, 
and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.” 
This case emphasizes the need for some form of alternative dispute resolution operating totally 
outside the court system as a means to provide an attentive ear to the parties and a resolution of 
disputes in a nominal case. Some need a forum in which they can express corrosive contempt for 
another without dragging their antagonist through the expense inherent in a lawsuit. Until such an 
alternative forum is created, Leichtman’s battery claim, previously knocked out by the trial judge in 
the first round, now survives round two to advance again through the courts into round three.… 
QUESTIONS 
1. Bad Timing: Does it matter that this happened during the Great American Smokeout? 
2. Who’s to Blame? Furman blew the smoke, so why did Leichtman sue Cunningham and 
WLW? 
3. What’s to Gain? Why do you think Leichtman brought this lawsuit? For publicity? 
Because he genuinely felt humiliated?  
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CECARELLI v. MAHER 
Court of Common Pleas New Haven County (1943) 
Cullinan, Judge: ã 
A willful, apparently unprovoked, and thoroughly 
unjustifiable assault represents the background of this 
litigation. The plaintiff, a personable, well-spoken 
and well-groomed young man, 25 years of age, alleges 
that the defendant George Maher, in concert with 
John Heinz and an unknown assailant, beat and 
assaulted him with intense ferocity to produce most 
serious physical consequences. 
On the evening of August 1, 1943, the plaintiff 
attended a public dance at Sea Cliff, New Haven, at 
the conclusion of which three young ladies requested 
him to drive them to their homes. His willingness to meet this request appears to have provoked the 
anger and wrath of the defendant and his two companions, who, at a secluded and lonely spot 
adjacent to the dance hall, set upon him to administer a severe, and painful beating. Fists and 
dangerous instruments constituted the implements of aggressive warfare. 
In consequence, the plaintiff’s upper right central and upper right lateral teeth and roots were 
severed from their sockets; his upper left central, lower right central, and lower right lateral teeth 
were so destroyed as to necessitate ultimate removal; his upper lip was severely lacerated, requiring 
sutures and resulting in an involvement of the nasal septum; his nose and left eye were abrased and 
contused; and his right arm, right shoulder, and right side became exceedingly sore and tender as a 
result of a vicious kicking process. Thereafter, the plaintiff required emergency hospital treatment 
and a complete restoration of the dental structures with the replacement of five teeth. In addition, 
the plaintiff was forced to absent himself from his employment for a complete week, experiencing 
acute pain for an extended period after his return to work. 
The terrifying and violent episode had its basis in the ungovernable tempers of these young men, 
who, after having had their attentions spurned by three young women, struck fiercely, suddenly, and 
stealthily at the innocent plaintiff. Both the defendant Maher and his companion Heinz were 
subsequently arrested and offered guilty pleas to assault charges before the City Court of New 
Haven. The third assailant is unknown to the plaintiff and his identity has never been disclosed by 
his colleagues in violence. 
This action originally joined both Maher and Heinz as codefendants. Subsequently, the action 
was withdrawn as to Heinz, and a default judgment has been entered against Maher by reason of his 
failure to appear. Thus, damages are now to be assessed against Maher alone. 
By way of special damage, the plaintiff has lost in wages and has become obligated to expend for 
dental and medical treatment approximately $315. To this sum may be added $2,000, representing 
fair and reasonable compensation for his pain, suffering, and permanent injury. Judgment may enter 
for the plaintiff to recover of the defendant $2,315, together with taxable costs. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Tort-Crim I: What’s the tort in this case? (Hint: the word doesn’t appear in the opinion.) 
2. Tort-Crim II: Maher and Heinz pled guilty to criminal charges, so what’s the point of 
having a tort suit? 
 
 
ã State Library Victoria Collections, Swiss Polka Dancing (CC BY-NC 2.0). 
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PAUL v. HOLBROOK 
Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida (1997) 
Orfinger, Judge: ã 
Meredith A. Paul (“Paul”) appeals an order of the trial court granting 
summary judgment in favor of Professional Medical Products, Inc. 
(“PMP”) and Paul Holbrook (“Holbrook”) on Paul’s claims against 
Holbrook and PMP for assault, battery, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and 
negligent hiring and retention. We affirm the entry of summary 
judgment in all respects except as to the battery claim against Holbrook. 
On that single claim, we reverse. 
Paul and Holbrook are former employees of PMP. Paul testified that 
Holbrook was her co-worker and not her supervisor. On various 
occasions, Paul worked alone with Holbrook. During some of these 
times, Paul alleges that Holbrook harassed her by asking that she wear 
revealing clothing and suggesting that they engage in sexual relations. 
Paul claims that on two occasions, Holbrook came up behind her while she was working and tried 
to massage her shoulders. On both occasions, Paul immediately pulled away and told Holbrook to 
leave, which he did. After Paul complained to PMP’s management, she and Holbrook never again 
worked the same shifts and his improper behavior toward her ended. 
While Paul takes issue with the trial court’s judgment in its entirety, we find merit only in Paul’s 
contention that the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment on her battery claim against 
Holbrook, finding that Holbrook’s contact with Paul amounted to no more than a “casual touching” 
and concluding that Paul failed to produce evidence establishing intent. 
A battery consists of the infliction of a harmful or offensive contact upon another with the intent 
to cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is imminent. Professor Prosser’s treatise 
explains that the tort of battery exists to protect the integrity of the person. As Prosser & Keeton 
wrote in [W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 9 (5th ed.1984)]: 
Proof of the technical invasion of the integrity of the plaintiff’s person by even an 
entirely harmless, but offensive contact entitles the plaintiff to vindication of the 
legal right by an award of nominal damages, and the establishment of the tort 
cause of action entitles the plaintiff also to compensation for the resulting mental 
disturbance, such as fright, revulsion or humiliation. 
Once a contact has been established, its character becomes the focus: 
The element of personal indignity involved always has been given considerable 
weight. Consequently, the defendant is liable not only for contact which do actual 
harm, but also for those relatively trivial ones which are merely offensive and 
insulting…. The time and place, and the circumstances under which the act is 
done, will necessarily affect its unpermitted character, and so will the relations 
between the parties. A stranger is not to be expected to tolerate liberties which 
would be allowed by an intimate friend. But unless the defendant has special 
reason to believe that more or less will be permitted by the individual plaintiff, the 
test is what would be offensive to an ordinary person not unduly sensitive to 
personal dignity. 
Id. Offensiveness is an essential element of the tort. The trial court, relying on Gatto v. Publix 
Supermarket, Inc., 387 So.2d 377 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), concluded that, as a matter of law, 
Holbrook’s actions were not offensive. The plaintiff in Gatto testified that a store employee, in 
attempting to retrieve allegedly stolen items from the plaintiff’s hands, “came into contact with 
either part of [his] palm or [his] wrist or [his] arms.” The third district concluded that this was not 
 
ã Brittanie Shey, Backrub (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0). 
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evidence of an offensive contact. But, the act of approaching a co-worker from behind while on the 
job and attempting to massage her shoulders is, in the circumstances of this case, not capable of such 
summary treatment. On these facts, offensiveness is a question for the trier of fact to decide. 
The trial court also found that Paul failed to produce evidence establishing Holbrook’s intent to 
commit a battery. Proof of intent to commit battery is rarely subject to direct proof, but must be 
established based on surrounding circumstances. Based on the record before this court, a jury could 
reasonably infer that Holbrook intended to touch Paul in a matter that would constitute a battery. 
No evidence of an intention to cause harm is necessary. 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment against Paul in all respects except with 
regard to the battery claim against Holbrook. On that claim, we reverse. In all other respects, we 
affirm the trial court’s judgment. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Procedural Precision: Did the appeals court actually conclude that Holbrook’s actions 
constituted battery?  
2. It’s All Circumstantial: Was Holbrook’s attempt to massage Paul offensive? What if he 
did the same thing on a date instead of at work? 
3. Alcorn Revisited: What would the justices in Alcorn have thought of this case in 1872? 
How do you think they would have decided it? 
 
TECH BRO PROBLEM 
Janice worked as a salesperson at Tesla in Alpharetta for fifteen years. The environment at Tesla 
was very laid back. Foul language, sexual innuendo, and dirty jokes were often in the airways. Janice 
was also known to give massages, back scratches, and hugs to her coworkers during work hours, and 
she often received the same in return. Leon—Janice’s boss—often poked fun at Janice and 
propositioned her for sex. Beyond these verbal encounters, Leon’s hands once lingered on Janice’s 
rear as he hugged her. Janice has now sued Leon for battery. 
(a) Was Leon’s contact with Janice offensive for purposes of battery liability? 
(b) Is the environment at Tesla a relevant part of this inquiry? 
(c) Are Janice’s own actions toward her coworkers relevant? What if she had been tactile 
with Leon in the past?  
(d) Does the outcome you reached sit well with you? Why or why not?  
 
COLE v. HIBBERD  
Court of Appeals of Ohio (1994) 
Young, Judge: 
Plaintiff-appellant, Debbie L. Cole, appeals the 
judgment of the Warren County Common Pleas Court 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-
appellee, Sheri L. Hibberd. 
Cole filed a personal injury complaint against 
Hibberd on June 11, 1993, based on an incident that 
occurred on June 15, 1991. She set forth the operative 
facts of this action in paragraph two of her complaint: 
“At said time and place, defendant negligently struck 
said plaintiff in the lower lumbar area, which negligence directly caused injuries and damages 
hereinafter set forth.” Cole described Hibberd’s actions more completely in her deposition taken on 
August 12, 1993. At the deposition, Cole described the incident as follows: 
The Hibberds had been drinking and Sheri was acting a little rambunctious. While 
I was standing there leaning over, I had ahold of my daughter with one hand and 
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my niece with the other, I was holding them by the hand, I leaned over to look at 
her children in her stroller, and she hauled off and kicked me. 
Hibberd’s attorney asked Cole to describe the incident in more detail, and she responded: 
Well, she kicked me. And I stood up and said, damn it, Sheri, that hurt. She started 
laughing. And… [Hibberd’s husband] Gary called me something foul and started 
laughing and thought it was funny. And I told my husband, I said, come on. I was, 
I was extremely hot about it. She hurt me. 
When asked whether she believed Hibberd’s action was intentional or accidental, Cole stated: 
I’d say she didn’t, she meant to kick me. I mean, she didn’t mean to hurt me, she 
was just horsing around. I guess she thought it wouldn’t hurt me…. No, she meant 
to kick me playingly, but I don’t think she meant to hurt me like she did. She 
basically thought it was funny. I mean, that’s how, how she was, really. 
R.C. 2305.111 establishes a one-year statute of limitations for claims involving assault and 
battery. On the other hand, R.C. 2305.10 requires that an action for bodily injury must be brought 
within two years after the cause arises. Cole filed her complaint more than one year, but less than 
two years after June 15, 1991, the date Hibberd kicked her. 
Hibberd filed a motion for summary judgment contending that her alleged actions constituted 
a battery which was no longer actionable under R.C. 2305.111 since the complaint was not filed 
within one year of the incident. The trial court granted Hibberd’s motion for summary judgment by 
entry filed January 14, 1994. 
In a single assignment of error, Cole contends that the court erred in concluding that her claim 
amounted to an action in assault and battery instead of negligence. Basically, Cole argues that a 
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Hibberd made intentional, offensive contact with 
Cole…. In determining which limitation period will apply, courts must look to the actual nature or 
subject matter of the case, rather than to the form in which the action is pleaded. The grounds for 
bringing the action are the determinative factors, the form is immaterial. 
In Love v. Port Clinton, 524 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio 1988), the Ohio Supreme Court stated that “where 
the essential character of an alleged tort is an intentional, offensive touching, the statute of 
limitations for assault and battery governs even if the touching is pleaded as an act of negligence. To 
hold otherwise would defeat the assault and battery statute of limitations.” 
An individual is liable for battery when he or she acts intending to cause offensive or harmful 
contact, and such contact results. “Offensive contact” is contact that would be offensive to a 
reasonable sense of personal dignity. 
Cole insists that Hibberd did not act with an intention to cause harm. However, it is the 
intentional nature of the contact with the plaintiff that controls the definition, not the intent to cause 
actual harm or injury. 
Construing the facts most strongly in favor of Cole, this court concludes that the essential 
character of her complaint is grounded in the intentional tort of assault and battery. From the 
evidence presented, reasonable minds can only conclude that Hibberd intended to kick Cole. We 
also conclude that Hibberd’s contact, as testified to by Cole in her deposition, would be considered 
offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity. It is irrelevant to this determination whether or 
not Hibberd intended to cause injury. 
In this case, the statute of limitations for assault and battery applies over the statute of limitations 
for bodily injury. Accordingly, Cole had only one year from the time of the incident, or until June 
15, 1991, to file this lawsuit. The filing of this suit on June 11, 1993, was therefore untimely. 
Appellant’s assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed.  
Jones, Judge, dissenting: 
Summary judgment was simply inappropriate. A factual question existed with respect to 
Hibberd’s intentions. A jury could, would, and should find that Hibberd’s playful “kick in the rear” 
was not intended to cause offensive or harmful conduct. Hibberd wasn’t assaulting her friend Cole 
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any more than one would “assault” a friend by slapping him on the back. Hibberd’s “kick” was 
simply misdirected, striking the coccyx, and a jury could certainly conclude that such was merely 
negligence. The two-year statute of limitations [for negligence should apply, rather than the one-
year limit for assault and battery]. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Cruel Intentions: Did Hibberd intend to harm or offend Cole? Is that the intent that 
matters? 
2. Time Is of the Essence: Notice something seemingly odd about this case: Hibberd is 
trying to convince the court that she committed battery. Why is she doing that? 
 
VOSBURG v. PUTNEY 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin (1891) 
Lyon, Justice: ã 
The action was brought to recover damages for an 
assault and battery, alleged to have been committed 
by the defendant upon the plaintiff on February 20, 
1889…. At the date of the alleged assault the plaintiff 
was a little more than fourteen years of age, and the 
defendant a little less than twelve years of age. 
The injury complained of was caused by a kick 
inflicted by defendant upon the leg of the plaintiff, a 
little below the knee. The transaction occurred in a 
school-room in Waukesha, during school hours, 
both parties being pupils in the school. A former trial 
of the cause resulted in a verdict and judgment for the 
plaintiff for $2,800. The defendant appealed from 
such judgment to this court, and the same was 
reversed for error, and a new trial awarded. 
The case has been again tried in the circuit court, and the trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff 
for $2,500.… On the last trial the jury found a special verdict, as follows: 
“(1) Had the plaintiff during the month of January, 1889, received an injury just 
above the knee, which became inflamed, and produced pus? Answer. Yes. (2) Had 
such injury on the 20th day of February, 1889, nearly healed at the point of the 
injury? A. Yes. (3) Was the plaintiff, before said 20th of February, lame, as the 
result of such injury? A. No. (4) Had the tibia in the plaintiff’s right leg become 
inflamed or diseased to some extent before he received the blow or kick from the 
defendant? A. No. (5) What was the exciting cause of the injury to the plaintiff’s 
leg? A. Kick. (6) Did the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, intend 
to do him any harm? A. No. (7) At what sum do you assess the damages of the 
plaintiff? A. $ 2,500.”… 
Thereupon judgment for plaintiff for $2,500 damages and costs of suit was duly entered. The 
defendant appeals from the judgment…. 
The jury having found that the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, did not intend 
to do him any harm, counsel for defendant maintain that the plaintiff has no cause of action…. In 
support of this proposition counsel quote from 2 Greenl. Ev. § 83, the rule that “the intention to do 
harm is of the essence of an assault.” Such is the rule, no doubt, in actions or prosecutions for mere 
assaults. But this is an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery. In such case the 
rule is correctly stated, in many of the authorities cited by counsel, that plaintiff must show either 
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that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant is in fault. If the intended act is unlawful, the 
intention to commit it must necessarily be unlawful. Hence, as applied to this case, if the kicking of 
the plaintiff by the defendant was an unlawful act, the intention of defendant to kick him was also 
unlawful. 
Had the parties been upon the play-grounds of the school, engaged in the usual boyish sports, 
the defendant being free from malice, wantonness, or negligence, and intending no harm to plaintiff 
in what he did, we should hesitate to hold the act of the defendant unlawful, or that he could be held 
liable in this action. Some consideration is due to the implied license of the play-grounds. But it 
appears that the injury was inflicted in the school, after it had been called to order by the teacher, 
and after the regular exercises of the school had commenced. Under these circumstances, no implied 
license to do the act complained of existed, and such act was a violation of the order and decorum 
of the school, and necessarily unlawful. Hence we are of the opinion that, under the evidence and 
verdict, the action may be sustained. 
The plaintiff testified, as a witness in his own behalf, as to the circumstances of the alleged injury 
inflicted upon him by the defendant, and also in regard to the wound he received in January, near 
the same knee, mentioned in the special verdict. The defendant claimed that such wound was the 
proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff’s leg, in that it produced a diseased condition of the bone, 
which disease was in active progress when he received the kick, and that such kick did nothing more 
than to change the location, and perhaps somewhat hasten the progress, of the disease.… The 
following question was then propounded to Dr. Philler[, the plaintiff’s witness]: “After hearing [the 
teacher’s] testimony, and what you know of the case of the boy, seeing it on the 8th day of March, 
what, in your opinion, was the exciting cause that produced the inflammation that you saw in that 
boy’s leg on that day?” An objection to this question was overruled, and the witness answered: “The 
exciting cause was the injury received at that day by the kick on the shin-bone.” 
It will be observed that the above question to Dr. Philler calls for his opinion as a medical expert, 
based in part upon the testimony of the plaintiff, as to what was the proximate cause of the injury to 
plaintiff’s leg. The plaintiff testified to two wounds upon his leg, either of which might have been 
such proximate cause. Without taking both of these wounds into consideration, the expert could 
give no intelligent or reliable opinion as to which of them caused the injury complained of; yet, in 
the hypothetical question propounded to him, one of these probable causes was excluded from the 
consideration of the witness, and he was required to give his opinion upon an imperfect and 
insufficient hypothesis—one which excluded from his consideration a material fact essential to an 
intelligent opinion. A consideration by the witness of the wound received by the plaintiff in January 
being thus prevented, the witness had but one fact upon which to base his opinion, to wit, the fact 
that defendant kicked plaintiff on the shin-bone. Based, as it necessarily was, on that fact alone, the 
opinion of Dr. Philler that the kick caused the injury was inevitable, when, had the proper hypothesis 
been submitted to him, his opinion might have been different. The answer of Dr. Philler to the 
hypothetical question put to him may have had, probably did have, a controlling influence with the 
jury, for they found by their verdict that his opinion was correct. 
Surely there can be no rule of evidence which will tolerate a hypothetical question to an expert, 
calling for his opinion in a matter vital to the case, which excludes from his consideration facts 
already proved by a witness upon whose testimony such hypothetical question is based, when a 
consideration of such facts by the expert is absolutely essential to enable him to form an intelligent 
opinion concerning such matter. The objection to the question put to Dr. Philler should have been 
sustained. The error in permitting the witness to answer the question is material, and necessarily 
fatal to the judgment. 
Certain questions were proposed on behalf of defendant to be submitted to the jury, founded 
upon the theory that only such damages could be recovered as the defendant might reasonably be 
supposed to have contemplated as likely to result from his kicking the plaintiff. The court refused to 
submit such questions to the jury. The ruling was correct. The rule of damages in actions for torts 
was held in Brown v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. to be that the wrong-doer is liable for all injuries resulting 
directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him…. 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause will be remanded for a new trial. 
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QUESTIONS 
1. Accidentally on Purpose: Putney argues that he’s not liable because the jury found that 
he didn’t intend to hurt Vosburg. Is that a good defense? 
2. Karate Kids: What if the kick had been on the playground? Same result?  
3. Eggshell Skull: You’ll hear a lot about reasonable foreseeability in due course—it’s 
critically important when we cover the tort of negligence. But here the court says it’s 
legally irrelevant whether Putney could have foreseen that his kick would do so much 
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GARRATT v. DAILEY 
Supreme Court of Washington (1955) 
Hill, Justice: ã 
…Brian Dailey (age five years, nine months) was visiting with Naomi 
Garratt, an adult and a sister of the plaintiff, Ruth Garratt, likewise an adult, 
in the backyard of the plaintiff’s home, on July 16, 1951. It is plaintiff’s 
contention that she came out into the backyard to talk with Naomi and 
that, as she started to sit down in a wood and canvas lawn chair, Brian 
deliberately pulled it out from under her. The only one of the three persons 
present so testifying was Naomi Garratt. (Ruth Garratt, the plaintiff, did 
not testify as to how or why she fell.) The trial court, unwilling to accept 
this testimony, adopted instead Brian Dailey’s version of what happened, 
and made the following findings: 
…[W]hile Naomi Garratt and Brian Dailey were in the back yard the plaintiff, 
Ruth Garratt, came out of her house into the back yard. Some time subsequent 
thereto defendant, Brian Dailey, picked up a lightly built wood and canvas lawn 
chair which was then and there located in the back yard…moved it sideways a few 
feet and seated himself therein, at which time he discovered the plaintiff, Ruth 
Garratt, about to sit down at the place where the lawn chair had formerly been, at 
which time he hurriedly got up from the chair and attempted to move it toward 
Ruth Garratt to aid her in sitting down in the chair; that due to the defendant’s 
small size and lack of dexterity he was unable to get the lawn chair under the 
plaintiff in time to prevent her from falling to the ground. That plaintiff fell to the 
ground and sustained a fracture of her hip, and other injuries and damages as 
hereinafter set forth.… [T]he preponderance of the evidence in this case 
establishes that when the defendant, Brian Dailey, moved the chair in question he 
did not have any willful or unlawful purpose in doing so; that he did not have any 
intent to injure the plaintiff, or any intent to bring about any unauthorized or 
offensive contact with her person or any objects appurtenant thereto; that the 
circumstances which immediately preceded the fall of the plaintiff established that 
the defendant, Brian Dailey, did not have purpose, intent or design to perform a 
prank or to effect an assault and battery upon the person of the plaintiff. 
It is conceded that Ruth Garratt’s fall resulted in a fractured hip and other painful and serious 
injuries. To obviate the necessity of a retrial in the event this court determines that she was entitled 
to a judgment against Brian Dailey, the amount of her damage was found to be eleven thousand 
dollars. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing the action and asks for the entry of a judgment 
in that amount or a new trial…. 
It is urged that Brian’s action in moving the chair constituted a battery. A definition (not all-
inclusive but sufficient for our purpose) of a battery is the intentional infliction of a harmful bodily 
contact upon another. The rule that determines liability for battery is given in 1 Restatement, Torts, 
29, § 13, as: 
An act which, directly or indirectly, is the legal cause of a harmful contact with 
another’s person makes the actor liable to the other, if 
(a) the act is done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive 
contact or an apprehension thereof to the other or a third person, and 
(b) the contact is not consented to by the other or the other’s consent thereto is 
procured by fraud or duress, and 
(c) the contact is not otherwise privileged. 
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We have in this case no question of consent or privilege. We therefore proceed to an immediate 
consideration of intent and its place in the law of battery. In the comment on clause (a), the 
Restatement says: 
Character of actor’s intention. In order that an act may be done with the intention 
of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to a 
particular person, either the other or a third person, the act must be done for the 
purpose of causing the contact or apprehension or with knowledge on the part of 
the actor that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain to be produced. 
We have here the conceded volitional act of Brian, i.e., the moving of a chair. Had the plaintiff 
proved to the satisfaction of the trial court that Brian moved the chair while she was in the act of 
sitting down, Brian’s action would patently have been for the purpose or with the intent of causing 
the plaintiff’s bodily contact with the ground, and she would be entitled to a judgment against him 
for the resulting damages. Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403. (Wis. 1891). 
The plaintiff based her case on that theory, and the trial court held that she failed in her proof 
and accepted Brian’s version of the facts rather than that given by the eyewitness who testified for 
the plaintiff. After the trial court determined that the plaintiff had not established her theory of a 
battery (i.e., that Brian had pulled the chair out from under the plaintiff while she was in the act of 
sitting down), it then became concerned with whether a battery was established under the facts as it 
found them to be. 
In this connection, we quote another portion of the comment on the “Character of actor’s 
intention,” relating to clause (a) of the rule from the Restatement heretofore set forth: 
It is not enough that the act itself is intentionally done and this, even though the 
actor realizes or should realize that it contains a very grave risk of bringing about 
the contact or apprehension. Such realization may make the actor’s conduct 
negligent or even reckless but unless he realizes that to a substantial certainty, the 
contact or apprehension will result, the actor has not that intention which is 
necessary to make him liable under the rule stated in this Section. 
A battery would be established if, in addition to plaintiff’s fall, it was proved that, when Brian 
moved the chair, he knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down 
where the chair had been. If Brian had any of the intents which the trial court found, in the italicized 
portions of the findings of fact quoted above, that he did not have, he would of course have had the 
knowledge to which we have referred. The mere absence of any intent to injure the plaintiff or to 
play a prank on her or to embarrass her, or to commit an assault and battery on her would not 
absolve him from liability if in fact he had such knowledge. Without such knowledge, there would 
be nothing wrongful about Brian’s act in moving the chair, and, there being no wrongful act, there 
would be no liability. 
While a finding that Brian had no such knowledge can be inferred from the findings made, we 
believe that before the plaintiff’s action in such a case should be dismissed there should be no 
question but that the trial court had passed upon that issue; hence, the case should be remanded for 
clarification of the findings to specifically cover the question of Brian’s knowledge, because intent 
could be inferred therefrom. If the court finds that he had such knowledge, the necessary intent will 
be established and the plaintiff will be entitled to recover, even though there was no purpose to injure 
or embarrass the plaintiff. If Brian did not have such knowledge, there was no wrongful act by him, 
and the basic premise of liability on the theory of a battery was not established…. The cause is 
remanded for clarification, with instructions to make definite findings on the issue of whether Brian 
Dailey knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair 
which he moved had been, and to change the judgment if the findings warrant it…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Just Enough Knowledge to Be Dangerous: Does the legal standard discussed in Garratt 
modify the longstanding rule that battery requires the defendant to intentionally make 
contact with the plaintiff?  
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2. Access to Justice: Ruth Garratt ultimately won a judgment of $11,000—over $100,000 
in today’s money. How on earth would little Brian Dailey pay? Consider the following 
background from Jennifer Wriggins: 
Access to liability insurance equals access to the tort system. When plaintiffs in the 
tort system receive money for damages, the money generally comes out of a defendant’s 
liability insurance policy, rather than out of the defendant’s pocket. Liability insurance 
also pays the bills for defense and plaintiff lawyers—either directly (defense lawyers) or 
indirectly (plaintiffs’ lawyers). Torts casebooks…generally leave out how unequally 
liability insurance has been distributed. It has been unequally distributed by race—as a 
result at least in part of deliberate racism by institutions, individuals, and governments—
in several different ways. One way is that after World War II, the GI bill gave valuable 
benefits and low-cost home loans to returning white GIs while in practice denying 
benefits and home loans to African-American returning GIs. Homes purchased with the 
help of the GI bill had to have liability insurance. Thus, as housing was unequally 
distributed by race, so was liability insurance. A second way is that insurance companies 
refused to issue policies in urban neighborhoods with large populations of African-
Americans; this practice, known as ‘redlining,’ contributed to neighborhoods’ decline. 
Garratt v. Dailey, a classic torts case, looks a bit different with this background. Ruth 
Garratt sued a five-year-old boy, Brian Dailey, for injuries she received when he pulled 
a chair out from under her as she was starting to sit down. Generations of law students 
ponder the intent Brian did or did not have. Ruth Garratt won $11,000 (about $105,474 
in today’s dollars) for a fractured hip and serious injuries. Brian, of course, did not have 
the money to pay $11,000 for the injuries he caused. But as a resident of his parents’ 
home, he was an ‘insured’ under their homeowners policy, one casebook tells us. Thus, 
Ruth Garratt got the $11,000 compensation for her injuries from Brian’s parents’ 
homeowners policy. 
But let’s not stop there. Consider for a moment the same facts and injury if Brian’s 
parents did not own their house. If they rented rather than owned, it is very unlikely they 
would have had renters’ insurance that would cover Brian and the injuries he caused by 
his chair-pulling. And with no liability insurance covering Brian, Ruth Garratt would 
not have been able to find a lawyer, there would have been no lawsuit, and her injury 
would have gone uncompensated. The same outcome—no lawsuit—would result if his 
parents owned a house but had no insurance. The parents would probably not be liable 
for Brian’s actions. And even if they were, it would have been difficult or impossible for 
Ruth Garratt to find a lawyer to pursue the case unless Brian’s parents were very wealthy 
and had collectible assets. Liability insurance has a central place in torts regardless of the 
race of the participants, but distribution of liability insurance—and the extent to which 
plaintiffs are compensated—has been influenced by race and racism.* 
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FISHER v. CARROUSEL MOTOR HOTEL, INC. 
Supreme Court of Texas (1967) 
Greenhill, Justice: 
This is a suit for actual and exemplary 
damages growing out of an alleged assault and 
battery. The plaintiff Fisher was a 
mathematician with the Data Processing 
Division of the Manned Spacecraft Center, an 
agency of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Agency, commonly called NASA, near 
Houston. The defendants were the Carrousel 
Motor Hotel, Inc., located in Houston, the Brass 
Ring Club, which is located in the Carrousel, 
and Robert W. Flynn, who as an employee of 
the Carrousel was the manager of the Brass Ring Club…. 
The plaintiff Fisher had been invited by Ampex Corporation and Defense Electronics to a one 
day’s meeting regarding telemetry equipment at the Carrousel. The invitation included a luncheon. 
The guests were asked to reply by telephone whether they could attend the luncheon, and Fisher 
called in his acceptance. After the morning session, the group of 25 or 30 guests adjourned to the 
Brass Ring Club for lunch. The luncheon was buffet style, and Fisher stood in line with others and 
just ahead of a graduate student of Rice University who testified at the trial. As Fisher was about to 
be served, he was approached by Flynn, who snatched the plate from Fisher’s hand and shouted that 
he, a Negro, could not be served in the club. Fisher testified that he was not actually touched, and 
did not testify that he suffered fear or apprehension of physical injury; but he did testify that he was 
highly embarrassed and hurt by Flynn’s conduct in the presence of his associates. 
The jury found that Flynn “forceably dispossessed plaintiff of his dinner plate” and “shouted in 
a loud and offensive manner” that Fisher could not be served there, thus subjecting Fisher to 
humiliation and indignity. It was stipulated that Flynn was an employee of the Carrousel Hotel and, 
as such, managed the Brass Ring Club. The jury also found that Flynn acted maliciously and awarded 
Fisher $400 actual damages for his humiliation and indignity and $500 exemplary damages for 
Flynn’s malicious conduct. 
The Court of Civil Appeals held that there was no assault because there was no physical contact 
and no evidence of fear or apprehension of physical contact. However, it has long been settled that 
there can be a battery without an assault, and that actual physical contact is not necessary to 
constitute a battery, so long as there is contact with clothing or an object closely identified with the 
body. In Prosser, Law of Torts 32 (3d Ed. 1964), it is said: 
The interest in freedom from intentional and unpermitted contacts with the 
plaintiff’s person is protected by an action for the tort commonly called battery. 
The protection extends to any part of the body, or to anything which is attached 
to it and practically identified with it. Thus contact with the plaintiff’s clothing, or 
with a cane, a paper, or any other object held in his hand will be sufficient;… The 
plaintiff’s interest in the integrity of his person includes all those things which are 
in contact or connected with it. 
Under the facts of this case, we have no difficulty in holding that the intentional grabbing of 
plaintiff’s plate constituted a battery. The intentional snatching of an object from one’s hand is as 
clearly an offensive invasion of his person as would be an actual contact with the body. To constitute 
an assault and battery, it is not necessary to touch the plaintiff’s body or even his clothing; knocking 
or snatching anything from plaintiff’s hand or touching anything connected with his person, when 
done in an offensive manner, is sufficient.… In S. H. Kress & Co. v. Brashier, 50 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 
The following case and questions involve racism and slavery. 
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Civ. App. 1932), the defendant was held to have committed “an assault or trespass upon the person” 
by snatching a book from the plaintiff’s hand. The jury findings in that case were that the defendant 
“dispossessed plaintiff of the book” and caused her to suffer “humiliation and indignity.” 
The rationale for holding an offensive contact with such an object to be a battery is explained in 
1 Restatement of Torts 2d § 18 as follows: “Since the essence of the plaintiff’s grievance consists in 
the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and intentional invasion of the inviolability 
of his person and not in any physical harm done to his body, it is not necessary that the plaintiff’s 
actual body be disturbed. Unpermitted and intentional contacts with anything so connected with 
the body as to be customarily regarded as part of the other’s person and therefore as partaking of its 
inviolability is actionable as an offensive contact with his person. There are some things such as 
clothing or a cane or, indeed, anything directly grasped by the hand which are so intimately 
connected with one’s body as to be universally regarded as part of the person.” We hold, therefore, 
that the forceful dispossession of plaintiff Fisher’s plate in an offensive manner was sufficient to 
constitute a battery, and the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict on 
the issue of actual damages. 
In Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., 254 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1953), this Court refused to adopt the “new 
tort” of intentional interference with peace of mind which permits recovery for mental suffering in 
the absence of resulting physical injury or an assault and battery. This cause of action has long been 
advocated by respectable writers and legal scholars. However, it is not necessary to adopt such a 
cause of action in order to sustain the verdict of the jury in this case. The Harned case recognized 
the well established rule that mental suffering is compensable in suits for willful torts “which are 
recognized as torts and actionable independently and separately from mental suffering or other 
injury.” Damages for mental suffering are recoverable without the necessity for showing actual 
physical injury in a case of willful battery because the basis of that action is the unpermitted and 
intentional invasion of the plaintiff’s person and not the actual harm done to the plaintiff’s body. 
Personal indignity is the essence of an action for battery; and consequently the defendant is liable 
not only for contacts which do actual physical harm, but also for those which are offensive and 
insulting. We hold, therefore, that plaintiff was entitled to actual damages for mental suffering due 
to the willful battery, even in the absence of any physical injury.… The judgments of the courts 
below are reversed, and judgment is here rendered for the plaintiff for $900 with interest from the 
date of the trial court’s judgment, and for costs of this suit. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Pen Pals: If your friend reaches over during class and grabs your pen from your hand, is 
that battery under Fisher? 
2. What’s Tort Law Up To? How are the goals of tort law served by a decision like Fisher? 
3. Personality Extended, but to Whom? Fisher presents a famous example of the doctrine 
of “extended personality,” under which battery may occur through “intentional contacts 
with anything so connected with the body as to be customarily regarded as part of the 
other’s person.” Here, it was contact with a plate snatched from the hands of a Black 
man. But consider the case of State v. Davis, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 46 (S.C. App. L. & Eq. 
1833), a criminal assault case in which an enslaved person was attached by a rope to a 
deputy sheriff to prevent escape. A third man, Davis, cut the rope and took the enslaved 
person away. The court explained that Davis’s act constituted assault on the deputy 
sheriff because “[t]he rope was as much identified with his person, as the hat or coat 
which he wore, or the stick which he held in his hand,” or even “the horse on which he 
rides.” The court said nothing, however, about the interests of the enslaved person who 
was also attached to the rope. 
 
EICHENWALD v. RIVELLO 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland (2018) 
Bredar, Chief Judge: 
Plaintiff Kurt Eichenwald brought this 
action against Defendant John Rivello over a 
year ago, on April 24, 2017. Defendant is facing 
criminal charges related to the same incident 
underlying this civil case…. 
Plaintiff is a journalist and author currently 
living in Texas. Plaintiff’s work is well known. 
He writes for Newsweek and Vanity Fair. He 
worked for years at the New York Times, has 
authored four books, and has won several 
awards including the George Polk Award 
(twice). He is an active Twitter user, having 
posted over 50,000 tweets.  
Plaintiff also has epilepsy. He was diagnosed 
at age 18, and suffered from frequent seizures as 
a young adult. Medication has helped reduce 
the number of seizures, but he continues to 
experience them. Plaintiff has been public about 
his condition in the past and in 2016 wrote an 
article, published in Newsweek, titled “Sean 
Hannity: Apologize to Those with Epilepsy, or 
Burn in Hell.” 
During the 2016 election, Plaintiff was often critical of then-candidate Donald J. Trump, and 
expressed those views in his writing and on his Twitter account. Plaintiff received numerous threats 
and messages over the Internet as a result of his public criticism, and wrote about the online abuse 
for Newsweek in October 2016. In that article, Plaintiff wrote about one instance of online 
harassment in particular. Plaintiff received a tweet from someone with the twitter handle “Mike’s 
Deplorable AF.” In that tweet Mike made mention of [Plaintiff’s] seizures and included a small 
video…. The video was some sort of strobe light, with flashing circles and images…flying toward 
the screen. The video was “epileptogenic,” meaning it triggers seizures. Plaintiff did not suffer a 
seizure upon opening this video, however, because he quickly dropped the device.  
Two months later, on December 15, 2016, a Twitter user with the handle @jew_goldstein, replied 
to one of Plaintiff’s tweets. (When Plaintiff clicked on the notification button on twitter, the replies 
to his tweet immediately loaded, including the reply from @jew_goldstein. The tweet included (and 
immediately displayed) a Graphic Interchange Format (“GIF”) that contained an animated strobe 
image flashing at a rapid speed. In addition to the flashing images, the GIF contained the message 
“YOU DESERVE A SEIZURE FOR YOUR POSTS.” Upon seeing the rapidly flashing GIF, Plaintiff 
suffered a severe seizure. 
For reasons that will become clear, it is necessary to briefly discuss the physical reactions that led 
to Plaintiff’s seizure. Light comes in rays, or waves, comprised in part by photons. These waves 
sometimes reflect off objects and strike a person’s cornea, which focuses the light wave. The eye 
focuses the wave onto its retina, which through a process of visual phototransduction, converts the 
light wave into electrical impulses. That is, photons hit the retina and are converted into electrical 
signals. These electrical signals are then transmitted by the optic nerve to the visual cortex. Such 
electrical signals from strobing images can trigger seizures in certain individuals with epilepsy. So, 
Defendant intentionally caused photons to hit Plaintiff’s retina, causing Plaintiff to suffer a seizure. 
Plaintiff’s wife witnessed the seizure and, after caring for Plaintiff, called the police. According 
to information obtained as a result of the criminal investigation, Defendant, who lives in Maryland, 
operated the @jew_goldstein account. Defendant discussed with others his intent to harm Plaintiff 
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by causing a seizure. Defendant was arrested on March 17, 2017, and three days later a grand jury 
indicted him for the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.  
Plaintiff continued to suffer as a result of the December 15 seizure. He experienced another 
seizure in his sleep, and he had to take increased medication, which left him sedated and disabled 
during the holidays. He required assistance from his family to perform routine tasks, and was 
embarrassed, humiliated, and deeply upset as a result of this incident.  
With the criminal case against Defendant still pending, Plaintiff filed a civil case against 
Defendant in this Court on April 24, 2017. Plaintiff brought four claims: (I) battery, (II) assault, 
(III) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (IV) “purposeful infliction of bodily 
harm/prima facie tort under Texas law.”… [Under the rule of lex loci delicti,] the substantive tort 
law of the state where the wrong occurs governs. Plaintiff has alleged that he was harmed in Texas, 
and therefore the Court will apply the substantive tort law of Texas in analyzing Plaintiff’s claims…. 
Defendant has moved to dismiss Counts I and IV of Plaintiff’s complaint, and presents three 
arguments in support of that request. First, Defendant contends that Texas courts do not recognize 
a claim of civil battery, and instead only recognize a claim for assault. Second, Defendant argues that 
Plaintiff’s claim of battery fails because he has not alleged any physical contact. Third, Defendant 
asserts that the “wrong” claimed in Count IV has not yet been recognized as a tort in Texas and 
therefore it must be dismissed with prejudice…. 
a. Assault and Battery 
Defendant requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s first count of battery because, he argues, 
Texas does not recognize the tort of battery. Defendant is incorrect…. 
Texas courts’ reliance on the Texas penal code in civil cases, and the Texas penal code’s 
combination of common law assault (threatening another with imminent bodily injury) and 
common law battery (harmful or offensive touching), has resulted in a number of civil courts mixing 
them together under the term “assault.” Still, although the two torts are related, they are conceptually 
distinct. Assault is redress for threatened, but non-consummated, harmful touchings; battery is 
redress for actual harmful, or offensive, touchings. Texas courts have recognized private causes of 
action for both assault and battery for well over a century. 
So, the law is clear (even if the semantics are not). Whatever the label given to the cause of action, 
under Texas law a plaintiff can assert a cause of action for common law battery, i.e. for 
“intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury or intentionally or knowingly causing 
physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other 
will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1), (3). Insofar 
as Defendant’s argument is that Plaintiff cannot bring a battery claim at all under Texas law, 
Defendant is incorrect. 
Another reading of Defendant’s argument, however, is that Plaintiff cannot bring both an 
assault and a battery claim under Texas law. According to this argument, both causes of action are 
now melded into a single cause of action, “assault,” and although a plaintiff can recover for an 
intentional harmful or offensive touching, he cannot recover for both an intentional harmful or 
offensive touching and the threat of such a touching. Insofar as this is a proper reading of 
Defendant’s argument, it still fails. As Plaintiff’s complaint stands, he alleges that Defendant’s 
intentional tortious conduct a) caused him to suffer physical harm and b) put him in fear of 
immediate physical harm. Under Texas law, he can recover for both. If it turns out that he can 
only prove physical harm, or only apprehension of immediate harm, that does not mean it is 
improper to plead both torts in his complaint. Furthermore, at least at this early stage Plaintiff can 
plead as many alternative, or even inconsistent, causes of action and legal theories as he 
pleases. Ultimately, Texas recognizes both assault and battery and Plaintiff may plead both assault 
and battery. The Court will not dismiss Count I on these grounds. 
b. Battery by GIF 
Defendant next argues that, whatever the label, Plaintiff’s allegations do not amount to a civil 
battery under Texas law. The Court disagrees. 
CASES & CRITIQUE    23 
As an initial matter, the Court notes that however one characterizes Plaintiff’s claim, the facts as 
pled constitute some form of a tort. The fundamental purposes of our tort system are to deter 
wrongful conduct, shift losses to responsible parties, and fairly compensate deserving victims. So far 
as there is one central idea in tort law, it would seem that it is it that liability must be based upon 
conduct which is socially unreasonable. The common thread woven into all torts is the idea of 
unreasonable interference with the interests of others. The civil tort is a mechanism by which courts 
aid in the maintenance of a civil society, and as such offensive contacts, or those which are contrary 
to all good manners, need not be tolerated. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant sent Plaintiff an 
image with the intent to cause Plaintiff to have a seizure. Whatever exact name a legal scholar may 
put to it, that is a tort; it is conduct outside the bounds of a civil society, conduct that should be 
punished so as to deter its repetition, and conduct that causes a compensable harm. And although 
the exact contours of the tort lack perfect clarity, ultimately it qualifies as a battery. “The essence of 
the plaintiff’s grievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and 
intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18 cmt. c 
(1965). It is alleged that Defendant purposely acted to violate the dignity and health of the Plaintiff 
and did in fact so harm him. The novelty of the mechanism by which the harm was achieved does 
not make those actions any less a tort. 
Although the nation’s leading authority on tort law contends there may be “no necessity 
whatever that a tort have a name,” W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 1 at 3 (5th 
ed. 1988), in the first three counts of his complaint, Plaintiff has applied several to the tortious 
conduct he perceives here: battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. And, 
specifically, Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s “battery” claim. Therefore, it is through the 
lens of an alleged “battery” that the Court shall assess the validity of Plaintiff’s pleading. 
As explained above, Texas courts look to the statutory definition of criminal assault for the 
definition of a civil battery. Thus, in Texas, a battery is the intentional, knowing, or reckless causing 
of a bodily injury, or intentionally or knowingly causing “physical contact with another when the 
person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or 
provocative.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1), (3). Or, more simply, a battery is “the least touching 
of another person willfully and in anger, by the use of any part of the body of the party committing 
the offense.” Marshall v. AT & T, 117 F.3d 1417 (5th Cir. 1997). 
A battery undoubtedly requires some physical contact…. It is similarly well-established that the 
physical contact need not be with the physical body of the plaintiff, see, e.g., Fisher v. Carrousel Motor 
Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967) (grabbing a person’s plate in buffet line constituted a 
battery), and it need not be direct physical contact, see Prosser § 9 n.16 (citing examples such as 
“operating car so as to throw plaintiff from running board”). So, in order for a battery to occur, there 
must be some physical contact between something and the plaintiff or something attached to the 
plaintiff. 
If a person intentionally (or knowingly, or recklessly) causes another to come into contact with 
a harmful physical element, that is a battery under Texas law. In Hutchinson v. Brookshire Bros., for 
example, the plaintiff alleged that a store owner had asked a police officer to force the plaintiff to 
siphon gasoline from the plaintiff’s car (plaintiff had accidentally over-pumped). The Court found 
that because a reasonable jury could conclude that the store owner knew the officer would force 
plaintiff to siphon the gas, the plaintiff’s battery claim survived summary judgment. In U.S. v. 
Villegas-Hernandez, the Fifth Circuit, discussing Texas law, stated that the injury caused in a battery 
“could result from any number of acts such as making available to the victim a poisoned drink while 
reassuring him the drink is safe, or telling the victim he can safely back his car out while knowing 
an approaching car will hit the victim.” 
Here, Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant intentionally caused Plaintiff to come into 
contact with a harmful physical element (i.e., the strobe GIF), and that is a battery under Texas law. 
It is alleged that Defendant knew that Plaintiff would see the GIF, knew that its physical properties 
would cause him a seizure, and knew that a seizure would be physically harmful, or at least offensive 
or provocative. Not only did Defendant know these things, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant intended 
the exact harmful result that occurred. Plaintiff has stated a claim for battery under Texas law. 
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Defendant’s concern focuses on the medium of the contact, asserting that “there is no allegation 
in the Corrected Complaint of any physical contact between Plaintiff and Defendant.” But there is. 
Plaintiff has alleged that light waves emitted from the GIF touched Plaintiff’s retina, generated an 
electric signal, and caused a seizure. Taking, as the Court must, Plaintiff’s allegations as true, 
including his characterization of the science and Plaintiff’s physical condition, there was physical 
contact. 
Such contact can often be of an amorphous nature; it is not always accomplished by means of a 
solid, graspable object. According to the Supreme Court, “‘physical force’ is simply ‘force exerted by 
and through concrete bodies,’ as opposed to ‘intellectual force or emotional force.’” U.S. v. 
Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014). For example, courts around the Country have found that second-
hand smoke (i.e., causing a person to come into contact with harmful smoke) can constitute a 
battery. In Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697, 699 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1994), the court stated that “tobacco smoke, as particulate matter, has the physical properties 
capable of making contact.” Even less tangible than smoke is sound. Yet, a court in Georgia found a 
battery where the tortfeasor made a loud noise over the phone in order to harm the victim. This 
Court has stated in a prior case, applying Maryland law, that it is not unreasonable to infer that 
causing an electrical shock to someone may be regarded as a battery whether or not the tortfeasor 
ever laid a hand on the victim. 
Defendant here allegedly chose to use the electronic capabilities of a computer as a weapon—as 
a means of causing physical harm. Defendant’s tweet, activating certain harmful capabilities of the 
transmitting computer, converted the computer into a weapon to inflict physical injury. The 
computer and the tweet were no longer merely a mode of communication. Something more, and 
separate, from mere communication occurred[:] an offensive touching. And, conscious 
interpretation of the “message” was irrelevant to the offensive touching.1 The physical element that 
Defendant caused to come into contact with Plaintiff was something entirely outside either party’s 
mind. It was not words or pictures that would require conscious interpretation (i.e. an internal 
process) to cause an impact. The strobe GIF was a physical tool, one that would have the same impact 
on any person with Plaintiff’s condition. It would not have mattered if the GIF had displayed hateful 
words, words of kindness, certain colors or pictures, or only abstractions. What mattered was the 
physical nature of the light emitted from the GIF. The light, and not the emotional or intellectual 
impact of any accompanying message, caused a seizure, and it would not have caused a seizure if 
viewed by a person without epilepsy, regardless of whether they interpreted the tweet as mean-
spirited, frightening, or friendly. Effectively, and under the law, the scenario alleged is no different 
from that where a tortfeasor is alleged to have picked up a computer, thrown it at a Plaintiff 
(including one with or without an eggshell skull), and caused an impact that injured the Plaintiff’s 
brain. And, any message displayed on the computer’s screen at the instant of impact is irrelevant to 
the analysis of whether “battery” occurred….  
That no Texas case exists where a plaintiff was harmed by an epileptogenic GIF in a tweet is 
neither troubling nor surprising. The broad sweep of Texas tort precedents provides firm ground 
on which to find that this unique fact pattern, if proven, qualifies as “battery.”2  
c. Purposeful Infliction of Bodily Harm 
Finally, Defendant has moved to dismiss Count IV on the ground that it is a tort “not yet 
recognized under Texas law.” Plaintiff concedes that the tort has not been recognized in Texas, and 
asks the Court to dismiss the claim without prejudice. Defendant argues that because this tort has 
not been recognized in Texas, Plaintiff can prove no set of facts upon which relief could be granted, 
thus Count IV should be dismissed with prejudice. Again, the Court disagrees with Defendant. 
 
1 To be clear, Plaintiff’s conscious interpretation of the tweet is irrelevant to the physical touching and harm that it 
caused. How Plaintiff interpreted the message (i.e., “YOU DESERVE A SEIZURE FOR YOUR POSTS”) may be relevant to 
other aspects of this case, such as whether Defendant is liable for a civil assault, or for determining intent. 
2 Developments in the ongoing criminal case are instructive, even if they do not control. Defendant was charged with 
aggravated assault, and a Grand Jury indicted him on that charge. Aggravated assault in Texas is the commission of an assault 
with a deadly weapon.… The Grand Jury found that Defendant committed the harmful physical contact form of assault, and 
did so with a deadly weapon…. 
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The mere fact that a claim is novel does not defeat it. Defendant seems to concede that this is a 
developing area of the law, and not a foreclosed avenue for relief. He writes that the Texas courts 
have “not yet recognized” the tort, and presents the Court with no Texas case law that would prevent 
relief. So, as this is a developing area of the law, the Court will dismiss the count without prejudice. 
It is not the place of a federal court, particularly one in Maryland, to interfere with a developing 
body of state tort law in Texas. Therefore, with an eye alert to avoiding disregard of State law, the 
Court will not prevent Plaintiff from trying his hand in a different court, or at a different time, if he 
so chooses…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Harmful Hypos: Would it be battery to shine a laser in someone’s eye? How about using 
a sonic weapon to cause hearing loss? Can a beam of light or a sound wave really 
constitute a harmful or offensive contact?  




BEACH v. HANCOCK 
Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire (1853) 
Gilchrist, Justice: ã  
…[I]t appeared that the plaintiff and defendant, being engaged in 
an angry altercation, the defendant stepped into his office, which was at 
hand, and brought out a gun, which he aimed at the plaintiff in an 
excited and threatening manner, the plaintiff being three or four rods 
distant. The evidence tended to show that the defendant snapped the 
gun twice at the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff did not know whether 
the gun was loaded or not, and that, in fact, the gun was not loaded. 
The court ruled that the pointing of a gun, in an angry and 
threatening manner, at a person three or four rods distant, who was 
ignorant whether the gun was loaded or not, was an assault, though it 
should appear that the gun was not loaded, and that it made no 
difference whether the gun was snapped or not…. The jury…found a 
verdict for the plaintiff, [and] the defendant moved for a new trial… 
One of the most important objects to be attained by the enactment of laws and the institutions 
of civilized society is, each of us shall feel secure against unlawful assaults. Without such security 
society loses most of its value. Peace and order and domestic happiness, inexpressibly more precious 
than mere forms of government, cannot be enjoyed without the sense of perfect security. We have a 
right to live in society without being put in fear of personal harm. But it must be a reasonable fear 
of which we complain. And it surely is not unreasonable for a person to entertain a fear of personal 
injury, when a pistol is pointed at him in a threatening manner, when, for aught he knows, it may 
be loaded, and may occasion his immediate death. The business of the world could not be carried 
on with comfort, if such things could be done with impunity. We think the defendant guilty of an 
assault…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Ready, Aim, Fire! How far away was Hancock from Beach? Do you think it matters? 
2. Fear and Loathing in New Hampshire: The tort of battery clearly protects interests in 
bodily integrity. Can the same be said for assault? 
 
ã Jiuck, Hands up! (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0). 
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3. Comic Relief: An evil villain points a gun at three superheroes — Batman, who doesn’t 
fear death; Superman, who can’t be hurt by bullets; and The Flash, who can easily get 
out of the way. Which of them, if any, is likely to prevail on an assault claim? 
 
BROOKER v. SILVERTHORNE 
Supreme Court of South Carolina (1919) 
Hydrick, Justice:ã 
Defendant appeals from judgment for plaintiff for $2,000 
damages for mental anguish and nervous shock alleged to have been 
caused by abusive and threatening language addressed to plaintiff by 
defendant over the telephone. 
Plaintiff alleges: That on October 27, 1916, she was night 
operator at the telephone exchange at Barnwell. That defendant 
called the exchange over the telephone and asked for a certain 
connection, which she promptly tried to get for him, but, upon her 
failing to do so, he cursed and threatened her in an outrageous 
manner, saying to her: “You God damned woman! None of you 
attend to your business.” That she tried to reason with him, telling 
him that she had done all that she could to get the connection he 
wanted, but he continued to abuse and threaten her, saying to her: “You are a God damned liar. If I 
were there, I would break your God damned neck.” That the language and threat of defendant put 
her in great fear that he would come to the exchange and further insult her, and that she was so 
shocked and unnerved that she was made sick and unfit for duty, and had to take medicine to make 
her sleep. That for weeks afterwards, when defendant’s number would call, she would become so 
nervous that she could not answer the call. And that her nervous system was so shocked and wrecked 
that she suffered and continues to suffer in health, mind, and body on account of the abusive and 
threatening language addressed to her by defendant…. 
Although it cannot affect the decision, because the truth of the facts alleged is concluded by the 
verdict, it is nevertheless due to the defendant to say that he denied emphatically using the language 
attributed to him, and his denial was corroborated by the testimony of his wife and a lineman of the 
telephone company. Defendant testified, also, that, on hearing that plaintiff was offended, he went 
to her and told her that he did not intend to say anything to offend her, and did not remember 
having done so, and asked her what he had said that offended her, and she replied that he had spoken 
a little harshly to her; that he told her he did not remember having done so, but, if she thought so, 
he was very sorry, and she seemed to be satisfied with this apology. This conversation was not denied 
by plaintiff. 
The question is whether plaintiff stated or proved a cause of action. That question was decided 
in the negative in Rankin v. Railroad Co., 36 S.E. 997 (S.C. 1900). In that case, Mrs. Rankin alleged 
that the railroad company’s agents trespassed upon her premises, and were about to cut down some 
trees of great value and beauty, and when she approached them and requested them not to do so, 
the foreman of the gang “cursed her and ordered her to get away from there, or he would put her in 
the penitentiary, and threatened to strike her, she being an old woman, and otherwise maltreated 
and abused her to her great damage.”… The Court considered the complaint as having attempted 
to set forth two causes of action, one for trespass on the plaintiff’s property and the other for the 
abusive and threatening language. After showing that no cause of action for trespass was stated, the 
question whether an action would lie for the abusive and threatening language was considered, and 
it was held that it would not. On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment upon the reasoning of the 
Circuit Court, and said: “No assault upon the plaintiff is alleged, and mere words, under the 
circumstances stated, would not be civilly actionable.” 
The Circuit Court rested its conclusions in part upon…quotations from Cooley on Torts: 
 
ã Stanford Medical History Center, Switchboard Operators (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0). 
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An act or omission may be wrong in morals, or it may be wrong in law. It is 
scarcely necessary to say that the two things are not interchangeable. No 
government has undertaken to give redress whenever an act was found to be 
wrong, judged by the standard of strict morality; nor is it likely that any 
government ever will. A threat to commit an injury is also sometimes made a 
criminal offense, but it is not actionable private wrong. Many reasons may be 
assigned for distinguishing between this case and that of an assault, one of them 
being that the threat only promises a future injury, and usually gives ample 
opportunity to provide against it, while an assault must be resisted on the instant. 
But the principal reason, perhaps, is found in the reluctance of the law to give a 
cause of action for mere words. Words never constitute an assault, is a time-
honored maxim. Words may be thoughtlessly spoken; they may be 
misunderstood; they may have indicated to the person threatened nothing but 
momentary spleen or anger, though when afterwards reported by witnesses they 
seem to express deliberate malice and purpose to injure. Even when defamation 
is complained of, the law is very careful to require something more than 
expressions of anger, reproach, or contempt, before it will interfere; justly 
considering that it is safer to allow too much liberty than to interpose too much 
restraint. And comparing assaults and threats, another important difference is to 
be noted: In the case of threats, as has been stated, preventive remedies are 
available; but against an assault there are usually none beyond what the party 
assaulted has in his own power of physical resistance…. 
[W]hen it was said in the Rankin case that no action would lie for mere threats or abusive words 
spoken, the Court was careful to qualify the statement by confining it to the circumstances 
stated…[because] it is not absolutely true that no action will lie for threats. Blackstone says that 
injury may be committed “by threats and menaces of bodily hurt, through fear of which a man’s 
business is interrupted. A menace alone, without a consequent inconvenience, makes not the injury, 
but to complete the wrong there must be both of them together….” 3 Blackstone Commentaries 120. 
But the threat which causes the fear must be such as the law will recognize as adequate to produce 
the result. There must be just and reasonable ground for the fear; hence a vain or idle threat is not 
sufficient. It must be of such nature and made under such circumstances as to affect the mind of a 
person of ordinary reason and firmness, so as to influence his conduct; or it must appear that the 
person against whom it is made was peculiarly susceptible to fear, and that the person making the 
threat knew and took advantage of the fact that he could not stand as much as an ordinary person. 
If it should be conceded that the language of defendant contained a threat, it was not of such 
nature or made under such circumstances as to put a person of ordinary reason and firmness in fear 
of bodily hurt. And it is not alleged that plaintiff was not a person of ordinary reason and firmness 
and that defendant knew it; and, in the absence of such allegation, it will not be presumed. A person 
of ordinary reason and firmness should have known that the profane and vulgar language alleged to 
have been used by defendant was the result of a momentary fit of passion, caused by his failure to 
get the connection he asked for, and that he had no intention of doing or attempting to do plaintiff 
any bodily hurt. But the words used did not amount to a threat. Defendant said: “If I were there, I 
would break your…neck.” But he was not there, and plaintiff knew it; and there is nothing in what 
he said expressive of an intention to go there and injure plaintiff. Webster defines a “threat” as “the 
expression of an intention to inflict evil or injury on another.” The law dictionaries give practically 
the same definition. A threat therefore looks to the future. As Judge Cooley says, in the passage above 
quoted, “a threat only promises a future injury.” Here there was no expression of an intention to 
injure in the future, and therefore no threat. 
The language attributed to defendant—especially when used by a man to a woman—merits 
severest condemnation and subjects the user to the scorn and contempt of his fellow men. But it is 
not civilly actionable.… Judgment reversed. 
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QUESTIONS 
1. Be Careful What You Wish For: Silverthorne allegedly said: “If I were there, I would 
break your God damned neck.” The court said this wasn’t civilly actionable as assault. 
Can you think of any conditional or future threats that might have led to different results? 
2. Out of the Ordinary: The court notes that Brooker never alleged that she “was not a 
person of ordinary reason and firmness and that defendant knew it.” Would it have 
mattered if she had? Why? Should it? And what if a defendant can demonstrate that a 
plaintiff alleging assault is of “extraordinary” reason and firmness? Should such a 
plaintiff be barred from seeking relief? 
3. Gender Trouble I: Are the parties’ genders playing a role here? If so, how? 
 
VETTER v. MORGAN 
Court of Appeals of Kansas (1995) 
Briscoe, Judge: ã 
Laura Vetter appeals the summary judgment dismissal of her 
[assault claim] against Chad Morgan for injuries sustained in an 
automobile accident…. Vetter was injured when her van ran off 
the road after an encounter with a car owned by Morgan’s father 
and driven by Dana Gaither. Morgan and Jerrod Faulkner were 
passengers in the car. Vetter was alone at 1:30 or 1:45 a.m. when 
she stopped her van in the right-hand westbound lane of an 
intersection at a stoplight. Morgan and Gaither drove up beside 
Vetter. Morgan began screaming vile and threatening 
obscenities at Vetter, shaking his fist, and making obscene gestures in a violent manner. According to 
Vetter, Gaither revved the engine of the car and moved the car back and forth while Morgan was 
threatening Vetter. Vetter testified that Morgan threatened to remove her from her van and spat on 
her van door when the traffic light turned green. Vetter stated she was very frightened and thought 
Morgan was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. She was able to write down the license tag 
number of the car. Morgan stated he did not intend to scare, upset, or harm Vetter, but “didn’t really 
care” how she felt. He was trying to amuse his friends, who were laughing at his antics.  
When the traffic light changed to green, both vehicles drove forward. According to Vetter, after 
they had driven approximately 10 feet, the car driven by Gaither veered suddenly into her lane, and 
she reacted by steering her van sharply to the right. Vetter’s van struck the curb, causing her head to 
hit the steering wheel and snap back against the seat, after which she fell to the floor of the van. 
Morgan and Gaither denied that the car veered into Vetter’s lane, stating they drove straight away 
from the intersection and did not see Vetter’s collision with the curb. 
Vetter filed this action against Morgan and Gaither…. [The trial court concluded Morgan’s 
actions did not constitute assault.] Vetter argues the trial court erred in dismissing her assault claim 
against Morgan. Assault is defined as “an intentional threat or attempt, coupled with apparent 
ability, to do bodily harm to another, resulting in immediate apprehension of bodily harm. No 
bodily contact is necessary.” Taiwo v. Vu, 822 P.2d 1024 (Kan. 1991). 
The trial court concluded there was no evidence that Morgan threatened or attempted to harm 
Vetter, that he had no apparent ability to harm her because her van was locked and the windows 
were rolled up, and there was no claim of immediate apprehension of bodily harm. Vetter contends 
all of these conclusions involved questions of fact that should have been resolved by a jury. 
There was evidence of a threat. Vetter testified in her deposition that Morgan verbally threatened 
to take her from her van. Ordinarily, words alone cannot be an assault. However, words can 
constitute assault if together with other acts or circumstances they put the other in reasonable 
apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact with his person. 
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The record is sufficient to support an inference that Morgan’s threat and the acts and 
circumstances surrounding it could reasonably put someone in Vetter’s position in apprehension of 
imminent or immediate bodily harm. Morgan’s behavior was so extreme that Vetter could 
reasonably have believed he would immediately try to carry out his threat. It is not necessary that 
the victim be placed in apprehension of instantaneous harm. It is sufficient if it appears there will be 
no significant delay. 
The record also supports an inference that Morgan had the apparent ability to harm Vetter. 
Although Vetter’s van was locked and the windows rolled up, the windows could be broken. The 
two vehicles were only six feet apart, and Morgan was accompanied by two other males. It was late 
at night, so witnesses and potential rescuers were unlikely. Although Vetter may have had the ability 
to flee by turning right, backing up, or running the red light, her ability to prevent the threatened 
harm by flight or self-defense does not preclude an assault. It is enough that Vetter believed that 
Morgan was capable of immediately inflicting the contact unless prevented by self-defense, flight, 
or intervention by others. 
The trial court erred in concluding there was no evidence that Vetter was placed in apprehension 
of bodily harm. Whether Morgan’s actions constituted an assault was a question of fact for the jury…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Never Say Never: The court in Brooker says that words “never constitute an assault.” In 
what way does Vetter challenge this “time-honored maxim”? 
2. Assault by Tweet: Kelly tags Taylor on Twitter—“I’m gonna break your God damned 
neck, @TaylorK.” Drawing on Eichenwald, Brooker, and Vetter, could Kelly’s tweet be 
an actionable assault? What are your best arguments for either side? 





Nolan was an extra on the set of a movie about Thurgood Marshall—a great civil-rights lawyer 
(and later U.S. Supreme Court justice) who was often threatened as he took controversial cases in 
the Deep South. Nolan’s big scene depicted a time when Marshall was nearly snatched by a lynch 
mob. Nolan’s character was a painter who stood in a group of Black bystanders. Meanwhile, another 
extra named Trevor, who was white, saw one of the set props laying on the ground. It was a noose. 
During a break in filming, Trevor gleefully waived around the knotted rope and tossed it in Nolan’s 
direction. Nolan froze as he saw the noose fly through the air, land on his shoulder, and fall onto his 
foot, at which point he quickly kicked it away. Though Nolan wasn’t injured physically, he sued 
Trevor for both assault and battery. 
(a) Reacting to the assault claim, Trevor says “I mean, come on! I wasn’t going to lynch him, 
for crying out loud, nor could I have!” Does that argument persuade you? 
(b) Trevor also exclaims that he “didn’t mean to hit him!” How does this statement affect 
the assault claim? How about the battery claim? 
(c) Finally, Trevor bemoans that Nolan “didn’t even move to get out of the way, so it clearly 
wasn’t that big of a deal.” Is that a good argument? 
The following problem discusses lynching. 
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In re WHITE 
United States Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of Virginia (1982) 
Shelley, Judge: 
 …On September 10, 1977 Walter Calvin White, Jr. 
(White) shot Ralph Edward Davis (Davis) in the stomach 
with a handgun. White was arrested for the shooting and on 
November 29, 1978 the Circuit Court of the City of 
Richmond found him guilty of maiming Davis and 
sentenced him to serve five years in the state penitentiary. On 
February 26, 1980 Davis obtained a default judgment against 
White in the amount of $50,000.00 in the Circuit Court for 
the City of Richmond on the ground that White willfully and 
maliciously wounded Davis. White subsequently filed his petition in bankruptcy and Davis now asks 
this Court to declare White’s debt on account of that judgment nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 
On the day of the shooting Davis and his brother, Marvin W. Davis, were washing cars in front 
of their mother’s house on Fairmont Avenue in Richmond, Virginia. At the same time White, a 
neighbor who lives less than one block away on the same street, was having a conversation with 
William Tipton (Tipton). In that conversation White and Tipton continued an argument which had 
begun approximately one week earlier. White had obtained a gun in anticipation of seeing Tipton. 
White was carrying the pistol in a container on his motorcycle and pulled it out of the container 
during the course of that argument. 
When White pulled the gun Tipton mounted his motorcycle and sped away. White shot at 
Tipton as Tipton passed within twenty-five feet of Davis. He missed Tipton and the bullet hit Davis 
in the stomach. White fled the scene. 
White testified at the trial that he obtained the gun with the intent of scaring Tipton. He said 
that he drew the gun after Tipton insulted his mother but that he did not intentionally fire the gun. 
He claimed the gun went off when he tripped over a rock in the street. 
Davis and White did not know each other before the shooting incident. White said he pulled the 
gun intending to scare Tipton and that it accidently fired. This Court believes that White’s testimony 
that the gun accidently fired when he tripped over a rock is unworthy of belief. White testified that 
he obtained the gun earlier that week with another meeting with Tipton in mind. Although Davis 
was located almost a full block from White, the bullet hit him as Tipton passed within twenty-five 
feet of him. White clearly intended to shoot Tipton; however, he missed and the bullet hit Davis 
instead…. 
A debt incurred from an action based upon a willful and malicious injury by the debtor to 
another person may be nondischargeable in bankruptcy.… The word “willful” means “deliberate or 
intentional,” a deliberate and intentional act which necessarily leads to injury. Therefore, a wrongful 
act done intentionally, which necessarily produces harm and is without just cause or excuse, may 
constitute a willful and malicious injury. 
White committed the wrongful act when he shot at Tipton. The act was intentional and it 
produced an injury although not to the person White intended to injure. White’s actions cannot be 
excused solely because he missed his intended victim and instead hit someone else. The injury is not 
required to be directed against the victim, but includes any entity other than the intended victim. 
Under the doctrine of transferred intent one who intends a battery is liable for that battery when 
he unexpectedly hits a stranger instead of the intended victim. If one intentionally commits an 
assault or battery at another and by mistake strikes a third person, he is guilty of an assault and 
battery of the third person if defendant’s intention, in such a case, is to strike an unlawful blow, to 
injure some person by his act, and it is not essential that the injury be to the one intended. 
Virginia courts have adopted the doctrine of transferred intent reasoning that every person is 
liable for the direct, natural and probable consequence of his acts, and that everyone doing an 
unlawful act is responsible for all of the consequential results of that act. There need be no actual 
intent to injure the particular person who is injured…. 
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The evidence here clearly shows that the shooting was a wrongful act intentionally done and that 
Davis’s injuries resulted from that act. White deliberately, intentionally and maliciously fired the 
gun and injured Davis and the debt resulting from that act is nondischargeable in bankruptcy…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Stranger Danger: The court slips in the fact that Davis and White didn’t know each 
other before the shooting. Why bother to mention that? 
2. Close Shave: Why might it matter that the bullet passed within twenty-five feet of Tipton? 
3. Mix and Match: Tort law recognizes two main kinds of transferred intent: between 
people and between torts. Plaintiffs can also mix and match across people and torts. In 
re White is an example of intent transferring between people—White intended battery 
against Tipton but instead battered Davis (i.e., same tort, different victim). Can you 
think of hypotheticals in which intent transfers between torts (i.e., same victim, different 
tort)? How about between people and torts (i.e., different tort, different victim)?  
 
C. Consent 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B 
Consent Under Mistake, Misrepresentation or Duress (1965) 
(1) … [C]onsent to conduct of another is effective for all 
consequences of the conduct and for the invasion of any 
interests resulting from it. ã 
(2) If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to consent by 
[a] a substantial mistake concerning the  
[i] nature of the invasion of his interests or  
[ii] the extent of the harm to be expected from it  
and  
[b] the mistake is  
[i] known to the other or  
[ii] is induced by the other’s misrepresentation, 
the consent is not effective for the unexpected invasion or harm. 
(3) Consent is not effective if it is given under duress. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Invalidating Consent: Consent is a defense to battery and assault. If the plaintiff 
consented to an otherwise harmful or offensive contact, the contact is no longer tortious. 
But consent isn’t always valid. The Restatement envisions two distinct ways to invalidate 
a person’s consent. What are they? Can you think of examples of both types? 
2. Manipulation: Consent is ineffective if given under duress. But how are we to 
differentiate between persuasion and coercion? According to the Restatement, the parties’ 
age, sex, mental capacity, and relationship may all be significant, as are any “antecedent 
circumstances” and “[t]he type of conduct to which the other party consents.” 
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KOFFMAN v. GARNETT 
Supreme Court of Virginia (2003) 
Lacy, Justice:ã 
In this case we consider whether the trial court 
properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ second amended 
motion for judgment for failure to state causes of action 
for [assault and battery.]… 
In the fall of 2000, Andrew W. Koffman, a 13-year old 
middle school student at a public school in Botetourt 
County, began participating on the school’s football team. 
It was Andy’s first season playing organized football, and 
he was positioned as a third-string defensive player. 
James Garnett was employed by the Botetourt County 
School Board as an assistant coach for the football team 
and was responsible for the supervision, training, and instruction of the team’s defensive players. 
The team lost its first game of the season. Garnett was upset by the defensive players’ inadequate 
tackling in that game and became further displeased by what he perceived as inadequate tackling 
during the first practice following the loss. 
Garnett ordered Andy to hold a football and “stand upright and motionless” so that Garnett 
could explain the proper tackling technique to the defensive players. Then Garnett, without further 
warning, thrust his arms around Andy’s body, lifted him “off his feet by two feet or more,” and 
“slammed” him to the ground. Andy weighed 144 pounds, while Garnett weighed approximately 
260 pounds. The force of the tackle broke the humerus bone in Andy’s left arm. During prior 
practices, no coach had used physical force to instruct players on rules or techniques of playing 
football…. The disparity in size between Garnett and Andy was obvious to Garnett. Because of his 
authority as a coach, Garnett must have anticipated that Andy would comply with his instructions 
to stand in a non-defensive, upright, and motionless position. Under these circumstances, Garnett 
proceeded to aggressively tackle the much smaller, inexperienced student football player, by lifting 
him more than two feet from the ground and slamming him into the turf. According to the 
Koffmans’ allegations, no coach had tackled any player previously so there was no reason for Andy 
to expect to be tackled by Garnett, nor was Andy warned of the impending tackle or of the force 
Garnett would use. 
As the trial court observed, receiving an injury while participating in a tackling demonstration 
may be part of the sport. The facts alleged in this case, however, go beyond the circumstances of 
simply being tackled in the course of participating in organized football….  
The trial court held that the second amended motion for judgment was insufficient as a matter 
of law to establish causes of action for the torts of assault and battery. We begin by identifying the 
elements of these two independent torts. The tort of assault consists of an act intended to cause 
either harmful or offensive contact with another person or apprehension of such contact, and that 
creates in that other person’s mind a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery. The tort of 
battery is an unwanted touching which is neither consented to, excused, nor justified. Although 
these two torts “go together like ham and eggs,” the difference between them is “that between 
physical contact and the mere apprehension of it. One may exist without the other.” W. Page Keeton, 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 10 at 46. 
The Koffmans’ second amended motion for judgment does not include an allegation that Andy 
had any apprehension of an immediate battery. This allegation cannot be supplied by inference 
because any inference of Andy’s apprehension is discredited by the affirmative allegations that Andy 
had no warning of an imminent forceful tackle by Garnett. The Koffmans argue that a reasonable 
inference of apprehension can be found “in the very short period of time that it took the coach to 
lift Andy into the air and throw him violently to the ground.” At this point, however, the battery 
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alleged by the Koffmans was in progress. Accordingly, we find that the pleadings were insufficient 
as a matter of law to establish a cause of action for civil assault. 
The second amended motion for judgment is sufficient, however, to establish a cause of action 
for the tort of battery. The Koffmans pled that Andy consented to physical contact with players “of 
like age and experience” and that neither Andy nor his parents expected or consented to his 
“participation in aggressive contact tackling by the adult coaches.” Further, the Koffmans pled that, 
in the past, coaches had not tackled players as a method of instruction. Garnett asserts that, by 
consenting to play football, Andy consented to be tackled, by either other football players or by the 
coaches. 
Whether Andy consented to be tackled by Garnett in the manner alleged was a matter of fact. 
Based on the allegations in the Koffmans’ second amended motion for judgment, reasonable persons 
could disagree on whether Andy gave such consent. Thus, we find that the trial court erred in 
holding that the Koffmans’ second amended motion for judgment was insufficient as a matter of 
law to establish a claim for battery….  
Kinser, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
I agree with the majority opinion except with regard to the issue of consent as it pertains to the 
intentional tort of battery…. Absent fraud, consent is generally a defense to an alleged battery. In 
the context of this case, taking part in a game manifests a willingness to submit to such bodily 
contacts or restrictions of liberty as are permitted by its rules or usages. However, participating in a 
particular sport does not manifest consent to contacts which are prohibited by rules or usages of the 
game if such rules or usages are designed to protect the participants and not merely to secure the 
better playing of the game as a test of skill. 
The thrust of the plaintiffs’ allegations is that they did not consent to “Andy’s participation in 
aggressive contact tackling by the adult coaches” but that they consented only to Andy’s engaging 
“in a contact sport with other children of like age and experience.” They further alleged that the 
coaches had not previously tackled the players when instructing them about the rules and techniques 
of football. 
It is notable, in my opinion, that the plaintiffs admitted in their pleading that Andy’s coach was 
“responsible…for the supervision, training and instruction of the defensive players.” It cannot be 
disputed that one responsibility of a football coach is to minimize the possibility that players will 
sustain something more than slight injury while playing the sport. A football coach cannot be 
expected to extract from the game the body clashes that cause bruises, jolts and hard falls. Instead, a 
coach should ensure that players are able to withstand the shocks, blows and other rough treatment 
with which they would meet in actual play by making certain that players are in sound physical 
condition, are issued proper protective equipment, and are taught and shown how to handle 
themselves while in play. The instruction on how to handle themselves during a game should 
include demonstrations of proper tackling techniques. By voluntarily participating in football, Andy 
and his parents necessarily consented to instruction by the coach on such techniques. The alleged 
battery occurred during that instruction. 
The plaintiffs alleged that they were not aware that Andy’s coach would use physical force to 
instruct on the rules and techniques of football since neither he nor the other coaches had done so 
in the past. Surely, the plaintiffs are not claiming that the scope of their consent changed from day 
to day depending on the coaches’ instruction methods during prior practices. Moreover, they did 
not allege that they were told that the coaches would not use physical demonstrations to instruct the 
players. 
Additionally, the plaintiffs did not allege that the tackle itself violated any rule or usage of the 
sport of football. Nor did they plead that Andy could not have been tackled by a larger, physically 
stronger, and more experienced player either during a game or practice. Tackling and instruction 
on proper tackling techniques are aspects of the sport of football to which a player consents when 
making a decision to participate in the sport. 
In sum, I conclude that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead a claim for battery. We must 
remember that acts that might give rise to a battery on a city street will not do so in the context of 
the sport of football…. 
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QUESTIONS 
1. In the Blink of an Eye: The court concludes there was no assault, essentially because 
Andy had no warning before the tackle. But wouldn’t Andy have seen Coach Garnett 
coming toward him? Think carefully about why the court still felt that wasn’t enough, as 
well as any counterarguments you could have raised to save Andy’s assault claim. 
2. Scoping Consent: Austin needs surgery in his right ear. His surgeon, Dr. Fabiana, puts 
him under anesthesia and operates on his left ear. Has Dr. Fabiana committed battery? 
3. Hairdryer Treatment: The court mentions in passing that Andy’s team had lost its first 
game of the season and that Coach Garnett was upset. Why bring that up? Can you see 
how it could be legally relevant?
 
NEAL v. NEAL 
Supreme Court of Idaho (1994) 
Trout, Justice: ã 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing appellant’s 
action for damages allegedly suffered as a result of an 
adulterous relationship between her husband and his 
mistress…. In January of 1990, defendant Thomas A. Neal filed 
for divorce after his wife became aware that he was having an 
extramarital affair. Mary Neal, his wife, counterclaimed for 
divorce and also asserted tort claims against Thomas Neal and 
Jill LaGasse. The gravamen of the claims against Thomas Neal 
and Jill LaGasse center upon allegations of an adulterous 
relationship between them. Respondents moved to dismiss 
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The trial court 
treated the motion as one for summary judgment [and granted 
it]…. On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, 
we review the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
I. Recovery for Criminal Conversation 
Mary Neal seeks to recover for the respondents’ adulterous conduct which she contends is 
actionable under tort theories of criminal conversation, invasion of privacy, interference with 
contract, violation of a statutory duty of fidelity and negligence. All of these causes of action are 
based, factually, on the alleged adulterous affair between Thomas Neal and Jill LaGasse. In addition, 
although Mary Neal alleged the various torts cited, the focus of her argument throughout this case 
has been on her claim of criminal conversation. For these reasons, our discussion here centers on 
the criminal conversation issue. 
Mary Neal contends that criminal conversation remains a viable cause of action under Idaho 
law, thereby allowing her to maintain an action for interference with her exclusive sexual 
relationship with her husband. She further contends that this cause of action, based on her husband’s 
adultery, is grounded in I.C. § 32–901, which provides that a spouse has a marital duty of mutual 
respect, fidelity and support, and I.C. § 18–6001, which provides a criminal penalty for adultery. We 
address these issues in turn. 
Black’s Law Dictionary 373 (1990) defines “criminal conversation” as 
Sexual intercourse of an outsider with husband or wife, or a breaking down of the 
covenant of fidelity. Tort action based on adultery, considered in its aspect of a 
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civil injury to the husband or wife entitling him or her to damages; the tort of 
debauching or seducing of a wife or husband…. 
Criminal conversation was recognized in Idaho as a common law tort in Watkins v. Lord, 171 P. 
1133 (Ida. 1918). It has its genesis in the proposition that a husband has a property right in his wife 
and her services. This property interest in his wife could be “stolen” by a third party through 
adultery. Since a wife was her husband’s property and servant, her consent to the adultery was no 
defense to her husband’s suit against her paramour. Prosser comments on the basis of criminal 
conversation from Holdsworth, History of English Law 430 (1937), and states that “it was considered 
that she [the wife] was no more capable of giving a consent which would prejudice the husband’s 
interest than would his horse.” W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 124 (1971). This Court, and the courts of 
other states, have condemned this reasoning as archaic. O’Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693 (Ida. 
1986) (where this Court abolished the related cause of action of alienation of affections). 
Not since Watkins v. Lord was decided in 1918 has there been a reported case in Idaho involving 
criminal conversation. We believe that the change in societal views toward women which has 
occurred since then may have much to do with this total absence of case law. Here we take the 
opportunity presented us to hold that criminal conversation has been abolished as a cause of action 
in Idaho. 
The medieval rationale for the viability of the tort offers the very reason to abolish it. The notion 
that a wife is the property of her husband offends the right of every woman to be treated as an equal 
member of society. In abolishing criminal conversation we join a number of jurisdictions which 
have already done so. See Irwin v. Coluccio, 648 P.2d 458 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (listing some 
eighteen jurisdictions which have abolished, legislatively or judicially, criminal conversation)…. 
Finally, we reject Mary Neal’s contention that the adultery statute results in the codification of 
criminal conversation as a tort and that this Court cannot abolish the tort of criminal conversation 
absent legislative abolition of the crime of adultery. The existence of a criminal statute proscribing 
adultery seeks recompense for a public wrong. A civil action arises from the violation of a private 
right. The existence of the former does not prevent the elimination of the latter. In addition, the tort 
of criminal conversation has its origins in common law and this Court may modify such law. 
While this Court does not condone adultery and continues to hold marriage in the highest 
esteem, we are persuaded, for the reasons given, that the action pursued by Mary Neal does not serve 
to protect the institution of marriage…. [O]nce such cause of action is brought, it can only serve to 
add more tension to the family relationship. 
There are other reasons to abolish the tort of criminal conversation. Revenge, which may be a 
motive for bringing the cause of action, has no place in determining the legal rights between two 
parties. Further, this type of suit may expose the defendant to the extortionate schemes of the 
plaintiff, since it could ruin the defendant’s reputation. Deterrence is not achieved; the nature of the 
activities underlying criminal conversation, that is sexual activity, are not such that the risk of 
damages would likely be a deterrent. Finally, since the injuries suffered are intangible, damage 
awards are not governed by any true standards, making it more likely that they could result from 
passion or prejudice. These negative aspects, combined with the archaic basis for the tort, convince 
us that the ill effects of a suit for criminal conversation outweigh any benefit it may have…. 
II. Recovery for Battery 
Finally, Mary Neal contends that she has alleged a prima facie case of battery against Thomas 
Neal. Her battery claim is founded on her assertion that although she consented to sexual 
intercourse with her husband during the time of his affair, had she known of his sexual involvement 
with another woman, she would not have consented, as sexual relations under those circumstances 
would have been offensive to her. Therefore, she contends that his failure to disclose the fact of the 
affair rendered her consent ineffective and subjects him to liability for battery. 
Civil battery consists of an intentional, unpermitted contact upon the person of another which 
is either unlawful, harmful or offensive. The intent necessary for battery is the intent to commit the 
act, not the intent to cause harm. Further, lack of consent is also an essential element of battery. 
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Consent obtained by fraud or misrepresentation vitiates the consent and can render the offending 
party liable for a battery. 
The district court concluded that Thomas Neal’s failure to disclose the fact of his sexual 
relationship with LaGasse did not vitiate Mary Neal’s consent to engage in sexual relations with him, 
such consent being measured at the time of the relations. We do not agree with the district court’s 
reasoning. To accept that the consent, or lack thereof, must be measured by only those facts which 
are known to the parties at the time of the alleged battery would effectively destroy any exception 
for consent induced by fraud or deceit. Obviously if the fraud or deceit were known at the time of 
the occurrence, the “consented to” act would never occur. 
Mary Neal’s affidavit states that: “[I]f the undersigned had realized that her husband was having 
sexual intercourse with counterdefendant LaGasse, the undersigned would not have consented to 
sexual intercourse with counterdefendant Neal and to do so would have been offensive.” The district 
court opined that because the act was not actually offensive at the time it occurred, her later 
statements that it would have been offensive were ineffective. This reasoning ignores the possibility 
that Mary Neal may have engaged in a sexual act based upon a substantial mistake concerning the 
nature of the contact or the harm to be expected from it, and that she did not become aware of the 
offensiveness until well after the act had occurred. Mary Neal’s affidavit at least raises a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether there was indeed consent to the alleged act of battery. 
The district court also noted that Mary Neal’s later sexual relations with her husband after 
becoming aware of his infidelity, extinguished any offensiveness or lack of consent. The fact that she 
may have consented to sexual relations on a later occasion cannot be said to negate, as a matter of 
law, an ineffective consent to prior sexual encounters. Again, her affidavit raises a question of fact 
regarding whether these prior sexual encounters were nonconsensual. This factual issue precluded 
the dismissal of the battery claim by the district court…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Harmful or Offensive I: What’s Mary’s theory of why this was battery? Does she think 
the contact was harmful or offensive? 
2. Forgive and Forget: Does it matter that Mary had sex with Thomas after discovering the 
affair? What does the court say, and do you agree? Should it affect the legal 
determination of whether she consented? How about whether the contact was offensive? 
3. The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away: Why does the court feel empowered to 
abolish the tort of criminal conversation? 
 
McPHERSON v. McPHERSON 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (1998) 
Dana, Justice: 
Nancy McPherson appeals from the judgment of the Superior 
Court denying her claims for [assault and battery]. These claims 
arise from her claim that her husband, Steven McPherson, infected 
her with a sexually transmitted disease he acquired through an 
extramarital affair…. Nancy filed a complaint against Steven, after 
their divorce, claiming that he had infected her with…Human 
Papilloma Virus (HPV). Nancy alleged that Steven acquired HPV 
through a clandestine extramarital affair with Jane Doe. The 
complaint further alleges that Steven transmitted the disease to 
her, prior to their divorce, through sexual intercourse. 
Following a jury-waived trial, the court made the following 
factual findings: that Nancy “has been and may still be infected 
with HPV”; that it is more likely than not that she was infected with 
HPV through sexual contact with another individual; that Steven 
was the only sexual partner that Nancy has ever had; and that it was more likely than not that Steven 
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infected Nancy with HPV. The court also noted that, even though Steven did not then exhibit 
evidence of the HPV infection, “this is in no way proof that he is not now in a latent stage nor does 
it demonstrate or have any probative value as to whether or not he was a carrier” at the time he 
allegedly infected Nancy. The court found further that Steven had a sexual relationship with Doe, 
that he had sexual intercourse with Nancy after having intercourse with Doe, that he did not disclose 
his sexual relationship with Doe to Nancy, and that he took no steps to protect Nancy from possible 
infection with a sexually transmitted disease. Finally, the court found that Steven “did not know or 
have reason to know” that he might have HPV at the time he infected Nancy because he had no 
physical symptoms of HPV infection, he had no knowledge of any other partner having symptoms 
of HPV, and he had no medical diagnosis of any kind of a sexually transmitted disease…. 
The court found that no assault and battery occurred because the sexual intercourse between 
Steven and Nancy was consensual. She argues that her consent to have sexual intercourse with 
Steven was vitiated by the fact that he failed to inform her of his extramarital affair. 
One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot 
recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it. Consent may be vitiated, 
however by misrepresentation: 
If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to consent by a 
substantial mistake concerning the nature of the invasion of his interests or the 
extent of the harm to be expected from it and the mistake is known to the other 
or is induced by the other’s misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the 
unexpected invasion or harm. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892B(2) (1977). By way of illustration, the Restatement provides: 
“A consents to sexual intercourse with B, who knows that A is ignorant of the fact that B has a 
venereal disease. B is subject to liability to A for battery.” 
Nancy argues only that Steven misled her concerning his fidelity. Given the court’s finding that 
Steven neither knew nor should have known of his infection with HPV, however, Nancy cannot 
argue that Steven misled her “concerning the nature of the invasion of [her] interest or the extent of 
the harm to be expected” therefrom. If the defendant, ignorant of the fact that he was infected with 
a sexually transmitted disease, has sexual intercourse with the plaintiff, the defendant will not be 
liable, because the plaintiff consented to the kind of touch intended by the defendant, and both were 
ignorant of the harmful nature of the invasion. Thus, Steven may not be held liable for assault and 
battery…. Judgment affirmed. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Harmful or Offensive II: What’s Nancy’s theory of why this was battery? Does she think 
the contact was harmful or offensive? 
2. Sex Ed: The court stresses that there was no reason Steven should have known about his 
HPV infection. What if HPV infection rates had been unusually high in their town? 
3. Seeing the Forest: Now that we’ve covered several key concepts in the law of battery and 
assault, consider how the same facts might be relevant to multiple parts of the overall 
legal analysis. Can you see the possible overlap between facts establishing the 
offensiveness of a touching, the existence of implicit consent, the scope of consent, and 
the presence of duress? 
 
ANTI-VAX PROBLEM 
In June 2021, Taylor flew into Canada. Everyone seemed to think that COVID-19 was becoming 
a non-issue, especially with the rollout of vaccines in many parts of the world. The CDC had even 
lifted mask recommendations for vaccinated individuals. When Taylor landed in Montreal, she 
noticed a long line forming under a sign saying “COVID-19 Safety Procedures.” She knew that most 
countries require travelers to take some sort of precautionary steps, so she joined the queue. As 
Taylor reached the front of the line, a man in a white coat said, “Bonjour-Hi! Roll up your sleeve 
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and hold out your arm, s’il vous plaît.” She did as he said, and the man injected her with the COVID-
19 vaccine. Taylor urges that she didn’t want the vaccine and sues for battery. 
(a) Does Taylor have a decent battery claim? Does the man in the white coat have a defense? 
(b) What if the sign had instead said “Tourist Information and Services”? 
(c) Imagine, instead, that plain-clothes Canadian agents were planted in the middle seat of 
each row of planes flying into Montreal. One of the agents, Jean-Guy, sat next to Taylor. 
They made small talk, and Jean-Guy, as he was trained to do, convinced Taylor of the 
benefits of the COVID-19 vaccine. After Taylor receives her shot from the man in the 
white coat, she sees Jean-Guy walk out of a nearby door labeled “authorized personnel 
only.” Ever suspicious of authority figures, Taylor decides to sue for battery and argue 
that she didn’t freely give consent. What result? 
 
D. Defense of People & Property 
HAEUSSLER v. De LORETTO 
California Court of Appeals (1952) 
Vallee, Justice: ã 
[Plaintiff appeals a judgment in favor of defendant] for 
damages for assault and battery…. [O]n May 21, 1950, 
about 10:30 p.m., plaintiff went to the home of defendant, a 
neighbor, to inquire about his dog which was missing and 
which frequently had gone to defendant’s home. The dog 
had been the subject of disagreement between the wives of 
the parties on several previous occasions. When defendant, 
in response to plaintiff’s knock, opened the door, the dog 
ran out from inside the house. Defendant testified that 
plaintiff immediately started talking in a loud tone of voice, told him he did not want defendant or 
his wife to feed the dog or keep it at their house; that plaintiff kept “waving his hands, and while he 
talked, his face was pretty flushed and he was pretty excited, like he had been drinking, and he kept 
arguing with me and one word led to another and I don’t know the man, but I do know of him. I 
know he had trouble with the Teamsters’ Union and [he] beat up a couple of friends of mine, and I 
got a little afraid, and towards the end, after I had asked him to go three times, and he kept waving 
his hands, I thought he was going to strike me, and I struck him or pushed him, and I went in and 
closed the door.” Plaintiff called the police but no arrest was made nor was any criminal action had. 
The [trial] court found that plaintiff precipitated the argument; defendant ordered plaintiff to 
leave his premises; plaintiff advanced threateningly toward defendant; defendant struck him once; 
two of plaintiff’s teeth were loosened, necessitating dental care; defendant used reasonable force in 
defense of himself and in removing plaintiff from his premises; plaintiff failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that defendant used or attempted to use wilful and unlawful force upon 
the person of plaintiff. 
The issue of self-defense was pleaded by defendant and litigated. The determination of which of 
the two parties precipitated the fight, and whether defendant acted in self-defense, and whether in 
so doing he used more force than was reasonably necessary under the circumstances, were questions 
for the trier of fact. One who is involved in an altercation with another has the right to use such force 
as is necessary to protect himself from bodily injury, and the question of the amount of force 
justifiable under the circumstances of a particular case is also one for the trier of fact. As the court 
found that defendant used reasonable force in defense of himself, it necessarily follows the force 
used was not wilful or unlawful and that plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proof. Since the 
conflicts in the evidence were resolved in defendant’s favor, and the foregoing narration of the 
evidence supports the findings, this court may not disturb the judgment. Affirmed. 
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QUESTIONS 
1. The Logic of Self-Defense: How is the availability of self-defense as a legal defense 
consistent with the goals of tort law? How is it inconsistent? 
2. Factual Findings: The court in Haeussler recounts what happened in great detail. Facts 
are always important in tort law, but detailed factual findings can be particularly crucial 
in judging self-defense. The factfinder—usually the jury, though here the trial judge—
must determine whether the defendant actually and reasonably believed it was necessary 
to injure another to avoid injury that was imminent, and that they used no more force 
than reasonably necessary under the circumstances. Paying attention to each italicized 
word or phrase in that standard, which facts were important? 
3. But They Started It! If you provoke a fight that then leads you to use force in self-
defense, should you be allowed to escape liability for battery? 
 
KATKO v. BRINEY 
Supreme Court of Iowa (1971) 
Moore, Chief Justice: ã 
The primary issue presented here is whether an owner may protect 
personal property in an unoccupied boarded-up farm house against 
trespassers and thieves by a spring gun capable of inflicting death or serious 
injury. We are not here concerned with a man’s right to protect his home 
and members of his family. Defendants’ home was several miles from the 
scene of the incident to which we refer infra. 
Plaintiff’s action is for damages resulting from serious injury caused by 
a shot from a 20-gauge spring shotgun set by defendants in a bedroom of an 
old farm house which had been uninhabited for several years. Plaintiff and 
his companion, Marvin McDonough, had broken and entered the house to 
find and steal old bottles and dated fruit jars which they considered antiques. 
At defendants’ request plaintiff’s action was tried to a jury consisting of residents of the 
community where defendants’ property was located. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and 
against defendants for $20,000 actual and $10,000 punitive damages…. 
Most of the facts are not disputed. In 1957 defendant Bertha L. Briney inherited her parents’ 
farm land in Mahaska and Monroe Counties. Included was an 80-acre tract in southwest Mahaska 
County where her grandparents and parents had lived. No one occupied the house thereafter. Her 
husband, Edward, attempted to care for the land. He kept no farm machinery thereon. The 
outbuildings became dilapidated. For about 10 years, 1957 to 1967, there occurred a series of 
trespassing and housebreaking events with loss of some household items, the breaking of windows 
and “messing up of the property in general.” The latest occurred June 8, 1967, prior to the event on 
July 16, 1967 herein involved. 
Defendants through the years boarded up the windows and doors in an attempt to stop the 
intrusions. They had posted “no trespass” signs on the land several years before 1967. The nearest 
one was 35 feet from the house. On June 11, 1967 defendants set “a shotgun trap” in the north 
bedroom. After Mr. Briney cleaned and oiled his 20-gauge shotgun, the power of which he was well 
aware, defendants took it to the old house where they secured it to an iron bed with the barrel 
pointed at the bedroom door. It was rigged with wire from the doorknob to the gun’s trigger so it 
would fire when the door was opened. Briney first pointed the gun so an intruder would be hit in 
the stomach but at Mrs. Briney’s suggestion it was lowered to hit the legs. He admitted he did so 
“because I was mad and tired of being tormented” but “he did not intend to injure anyone.” He gave 
no explanation of why he used a loaded shell and set it to hit a person already in the house. Tin was 
nailed over the bedroom window. The spring gun could not be seen from the outside. No warning 
of its presence was posted. 
 
ã Susanne Nilsson, Abandoned Barn (CC BY-SA 2.0). 
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Plaintiff lived with his wife and worked regularly as a gasoline station attendant in Eddyville, seven 
miles from the old house. He had observed it for several years while hunting in the area and 
considered it as being abandoned. He knew it had long been uninhabited. In 1967 the area around 
the house was covered with high weeds. Prior to July 16, 1967 plaintiff and McDonough had been to 
the premises and found several old bottles and fruit jars which they took and added to their collection 
of antiques. On the latter date about 9:30 p.m. they made a second trip to the Briney property. They 
entered the old house by removing a board from a porch window which was without glass. While 
McDonough was looking around the kitchen area plaintiff went to another part of the house. As he 
started to open the north bedroom door the shotgun went off striking him in the right leg above the 
ankle bone. Much of his leg, including part of the tibia, was blown away. Only by 
McDonough’s assistance was plaintiff able to get out of the house and after crawling some distance was 
put in his vehicle and rushed to a doctor and then to a hospital. He remained in the hospital 40 days. 
Plaintiff’s doctor testified he seriously considered amputation but eventually the healing process 
was successful. Some weeks after his release from the hospital plaintiff returned to work on crutches. 
He was required to keep the injured leg in a cast for approximately a year and wear a special brace 
for another year. He continued to suffer pain during this period. 
There was undenied medical testimony plaintiff had a permanent deformity, a loss of tissue, and 
a shortening of the leg…. [He] incurred $710 medical expense, $2,056.85 for hospital service, $61.80 
for orthopedic service and $750 as loss of earnings. In addition thereto the trial court submitted to 
the jury the question of damages for pain and suffering and for future disability. 
Plaintiff testified he knew he had no right to break and enter the house with intent to steal bottles 
and fruit jars therefrom. He further testified he had entered a plea of guilty to larceny in the 
nighttime of property of less than $20 value from a private building. He stated he had been fined $50 
and costs and paroled during good behavior from a 60-day jail sentence. Other than minor traffic 
charges this was plaintiff’s first brush with the law. On this civil case appeal it is not our prerogative 
to review the disposition made of the criminal charge against him. 
The main thrust of defendants’ defense in the trial court and on this appeal is that “the law 
permits use of a spring gun in a dwelling or warehouse for the purpose of preventing the unlawful 
entry of a burglar or thief.”… In the statement of issues the trial court stated plaintiff and his 
companion committed a felony when they broke and entered defendants’ house. [The trial court 
instructed the jury that the property owners were not permitted to use excessive force, including 
force likely to cause death or great bodily harm, to protect their property, unless it would prevent 
violent felonies that themselves would endanger human life. The instructions explained that 
breaking and entering did not rise to this level of violent felony.]…  
The overwhelming weight of authority…supports the trial court’s statement of the applicable 
principles of law…. Restatement of Torts, section 85, page 180, states:  
The value of human life and limb, not only to the individual concerned but also 
to society, so outweighs the interest of a possessor of land in excluding from it 
those whom he is not willing to admit thereto that a possessor of land has, as is 
stated in § 79, no privilege to use force intended or likely to cause death or serious 
harm against another whom the possessor sees about to enter his premises or 
meddle with his chattel, unless the intrusion threatens death or serious bodily 
harm to the occupiers or users of the premises…. A possessor of land cannot do 
indirectly and by a mechanical device that which, were he present, he could not 
do immediately and in person. Therefore, he cannot gain a privilege to install, for 
the purpose of protecting his land from intrusions harmless to the lives and limbs 
of the occupiers or users of it, a mechanical device whose only purpose is to inflict 
death or serious harm upon such as may intrude, by giving notice of his intention 
to inflict, by mechanical means and indirectly, harm which he could not, even 
after request, inflict directly were he present. 
In Volume 2, Harper and James, The Law of Torts, section 27.3, pages 1440, 1441, this is found:  
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The possessor of land may not arrange his premises intentionally so as to cause 
death or serious bodily harm to a trespasser. The possessor may of course take 
some steps to repel a trespass. If he is present he may use force to do so, but only 
that amount which is reasonably necessary to effect the repulse. Moreover if the 
trespass threatens harm to property only—even a theft of property—the possessor 
would not be privileged to use deadly force, he may not arrange his premises so 
that such force will be inflicted by mechanical means. If he does, he will be liable 
even to a thief who is injured by such device….  
The legal principles stated by the trial court in [its] instructions…are well established and 
supported by the authorities cited and quoted supra. There is no merit in defendants’ objections and 
exceptions thereto…. 
Larson, Justice, dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent, first, because the majority wrongfully assumes that by installing a spring 
gun in the bedroom of their unoccupied house the defendants intended to shoot any intruder who 
attempted to enter the room. Under the record presented here, that was a fact question. Unless it is 
held that these property owners are liable for any injury to an intruder from such a device regardless 
of the intent with which it is installed, liability under these pleadings must rest upon two definite 
issues of fact, i.e., did the defendants intend to shoot the invader, and if so, did they employ 
unnecessary and unreasonable force against him?… 
[The jury should have been instructed that it could not impose liability unless it found the 
defendants intended to kill or seriously injure an intruder by setting up the spring gun. A reasonable 
jury could have found that such intent was lacking because of testimony claiming the gun was only 
set up to scare intruders.] 
In the case at bar the plaintiff was guilty of serious criminal conduct, which event gave rise to his 
claim against defendants. Even so, he may be eligible for an award of compensatory damages which 
so far as the law is concerned redresses him and places him in the position he was prior to sustaining 
the injury. The windfall he would receive in the form of punitive damages is bothersome to the 
principle of damages, because it is a response to the conduct of the defendants rather than any 
reaction to the loss suffered by plaintiff or any measurement of his worthiness for the award. 
When such a windfall comes to a criminal as a result of his indulgence in serious criminal conduct, 
the result is intolerable and indeed shocks the conscience. If we find the law upholds such a result, the 
criminal would be permitted by operation of law to profit from his own crime…. We cannot in good 
conscience ignore the conduct of the plaintiff. He does not come into court with clean hands, and 
attempts to make a claim to punitive damages in part on his own criminal conduct. In such 
circumstances, to enrich him would be unjust, and compensatory damages in such a case itself would 
be a sufficient deterrent to the defendant or others who might intend to set such a device…. The 
admonitory function of the tort law is adequately served where the compensatory damages claimed 
are high and the granted award itself may act as a severe punishment and a deterrence. In such a case 
as we have here there is no need to hold out the prospect of punitive damages as an incentive to sue 
and rectify a minor physical damage such as a redress for lost dignity…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. The Underlying Tort: Did Briney commit a battery? Did he have the requisite intent? 
How could Katko rely on Garratt v. Dailey to support his claim? Even if there wasn’t a 
battery, was there an assault? 
2. Self-Help: If the spring gun wasn’t a permissible option, what else could Briney have 
done to protect his property? Is there anything he could have done with the gun that 
would have been constituted reasonable force? 
3. Unclean Hands: Should it matter that Katko was committing a crime when he was shot? 
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E. False Imprisonment 
FOJTIK v. CHARTER MEDICAL CORP. 
Court of Appeals of Texas (1999) 
Chavez, Justice: ã 
Felix Fojtik appeals from a…summary judgment entered 
against him on his claim against Charter Medical Corporation. 
Fojtik had brought a false imprisonment cause of 
action against Charter arising from his stay at a Charter 
hospital where he was treated for alcoholism…. We affirm the 
judgment of the trial court…. 
Fojtik’s admission to Charter was preceded by an 
“intervention,” where Dorrill Nabours and Valerie Bullock 
from Charter, along with a group of Fojtik’s family and friends, confronted him and told him that 
he needed to go through an inpatient treatment at Charter for alcohol abuse. Fojtik’s medical records 
indicate that he told Charter staff he had admitted himself to Charter because those conducting the 
“intervention” had told him that, if he did not voluntarily admit himself, they would have him 
committed to the hospital and have him brought in wearing handcuffs. When admitted, Fojtik was 
angry about being at Charter and refused to be photographed or to agree to permit Charter to 
contact him after he left the treatment program. While at the hospital Fojtik made several requests 
for a “pass” permitting him to leave the Charter facility. His initial requests were denied on the 
ground that he was not “eligible” for a pass until he was further into his stay. Fojtik expressed his 
opinion that he was getting a “raw deal” because he was “locked up and couldn’t get away.” Later 
Fojtik was granted passes for a few hours at a time, and always returned to Charter voluntarily and 
on time. Fojtik explained that he had vowed to follow all of the rules at Charter. Although nothing 
in the record explains the reason Fojtik made this “vow,” he argues on appeal that he had decided to 
follow all the rules only because he hoped that obedient behavior might speed his release. 
Charter produced summary judgment evidence that Fojtik was free to leave at any time. Charter 
employees explained that, although they used a system of “passes” and preferred to follow certain 
procedures when patients left the hospital, if a patient insisted on leaving without following Charter 
procedures, Charter would permit the patient to leave. Charter also refers us to Fojtik’s admission 
documents, which indicate that he consented to inpatient treatment…. 
The elements of a false imprisonment cause of action are: (1) willful detention by the defendant, 
(2) without consent of the detainee, and (3) without authority of law. A detention may be 
accomplished by violence, by threats, or by any other means that restrain a person from moving 
from one place to another. Where it is alleged that a detention is effected by a threat, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the threat was such as would inspire in the threatened person a just fear of 
injury to his person, reputation, or property. Threats to call the police are not ordinarily sufficient 
in themselves to effect an unlawful imprisonment. In determining whether such threats are 
sufficient to overcome the plaintiff’s free will, factors such as the relative size, age, experience, sex, 
and physical demeanor of the participants may be considered…. 
Although Fojtik was not physically restrained, he alleges that he was detained against his will by 
threats that, if he did not submit to his detention, he would be forcibly committed and “brought in 
in handcuffs.” Fojtik also contends that Charter used “other means” in addition to threats of 
commitment in order to restrain him. We first consider whether the evidence raises a question of 
fact regarding whether Fojtik was restrained by threats. 
A review of false imprisonment case law is instructive. In Black v. Kroger, an eighteen year old 
woman with a tenth grade education and a two-year-old daughter was accused by her employers of 
stealing. She was led into a small, windowless room lit by bare light bulbs, where the store manager 
and another man who worked for “Kroger Security” were waiting. She was told repeatedly that they 
knew she had been stealing, and that if she did not admit to stealing they would handcuff her and 
take her to jail. She testified that she made a false confession, explaining “I just had it in my head 
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that they were going to put me in jail no matter what I did, and I wasn’t going to see my little girl for 
a long, long time.” The court noted the woman’s lack of business experience and the harsh and 
intimidating nature of her questioning. The court held that under these facts the jury could have 
reasonably concluded that the threats to the woman intimidated her to the point where she was not 
free to leave and was unreasonably detained. 
Skillern & Sons, Inc. v. Stewart presents a similar set of facts. A female employee was accused of 
stealing. She was led by the arm to a room where two men she had never met beat on a desk while telling 
her “we have the goods on you…we know you’ve been stealing money.” She was threatened with 
imprisonment, and told that she could not leave until she wrote a confession. She managed to leave, but 
was ordered back, and again told that she would either sign a confession or she would go to jail, but that 
she could not leave without confessing. When she tried to stand up she was physically pushed back into 
a chair by her accusers. These facts were held to support a recovery for false imprisonment. 
In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Amburn, the evidence was held insufficient to support a finding that 
the plaintiff was falsely imprisoned. In this case as well, an employee was led to a secluded room 
where others were waiting to accuse him of theft. The employee’s path to the door, if he had desired 
to leave, was not blocked. The only physical contact between the employee and his accusers was a 
handshake. When the employee denied stealing anything he was accused of lying and threatened 
with jail. The employee spent thirty to forty minutes with his accusers. The court held that, where 
there is nothing else particularly overbearing about this kind of meeting, threats of imprisonment 
are not enough to establish a claim for false imprisonment, and the court reversed the jury’s verdict 
in the plaintiff’s favor. 
In Randall’s Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, the plaintiff was a store employee accused of stealing. 
She was told to either wait in an office or to work on a volunteer project in a particular area. She 
waited in the office, but left twice and returned each time. The Texas Supreme Court rejected the 
plaintiff’s contention that the store management had impliedly threatened her person, because no 
one was guarding her and she had in fact left the office twice. Summary judgment in favor of the 
store on the employee’s false imprisonment claim was upheld. 
In evaluating Fojtik’s claim of false imprisonment, the issue is essentially this: to what extent 
must plaintiffs insist on their freedom and have it denied to them before they can recover for false 
imprisonment? Under some circumstances, a combination of the plaintiff’s vulnerability and 
oppressive circumstances permit recovery, even when the plaintiffs does not actually resist their 
detention. Comparing the facts of this case to previous reported cases, however, indicates that this 
is not one of those cases. None of the factors that are considered in evaluating whether threats are 
sufficient to overcome the plaintiff’s free will, i.e., the relative size, age, experience, sex, and physical 
demeanor of the participants, weigh in Fojtik’s favor. Fojtik was a forty-five-year-old man who had 
run several businesses. He was not a young, inexperienced woman, like the plaintiff in Black. He was 
not physically restrained, like the plaintiff in Skillern. Although he was threatened with the police, 
there were no other factors adding to the intimidating effect of those threats, and, as 
in Amburn, such threats, standing alone, are not enough to establish false imprisonment. Fojtik left 
and voluntarily returned, as the plaintiff did in Johnson, where the plaintiff’s actions were held to 
negate her false imprisonment theory. 
Fojtik contends that his frequent comments at Charter about being “locked up” and his generally 
uncooperative attitude are evidence that he did not consider himself free to leave. While it may be 
true that Fojtik considered himself restrained, the issue is not Fojtik’s subjective interpretation of his 
situation, but rather whether he had a just fear of injury. The facts of this case do not raise a fact issue 
on whether Fojtik had a “just fear” of injury. The record before us indicates that, while Fojtik certainly 
complained about being at Charter, he never insisted that he be permitted to leave. As discussed 
above, there is nothing in this case to suggest that Fojtik was a person whose weakness or susceptibility 
to intimidation might excuse his failure to insist on leaving when he felt he was falsely imprisoned. 
Aside from threats of legal commitment, the “other means” of restraint identified by Fojtik are: 
(1) constantly telling him that he was an alcoholic and treating him as though he were, and 
(2) permitting him to leave on temporary passes. Appellant’s argument appears to be that these 
methods lessened his will to insist on being released. We do not believe that such trifling matters as 
these constitute restraint. Treating Fojtik as an alcoholic did not restrain him; if it contributed to his 
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ongoing presence at the Charter hospital, it did so by persuading Fojtik that he did have a problem 
with alcohol that should be addressed, not by any actual restraint. The fact that Charter 
permitted Fojtik to leave on passes undermines his claim for false imprisonment rather than 
supporting it…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Stereotypes: Detentions may be accomplished through violence, threats, or other means 
of restraint. What types of threats are legally sufficient? What factors are considered? 
How might characteristics like gender or race become relevant? Should they be? 
2. Supermarket Sweep: Map out the features of Black, Skillern, Safeway, Randall’s, and 
Fojtik—the reason for the detention, the nature of the explicit or implicit threat, the 
characteristics of the people involved, and the courts’ ultimate conclusions. Can you 
discern a logic tying these cases together? Or is each court just making it up on the fly? 
3. Blissful Ignorance: Some states require plaintiffs claiming false imprisonment to show 
that they were aware of their confinement, while other states don’t. Which states have 
the better rule? Why? 
 
GRANT v. STOP-N-GO MARKET OF TEXAS, INC. 
Court of Appeals of Texas (1999) 
O’Connor, Justice: ã 
Gerald Grant, the appellant, sued Stop-N-Go Market of Texas, Inc., 
the appellee, for false imprisonment…. The trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Stop-N-Go. We reverse and remand…. 
The elements of false imprisonment are (1) a willful detention, (2) 
without consent, and (3) without authority of law. Stop-N-Go argues it 
negated the first two elements of Grant’s claim because it established 
Grant was not wilfully detained without his consent. Stop-N-Go argues 
Grant chose to remain in the store, and he could have left if he so desired. 
In the alternative, Stop-N-Go argues it negated the third element of a 
false imprisonment claim because its actions were authorized by law 
under Chapter 124 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 
1. The Summary Judgment Evidence 
…The summary judgment evidence is summarized as follows. 
Grant’s Deposition Testimony 
In his deposition, Grant said he went to the Stop-N-Go store with his girlfriend. His girlfriend 
stayed in the car, which was parked in front of the door to the store. Grant paid for a can of beer, 
and then decided he wanted to buy some potato chips. He left the bag with the can of beer on the 
counter, and picked out two bags of potato chips which were marked on sale, two for 99 cents. Grant 
returned to the clerk and laid both bags of potato chips on the counter along with a one dollar bill. 
The store clerk rang up the chips at 69 cents each. Grant told the clerk that the chips were on 
sale. The store clerk said something to Grant, but Grant did not understand what was said because 
the clerk spoke with a heavy foreign accent. The store clerk and Grant went back to the chip display. 
The clerk told Grant that the chips he selected were not on sale, but that another brand was on sale. 
Although Grant thought the clerk was wrong, he decided to buy the brand that the clerk said was on 
sale because he was in a hurry. 
As the clerk began to total the price for the two bags of chips, Grant noticed someone leaning 
through the window of his car and apparently talking to his girlfriend. The appellant became 
concerned for his girlfriend because he did not recognize the person. He went to the door to make 
sure she was alright. As Grant walked to the door, he picked up the one dollar bill which he had 
 
ã James Offer, CCTV Heads – d*base (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0). 
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previously laid on the counter. Grant opened the door to the store with his right hand and held the 
dollar bill in his left hand. After determining that the person leaning on his car was an acquaintance, 
Grant returned to the counter, paid for the two bags of chips, and began to walk out of the store. As 
he walked away from the counter, Grant told the clerk that he (the clerk) needed to learn his job 
better, a reference to the verbal altercation concerning the price of the chips. 
Just as Grant reached the door, the store manager, Calhoun, came from the back of the store, 
grabbed him by the arm, and said words to the effect, “he (the clerk) is doing his job well, let’s talk 
about the cigarettes that you stole.” Grant said he was pulled back when Calhoun grabbed his arm. 
When Calhoun made the accusation against Grant, his voice was loud enough that all the patrons 
in the store heard what he was saying. Calhoun said words to the effect, “everything was on a 
surveillance videotape and there is nothing to talk about.” 
Grant said Calhoun went behind the counter and asked the store clerk three times what it was 
that Grant had stolen. The clerk did not respond until Calhoun asked if a pack of cigarettes was on 
the counter, to which the clerk responded affirmatively. Calhoun repeated his accusation that Grant 
stole a pack of cigarettes and passed them through the door. 
Grant tried to explain to Calhoun that he did not steal any cigarettes. Grant said Calhoun told 
him to shut up. Grant said he got real quiet after Calhoun told him to shut up because he was afraid. 
After Calhoun grabbed him and accused him of stealing, Grant felt he could not leave. He thought 
if he did leave, the police would come looking for him. 
Calhoun’s Affidavit 
In his affidavit, Calhoun said he was in the back room of the store where a monitor for the store’s 
surveillance camera was located. On the monitor, he saw Grant pick up something from the counter 
which appeared to him to be a pack of cigarettes. Calhoun said Grant went to the door and stepped 
at least part way outside, while still holding the object in his hand. Calhoun said a car was parked 
directly in front of the door to the store. He then saw Grant return to the counter and complete his 
purchase. However, Calhoun did not see Grant return the item that he picked up from the counter. 
Calhoun said he left the back room and approached Grant as he was leaving the store because, 
after watching the monitor, he believed Grant had passed a pack of cigarettes out the door. He put 
his hand on Grant’s arm to get his attention, and then he asked Grant about the cigarettes he thought 
were stolen. Calhoun said his hand was only on Grant’s arm for a few seconds because, as soon as 
Grant turned around, Calhoun quit touching his arm. 
According to Calhoun’s affidavit, Grant denied stealing any cigarettes. Calhoun thought Grant’s 
attitude was hostile and somewhat threatening, and so he decided to call the police to investigate the 
matter. He said he feared a confrontation with Grant. Calhoun said that when he told Grant he was 
going to call the police, Grant responded by saying to go ahead and call the police. 
The police arrived within 15 to 20 minutes. Calhoun said Grant and the officer viewed the 
surveillance video. He said Grant told the officer he had picked up a dollar before stepping out the 
door. Calhoun told the officer he thought the object Grant picked up looked like a pack of cigarettes. 
According to Calhoun, the officer said he would take Grant in, but Calhoun never asked or directed 
the officer to do so. Calhoun gave the officer the surveillance video, and then the officer left the store 
with Grant. 
Calhoun said he had no physical contact with Grant other than the initial touching to get Grant’s 
attention. Once he got his attention, Calhoun said he and Grant remained on opposite sides of the 
counter while they waited for the police. Calhoun said a woman, perhaps Grant’s girlfriend, came 
into the store and waited with Grant. Calhoun said nobody threatened Grant, nobody told Grant he 
could not leave, nobody prevented Grant from leaving, and nobody told Grant he was under arrest. 
According to Calhoun, Grant had a clear path to the door, nothing prevented Grant from leaving 
the store, Grant was never directed to remain in the store, and Grant was not put in or asked to go 
to a back room. 
The Surveillance Videotape 
Grant claims the surveillance videotape is the best evidence to determine the reasonableness of 
Calhoun’s belief that he stole cigarettes and of Calhoun’s actions…. The police report states the 
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videotape was returned to Stop-N-Go…. However, in a response to a request to produce the 
surveillance videotape, Stop-N-Go said, “none.” During oral argument before this Court, Stop-N-
Go said the tape was lost. 
The Police Report 
In the police report, Officer Anderson said when he walked into the Stop-N-Go store, Calhoun 
and Grant were arguing. Calhoun told the officer Grant stole a pack of cigarettes, and that it would 
be on the surveillance video. Anderson said he took Grant to the station to view the videotape. After 
reviewing the tape with Sergeant Hartley, Anderson determined the allegations against Grant were 
unfounded and released him. Anderson said the videotape was returned to Stop-N-Go. 
2. Willful Detention Without Consent 
Stop-N-Go relies on Morales v. Lee, 668 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), to argue that 
Grant was not willfully detained without his consent as a matter of law. It argues Grant was not 
detained because he was not restrained from moving from one place to another. When, as here, a 
plaintiff alleges the detention was effected by a threat, the plaintiff must demonstrate the threat was 
such as would inspire a just fear of injury to his person, reputation, or property…. According to 
Grant, Calhoun told Grant he could not leave and that he (Calhoun) was calling the police. This 
contradicts Calhoun’s affidavit, in which Calhoun said he did not tell Grant that he could not leave. 
This raises a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Grant was detained, and whether he 
consented to stay in the store. 
Stop-N-Go also argues that threats of future actions, such as to call the police, are not sufficient 
to constitute false imprisonment. However, Calhoun did more than threaten to call the police; he 
actually called the police. Grant said he was afraid of what was going to happen; he had never been 
in trouble with the police before. He was afraid to try and leave the store because Calhoun had 
already grabbed him and told him not to leave. Grant was afraid that if he left, he would be labeled 
a fugitive from justice, causing even more damage to his reputation…. [W]e conclude Grant raised 
fact issues concerning whether he was willfully detained without his consent. 
3. The Shopkeeper’s Privilege 
In its motion for summary judgment, Stop-N-Go claimed its actions were authorized by law 
under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 124.001, the shopkeeper’s privilege. If this is true, 
then Stop-N-Go would have negated the third element of Grant’s false imprisonment claim. Grant 
argues he raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Stop-N-Go established this 
privilege as a matter of law. 
Stop-N-Go’s only summary judgment evidence was from an interested witness, Calhoun. 
Calhoun’s affidavit explains what Calhoun saw on the surveillance monitor. The videotape is the 
best evidence of what happened. However, Stop-N-Go has refused to produce the videotape, and 
each time Stop-N-Go was asked for it, it gave a different reason why it could not be produced. 
The shopkeeper’s privilege provides that a person who reasonably believes another person has 
stolen, or is attempting to steal property, is privileged to detain that person in a reasonable manner 
and for a reasonable time to investigate ownership of the property. Thus, there are three components 
to the shopkeeper’s privilege: (1) a reasonable belief a person has stolen or is attempting to steal; 
(2) detention for a reasonable time; and (3) detention in a reasonable manner…. [T]he shopkeeper’s 
privilege is limited in its application to false imprisonment claims arising from investigative 
detentions. The test of liability is not based on the store patron’s guilt or innocence, but instead on 
the reasonableness of the store’s action under the circumstances; the trier of fact usually determines 
whether reasonable belief is established. Whether Calhoun was reasonable in believing Grant had 
committed a theft, or reasonable in detaining Grant, is a question to be determined by the jury. 
Stop-N-Go relies on Wal-Mart v. Resendez, 962 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. 1998), to argue that a ten to 
15 minute detention is reasonable as a matter of law. This is a true statement of the law in Resendez. 
While Resendez held a ten to 15 minute detention was reasonable as a matter of law, it so held, 
“without deciding the outer parameters of a permissible period of time under section 124.001.” 
Resendez does not support Stop-N-Go’s position, because Grant was detained for more than ten to 
15 minutes. According to Calhoun, the police arrived 15 to 20 minutes after they were called. Once 
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the police arrived, they viewed the tape at the store, and then they took Grant to the police station 
and viewed the tape again. Grant said he spent approximately an hour in police custody. Thus, 
Grant’s detention lasted for more than an hour and 20 minutes…. 
Stop-N-Go did not negate any element of Grant’s false imprisonment claim as a matter of law, 
and Grant raised genuine issues of material fact on each element. Therefore, summary judgment on 
this claim was improper. 
QUESTIONS 
1. The Fuzz: Stop-N-Go argues that Grant was free to leave, but Grant claims he wasn’t 
because Calhoun said the police were being called. This disputed fact is key to resolving 
two distinct parts of the legal analysis. What are they? 
2. Posse Comitatus: Going beyond the shopkeeper’s 
privilege, some states allow citizens to make 
arrests in other settings, creating legal privileges 
for people who witness crimes. These laws date 
back to medieval times, when King Edward I 
lacked an organized police force in the late 1200s. 
The legal concept traveled across the pond to the 
United States, where it could take days for law 
enforcement to travel to crime scenes during the country’s infancy. Nowadays, these 
laws usually permit arrests when a serious crime (often a felony) has been committed 
and the person effecting the arrest has probable cause (i.e., objectively reasonable 
grounds) to believe that the detainee committed it. Should these laws apply so broadly? 
Should they be limited to special circumstances, like shopkeepers catching shoplifters or 
restaurant owners witnessing “dine and dash” customers? Or should they be repealed 
entirely? This question became national news in 2020 after 
the killing of Ahmaud Arbery, a young Black man from 
Brunswick, Georgia. While Arbery was jogging, three white 
men pursued him before one of the men, Travis McMichael, 
shot and killed Arbery. The men claimed Arbery resembled 
a suspect in a string of burglaries, though nothing ever linked 
him to those incidents. Lawmakers responded by repealing 
Georgia’s citizen’s arrest law, making it the first state in the 
country to do so. Should other states follow suit? What are 
some of the benefits of deputizing private citizens with police 
powers? What are some of the risks and problems?ã 
 
BAR TRIP PROBLEM 
It’s July 2025. Zay lands at LaGuardia after his post-Bar Exam trip to Jamaica. Unbeknownst to 
him, the local New York police have been investigating a smuggling operation that Andre is suspected 
of orchestrating from the Caribbean island. The police believe Andre is on Zay’s flight. Unfortunately, 
Zay has the same green suitcase as Andre—a suitcase that the police know Andre owns. 
At baggage claim, Zay grabs what he thinks is his bag and walks toward the exit, but the sniffer 
dogs lunge at him and alert their handlers to the scent of drugs. The police handcuff Zay before 
locking him in an interrogation room with his hands and feet tied while they question him. 
Zay is released seven hours later after the confusion gets cleared up. On his way home, he calls 
you, his old Torts classmate, and asks if he can sue for false imprisonment. 
(a) What do you tell Zay? 
 
ã Matthew Almon Roth, Black Lives Matter March in Portland, OR. June 4, 2020 (CC BY-NC 2.0); Steve Devol, Ahmaud 
Arbery Memorial (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0). 
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(b) What if, instead, Zay wasn’t handcuffed and the officers say “please come with us” before 
he walks into an interrogation room where the door is left open and he isn’t tied up? 
(c) Imagine that the police never stop Zay at the airport. He makes it to his apartment with 
Andre’s drug-filled bag. His neighbor, Davis, owns a German Shepherd that he has 
trained to sniff drugs. As Zay walks up the stairs and Davis is on his way down to let his 
dog out, the dog alerts. Davis, an aspiring police officer, blocks the staircase and tells 
Zay, “Don’t move or I’ll sic my dog on you, and sit tight while I call the cops.” It takes 
twenty minutes for the police to arrive, followed by two hours of officers questioning 
Zay on the staircase before they tell him he can return to his apartment. Zay sues Davis, 
who, having read online about the hunt to catch Andre, argues that he was acting under 
the authority of the law. What result?  
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CHAPTER 2:  PROPERTY TORTS  
A. Trespass to Land 
JACQUE v. STEENBERG HOMES, INC. 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin (1997) 
Bablitch, Justice: ã 
Steenberg Homes had a mobile home to 
deliver. Unfortunately for Harvey and Lois 
Jacque (the Jacques), the easiest route of 
delivery was across their land. Despite 
adamant protests by the Jacques, Steenberg 
plowed a path through the Jacques’ snow-
covered field and via that path, delivered the 
mobile home…. At trial, Steenberg Homes 
conceded the intentional trespass, but argued 
that no compensatory damages had been proved, and that punitive damages could not be awarded 
without compensatory damages…. We conclude that when nominal damages are awarded for an 
intentional trespass to land, punitive damages may, in the discretion of the jury, be awarded…. 
I. 
…Plaintiffs, Lois and Harvey Jacques, are an elderly couple, now retired from farming, who own 
roughly 170 acres near Wilke’s Lake in the town of Schleswig. The defendant, Steenberg Homes, Inc. 
(Steenberg), is in the business of selling mobile homes. In the fall of 1993, a neighbor of the Jacques 
purchased a mobile home from Steenberg…. Steenberg preferred transporting the home across the 
Jacques’ land because the only alternative was a private road which was covered in up to seven feet 
of snow and contained a sharp curve which would require sets of “rollers” to be used when 
maneuvering the home around the curve. Steenberg asked the Jacques on several separate occasions 
whether it could move the home across the Jacques’ farm field. The Jacques refused. The Jacques 
were sensitive about allowing others on their land because they had lost property valued at over 
$10,000 to other neighbors in an adverse possession action in the mid-1980’s. Despite repeated 
refusals from the Jacques, Steenberg decided to sell the mobile home…and delivered it on February 
15, 1994. 
On the morning of delivery, Mr. Jacque observed the mobile home parked on the corner of 
the town road adjacent to his property…. The movers, who were Steenberg employees, showed Mr. 
Jacque the path they planned to take with the mobile home to reach the neighbor’s lot. The path cut 
across the Jacques’ land. Mr. Jacque informed the movers that it was the Jacques’ land they were 
planning to cross and that Steenberg did not have permission to cross their land…. One of 
Steenberg’s employees called the assistant manager, who then came out to the Jacques’ home. In the 
meantime, the Jacques called and asked some of their neighbors and the town chairman to come 
over immediately. Once everyone was present, the Jacques showed the assistant manager an aerial 
map and plat book of the township to prove their ownership of the land, and reiterated their demand 
that the home not be moved across their land. 
At that point, the assistant manager asked Mr. Jacque how much money it would take to get 
permission. Mr. Jacque responded that it was not a question of money; the Jacques just did not want 
Steenberg to cross their land. Mr. Jacque testified that he told Steenberg to “[F]ollow the road, that 
is what the road is for.”… [U]pon coming out of the Jacques’ home, the assistant manager stated: “I 
don’t give a —— what [Mr. Jacque] said, just get the home in there any way you can.”… The 
employees, after beginning down the private road, ultimately used a “bobcat” to cut a path through 
the Jacques’ snow-covered field and hauled the home across the Jacques’ land to the neighbor’s lot. 
One employee testified that upon returning to the office and informing the assistant manager that 
they had gone across the field, the assistant manager reacted by giggling and laughing…. When a 
 
ã Google Earth (aerial view of Wilke’s Lake with the Jacques’ private road marked in yellow). 
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neighbor informed the Jacques that Steenberg had, in fact, moved the mobile home across the 
Jacques’ land, Mr. Jacque called the Manitowoc County Sheriff’s Department…[and] an officer from 
the sheriff’s department issued a $30 citation to Steenberg’s assistant manager. 
The Jacques commenced an intentional tort action…. The jury awarded the Jacques $1 nominal 
damages and $100,000 punitive damages…. 
II. 
…Steenberg argues that, as a matter of law, punitive damages could not be awarded by the jury 
because punitive damages must be supported by an award of compensatory damages and here the 
jury awarded only nominal and punitive damages. The Jacques contend that the rationale 
supporting the compensatory damage award requirement is inapposite when the wrongful act is an 
intentional trespass to land. We agree with the Jacques…. 
The general rule was stated in Barnard v. Cohen, 162 N.W.2d 480 (Wis. 1917), where the 
question presented was: “In an action for libel, can there be a recovery of punitory damages if only 
nominal compensatory damages are found?” With the bare assertion that authority and better 
reason supported its conclusion, the Barnard court said no. Barnard continues to state the general 
rule of punitive damages in Wisconsin. The rationale for the compensatory damage requirement is 
that if the individual cannot show actual harm, he or she has but a nominal interest, hence, society 
has little interest in having the unlawful, but otherwise harmless, conduct deterred, therefore, 
punitive damages are inappropriate. 
However, whether nominal damages can support a punitive damage award in the case of an 
intentional trespass to land has never been squarely addressed by this court…. In 1854 the court 
established punitive damages, allowing the assessment of “damages as a punishment to the 
defendant for the purpose of making an example.” McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 377 (1854). 
The McWilliams court related the facts and an illustrative tale from the English case of Merest v. 
Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814), to explain the rationale underlying punitive damages. 
In Merest, a landowner was shooting birds in his field when he was approached by the local 
magistrate who wanted to hunt with him. Although the landowner refused, the magistrate 
proceeded to hunt. When the landowner continued to object, the magistrate threatened to have him 
jailed and dared him to file suit. Although little actual harm had been caused, the English court 
upheld damages of 500 pounds, explaining “in a case where a man disregards every principle which 
actuates the conduct of gentlemen, what is to restrain him except large damages?” 
To explain the need for punitive damages, even where actual harm is slight, McWilliams related 
the hypothetical tale from Merest of an intentional trespasser: 
Suppose a gentleman has a paved walk in his paddock, before his window, and 
that a man intrudes and walks up and down before the window of his house, and 
looks in while the owner is at dinner, is the trespasser permitted to say “here is a 
halfpenny for you which is the full extent of the mischief I have done.” Would that 
be a compensation? I cannot say that it would be. 
Thus, in the case establishing punitive damages in this state, this court recognized that in certain 
situations of trespass, the actual harm is not in the damage done to the land, which may be minimal, 
but in the loss of the individual’s right to exclude others from his or her property and, the court 
implied that this right may be punished by a large damage award despite the lack of measurable 
harm…. 
The Jacques argue that the rationale for not allowing nominal damages to support a punitive 
damage award is inapposite when the wrongful act involved is an intentional trespass to land. The 
Jacques argue that both the individual and society have significant interests in deterring intentional 
trespass to land, regardless of the lack of measurable harm that results. We agree with the Jacques. 
An examination of the individual interests invaded by an intentional trespass to land, and society’s 
interests in preventing intentional trespass to land, leads us to the conclusion that the Barnard rule 
should not apply when the tort supporting the award is intentional trespass to land. 
We turn first to the individual landowner’s interest in protecting his or her land from trespass…. 
[T]he private landowner’s right to exclude others from his or her land is one of the most essential 
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sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property…. Yet a right is hollow if 
the legal system provides insufficient means to protect it. Felix Cohen offers the following analysis 
summarizing the relationship between the individual and the state regarding property rights:  
[T]hat is property to which the following  
label can be attached: 
To the world: 
Keep off X unless you have my permission,  
which I may grant or withhold. 
Signed: Private Citizen Endorsed: The state 
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, IX Rutgers Law Review 357, 374 (1954). Harvey and 
Lois Jacque have the right to tell Steenberg Homes and any other trespasser, “No, you cannot cross 
our land.” But that right has no practical meaning unless protected by the State. And, as this court 
recognized as early as 1854, a “halfpenny” award does not constitute state protection. 
The nature of the nominal damage award in an intentional trespass to land case further supports 
an exception to Barnard…. The law recognizes actual harm in every trespass to land whether or not 
compensatory damages are awarded. Thus, in the case of intentional trespass to land, the nominal 
damage award represents the recognition that, although immeasurable in mere dollars, actual harm 
has occurred. 
The potential for harm resulting from intentional trespass also supports an exception 
to Barnard. A series of intentional trespasses, as the Jacques had the misfortune to discover in an 
unrelated action, can threaten the individual’s very ownership of the land. The conduct of an 
intentional trespasser, if repeated, might ripen into prescription or adverse possession and, as a 
consequence, the individual landowner can lose his or her property rights to the trespasser…. 
Society has an interest in punishing and deterring intentional trespassers beyond that of 
protecting the interests of the individual landowner. Society has an interest in preserving the 
integrity of the legal system. Private landowners should feel confident that wrongdoers who trespass 
upon their land will be appropriately punished. When landowners have confidence in the legal 
system, they are less likely to resort to “self-help” remedies. In McWilliams, the court recognized the 
importance of “preventing the practice of dueling, by permitting juries to punish insult by exemplary 
damages.” Although dueling is rarely a modern form of self-help, one can easily imagine a frustrated 
landowner taking the law into his or her own hands when faced with a brazen trespasser, like 
Steenberg, who refuses to heed no trespass warnings. 
People expect wrongdoers to be appropriately punished. Punitive damages have the effect of 
bringing to punishment types of conduct that, though oppressive and hurtful to the individual, 
almost invariably go unpunished by the public prosecutor. The $30 forfeiture was certainly not an 
appropriate punishment for Steenberg’s egregious trespass in the eyes of the Jacques. It was more 
akin to Merest’s “halfpenny.” If punitive damages are not allowed in a situation like this, what 
punishment will prohibit the intentional trespass to land? Moreover, what is to stop Steenberg 
Homes from concluding, in the future, that delivering its mobile homes via an intentional trespass 
and paying the resulting Class B forfeiture, is not more profitable than obeying the law? Steenberg 
Homes plowed a path across the Jacques’ land and dragged the mobile home across that path, in the 
face of the Jacques’ adamant refusal. A $30 forfeiture and a $1 nominal damage award are unlikely 
to restrain Steenberg Homes from similar conduct in the future. An appropriate punitive damage 
award probably will. 
In sum,…the Barnard rule sends the wrong message to Steenberg Homes and any others who 
contemplate trespassing on the land of another. It implicitly tells them that they are free to go where 
they please, regardless of the landowner’s wishes…. We conclude that both the private landowner 
and society have much more than a nominal interest in excluding others from private land. 
Intentional trespass to land causes actual harm to the individual, regardless of whether that harm 
can be measured in mere dollars…. 
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QUESTIONS 
1. What’s Tort Law Up To? How does the Jacque decision serve the goals of tort law?  
2. Trivial Pursuits: In the famous Case of the Thorns (1466), a man sued his neighbor for 
trespass after the neighbor’s hedge-trimming left thorns on the man’s land. Who do 
think prevailed? Who do you think should prevail? 
3. 21st Century Trespass: If Steenberg flew a drone over the Jacques’ land, should they still 
be liable for trespass? 
 
BURNS PHILP FOOD, INC v. CAVALEA CONTINENTAL FREIGHT, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (1998) 
Easterbrook, Judge: ã 
Nabisco broke up a tract of industrial real estate in Chicago. Cavalea 
Continental Freight bought several parcels and Burns Philp Food the 
remainder. In 1986 real estate records were changed to reflect these 
transactions, but something went awry…. [As a result, Burns Philp 
mistakenly paid almost $125,000 in property taxes on land owned by 
Cavalea. It notified Cavalea of the mistake in 1993.] Instead of resolving 
matters amicably, these neighbors have acted like the Hatfields and 
McCoys. Cavalea refused to pay a dime, leading Burns Philp to sue [in 
restitution to obtain reimbursement for the tax payments]. Cavalea filed a 
counterclaim accusing Burns Philp of building a fence that encroached 
onto its parcel…. The district judge…entered a judgment from which, 
predictably, both sides have appealed. 
[Under the applicable statute of limitations, Burns Philp cannot recover for taxes unwittingly 
paid on behalf of Cavalea for the five years immediately prior to the filing of the suit.]… 
Now for Cavalea’s counterclaim. Burns Philp constructed a fence on what it thought was the 
border between its property and Cavalea’s. Whoever surveyed the land to fix the border for the fence 
did a lousy job. The border is 205 feet long. One end of the fence was located several feet inside 
Burns Philp’s lot and the other was 20 feet into Cavalea’s. Burns Philp thus occupied about 2,000 
square feet of land that belonged to Cavalea. After Ameritech conducted a survey in 1995, Cavalea 
learned that some of its land was on the other side of the fence. It did not notify Burns Philp of the 
problem until November 1995, when it filed the counterclaim seeking damages for trespass and an 
injunction requiring Burns Philp to remove the fence. Burns Philp responded by denying liability; 
it did not verify the accuracy of Cavalea’s survey or move the fence back to the property line. In 
December 1996 Cavalea ripped out the fence and appurtenances without Burns Philp’s leave and 
placed a large container right at the property line, interfering with the use of Burns Philp’s loading 
dock. Burns Philp now concedes that Cavalea was entitled to do these things. But the district judge 
held that Cavalea is not entitled to damages, because it did not notify Burns Philp that the fence had 
been erected on its land. Trespass is a strict liability tort, and an obligation to notify the intruder is 
inconsistent with the idea of strict liability. Nonetheless, the district judge stated: “That [notice 
requirement] may be difficult to rationalize in terms of the traditional law of trespass, but it’s not 
difficult for me to rationalize in terms of elemental justice, and that’s the way I come out.” 
In diversity litigation, however, state law prevails over notions of “elemental justice.” The only 
question for decision is whether Illinois conditions damages on the landowner’s notice to the 
trespasser. (Cavalea contends that the counterclaim filed in 1995 gave whatever notice state law 
requires, a possibility the district judge did not discuss, but we need not pursue that prospect.) 
Burns Philp locates a notice-to-trespassers requirement in cases holding that a landowner who 
has consented to entry may not complain about trespass until the consent has been revoked. The 
proposition is unremarkable. Trespass is entry without consent; while the consent lasts there can be 
no trespass, and therefore no legal remedy. How can this assist Burns Philp? Cavalea did not consent 
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to the construction of a fence on its land. Had it done so, a change of mind would not necessarily 
require demolition of the fence—the original consent may grant a license that can be revoked only 
with compensation. But Burns Philp did not seek anyone’s consent to build the fence. It thought 
that the fence was on its land, and no one knew otherwise until 1995. Knowledge of a fence’s 
existence is not equivalent to consent—not, at least, when the landowner does not suspect that the 
border has been crossed. Paths that cut diagonals across parcels with known borders and similarly 
obvious intrusions, where failure to protest might imply consent, pose different 
questions…. Cavalea accordingly is entitled to damages—if it suffered monetary loss. 
Cavalea offered evidence that it used the land along its border with Burns Philp to store trailers 
and freight containers, and that it could have stored 102 additional trailers or containers had the 
fence been located correctly. It charges shippers and truckers $25 per day to store loaded containers, 
75¢ a day for empty truck trailers, and 55¢ a day for empty containers. Proposing that all 102 places 
would have been used all of the time, Cavalea demanded nearly $1 million in damages, which would 
make this the most valuable twentieth of an acre in Chicago. Burns Philp responds that its employees 
consistently noticed empty places at Cavalea’s facility even before the fence was removed, and it 
argues that access to the extra land accordingly would not have added to Cavalea’s receipts. Because 
it concluded that Cavalea could not maintain an action for trespass, the district judge did not resolve 
this dispute. It is not our place to play factfinder, but we hope that it will prove possible for the new 
district judge to wrap things up after reviewing the existing record without taking additional 
evidence…. The judgment is vacated and the case remanded…to calculate and award the damages 
(if any) that Cavalea sustained from the trespass. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Nosy Neighbors: Cavalea knew that the fence was there and didn’t do anything about it 
for years. Why isn’t that enough to show that the company implicitly consented to the 
trespass on its land?  
2. Elemental Justice: Did Burns Philp Food do anything wrong by building the fence? Is 
the court’s decision fair to the company? Would your answer change if, on remand, 
Cavalea got the $1 million in damages that it sought? 
3. Intentional Acts: What type of intent is required to commit a trespass? Do you need to 
intend harm or to know that you’re trespassing? What if you’re in a car accident that 
sends you flying into your neighbor’s front yard? What if kidnappers hold you hostage 
in a stranger’s abandoned barn? What if you tie your boat to a dock in order to keep safe 
during a sudden storm? 
 
FÚTBOL IS LIFE PROBLEM 
Roy and Jamie have been next-door neighbors for several years. Until recently, they were great 
friends who regularly showed up at each other’s houses unannounced, borrowed tools from each 
other’s sheds without asking, and even mowed the other’s lawn whenever they did their own. 
Everything changed when Roy’s beloved AFC Richmond played in the cup final against Jamie’s pick, 
Manchester City. Before kick-off, both men had several beers and agreed to a $500 bet on the game. 
With Manchester City victorious at the final whistle, Jamie demanded his winnings. An irate Roy 
began screaming that it wouldn’t be fair to make him pay because of the referee’s appalling decision 
to send off Ted, Richmond’s talismanic coach. Jamie and Roy argued until Roy finally stormed out. 
A few days later, Roy left for a romantic weekend with his girlfriend Keeley. While Roy was gone, 
Jamie hosted a party. To accommodate his guests, Jamie stored some of his things in Roy’s shed. 
Roy got an app alert to his phone from his home-security camera and watched Jamie enter through 
the back gate and deposit his things in the shed. The things were gone by the time Roy and Keeley 
returned. Still seething over their fight, Roy decides to sue Jamie for trespass. 
(a) Can Roy satisfy the elements of trespass? Does it matter that Roy wasn’t home or using 
his shed that weekend? Does it matter that Jamie’s presence left no trace on Roy’s land? 
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(b) If Roy can satisfy the elements of trespass, what relief could he seek? 
(c) Does it matter that Roy and Jamie seem to have had an unspoken agreement about 
entering each other’s land? Would it make any difference if, during the week before their 
fight, Roy had given Jamie a key to his house and told him, “Feel free to use the house, 
shed, garage, yard—whatever you need while I’m off with Keeley”? 
 
B. Conversion 
THYROFF v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. 
New York Court of Appeals (2007) 
Graffeo, Judge: ã 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
certified a question to us that asks whether the common-law cause of 
action of conversion applies to certain electronic computer records 
and data…. 
I 
Plaintiff Louis Thyroff was an insurance agent for defendant 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. In 1988, the parties had 
entered into an Agent’s Agreement that specified the terms of their 
business relationship. As part of the arrangement, Nationwide agreed 
to lease Thyroff computer hardware and software, referred to as the agency office-automation 
(AOA) system, to facilitate the collection and transfer of customer information to Nationwide. In 
addition to the entry of business data, Thyroff also used the AOA system for personal e-mails, 
correspondence and other data storage that pertained to his customers. On a daily basis, Nationwide 
would automatically upload all of the information from Thyroff’s AOA system, including Thryoff’s 
personal data, to its centralized computers. 
The Agent’s Agreement was terminable at will and, in September 2000, Thyroff received a letter 
from Nationwide informing him that his contract as an exclusive agent had been cancelled. The next 
day, Nationwide repossessed its AOA system and denied Thyroff further access to the computers 
and all electronic records and data. Consequently, Thyroff was unable to retrieve his customer 
information and other personal information that was stored on the computers. 
Thyroff initiated an action against Nationwide in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of New York, asserting several causes of action, including a claim for the 
conversion of his business and personal information stored on the computer hard drives. In 
response to Nationwide’s motion to dismiss, District Court held that the complaint failed to state a 
cause of action for conversion…. In his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, Thyroff sought reinstatement of his conversion cause of action, along with other relief. 
Nationwide countered that a conversion claim cannot be based on the misappropriation of 
electronic records and data because New York does not recognize a cause of action for the 
conversion of intangible property. The Second Circuit determined that the issue was unresolved in 
New York and therefore certified the following question of law to this Court: is a claim for the 
conversion of electronic data cognizable under New York law? 
II 
The hand of history lies heavy upon the tort of conversion. The “ancient doctrine” has gone 
through a great deal of evolution over time, dating back to the Norman Conquest of England in 
1066…. By 1252, a new cause of action—trespass de bonis asportatis [a Latin phrase meaning 
“trespass for carrying goods away”]—was introduced. It allowed a plaintiff to obtain pecuniary 
damages for certain misappropriations of property and, following a favorable jury verdict, the sale 
of the defendant’s property to pay a plaintiff the value of the stolen goods. If, however, the defendant 
offered to return the property to its rightful owner, the owner had to accept it and recovery was 
 
ã Michael Molenda, Internet Bank Robbery (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0). 
CASES & CRITIQUE    55 
limited to the damages he had sustained through his loss of possession, or through harm to the 
chattel, which were usually considerably less than its value. 
In the late 15th century, the common law was extended to fill the gap left by the action of trespass 
by providing a more comprehensive remedy in cases where a defendant’s interference with property 
rights was so serious that it went beyond mere trespass to a conversion of the property. Known as 
“trover,” this cause of action was aimed at a person who had found goods and refused to return them 
to the title owner, and was premised on the theory that the defendant, by “converting” the chattel to 
his own use, had appropriated the plaintiff’s rights, for which he was required to make 
compensation. The plaintiff was therefore not required to accept the chattel when it was tendered 
back to him; and he recovered as his damages the full value of the chattel at the time and place of the 
conversion. The effect was that the defendant was compelled, because of his wrongful appropriation, 
to buy the chattel at a forced sale, of which the action of trover was the judicial instrument…. 
Trover gave way slowly to the tort of conversion, which was created to address some 
interferences with chattels for which the action of trover would not lie, such as a claim dealing with 
a right of future possession. The technical differences between trover and conversion eventually 
disappeared. The Restatement (Second) of Torts now defines conversion as an intentional act of 
“dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control 
it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.” 
III 
As history reveals, the common law has evolved to broaden the remedies available for the 
misappropriation of personal property. [With changes in society,] the courts became willing to 
consider new species of personal property eligible for conversion actions. 
Conversion and its common-law antecedents were directed against interferences with or 
misappropriation of “goods” that were tangible, personal property. This was consistent with the 
original notions associated with the appeals of robbery and larceny, trespass and trover because 
tangible property could be lost or stolen. By contrast, real property and all manner of intangible 
rights could not be “lost or found” in the eyes of the law and were not therefore subject to an action 
for trover or conversion. 
Under this traditional construct, conversion was viewed as the unauthorized assumption and 
exercise of the right of ownership over goods belonging to another to the exclusion of the owner’s 
rights. Thus, the general rule was that an action for conversion will not normally lie, when it involves 
intangible property because there is no physical item that can be misappropriated. 
Despite this long-standing reluctance to expand conversion beyond the realm of tangible 
property, some courts determined that there was no good reason for keeping up a distinction that 
arose wholly from that original peculiarity of the action of trover (that an item had to be capable of 
being lost and found) and substituted a theory of conversion that covered things represented by 
valuable papers, such as certificates of stock, promissory notes, and other papers of value. This, in 
turn, led to the recognition that an intangible property right can be united with a tangible object for 
conversion purposes. In Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 251 (1934), which involved the conversion of 
intangible shares of stock, this Court applied the so-called “merger” doctrine because: 
for practical purposes [the shares] are merged in stock certificates which are 
instrumentalities of trade and commerce. Such certificates are treated by business 
men as property for all practical purposes. Indeed, this court has held that the shares 
of stock are so completely merged in the certificate that conversion of the certificate 
may be treated as a conversion of the shares of stock represented by the certificate. 
More recently, we concluded that a plaintiff could maintain a cause of action for conversion where 
the defendant infringed on the plaintiff’s intangible property right to a musical performance by 
misappropriating a master recording—a tangible item of property capable of being physically taken. 
IV 
We have not previously had occasion to consider whether the common law should permit 
conversion for intangible property interests that do not strictly satisfy the merger test. Although 
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some courts have adhered to the traditional rules of conversion, others have taken a more flexible 
view of conversion and held that the cause of action can embrace intangible property. 
A variety of arguments have been made in support of expanding the scope of conversion. Some 
courts have decided that a theft of intangible property is a violation of the criminal law and should 
be civilly remediable…. On the other hand, the primary argument for retaining the traditional 
boundaries of the tort is that it seems preferable to fashion other remedies, such as unfair 
competition, to protect people from having intangible values used and appropriated in unfair ways. 
Nonetheless, advocates of this view readily concede that there is perhaps no very valid and essential 
reason why there might not be conversion of intangible property and that there is very little practical 
importance whether the tort is called conversion, or a similar tort with another name because in 
either case the recovery is for the full value of the intangible right so appropriated…. 
V 
It is the strength of the common law to respond, albeit cautiously and intelligently, to the 
demands of commonsense justice in an evolving society. That time has arrived. The reasons for 
creating the merger doctrine and departing from the strict common-law limitation of conversion 
inform our analysis. The expansion of conversion to encompass a different class of property, such 
as shares of stock, was motivated by society’s growing dependence on intangibles. It cannot be 
seriously disputed that society’s reliance on computers and electronic data is substantial, if not 
essential. Computers and digital information are ubiquitous and pervade all aspects of business, 
financial and personal communication activities. Indeed, this opinion was drafted in electronic 
form, stored in a computer’s memory and disseminated to the Judges of this Court via e-mail. We 
cannot conceive of any reason in law or logic why this process of virtual creation should be treated 
any differently from production by pen on paper or quill on parchment. A document stored on a 
computer hard drive has the same value as a paper document kept in a file cabinet. 
The merger rule reflected the concept that intangible property interests could be converted only 
by exercising dominion over the paper document that represented that interest. Now, however, it is 
customary that stock ownership exclusively exists in electronic format. Because shares of stock can 
be transferred by mere computer entries, a thief can use a computer to access a person’s financial 
accounts and transfer the shares to an account controlled by the thief. Similarly, electronic documents 
and records stored on a computer can also be converted by simply pressing the delete button. 
Furthermore, it generally is not the physical nature of a document that determines its worth, it is 
the information memorialized in the document that has intrinsic value. A manuscript of a novel has 
the same value whether it is saved in a computer’s memory or printed on paper. So too, the information 
that Thyroff allegedly stored on his leased computers in the form of electronic records of customer 
contacts and related data has value to him regardless of whether the format in which the information 
was stored was tangible or intangible. In the absence of a significant difference in the value of the 
information, the protections of the law should apply equally to both forms—physical and virtual. 
In light of these considerations, we believe that the tort of conversion must keep pace with the 
contemporary realities of widespread computer use. We therefore answer the certified question in 
the affirmative and hold that the type of data that Nationwide allegedly took possession of—
electronic records that were stored on a computer and were indistinguishable from printed 
documents—is subject to a claim of conversion in New York. Because this is the only type of 
intangible property at issue in this case, we do not consider whether any of the myriad other forms 
of virtual information should be protected by the tort…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Phone a Friend: Why would a federal appeals court certify a legal question to a state 
supreme court? Why do you think the Second Circuit certified this question? 
2. Blameless Conversions: Is it possible to have a blameless conversion? Imagine that you 
make a reasonable mistake that damages someone else’s property—you shoot a pet dog 
because you genuinely think it’s a wolf, or you steal a bike that you believe is yours but 
is actually your neighbor’s. Should the owner be able to recover damages?  
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3. Harmless Conversions: Is it possible to have a harmless conversion? We’ve seen 
defendants be liable for trespass to land despite causing no damage to the plaintiff’s 
property. Should similar liability attach for torts protecting legal interests in possessions? 
Or should the plaintiff have to show actual injury when bringing a conversion claim? 
 
C. Trespass to Chattels 
INTEL CORP. v. HAMIDI 
Supreme Court of California (2003) 
Werdegar, Justice: ã 
…[Kourosh Kenneth] Hamidi, a former Intel 
engineer, together with others, formed an organization 
named Former and Current Employees of Intel (FACE-
Intel) to disseminate information and views critical of 
Intel’s employment and personnel policies and practices. 
FACE-Intel maintained a Web site…containing such 
material. In addition, over a 21-month period Hamidi, on 
behalf of FACE-Intel, sent six mass e-mails to employee 
addresses on Intel’s electronic mail system. The messages 
criticized Intel’s employment practices, warned 
employees of the dangers those practices posed to their careers, suggested employees consider 
moving to other companies, solicited employees’ participation in FACE-Intel, and urged employees 
to inform themselves further by visiting FACE-Intel’s Web site. The messages stated that recipients 
could, by notifying the sender of their wishes, be removed from FACE-Intel’s mailing list; Hamidi 
did not subsequently send messages to anyone who requested removal. 
Each message was sent to thousands of addresses (as many as 35,000 according to FACE-Intel’s 
Web site), though some messages were blocked by Intel before reaching employees. Intel’s attempt 
to block internal transmission of the messages succeeded only in part; Hamidi later admitted he 
evaded blocking efforts by using different sending computers. When Intel, in March 1998, 
demanded in writing that Hamidi and FACE-Intel stop sending e-mails to Intel’s computer system, 
Hamidi asserted the organization had a right to communicate with willing Intel employees; he sent 
a new mass mailing in September 1998. 
The summary judgment record contains no evidence Hamidi breached Intel’s computer security 
in order to obtain the recipient addresses for his messages; indeed, internal Intel memoranda show 
the company’s management concluded no security breach had occurred. Hamidi stated he created 
the recipient address list using an Intel directory on a floppy disk anonymously sent to him. Nor is 
there any evidence that the receipt or internal distribution of Hamidi’s electronic messages damaged 
Intel’s computer system or slowed or impaired its functioning. Intel did present uncontradicted 
evidence, however, that many employee recipients asked a company official to stop the messages 
and that staff time was consumed in attempts to block further messages from FACE-Intel. According 
to the FACE-Intel Web site, moreover, the messages had prompted discussions between “[e]xcited 
and nervous managers” and the company’s human resources department. 
Intel sued Hamidi and FACE-Intel [for trespass to chattels] and seeking both actual damages 
and an injunction against further e-mail messages…. [The trial court] granted Intel’s motion for 
summary judgment, permanently enjoining Hamidi, FACE-Intel, and their agents “from sending 
unsolicited e-mail to addresses on Intel’s computer systems.”… [The Court of Appeal affirmed.]  
I. Current California Tort Law 
Dubbed by Prosser the “little brother of conversion,” the tort of trespass to chattels allows 
recovery for interferences with possession of personal property “not sufficiently important to be 
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classed as conversion, and so to compel the defendant to pay the full value of the thing with which 
he has interfered.” Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 14 (1984). 
Though not amounting to conversion, the defendant’s interference must, to be actionable, have 
caused some injury to the chattel or to the plaintiffs rights in it…. In cases of interference with 
possession of personal property not amounting to conversion, the owner has a cause of action for 
trespass or case, and may recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the 
property or the loss of its use. In modern American law generally, trespass remains as an occasional 
remedy for minor interferences, resulting in some damage, but not sufficiently serious or sufficiently 
important to amount to the greater tort of conversion. 
The Restatement, too, makes clear that some actual injury must have occurred in order for a 
trespass to chattels to be actionable. Under section 218 of the Restatement Second of Torts, 
dispossession alone, without further damages, is actionable, but other forms of interference require 
some additional harm to the personal property or the possessor’s interests in it[:] 
The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similar interest 
of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an action for nominal 
damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel. In order that an actor who 
interferes with another’s chattel may be liable, his conduct must affect some other 
and more important interest of the possessor. Therefore, one who intentionally 
intermeddles with another’s chattel is subject to liability only if his intermeddling is 
harmful to the possessor’s materially valuable interest in the physical condition, 
quality, or value of the chattel, or if the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel 
for a substantial time, or some other legally protected interest of the possessor is 
affected as stated in Clause (c). Sufficient legal protection of the possessor’s interest 
in the mere inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable 
force to protect his possession against even harmless interference…. 
Intel suggests that the requirement of actual harm does not apply here because it sought only 
injunctive relief, as protection from future injuries. But…the fact the relief sought is injunctive does 
not excuse a showing of injury, whether actual or threatened. Indeed, in order to obtain injunctive 
relief the plaintiff must ordinarily show that the defendant’s wrongful acts threaten to 
cause irreparable injuries, ones that cannot be adequately compensated in damages…. 
The dispositive issue in this case, therefore, is whether the undisputed facts demonstrate 
Hamidi’s actions caused or threatened to cause damage to Intel’s computer system, or injury to its 
rights in that personal property, such as to entitle Intel to judgment as a matter of law. To review, 
the undisputed evidence revealed no actual or threatened damage to Intel’s computer hardware or 
software and no interference with its ordinary and intended operation. Intel was not dispossessed 
of its computers, nor did Hamidi’s messages prevent Intel from using its computers for any 
measurable length of time. Intel presented no evidence its system was slowed or otherwise impaired 
by the burden of delivering Hamidi’s electronic messages. Nor was there any evidence transmission 
of the messages imposed any marginal cost on the operation of Intel’s computers. In sum, no 
evidence suggested that in sending messages through Intel’s Internet connections and internal 
computer system Hamidi used the system in any manner in which it was not intended to function 
or impaired the system in any way. Nor does the evidence show the request of any employee to be 
removed from FACE-Intel’s mailing list was not honored. The evidence did show, however, that 
some employees who found the messages unwelcome asked management to stop them and that Intel 
technical staff spent time and effort attempting to block the messages. A statement on the FACE-
Intel Web site, moreover, could be taken as an admission that the messages had caused “[e]xcited 
and nervous managers” to discuss the matter with Intel’s human resources department. 
Relying on a line of decisions, most from federal district courts, applying the tort of trespass to 
chattels to various types of unwanted electronic contact between computers, Intel contends that, 
while its computers were not damaged by receiving Hamidi’s messages, its interest in the physical 
condition, quality or value of the computers was harmed. We disagree. The cited line of decisions 
does not persuade us that the mere sending of electronic communications that assertedly cause 
injury only because of their contents constitutes an actionable trespass to a computer system 
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through which the messages are transmitted. Rather, the decisions finding electronic contact to be 
a trespass to computer systems have generally involved some actual or threatened interference with 
the computers’ functioning. 
In Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), the California Court of 
Appeal held that evidence of automated searching of a telephone carrier’s system for authorization 
codes supported a cause of action for trespass to chattels. The defendant’s automated dialing 
program overburdened the plaintiff’s system, denying some subscribers access to phone lines, 
showing the requisite injury. [Following Thrifty-Tel, a series of federal district court decisions held 
that sending spam through an Internet service provider’s (ISP) equipment may constitute trespass 
to the ISP’s computer system.]  
In each of these spamming cases, the plaintiff showed, or was prepared to show, some 
interference with the efficient functioning of its computer system. In CompuServe, the plaintiff ISP’s 
mail equipment monitor stated that mass [spam] mailings, especially from nonexistent addresses 
such as those used by the defendant, placed “a tremendous burden” on the ISP’s equipment, using 
“disk space and draining the processing power,” making those resources unavailable to serve 
subscribers. Similarly, in Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., the court found the evidence 
supported a finding that the defendant’s mailings “fill[ed] up Hotmail’s computer storage space and 
threatened to damage Hotmail’s ability to service its legitimate customers.”… 
Building on the spamming cases, in particular CompuServe, three even more recent district court 
decisions addressed whether unauthorized robotic data collection from a company’s publicly 
accessible Web site is a trespass on the company’s computer system…. In the leading case, eBay, Inc. 
v. Bidder’s Edge, the defendant Bidder’s Edge (BE), operating an auction aggregation site, accessed 
the eBay Web site about 100,000 times per day, accounting for between 1 and 2 percent of the 
information requests received by eBay and a slightly smaller percentage of the data transferred by 
eBay. The district court rejected eBay’s claim that it was entitled to injunctive relief because of the 
defendant’s unauthorized presence alone, or because of the incremental cost the defendant had 
imposed on operation of the eBay site, but found sufficient proof of threatened harm in the potential 
for others to imitate the defendant’s activity: “If BE’s activity is allowed to continue unchecked, it 
would encourage other auction aggregators to engage in similar recursive searching of the eBay 
system such that eBay would suffer irreparable harm from reduced system performance, system 
unavailability, or data losses.” Again, in addressing the likelihood of eBay’s success on its trespass to 
chattels cause of action, the court held the evidence of injury to eBay’s computer system sufficient 
to support a preliminary injunction: “If the court were to hold otherwise, it would likely encourage 
other auction aggregators to crawl the eBay site, potentially to the point of denying effective access 
to eBay’s customers. If preliminary injunctive relief were denied, and other aggregators began to 
crawl the eBay site, there appears to be little doubt that the load on eBay’s computer system would 
qualify as a substantial impairment of condition or value.”… 
In the decisions so far reviewed, the defendant’s use of the plaintiffs computer system was held 
sufficient to support an action for trespass when it actually did, or threatened to, interfere with the 
intended functioning of the system, as by significantly reducing its available memory and processing 
power…. Intel does not claim the type of functional impact that spammers and robots have been 
alleged to cause…. The functional burden on Intel’s computers, or the cost in time to individual 
recipients, of receiving Hamidi’s occasional advocacy messages cannot be compared to the burdens 
and costs…[of handing] the ever-rising deluge of [spam emails like those seen in other cases]. 
Intel relies on language in the eBay decision suggesting that unauthorized use of another’s 
chattel is actionable even without any showing of injury: “Even if, as [defendant] BE argues, its 
searches use only a small amount of eBay’s computer system capacity, BE has nonetheless deprived 
eBay of the ability to use that portion of its personal property for its own purposes. The law 
recognizes no such right to use another’s personal property.” But as the eBay court went on 
immediately to find that the defendant’s conduct, if widely replicated, would likely impair the 
functioning of the plaintiffs system, we do not read the quoted remarks as expressing the court’s 
complete view of the issue. In isolation, moreover, they would not be a correct statement of 
California or general American law on this point. While one may have no right temporarily to use 
another’s personal property, such use is actionable as a trespass only if it has proximately caused 
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injury. In the absence of any actual damage the action will not lie. Short of dispossession, personal 
injury, or physical damage (not present here), intermeddling is actionable only if the chattel is 
impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel 
for a substantial time. In particular, an actionable deprivation of use must be for a time so substantial 
that it is possible to estimate the loss caused thereby. A mere momentary or theoretical deprivation 
of use is not sufficient unless there is a dispossession. That Hamidi’s messages temporarily used 
some portion of the Intel computers’ processors or storage is, therefore, not enough; Intel must, but 
does not, demonstrate some measurable loss from the use of its computer system. 
In addition to impairment of system functionality, CompuServe and its progeny also refer to the 
ISP’s loss of business reputation and customer goodwill, resulting from the inconvenience and cost 
that spam causes to its members, as harm to the ISP’s legally protected interests in its personal 
property. Intel argues that its own interest in employee productivity, assertedly disrupted by 
Hamidi’s messages, is a comparable protected interest in its computer system…. This theory of 
“impairment by content” threatens to stretch trespass law to cover injuries far afield from the harms 
to possession the tort evolved to protect. Intel’s theory would expand the tort of trespass to chattels 
to cover virtually any unconsented-to communication that, solely because of its content, is 
unwelcome to the recipient or intermediate transmitter. As the dissenting justice [in the Court of 
Appeal] explained,  
“Damage” of this nature—the distraction of reading or listening to an unsolicited 
communication—is not within the scope of the injury against which the trespass-
to-chattel tort protects, and indeed trivializes it. After all, the property interest 
protected by the old action of trespass was that of possession; and this has 
continued to affect the character of the action. Reading an e-mail transmitted to 
equipment designed to receive it, in and of itself, does not affect the possessory 
interest in the equipment. Indeed, if a chattel’s receipt of an electronic 
communication constitutes a trespass to that chattel, then not only are unsolicited 
telephone calls and faxes trespasses to chattel, but unwelcome radio waves and 
television signals also constitute a trespass to chattel every time the viewer 
inadvertently sees or hears the unwanted program. 
We agree. While unwelcome communications, electronic or otherwise, can cause a variety of injuries 
to economic relations, reputation and emotions, those interests are protected by other branches of 
tort law; in order to address them, we need not create a fiction of injury to the communication system. 
Nor may Intel appropriately assert a property interest in its employees’ time. The Restatement 
test clearly speaks in the first instance to the impairment of the chattel. But employees are not 
chattels (at least not in the legal sense of the term). Whatever interest Intel may have in preventing 
its employees from receiving disruptive communications, it is not an interest in personal property, 
and trespass to chattels is therefore not an action that will lie to protect it. Nor, finally, can the fact 
Intel staff spent time attempting to block Hamidi’s messages be bootstrapped into an injury to Intel’s 
possessory interest in its computers. To quote, again, from the dissenting opinion in the Court of 
Appeal: “[I]t is circular to premise the damage element of a tort solely upon the steps taken to 
prevent the damage. Injury can only be established by the completed tort’s consequences, not by the 
cost of the steps taken to avoid the injury and prevent the tort; otherwise, we can create injury for 
every supposed tort.” 
Intel connected its e-mail system to the Internet and permitted its employees to make use of this 
connection both for business and, to a reasonable extent, for their own purposes. In doing so, the 
company necessarily contemplated the employees’ receipt of unsolicited as well as solicited 
communications from other companies and individuals. That some communications would, 
because of their contents, be unwelcome to Intel management was virtually inevitable. Hamidi did 
nothing but use the e-mail system for its intended purpose—to communicate with employees. The 
system worked as designed, delivering the messages without any physical or functional harm or 
disruption. These occasional transmissions cannot reasonably be viewed as impairing the quality or 
value of Intel’s computer system. We conclude, therefore, that Intel has not presented undisputed 
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facts demonstrating an injury to its personal property, or to its legal interest in that property, that 
support, under California tort law, an action for trespass to chattels…. 
Kennard, Justice, concurring: 
…Intel has my sympathy. Unsolicited and unwanted bulk e-mail, most of it commercial, is a 
serious annoyance and inconvenience for persons who communicate electronically through the 
Internet, and bulk e-mail that distracts employees in the workplace can adversely affect overall 
productivity. But, as the majority persuasively explains, to establish the tort of trespass to chattels in 
California, the plaintiff must prove either damage to the plaintiff’s personal property or actual or 
threatened impairment of the plaintiff’s ability to use that property. Because plaintiff Intel has not 
shown that defendant Hamidi’s occasional bulk e-mail messages to Intel’s employees have damaged 
Intel’s computer system or impaired its functioning in any significant way, Intel has not established 
the tort of trespass to chattels. 
This is not to say that Intel is helpless either practically or legally. As a practical matter, Intel need 
only instruct its employees to delete messages from Hamidi without reading them and to notify 
Hamidi to remove their workplace e-mail addresses from his mailing lists. Hamidi’s messages 
promised to remove recipients from the mailing list on request, and there is no evidence that Hamidi 
has ever failed to do so. From a legal perspective, a tort theory other than trespass to chattels may 
provide Intel with an effective remedy if Hamidi’s messages are defamatory or wrongfully interfere 
with Intel’s economic interests. Additionally, the Legislature continues to study the problems caused 
by bulk e-mails and other dubious uses of modern communication technologies and may craft 
legislation that accommodates the competing concerns in these sensitive and highly complex areas…. 
Brown, Justice, dissenting: 
Candidate A finds the vehicles that candidate B has provided for his campaign workers, and A 
spray paints the water soluble message, “Fight corruption, vote for A” on the bumpers. The 
majority’s reasoning would find that notwithstanding the time it takes the workers to remove the 
paint and the expense they incur in altering the bumpers to prevent further unwanted messages, 
candidate B does not deserve an injunction unless the paint is so heavy that it reduces the cars’ gas 
mileage or otherwise depreciates the cars’ market value. Furthermore, candidate B has an obligation 
to permit the paint’s display, because the cars are driven by workers and not B personally, because 
B allows his workers to use the cars to pick up their lunch or retrieve their children from school, or 
because the bumpers display B’s own slogans. I disagree. 
Intel has invested millions of dollars to develop and maintain a computer system. It did this not 
to act as a public forum but to enhance the productivity of its employees. Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi 
sent as many as 200,000 e-mail messages to Intel employees. The time required to review and delete 
Hamidi’s messages diverted employees from productive tasks and undermined the utility of the 
computer system. There may be situations in which the value to the owner of a particular type of 
chattel may be impaired by dealing with it in a manner that does not affect its physical condition. 
This is such a case….  
Of course, Intel deserves an injunction even if its objections are based entirely on the e-mail’s 
content. Intel is entitled, for example, to allow employees use of the Internet to check stock market 
tables or weather forecasts without incurring any concomitant obligation to allow access to 
pornographic Web sites. A private property owner may choose to exclude unwanted mail for any 
reason, including its content…. Those who have contempt for grubby commerce and reverence for 
the rarified heights of intellectual discourse may applaud today’s decision, but even the flow of ideas 
will be curtailed if the right to exclude is denied…. 
Mosk, Justice, dissenting: 
 …The majority fail to distinguish open communication in the public “commons” of the Internet 
from unauthorized intermeddling on a private, proprietary intranet. Hamidi is not communicating 
in the equivalent of a town square or of an unsolicited “junk” mailing through the United States 
Postal Service. His action, in crossing from the public Internet into a private intranet, is more like 
intruding into a private office mailroom, commandeering the mail cart, and dropping off unwanted 
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broadsides on 30,000 desks. Because Intel’s security measures have been circumvented by Hamidi, 
the majority leave Intel, which has exercised all reasonable self-help efforts, with no recourse unless 
he causes a malfunction or systems “crash.” Hamidi’s repeated intrusions did more than merely 
“prompt discussions between ‘excited and nervous managers’ and the company’s human resource 
department” ; they also constituted a misappropriation of Intel’s private computer system contrary 
to its intended use and against Intel’s wishes…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Spot the Difference: What’s the difference between conversion and trespass to chattels?  
2. Self-Help: In justifying the type of rule applied in Intel, the Restatement asserts that 
“[s]ufficient legal protection of the possessor’s interest in the mere inviolability of his 
chattel is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his possession 
against even harmless interference.” What does that mean? And do you agree? 
3. Straight from the Horse’s Mouth: After the 
trial court enjoined Hamidi from sending 
unsolicited emails, he didn’t give up 
challenging Intel. As he put it, “They thought I 
was this bozo, coming here from some weird 
country. ‘He is helpless,’ ‘He will come to his 
knees.’” Unsatisfied with merely filing a legal 
appeal, he rode on horseback to Intel’s 
headquarters—as shown here—to deliver a 
floppy disk and later returned in a horse-
drawn carriage with 40,000 printed copies of 
an email notifying employees that he was 
barred from communicating with them 
through the internet. Could Intel have won 
punitive damages and an injunction barring 
him from the premises? Should trespass to 
land and trespass to chattels apply identically?ã 
 
NFT PROBLEM 
Twitter CEO, Jack Dorsey, recently auctioned off his inaugural tweet—“just setting up my twttr,” 
published on March 21, 2006—for $2.9m. The tweet was sold as a nonfungible token (NFT), a 
unique digital certificate e-signed and verified by Dorsey stating who owns the media and including 
the original tweet’s metadata. The buyer, Malaysia-based businessman Sina Estavi, celebrated with 
glee: “This is not just a tweet! I think years later people will realize the true value of this tweet, like 
the Mona Lisa painting.” 
Jane, a Silicon Valley businesswoman, thought the tweet belonged in the hands (or on the screen) 
of a Californian or nobody at all. She traveled to Malaysia and took Sina’s phone from a coffee-shop 
table. After cracking the phone’s passcode, she accessed the NFT on Sina’s cloud-based storage 
system and used malicious software to corrupt the NFT, making it impossible to see who owned the 
certificate or view the metadata. Sina was able to restore the NFT to its original condition 14 months 
later. He promptly flipped it for a $3.4m profit, in part due to the hype surrounding the scandal. 
(a) Despite the large profit, Sina wants to sue. Which tort gives him the best chance? 
(b) What if Sina restored the NFT in just five minutes?  
(c) What if, instead of corrupting the NFT, the malicious software irrevocably listed Jane’s 
name as the owner on the digital certificate? 
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TANK PROBLEM 
Lauren, who went blind at the age of 14 due to a childhood accident, now specializes in Supreme 
Court litigation at Nogan & Hix in Washington, D.C. Her guide dog, Tank, helps her with everyday 
tasks and getting to work. Lauren’s neighbor, Marco, constantly pets Tank, whistles at him, and says 
“hi buddy” even though Tank is working, Lauren politely asks Marco to refrain from doing so, and 
Tank’s vest reads “Do Not Pet.” 
Lauren lives in an apartment complex called The Haven. One morning, as she was taking Tank 
out to use the bathroom and play, she heard a yelp. Tank had sliced his paw on a piece of glass in 
the grassy area in middle of the complex. Lauren had an important meeting that day, but Tank 
simply couldn’t walk because of the paw injury. She missed the meeting and, as a result, failed to 
reach her billable-hours goal and missed out on a $75,000 bonus. It turns out that Vicky, Lauren’s 
old nemesis from law school who was also trying to make partner at Nogan & Hix, planted the glass. 
(a) Does Lauren have any viable claims for conversion or trespass to chattels? Based on what 
personal property? 
(b) Should Lauren sue anyone for battery?  




COPELAND v. HUBBARD BROADCASTING, INC. 
Court of Appeals of Minnesota (1995) 
Lansing, Judge:ã 
…In the spring of 1993, KSTP television [(owned and operated by 
Hubbard)] broadcast an investigative report on the practices of two 
metro-area veterinarians. One of the veterinarians, Dr. Sam Ulland, 
treated Greg and Betty Copeland’s cat. Before an April 1993 visit to 
the Copeland home, Dr. Ulland received the Copelands’ permission 
to bring along a student interested in a career in veterinary medicine. 
The student, Patty Johnson, did not tell the Copelands or Dr. Ulland 
that, in addition to being a part-time student at the University of 
Minnesota, she was also an employee of KSTP and was videotaping Dr. Ulland’s practice methods. 
When the investigative report was broadcast, it included two brief video portions filmed inside 
the Copelands’ house. The Copelands sued KSTP and Johnson (collectively KSTP) for trespass…. 
The district court…granted KSTP’s summary judgment motion on the trespass claim…. 
A trespass is committed when a person enters the land of another without consent. Consent may 
be implied from the conduct of the parties, but silence alone will not support an inference of consent. 
Consent may be geographically or temporally restricted. 
The district court concluded that KSTP was entitled to summary judgment on the Copelands’ 
trespass claim because Johnson did not exceed the geographic boundaries of the Copelands’ consent 
and the Copelands did not expressly limit their consent to Johnson’s educational or vocational goals. 
We read the case law differently…. Minnesota case law establishes that an entrant may become a 
trespasser by moving beyond the possessor’s invitation or permission. See State v. Brooks-Scanlon 
Lumber Co., 150 N.W. 912 (Minn. 1915) (when consent given to cut mature trees, cutting of 
immature trees exceeded scope of consent and constituted trespass). Although trespass in Brooks-
Scanlon related to tangible objects, the decision nonetheless demonstrates that the scope of consent 
can be exceeded even though the entrant remains within the geographic limits of the consent…. [In 
other words,] wrongful conduct following an authorized entry on land can result in trespass. 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, KSTP cites Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 
(N.D. Cal. 1993), for the proposition that the scope of consent can be exceeded only when physical 
 
ã Doug, Cat Collar (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0). 
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boundaries are crossed. Baugh is, however, factually distinguishable. In Baugh, the homeowner 
granted the broadcaster permission to videotape events at her house so long as they were not shown 
on television. The homeowner brought a trespass action when the videotape was subsequently 
broadcast. The court held that the scope of consent was not exceeded because the plaintiff agreed to 
the initial videotaping and the homeowner’s cause of action was not trespass. Baugh has limited 
applicability to this case because the Copelands did not consent to any videotaping. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized trespass as a remedy when broadcasters use secret 
cameras for newsgathering. Newsgathering does not create a license to trespass or to intrude by 
electronic means into the precincts of another’s home or office. 
Whether a possessor of land has given consent for entry is, when disputed, a factual issue. The 
district court determined that the Copelands did not present any evidence indicating that the scope 
of consent was limited to educational purposes. The record, however, indicates that consent was 
given only to allow a veterinary student to accompany Dr. Ulland. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Copelands, there is sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. The Fourth Estate: The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress 
shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Is Copeland 
sufficiently deferential to that constitutional command? Should there be a 
newsgathering exception to the tort of trespass?  
2. Newsgathering: Do you think Copeland comes out the same way if, instead of 
videotaping, Patty took a stealthy photo with her cellphone? Or an audio-only 
recording? What if Patty simply took notes while inside the Copelands’ home? Or if she 
took notes from memory once she got back to KSTP headquarters? 
3. Consent Conundrums: What if Patty reasonably but mistakenly believed that the 
Copelands consented to her videotaping? Would it matter if that mistaken belief was 
due to (1) her boss at KSTP showing her a forged videotaping consent form purportedly 
signed by the Copelands or (2) statements made by the Copelands that implied their 
knowledge and acceptance of the surreptitious recording? (Hint: The consent rules here 




DESNICK v. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (1995) 
Posner, Chief Judge: ã 
The plaintiffs—an ophthalmic clinic known as the “Desnick 
Eye Center” after its owner, Dr. Desnick, and two ophthalmic 
surgeons employed by the clinic, Glazer and Simon—appeal 
from the dismissal of their suit against the ABC television 
network, a producer of the ABC program PrimeTime 
Live named Entine, and the program’s star reporter, Donaldson. 
The suit is for trespass, defamation, and other torts arising out 
of the production and broadcast of a program segment 
of PrimeTime Live that was highly critical of the Desnick Eye 
Center…. The suit was dismissed for failure to state a claim…. 
In March of 1993 Entine telephoned Dr. Desnick and told him that PrimeTime Live wanted to 
do a broadcast segment on large cataract practices. The Desnick Eye Center has 25 offices in four 
midwestern states and performs more than 10,000 cataract operations a year, mostly on elderly 
persons whose cataract surgery is paid for by Medicare. The complaint alleges…that Entine told 
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Desnick that the segment would not be about just one cataract practice, that it would not involve 
“ambush” interviews or “undercover” surveillance, and that it would be “fair and balanced.” Thus 
reassured, Desnick permitted an ABC crew to videotape the Desnick Eye Center’s main premises in 
Chicago, to film a cataract operation “live,” and to interview doctors, technicians, and patients. 
Desnick also gave Entine a videotape explaining the Desnick Eye Center’s services. 
Unbeknownst to Desnick, Entine had dispatched persons equipped with concealed cameras to 
offices of the Desnick Eye Center in Wisconsin and Indiana. Posing as patients, these persons—
seven in all—requested eye examinations. Plaintiffs Glazer and Simon are among the employees of 
the Desnick Eye Center who were secretly videotaped examining these “test patients.” 
The program aired on June 10. Donaldson introduces the segment by saying, “We begin tonight 
with the story of a so-called ‘big cutter,’ Dr. James Desnick. In our undercover investigation of the 
big cutter you’ll meet tonight, we turned up evidence that he may also be a big charger, doing 
unnecessary cataract surgery for the money.” Brief interviews with four patients of the Desnick Eye 
Center follow. One of the patients is satisfied (“I was blessed”); the other three are not—one of them 
says, “If you got three eyes, he’ll get three eyes.” Donaldson then reports on the experiences of the 
seven test patients. The two who were under 65 and thus not eligible for Medicare reimbursement 
were told they didn’t need cataract surgery. Four of the other five were told they did. Glazer and 
Simon are shown recommending cataract surgery to them. Donaldson tells the viewer 
that PrimeTime Live has hired a professor of ophthalmology to examine the test patients who had 
been told they needed cataract surgery, and the professor tells the viewer that they didn’t need it—
with regard to one he says, “I think it would be near malpractice to do surgery on him.” Later in the 
segment he denies that this could just be an honest difference of opinion between professionals. 
An ophthalmic surgeon is interviewed who had turned down a job at the Desnick Eye Center 
because he would not have been “able to screen who I was going to operate on.” He claims to have 
been told by one of the doctors at the Center (not Glazer or Simon) that “as soon as I reject them 
[i.e., turn down a patient for cataract surgery], they’re going in the next room to get surgery.” A 
former marketing executive for the Center says Desnick took advantage of “people who had 
Alzheimer’s, people who did not know what planet they were on, people whose quality of life 
wouldn’t change one iota by having cataract surgery done.” Two patients are interviewed who report 
miserable experiences with the Center—one claiming that the doctors there had failed to spot an 
easily visible melanoma, another that as a result of unnecessary cataract surgery her “eye ruptured,” 
producing “running pus.” A former employee tells the viewer that Dr. Desnick alters patients’ 
medical records to show they need cataract surgery—for example, changing the record of one 
patient’s vision test from 20/30 to 20/80—and that he instructs all members of his staff to use pens 
of the same color in order to facilitate the alteration of patients’ records. 
One symptom of cataracts is that lights of normal brightness produce glare. Glazer is shown 
telling a patient, “You know, you’re getting glare. I would say we could do significantly better [with 
an operation].” And Simon is shown asking two patients, “Do you ever notice any glare or blurriness 
when you’re driving, or difficulty with the signs?” Both say no, and immediately Donaldson tells the 
viewer that “the Desnick Center uses a very interesting machine, called an auto-refractor, to 
determine whether there are glare problems.” Donaldson demonstrates the machine, then says that 
“Paddy Kalish is an optometrist who says that when he worked at the Desnick clinic from 1987 to 
1990, the machine was regularly rigged. He says he watched a technician tamper with the machine, 
this way”—and then Kalish gives a demonstration, adding, “This happened routinely for all the older 
patients that came in for the eye exams.” Donaldson reveals that Dr. Desnick has obtained a 
judgment against Kalish for defamation, but adds that “Kalish is not the only one to tell us the 
machine may have been rigged. PrimeTime talked to four other former Desnick employees who say 
almost everyone failed the glare test.” 
There is more, including mention of a proceeding begun by the Illinois Medical Board in which 
Dr. Desnick is charged with a number of counts of malpractice and deception—and an “ambush” 
interview. Donaldson accosts Desnick at O’Hare Airport and cries, “Is it true, Doctor, that you 
changed medical records to show less vision than your patients actually have? We’ve been told, 
Doctor, that you’ve changed the glare machine so we have a different reading. Is that correct? 
Doctor, why won’t you respond to the questions?” 
  TORT LAW 66 
The plaintiffs’ claims fall into two distinct classes. The first arises from the broadcast itself…. 
The broadcast is alleged to have defamed the three plaintiffs by charging that the glare machine is 
tampered with…. [Due to ongoing factual disputes, it] is not so clear at this stage that the defamation 
count of the complaint can properly be dismissed. The second class of claims in this case 
concerns…the methods that the defendants used to create the broadcast segment. [Specifically, 
plaintiffs allege] that the defendants committed a trespass in insinuating the test patients into the 
Wisconsin and Indiana offices of the Desnick Eye Center…. 
To enter upon another’s land without consent is a trespass. The force of this rule has, it is true, 
been diluted somewhat by concepts of privilege and of implied consent. But there is no journalists’ 
privilege to trespass. And there can be no implied consent in any non-fictitious sense of the term 
when express consent is procured by a misrepresentation or a misleading omission. The Desnick 
Eye Center would not have agreed to the entry of the test patients into its offices had it known they 
wanted eye examinations only in order to gather material for a television exposé of the Center and 
that they were going to make secret videotapes of the examinations. Yet some cases…deem consent 
effective even though it was procured by fraud. There must be something to this surprising result. 
Without it a restaurant critic could not conceal his identity when he ordered a meal, or a browser 
pretend to be interested in merchandise that he could not afford to buy. Dinner guests would be 
trespassers if they were false friends who never would have been invited had the host known their 
true character, and a consumer who in an effort to bargain down an automobile dealer falsely 
claimed to be able to buy the same car elsewhere at a lower price would be a trespasser in the dealer’s 
showroom. Some of these might be classified as privileged trespasses, designed to promote 
competition. Others might be thought justified by some kind of implied consent—the restaurant 
critic for example might point by way of analogy to the use of the “fair use” defense by book 
reviewers charged with copyright infringement and argue that the restaurant industry as a whole 
would be injured if restaurants could exclude critics. But most such efforts at rationalization would 
be little better than evasions. The fact is that consent to an entry is often given legal effect even 
though the entrant has intentions that if known to the owner of the property would cause him for 
perfectly understandable and generally ethical or at least lawful reasons to revoke his consent. 
The law’s willingness to give effect to consent procured by fraud is not limited to the tort of 
trespass. The Restatement gives the example of a man who obtains consent to sexual intercourse by 
promising a woman $100, yet (unbeknownst to her, of course) he pays her with a counterfeit bill 
and intended to do so from the start. The man is not guilty of battery, even though unconsented-to 
sexual intercourse is a battery. Yet we know that to conceal the fact that one has a venereal disease 
transforms “consensual” intercourse into battery. Seduction, standardly effected by false promises 
of love, is not rape; intercourse under the pretense of rendering medical or psychiatric treatment is, 
at least in most states. Trespass presents close parallels. If a homeowner opens his door to a 
purported meter reader who is in fact nothing of the sort—just a busybody curious about the interior 
of the home—the homeowner’s consent to his entry is not a defense to a suit for trespass. And 
likewise if a competitor gained entry to a business firm’s premises posing as a customer but in fact 
hoping to steal the firm’s trade secrets. 
How to distinguish the two classes of case—the seducer from the medical impersonator, the 
restaurant critic from the meter-reader impersonator? The answer can have nothing to do with 
fraud; there is fraud in all the cases. It has to do with the interest that the torts in question, battery 
and trespass, protect. The one protects the inviolability of the person, the other the inviolability of 
the person’s property. The woman who is seduced wants to have sex with her seducer, and the 
restaurant owner wants to have customers. The woman who is victimized by the medical 
impersonator has no desire to have sex with her doctor; she wants medical treatment. And the 
homeowner victimized by the phony meter reader does not want strangers in his house unless they 
have authorized service functions. The dealer’s objection to the customer who claims falsely to have 
a lower price from a competing dealer is not to the physical presence of the customer, but to the 
fraud that he is trying to perpetuate. The lines are not bright—they are not even inevitable. They are 
the traces of the old forms of action, which have resulted in a multitude of artificial distinctions in 
modern law. But that is nothing new. 
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There was no invasion in the present case of any of the specific interests that the tort of trespass 
seeks to protect. The test patients entered offices that were open to anyone expressing a desire for 
ophthalmic services and videotaped physicians engaged in professional, not personal, 
communications with strangers (the testers themselves). The activities of the offices were not 
disrupted,…[n]or was there any invasion of a person’s private space, as in our hypothetical meter-
reader case, as in the famous case of De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881) (where a doctor, 
called to the plaintiff’s home to deliver her baby, brought along with him a friend who was curious 
to see a birth but was not a medical doctor, and represented the friend to be his medical 
assistant)…and as in Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971), on which the plaintiffs 
in our case rely. Dietemann involved a home. True, the portion invaded was an office, where the 
plaintiff performed quack healing of nonexistent ailments. The parallel to this case is plain enough, 
but there is a difference. Dietemann was not in business, and did not advertise his services or charge 
for them. His quackery was private. 
No embarrassingly intimate details of anybody’s life were publicized in the present case. There 
was no eavesdropping on a private conversation; the testers recorded their own conversations with 
the Desnick Eye Center’s physicians. There was no violation of the doctor-patient privilege. There 
was no theft, or intent to steal, trade secrets; no disruption of decorum, of peace and quiet; no noisy 
or distracting demonstrations. Had the testers been undercover FBI agents, there would have been 
no violation of the Fourth Amendment, because there would have been no invasion of a legally 
protected interest in property or privacy. “Testers” who pose as prospective home buyers in order 
to gather evidence of housing discrimination are not trespassers even if they are private persons not 
acting under color of law. The situation of the defendants’ “testers” is analogous. Like testers seeking 
evidence of violation of anti-discrimination laws, the defendants’ test patients gained entry into the 
plaintiffs’ premises by misrepresenting their purposes (more precisely by a misleading omission to 
disclose those purposes). But the entry was not invasive in the sense of infringing the kind of interest 
of the plaintiffs that the law of trespass protects; it was not an interference with the ownership or 
possession of land. We need not consider what if any difference it would make if the plaintiffs had 
festooned the premises with signs forbidding the entry of testers or other snoops. Perhaps none, but 
that is an issue for another day…. 
One further point about the claims concerning the making of the program segment, as distinct 
from the content of the segment itself, needs to be made. The Supreme Court in the name of the 
First Amendment has hedged about defamation suits, even when not brought by public figures, with 
many safeguards designed to protect a vigorous market in ideas and opinions. Today’s “tabloid” 
style investigative television reportage, conducted by networks desperate for viewers in an 
increasingly competitive television market, constitutes—although it is often shrill, one-sided, and 
offensive, and sometimes defamatory—an important part of that market. It is entitled to all the 
safeguards with which the Supreme Court has surrounded liability for defamation. And it is entitled 
to them regardless of the name of the tort, and, we add, regardless of whether the tort suit is aimed 
at the content of the broadcast or the production of the broadcast. If the broadcast itself does not 
contain actionable defamation, and no established rights are invaded in the process of creating it 
(for the media have no general immunity from tort or contract liability), then the target has no legal 
remedy even if the investigatory tactics used by the network are surreptitious, confrontational, 
unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly…. 
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QUESTIONS 
1. If It Ducks Like a Quack: In Dietemann 
v. Time, mentioned briefly above in 
Desnick, two Life magazine reporters 
writing an article on medical quackery 
targeted Antone Dietemann, a disabled 
veteran and plumber who professed to 
heal people with herbs and other 
unusual remedies. The reporters entered 
Dietemann’s home posing as patients 
and used hidden cameras and 
microphones to photograph and record 
what happened. Life ultimately published the photos and a partial transcript of the 
conversation, while also giving the materials to a local district attorney, who prosecuted 
Dietemann for practicing medicine without a license. After Dietemann sued the 
magazine’s publisher, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Constitution doesn’t give 
reporters a special right to trespass or invade people’s privacy: “The First Amendment 
has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed 
during the course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license to trespass, 
to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another’s home or office. 
It does not become such a license simply because the person subjected to the intrusion 
is reasonably suspected of committing a crime.” Do you agree with that decision? Is 
Desnick to the contrary? Do undercover journalists need the First Amendment if they 
can rely on decisions like Desnick to raise the defense of consent? ã  
 
TECH SUPPORT PROBLEM 
Professor Peaves teaches Privacy Law at St. Mark’s School of Law. Despite being quite tech-savvy, 
she could never get her slides to show on the screen during class. One Friday, she stuck around after 
class to figure it out once and for all. After calling IT for some help, one of the support staff named 
Joan emailed Peaves a link and told her to click it. Peaves, who was using her personal laptop, did as 
Joan asked. Through the link, Joan seized control of Peaves’s computer and used it as an extension 
of her own. Peaves watched as Joan moved the mouse around and clicked various settings for a total 
of four minutes. 
On her end, Joan was downloading all of Peaves’s personal photos while deleting them from 
Peaves’s computer as she went along. Although the issue with the slides was resolved, a few days 
later Peaves found herself fired after some photos showing her engaging in illegal activity were sent 
to the Dean of St. Mark’s. 
(a) Suspecting Joan as the culprit, what possible tort claims does Peaves have?  
(b) Does consent defeat Peaves’s claim against Joan? 
(c) Once you’ve covered public disclosure of private facts, come back to this problem. Does 
Peaves have a viable claim? 
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CHAPTER 3:  COMMUNICATIONS TORTS  
A. Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D 
Publicity Given to Private Life (1965) 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private 
life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion 
of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind thatã  
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and  
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public…. 
a. Publicity.…“Publicity”…means that the matter is made 
public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so 
many persons that the matter must be regarded as 
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. The…means of communication…may be 
oral, written or by any other means…. Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy…to 
communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private life to a single person or even to a small group 
of persons. On the other hand, any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small 
circulation, or in a handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or any broadcast over the radio, 
or statement made in an address to a large audience, is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning 
of the term as it is used in this Section. The distinction, in other words, is one between private and 
public communication…. 
b. Private life.…There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to 
information about the plaintiff that is already public…. On the other hand, if the record is one not 
open to public inspection, as in the case of income tax returns, it is not public, and there is an 
invasion of privacy when it is made so. Similarly, there is no liability for giving further publicity to 
what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye. Thus he normally cannot complain when 
his photograph is taken while he is walking down the public street and is published in the defendant’s 
newspaper. Nor is his privacy invaded when the defendant gives publicity to a business or activity 
in which the plaintiff is engaged in dealing with the public. On the other hand, when a photograph 
is taken without the plaintiff’s consent in a private place, or one already made is stolen from his 
home, the plaintiff’s appearance that is made public when the picture appears in a newspaper is still 
a private matter, and his privacy is invaded. Every individual has some phases of his life and his 
activities and some facts about himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely 
to himself or at most reveals only to his family or to close friends. Sexual relations, for example, are 
normally entirely private matters, as are family quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or 
humiliating illnesses, most intimate personal letters, most details of a man’s life in his home, and 
some of his past history that he would rather forget. When these intimate details of his life are spread 
before the public gaze in a manner highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man, there is an 
actionable invasion of his privacy, unless the matter is one of legitimate public interest…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Judges and Juries: Who should decide whether publicizing a matter would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person? How about whether the matter is of legitimate public 
concern? Are these tasks better entrusted to judges or juries? What are the benefits and 
risks to each decisionmaker? 
2. Facebook Friends and Foes: How does comment a from Restatement § 652D translate 
into the digital age? If you post a private fact about someone on Twitter or Snapchat, are 
you on the hook? What about in a DM on Instagram? How about in a Facebook group 
or on your Facebook wall? 
 
ã Daniel Novta, Land of the Tabloids (CC BY 2.0). 
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SIDIS v. F-R PUBLISHING CORP. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1940) 
Clark, Judge: ã 
William James Sidis was the unwilling subject of a brief 
biographical sketch and cartoon printed in The New Yorker weekly 
magazine for August 14, 1937…. He brought an action in the district 
court against the publisher, F-R Publishing Corporation,…[and] 
alleged violation of his right of privacy….  
William James Sidis was a famous child prodigy in 1910. His 
name and prowess were well known to newspaper readers of the 
period. At the age of eleven, he lectured to distinguished 
mathematicians on the subject of Four-Dimensional Bodies. When 
he was sixteen, he was graduated from Harvard College, amid 
considerable public attention. Since then, his name has appeared in 
the press only sporadically, and he has sought to live as 
unobtrusively as possible. Until the articles objected to appeared in 
The New Yorker, he had apparently succeeded in his endeavor to avoid the public gaze. 
Among The New Yorker’s features are brief biographical sketches of current and past 
personalities. In the latter department, which appears haphazardly under the title of “Where Are 
They Now?” the article on Sidis was printed with a subtitle “April 
Fool.” The author describes his subject’s early accomplishments 
in mathematics and the wide-spread attention he received, then 
recounts his general breakdown and the revulsion which Sidis 
thereafter felt for his former life of fame and study. The 
unfortunate prodigy is traced over the years that followed, 
through his attempts to conceal his identity, through his chosen 
career as an insignificant clerk who would not need to employ 
unusual mathematical talents, and through the bizarre ways in 
which his genius flowered, as in his enthusiasm for collecting 
streetcar transfers and in his proficiency with an adding machine. 
The article closes with an account of an interview with Sidis at his 
present lodgings, “a hall bedroom of Boston’s shabby south end.” 
The untidiness of his room, his curious laugh, his manner of 
speech, and other personal habits are commented upon at length, 
as is his present interest in the lore of the Okamakammessett 
[tribe]. The subtitle is explained by the closing sentence, quoting Sidis as saying “with a grin” that it 
was strange, “but, you know, I was born on April Fool’s Day.” Accompanying the biography is a 
small cartoon showing the genius of eleven years lecturing to a group of astounded professors. 
It is not contended that any of the matter printed is untrue. Nor is the manner of the author 
unfriendly; Sidis today is described as having “a certain childlike charm.” But the article is merciless 
in its dissection of intimate details of its subject’s personal life, and this in company with elaborate 
accounts of Sidis’ passion for privacy and the pitiable lengths to which he has gone in order to avoid 
public scrutiny. The work possesses great reader interest, for it is both amusing and instructive; but 
it may be fairly described as a ruthless exposure of a once public character, who has since sought 
and has now been deprived of the seclusion of private life…. 
[W]e are asked to declare that this exposure transgresses upon plaintiff’s right of 
privacy…. None of the cited rulings goes so far as to prevent a newspaper or magazine from 
publishing the truth about a person, however intimate, revealing, or harmful the truth may be. Nor 
are there any decided cases that confer such a privilege upon the press…. 
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All comment upon the right of privacy must stem from the famous article by Warren and 
Brandeis on The Right of Privacy in 4 Harvard Law Review 193. The learned authors of that paper 
were convinced that some limits ought to be imposed upon the privilege of newspapers to publish 
truthful items of a personal nature[:] 
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and 
of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has 
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. The intensity 
and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered 
necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of 
culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have 
become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention 
have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and 
distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. 
Warren and Brandeis realized that the interest of the individual in privacy must inevitably 
conflict with the interest of the public in news. Certain public figures, they conceded, such as holders 
of public office, must sacrifice their privacy and expose at least part of their lives to public scrutiny 
as the price of the powers they attain. But even public figures were not to be stripped bare. “In 
general, then, the matters of which the publication should be repressed may be described as those 
which concern the private life, habits, acts, and relations of an individual, and have no legitimate 
connection with his fitness for a public office. Some things all men alike are entitled to keep from 
popular curiosity, whether in public life or not, while others are only private because the persons 
concerned have not assumed a position which makes their doings legitimate matters of public 
investigation.” Warren and Brandeis, supra, at 216. 
It must be conceded that under the strict standards suggested by these authors plaintiff’s right of 
privacy has been invaded. Sidis today is neither politician, public administrator, nor statesman. Even 
if he were, some of the personal details revealed were of the sort that Warren and Brandeis believed 
“all men alike are entitled to keep from popular curiosity.” 
But despite eminent opinion to the contrary, we are not yet disposed to afford to all of the 
intimate details of private life an absolute immunity from the prying of the press. Everyone will agree 
that at some point the public interest in obtaining information becomes dominant over the 
individual’s desire for privacy. Warren and Brandeis were willing to lift the veil somewhat in the 
case of public officers. We would go further, though we are not yet prepared to say how far. At least 
we would permit limited scrutiny of the “private” life of any person who has achieved, or has had 
thrust upon him, the questionable and indefinable status of a “public figure.” 
William James Sidis was once a public figure. As a child prodigy, he excited both admiration and 
curiosity. Of him great deeds were expected. In 1910, he was a person about whom the newspapers 
might display a legitimate intellectual interest, in the sense meant by Warren and Brandeis, as 
distinguished from a trivial and unseemly curiosity. But the precise motives of the press we regard 
as unimportant. And even if Sidis had loathed public attention at that time, we think his uncommon 
achievements and personality would have made the attention permissible. Since then Sidis has 
cloaked himself in obscurity, but his subsequent history, containing as it did the answer to the 
question of whether or not he had fulfilled his early promise, was still a matter of public concern. 
The article in The New Yorker sketched the life of an unusual personality, and it possessed 
considerable popular news interest. 
We express no comment on whether or not the news worthiness of the matter printed will always 
constitute a complete defense. Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the 
victim’s position as to outrage the community’s notions of decency. But when focused upon public 
characters, truthful comments upon dress, speech, habits, and the ordinary aspects of personality 
will usually not transgress this line. Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors 
and “public figures” are subjects of considerable interest and discussion to the rest of the population. 
And when such are the mores of the community, it would be unwise for a court to bar their 
expression in the newspapers, books, and magazines of the day. 
  TORT LAW 72 
Plaintiff…charged actual malice in the publication, and now claims that an order of dismissal 
was improper in the face of such an allegation. We cannot agree. If plaintiff’s right of privacy was 
not invaded by the article, the existence of actual malice in its publication would not change that 
result. Unless made so by statute, a truthful and therefore non-libelous statement will not become 
libelous when uttered maliciously. A similar rule should prevail on invasions of the right of privacy. 
Personal ill-will is not an ingredient of the offence, any more than in an ordinary case of trespass to 
person or to property. Nor does the malice give rise to an independent wrong based on an 
intentional invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in mental and emotional tranquillity. This interest, 
however real, is one not yet protected by the law…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. What’s the Matter (of Public Concern)? The court concludes that Sidis’s history 
remained a “matter of public concern.” Is this a descriptive or normative concept? 
Specifically, do we care whether people actually are concerned (descriptively) or whether 
they should be concerned (normatively)? 
2. Quasi-Constitutional Rules: Notice that Sidis never mentions the Constitution, nor 
does it explicitly invoke First Amendment freedoms of speech or the press. Instead, the 
court relies on the quasi-constitutional concept of whether liability would restrict 
communications about matters of public concern. As the Restatement explains in a 
“special note” following § 652D, although the Supreme Court “has placed a number of 
substantial restrictions on tort actions involving false and defamatory publications,” the 
questions of whether and when the public-disclosure tort is constitutional “has not been 
established with certainty.” Under Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), 
we know that the First Amendment bars recovery for disclosure of truthful facts that are 
a matter of public record—in that case, the name of a sexual-assault victim—but the case 
leaves unsettled whether courts may constitutionally impose liability for disclosing other 
private facts that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and that aren’t of 
legitimate concern. How is it possible that such important legal questions remain 
unanswered? What do you think the answer should be? 
3. Picketing Priests: Three priests protest a healthcare clinic by carrying large signs 
displaying the names of two women due to have abortions and imploring the women 
not to “kill their babies.” The women had kept their abortion plans private, but members 
of their community now see the signs and a passerby tweets photos from the scene. Are 
the priests liable for public disclosure of private facts? Does it matter how the priests 
discovered the women’s names? What if they had climbed into a nearby dumpster and 
found discarded schedules showing the clinic’s upcoming appointments? What if the 
women aren’t ashamed of their decision to get an abortion?  
 
DAILY TIMES DEMOCRAT v. GRAHAM 
Supreme Court of Alabama (1964) 
Harwood, Justice: ã 
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action 
charging an invasion by the defendant of the plaintiff’s right of privacy. 
Damages were assessed by the jury at $4,166.00…. 
Appellee is a woman 44 years of age who has lived in Cullman County, 
Alabama her entire life. She is married and has two sons, ages 10 and 8. 
The family resides in a rural community where her husband is engaged in 
the business of raising chickens. The appellee has led the usual life of a 
housewife in her community, participating in normal church and 
community affairs. 
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On 9 October 1961, the Cullman County Fair was in progress. On that day the appellee took her 
two children to the Fair. After going on some of the rides, the boys expressed a wish to go through 
what is called in the record the “Fun House.” The boys were afraid to enter alone so the appellee 
accompanied them. She testified she had never been through a Fun House before and had no 
knowledge that there was a device that blew jets of air up from the platform of the Fun House upon 
which one exited therefrom. 
The appellee entered the Fun House with her two boys and as she was leaving her dress was 
blown up by the air jets and her body was exposed from the waist down, with the exception of that 
portion covered by her “panties.” At this moment the appellant’s photographer snapped a picture 
of the appellee in this situation. This was done without the appellee’s knowledge or consent. Four 
days later the appellant published this picture on the front page of its newspaper…. On the Sunday 
following the publication of the picture, the appellee went into the city of Cullman. There she saw 
the appellant’s newspaper display with her picture on the front page in one of the appellant’s 
newspaper racks, and she also saw copies of the said newspaper in other places.  
While the appellee’s back was largely towards the camera in the picture, her two sons are in the 
picture, and the photograph was recognized as being of her by other people with whom she was 
acquainted. The matter of her photograph was mentioned to the appellee by others on several 
occasions. Evidence offered by the appellee during the trial tended to show that the appellee, as a 
result of the publication of the picture, became embarrassed, self-conscious, upset and was known 
to cry on occasions. 
Since the article by Warren and Brandeis, 4 Harvard Law Review 193, formulating the action for 
invasion of one’s privacy, the decisions in those states accepting such doctrine have been 
numerous…. Among the alternative statements of what may constitute an actionable invasion of 
one’s right of privacy, this court stated that such action accrued upon the wrongful intrusion into 
one’s private activities, in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation 
to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 
There is a fertile medium in this field of torts for the production of conflicts between the right of 
the individual to be let alone, and the right of the public to know—the latter concept being 
crystalized in our age old concept of freedom of speech and of the press. 
The right of action for invasion of privacy has had to give way to the interest of the public to be 
informed, where as stated by the late Dean Hepburn in his Cases on Torts: 
(4) It does not exist where the person has published the material complained of or 
consented thereto. It does not exist where a person has become so prominent that 
by his very prominence he has dedicated his life to the public and thereby waived 
his right to privacy. (5) There can be no privacy in that which is already public. 
(6) It does not exist in the dissemination of news and news events nor in the 
discussion of events of the life of a person in whom the public has a rightful interest, 
nor where the information would be of public benefit as in the case of a candidate 
for public office. 
…Counsel [for the appellant] contends that as a matter of law the publication of the photograph 
was a matter of legitimate news of interest to the public; that the publishing of the picture was in 
connection with a write-up of the Fair, which was a matter of legitimate news. If this be so, then of 
course the appellant would have been privileged to have published the picture…. We can see nothing 
of legitimate news value in the photograph. Certainly it discloses nothing as to which the public is 
entitled to be informed. Even so,…Mr. Prosser in his article on “Privacy” observes: “It may 
nevertheless be suggested that there must be yet some undefined limits of common decency as to 
what can be published about anyone; and that a photograph of indecent exposure, for example, can 
never be legitimate ‘news.’” 
In the Restatement of the Law of Torts…it is provided: “A person who unreasonably and 
seriously interferes with another’s interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness 
exhibited to the public is liable to the other.” In the comment under this section it is stated: “These 
limits” (justifiable invasion of privacy) “are exceeded where intimate details of the life of one who 
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has never manifested a desire to have publicity are exposed to the public, or where photographs of a 
person in an embarrassing pose are surreptitiously taken and published.” 
Not only was this photograph embarrassing to one of normal sensibilities, we think it could 
properly be classified as obscene, in that “obscene” means offensive to modesty or decency; or 
expressing to the mind or view something which delicacy, purity, or decency forbid to be expressed…. 
Counsel further argues that the court erred in refusal of appellant’s requested affirmative charges 
in that appellee’s picture was taken at the time she was a part of a public scene, and the publication 
of the photograph could not therefore be deemed an invasion of her privacy as a matter of law. The 
proposition for which appellant contends is probably best illustrated by the following quotation 
from Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1963): 
On the public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no right to be 
alone, and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than follow him about. 
Neither is it such an invasion to take his photograph in such a place, since this 
amounts to nothing more than making a record, not differing essentially from a 
full written description of a public sight which anyone present would be free to see. 
Admittedly this principle is established by the cases…. [But] when a legal principle is pushed to 
an absurdity, the principle is not abandoned, but the absurdity avoided. In other words, a purely 
mechanical application of legal principles should not be permitted to create an illogical conclusion. 
To hold that one who is involuntarily and instantaneously enmeshed in an embarrassing pose 
forfeits her right of privacy merely because she happened at the moment to be part of a public scene 
would be illogical, wrong, and unjust. 
One who is a part of a public scene may be lawfully photographed as an incidental part of that 
scene in his ordinary status. Where the status he expects to occupy is changed without his volition 
to a status embarrassing to an ordinary person of reasonable sensitivity, then he should not be 
deemed to have forfeited his right to be protected from an indecent and vulgar intrusion of his right 
of privacy merely because misfortune overtakes him in a public place…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Community Standards: How is the outrageousness of a disclosure determined by a 
community-based standard? And how should the law deal with shifting conceptions of 
privacy in the modern world? Should the legal rules adjust over time, or do we need 
those rules to remain stable to prevent changing social norms from eroding our privacy?ã 
2. The Streisand Effect: In 2003, 
singer-actress Barbara Streisand 
sued an environmentalist 
photographer, Kenneth 
Adelman, who took an aerial 
photo of her house for the 
California Coastal Records 
Project, an initiative showing 
degradation of the California 
coast. The trial court held that 
the photo captured a matter of 
public concern, noting that 
Streisand had opened her home to reporters in the past and that no one was visible in the 
photo. This case is the root of the so-called “Streisand Effect”—a social phenomenon that 
occurs when efforts to hide information has the unintended consequence of further 
publicizing it, often via the internet. The Streisand Effect can also be understood as a legal 
phenomenon, particularly for privacy torts: suing can garner greater attention, thereby 
worsening the privacy invasion sought to be remedied by the lawsuit. Indeed, before 
Streisand sued, the photo was downloaded six times (twice by her lawyers); after the 
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lawsuit, 420,000 people did so in a month. For a 
recent example involving a different tort, 
consider the parody Twitter account, Devin 
Nunes’ cow (@DevinCow). Unamused, 
Congressman Devin Nunes sued the satirist 
(and Twitter) for defamation. The account had 
1,200 followers before the lawsuit, but soon 
boasted over 600,000 acolytes. Are the potential 
benefits of suing worth the likely costs? 
 
TOUR DE ATLANTA PROBLEM 
Jaden had just finished second in the Tour de Atlanta, a 105-mile bike race through Metro Atlanta. 
President Bennett, an Atlanta native and avid cyclist, was preparing to award the medals when Jaden 
noticed a woman reaching into her fanny pack for what looked like a small pistol. Jaden made his way 
towards the woman, relying on his instincts from a brief stint in the military. The would-be assassin 
got a shot off, but Jaden grabbed her arm just as she fired. The bullet missed the president. 
Jaden became an instant media star. A few newspapers speculated as to why President Bennett 
hadn’t publicly thanked Jaden. The Gwinnett Globe, for example, published an piece suggesting that 
Jaden was a prominent member of Savannah’s gay community and claiming that Jaden’s sexual 
orientation explained the president’s silence. Jaden sues the Globe for public disclosure of private facts. 
(a) What would Jaden’s main arguments be? And the Globe’s counterarguments?  
(b) What if Jaden wasn’t prominent in Savannah’s gay community and the only people who 
knew of his sexual orientation were members of his pickup basketball team? 
(c) What if Jaden isn’t gay and is happily married to his high-school sweetheart, Cindy, 
who’s mortified about the Globe story? 
(d) Would it matter whether this incident happened during or after the era of “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell,” a U.S. government directive that barred openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
people from military service from 1994 to 2011? 
(e) The Globe argues that this sort of “speculation” about the president’s motivations 
constitutes a “newsworthy” fact. If the court agrees, does that give media outlets undue 
power to evade liability under this tort?  
(f) What other claims might Jaden bring? Is our next tort, defamation, a viable option? 
 
B. Defamation 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558–559, 564–566 
Invasions of Interest in Reputation (1965) 
To create liability for defamation there must be:  
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; 
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;  
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and  
(d) [harm]. 
A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him 
in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him….  
A defamatory communication is made concerning the person to whom its recipient correctly, or 
mistakenly but reasonably, understands that it was intended to refer…. 
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement of fact…. [Or it] may consist of a 
statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the 
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion. 
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QUESTIONS 
1. Defaming the Dead: Some tort claims can survive a person’s death. Not so with 
defamation. As Don Herzog observes in his 2017 book, Defaming the Dead: “Any 
journalist will assure you it’s axiomatic that there’s no such thing as defaming the dead. 
Not that it’s impossible to publish false statements of fact that damage their reputations: 
nothing easier. Rather that once you’re dead, tort law will not protect your reputation.” 
Does this rule square with the goals of tort law? And is it consistent with the interests 
underlying the tort of defamation? (Note the curious statute that appears unique to 
Rhode Island: if you’re defamed in an obituary within three months of your death, your 
estate may sue.) 
2. Write No Evil, Speak No Evil, Do No Evil: Libel consists of publishing defamatory 
matter by written or printed words, whereas slander usually involves defamation by 
spoken words. A person may even defame through gestures by using hand motions, 
facial expressions, and other bodily movements to substitute for words. Some states also 
permit “defamation by conduct” when a person’s physical actions, though not intended 
to substitute for words, convey a defamatory message to anybody watching. Can you 





NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. SULLIVAN 
Supreme Court of Alabama (1962) 
Harwood, Justice: 
This is an appeal from a judgment in the 
amount of $500,000.00 awarded as damages in 
a libel suit. The plaintiff below was L. B. 
Sullivan, a member of the Board of 
Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, 
where he served as Police Commissioner. The 
defendants below were The New York 
Times…and four [civil-rights activists and 
associates of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.], Ralph 
D. Abernathy, Fred L. Shuttlesworth, S. S. Seay, 
Sr., and J. E. Lowery. [The plaintiff’s complaint 
alleged that the defendants published an 
advertisement in the New York Times entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices” that contained “false and 
defamatory matter or charges reflecting upon the conduct of the plaintiff…and imputing improper 
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conduct to him, and subjecting him to public contempt, ridicule and shame, and prejudicing the 
plaintiff in his office, profession, trade or business, with an intent to defame the plaintiff.”]… 
We hold that the matter complained of is…libelous per se, if it was published of and concerning 
the plaintiff…. The [trial] court did not err in overruling the demurrer…. 
It is appellant’s contention that refusal [to properly instruct the jury] contravenes Amendment 
One of the United States Constitution and results in an improper restraint of freedom of the press…. 
In argument in support of this assignment, counsel for appellant asserts that the advertisement was 
only an appeal for support of King and “thousands of Southern Negro students” said to be “engaged 
in widespread non-violent demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to live in human 
dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights.” The fallacy of such argument 
is that it overlooks the libelous portions of the advertisement which are the very crux of this suit. 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not protect libelous publications…. 
Counsel have also argued…that error infects this record because, (1) the courtroom was 
segregated during the trial below, and (2) the trial judge was not duly and legally elected because of 
alleged deprivation of voting rights to negroes. Neither of the above matters were presented in the 
trial below, and cannot now be presented for review…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Counting Chickens: After the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the Alabama 
Supreme Court’s decision, legend has it that Sullivan asked his lawyer “Can they win?” 
and the lawyer replied “The Supreme Court would have to change 200 years of libel law 
for us to lose!” What do you think happened next? 
 
NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. SULLIVAN 
Supreme Court of the United States (1964) 
Brennan, Justice: 
We are required in this case to determine for the 
first time the extent to which the constitutional 
protections for speech and press limit a State’s power 
to award damages in a libel action brought by a public 
official against critics of his official conduct. 
Respondent L. B. Sullivan…brought this civil libel 
action against the four individual petitioners, who are 
Negroes and Alabama clergymen, and against 
petitioner the New York Times 
Company…. Respondent’s complaint alleged that he 
had been libeled by statements in a full-page 
advertisement that was carried in the New York Times 
on March 29, 1960. Entitled “Heed Their Rising 
Voices,” the advertisement began by stating that “As 
the whole world knows by now, thousands of Southern 
Negro students are engaged in widespread non-violent 
demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to 
live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.” It went on to 
charge that “in their efforts to uphold these guarantees, 
they are being met by an unprecedented wave of terror 
by those who would deny and negate that document 
which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for modern freedom.” 
Succeeding paragraphs purported to illustrate the “wave of terror” by describing certain alleged 
events. The text concluded with an appeal for funds for three purposes: support of the student 
movement, “the struggle for the right-to-vote,” and the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
leader of the movement, against a perjury indictment then pending in Montgomery…. 
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Of the 10 paragraphs of text in the advertisement, the third and a portion of the sixth were the 
basis of respondent’s claim of libel. They read as follows: 
Third paragraph: 
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang ‘My Country, ‘Tis of Thee’ on the 
State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truckloads of police 
armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When 
the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their 
dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission. 
Sixth paragraph: 
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King’s peaceful protests 
with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost killing his wife 
and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times—for 
‘speeding,’ ‘loitering’ and similar ‘offenses.’ And now they have charged him with 
‘perjury’—a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years. 
Although neither of these statements mentions respondent by name, he contended that the word 
“police” in the third paragraph referred to him as the Montgomery Commissioner who supervised 
the Police Department, so that he was being accused of “ringing” the campus with police. He further 
claimed that the paragraph would be read as imputing to the police, and hence to him, the 
padlocking of the dining hall in order to starve the students into submission. As to the sixth 
paragraph, he contended that since arrests are ordinarily made by the police, the statement “They 
have arrested [Dr. King] seven times” would be read as referring to him; he further contended that 
the “They” who did the arresting would be equated with the “They” who committed the other 
described acts and with the “Southern violators.” Thus, he argued, the paragraph would be read as 
accusing the Montgomery police, and hence him, of answering Dr. King’s protests with 
“intimidation and violence,” bombing his home, assaulting his person, and charging him with 
perjury. Respondent and six other Montgomery residents testified that they read some or all of the 
statements as referring to him in his capacity as Commissioner. ã 
It is uncontroverted that some of the 
statements contained in the paragraphs 
were not accurate descriptions of events 
which occurred in Montgomery. 
Although Negro students staged a 
demonstration on the State Capitol steps, 
they sang the National Anthem and not 
“My Country, ‘Tis of Thee.” Although 
nine students were expelled by the State 
Board of Education, this was not for 
leading the demonstration at the Capitol, but for demanding service at a lunch counter in the 
Montgomery County Courthouse on another day…. Although the police were deployed near the 
campus in large numbers on three occasions, they did not at any time “ring” the campus, and they 
were not called to the campus in connection with the demonstration on the State Capitol steps, as 
the third paragraph implied. Dr. King had not been arrested seven times, but only four; and although 
he claimed to have been assaulted some years earlier in connection with his arrest for loitering 
outside a courtroom, one of the officers who made the arrest denied that there was such an assault…. 
Respondent made no effort to prove that he suffered actual pecuniary loss as a result of the 
alleged libel. One of his witnesses, a former employer, testified that if he had believed the statements, 
he doubted whether he “would want to be associated with anybody who would be a party to such 
things that are stated in that ad,” and that he would not re-employ respondent if he believed “that 
he allowed the Police Department to do the things that the paper say he did.” But neither this witness 
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nor any of the others testified that he had actually believed the statements in their supposed reference 
to respondent…. 
Alabama law denies a public officer recovery of punitive damages in a libel action brought on 
account of a publication concerning his official conduct unless he first makes a written demand for 
a public retraction and the defendant fails or refuses to comply. Respondent served such a demand 
upon each of the petitioners. None of the individual petitioners responded to the demand, primarily 
because each took the position that he had not authorized the use of his name on the advertisement 
and therefore had not published the statements that respondent alleged had libeled him. The Times 
did not publish a retraction in response to the demand, but wrote respondent a letter stating, among 
other things, that “we are somewhat puzzled as to how you think the statements in any way reflect 
on you,” and “you might, if you desire, let us know in what respect you claim that the statements in 
the advertisement reflect on you.” Respondent filed this suit a few days later without answering…. 
The trial judge submitted the case to the jury under instructions that the statements in the 
advertisement were libelous per se and were not privileged, so that petitioners might be held liable 
if the jury found that they had published the advertisement and that the statements were made “of 
and concerning” respondent. The jury was instructed that, because the statements were libelous per 
se, “the law implies legal injury from the bare fact of publication itself,” “falsity and malice are 
presumed,” “general damages need not be alleged or proved but are presumed,” and “punitive 
damages may be awarded by the jury even though the amount of actual damages is neither found 
nor shown.”… In affirming the judgment, the Supreme Court of Alabama sustained the trial judge’s 
rulings and instructions in all respects. It held that “where the words published tend to injure a 
person libeled by them in his reputation, profession, trade or business, or charge him with an 
indictable offense, or tend to bring the individual into public contempt,” they are “libelous per se.”… 
We reverse the judgment. We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is 
constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press 
that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public 
official against critics of his official conduct…. 
Under Alabama law as applied in this case, a publication is “libelous per se” if the words “tend 
to injure a person…in his reputation” or to “bring [him] into public contempt”; the trial court stated 
that the standard was met if the words are such as to “injure him in his public office, or impute 
misconduct to him in his office, or want of official integrity, or want of fidelity to a public trust.” 
The jury must find that the words were published “of and concerning” the plaintiff, but where the 
plaintiff is a public official his place in the governmental hierarchy is sufficient evidence to support 
a finding that his reputation has been affected by statements that reflect upon the agency of which 
he is in charge. Once “libel per se” has been established, the defendant has no defense as to stated 
facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their particulars…. The question 
before us is whether this rule of liability, as applied to an action brought by a public official against 
critics of his official conduct, abridges the freedom of speech and of the press that is guaranteed by 
the first and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Respondent relies heavily, as did the Alabama courts, on statements of this Court to the effect 
that the Constitution does not protect libelous publications…[, but none] of the cases sustained the 
use of libel laws to impose sanctions upon expression critical of the official conduct of public 
officials…. The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by 
the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions….  
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may 
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and 
public officials. The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the 
major public issues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection. The 
question is whether it forfeits that protection by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by 
its alleged defamation of respondent. 
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to 
recognize an exception for any test of truth—whether administered by judges, juries, or 
administrative officials—and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker. 
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The constitutional protection does not turn upon the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas 
and beliefs which are offered. As Madison said, “Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper 
use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.” 4 Elliot’s Debates 
on the Federal Constitution (1876)…. That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that 
it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the “breathing space” that they “need 
to survive,” [has been widely recognized.]  
Injury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be 
free than does factual error…. This is true even though the utterance contains “half-truths” and 
“misinformation.”… Criticism of [government actors’] official conduct does not lose its constitutional 
protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations. 
If neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from 
criticism of official conduct, the combination of the two elements is no less inadequate. This is the 
lesson to be drawn from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798, which first crystallized 
a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment. That statute made it a crime, 
punishable by a $5,000 fine and five years in prison, “if any person shall write, print, utter or publish 
any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, 
or either house of the Congress, or the President, with intent to defame or to bring them, or either 
of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred 
of the good people of the United States.” The Act allowed the defendant the defense of truth…[but] 
was vigorously condemned as unconstitutional in an attack joined in by Jefferson and Madison…. 
The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison’s view, 
a fundamental principle of the American form of government. Although the Sedition Act was never 
tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history…. 
What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise 
beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked 
by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a 
criminal statute…. Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the pall 
of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere 
in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive. 
The state rule of law is not saved by its allowance of the defense of truth…. A rule compelling 
the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on pain 
of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—leads to…“self-censorship.” Allowance of the 
defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech 
will be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the 
difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars. Under 
such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even 
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be 
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which 
steer far wider of the unlawful zone. The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public 
debate…. The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public 
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless 
he proves that the statement was made with “actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false 
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not…. 
We hold today that the Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in 
actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. Since this is such an 
action, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable…. [W]e consider that the proof 
presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard 
demands, and hence that it would not constitutionally sustain the judgment for respondent under 
the proper rule of law. The case of the individual petitioners requires little discussion. Even assuming 
that they could constitutionally be found to have authorized the use of their names on the 
advertisement, there was no evidence whatever that they were aware of any erroneous statements or 
were in any way reckless in that regard…. 
As to the Times, we similarly conclude that the facts do not support a finding of actual malice. 
The statement by the Times’ Secretary that, apart from the padlocking allegation, he thought the 
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advertisement was “substantially correct,” affords no constitutional warrant for the Alabama 
Supreme Court’s conclusion that it was a “cavalier ignoring of the falsity of the advertisement from 
which the jury could not have but been impressed with the bad faith of The Times, and its 
maliciousness inferable therefrom.” The statement does not indicate malice at the time of the 
publication; even if the advertisement was not “substantially correct”—although respondent’s own 
proofs tend to show that it was—that opinion was at least a reasonable one, and there was no 
evidence to impeach the witness’ good faith in holding it…. 
We also think the evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect: it was incapable of 
supporting the jury’s finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made “of and concerning” 
respondent…. There was no reference to respondent in the advertisement, either by name or official 
position. A number of the allegedly libelous statements—the charges that the dining hall was 
padlocked and that Dr. King’s home was bombed, his person assaulted, and a perjury prosecution 
instituted against him—did not even concern the police; despite the ingenuity of the arguments 
which would attach this significance to the word “They,” it is plain that these statements could not 
reasonably be read as accusing respondent of personal involvement in the acts in question…. 
Although the statements may be taken as referring to the police, they did not on their face make 
even an oblique reference to respondent as an individual….  
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reversed and the case is remanded to that 
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion…. 
Black, Justice, concurring: 
I concur in reversing this half-million-dollar judgment against the New York Times Company 
and the four individual defendants…. I base my vote to reverse on the belief that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments not merely “delimit” a State’s power to award damages to “public officials 
against critics of their official conduct” but completely prohibit a State from exercising such a power. 
The Court goes on to hold that a State can subject such critics to damages if “actual malice” can be 
proved against them. “Malice,” even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to 
prove and hard to disprove. The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent 
protection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to the 
sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment. Unlike the Court, therefore, I vote to reverse 
exclusively on the ground that the Times and the individual defendants had an absolute, 
unconditional constitutional right to publish in the Times advertisement their criticisms of the 
Montgomery agencies and officials…. In my opinion the Federal Constitution has dealt with this 
deadly danger to the press in the only way possible without leaving the free press open to 
destruction—by granting the press an absolute immunity for criticism of the way public officials do 
their public duty…. We would, I think, more faithfully interpret the First Amendment by holding 
that at the very least it leaves the people and the press free to criticize officials and discuss public 
affairs with impunity….  
This Nation, I suspect, can live in peace without libel suits based on public discussions of public 
affairs and public officials. But I doubt that a country can live in freedom where its people can be 
made to suffer physically or financially for criticizing their government, its actions, or its officials…. 
An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I consider to be the 
minimum guarantee of the First Amendment. I regret that the Court has stopped short of this 
holding indispensable to preserve our free press from destruction. 
Goldberg, Justice, concurring in the result: 
…In my view, the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution afford to the citizen 
and to the press an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm 
which may flow from excesses and abuses. The prized American right to speak one’s mind about 
public officials and affairs needs breathing space to survive… 
The conclusion that the Constitution affords the citizen and the press an absolute privilege for 
criticism of official conduct does not leave the public official without defenses against 
unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate misstatements. Under our system of government, 
counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose these matters, not abridgment 
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of free speech. The public official certainly has equal if not greater access than most private citizens 
to media of communication…. As Mr. Justice Brandeis correctly observed, “sunlight is the most 
powerful of all disinfectants.”… 
QUESTIONS 
1. Malicious Misnomer: Sullivan is famous for establishing “actual malice” as a 
constitutional standard in defamation claims. Read the actual-malice standard carefully. 
Must the plaintiff show that the defendant was being cruel or intended to do harm? Does 
the standard contain the biggest misnomer in constitutional law? 
2. Sullivan’s Creep: It didn’t take long for the Court to extend the actual-malice standard 
to other prominent but non-governmental plaintiffs, starting with a university’s athletic 
director in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court then flirted 
with greater doctrinal expansion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S 29 (1971), 
when a plurality sought to apply the rule to all defamation claims involving speech on 
matters of public concern, regardless of whether the plaintiff was a public or private 
figure. This approach was rebuffed in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), 
when the Court endorsed it for only public figures—that is, any defamation plaintiff who 
has “pervasive fame or notoriety” (general public figures) or who “voluntarily injects 
himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy” (limited-purpose public 
figures). Notably, the Gertz Court mused ambiguously about another potential public 
figure, observing that “truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare.” This 
remark has been prophetic: the Court hasn’t encountered its mythical character in the 
forty years that have since passed. What should the rule be for those involuntarily thrust 
into the limelight? Does the internet make public figures of us all? Note also the 
plurality’s decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 
(1985), holding that the actual-malice standard doesn’t apply to “speech on matters of 
purely private concern.”  
3. Party Poopers: Eminent First Amendment scholar Alexander Meiklejohn famously said 
that the Sullivan decision was “an occasion for dancing in the streets.” Nearly sixty years 
later, do you still feel like partying? At least two current Supreme Court justices, it seems, 
don’t like the music. Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari) (urging reconsideration of Sullivan “given the momentous 
changes in the Nation’s media landscape since 1964” and the fact that “private citizens 
can become ‘public figures’ on social media overnight”); McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (describing Sullivan and its 
progeny as “policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional law”). 
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POTTER PROBLEM 
Harry Potter lives in Little 
Whinging at number four Privet 
Drive, the home of his aunt and 
uncle, Petunia and Vernon Dursley. 
One summer day, Harry is out in the 
garden and sees a pair of large eyes 
watching him from the bushes—the 
eyes of Dobby the house-elf, a 
magical servant belonging to the 
wicked Malfoy family. Over the 
course of the summer, Dobby has 
been intercepting all of Harry’s owl post—birthday cards and all—in an attempt to keep Harry from 
returning to Hogwarts School, where Dobby fears Harry will be in danger. 
On the night of a special dinner at the Dursleys’ home with Mr. and Mrs. Mason, Dobby creeps 
upstairs into Harry’s bedroom. Harry invites him to sit down, leading Dobby to howl in distress. 
After refusing to return Harry’s mail, Dobby makes enough noise to startle Uncle Vernon, who 
comes upstairs, spitting with rage, and furiously yells at Harry to “shut it” or Harry would wish he’d 
“never been born.” After Uncle Vernon leaves, Dobby attempts to convince Harry not to go back to 
Hogwarts. When Harry refuses and tells Dobby to leave before he gets Harry in trouble, Dobby runs 
downstairs to the kitchen and levitates Aunt Petunia’s glorious pudding before Harry’s eyes, making 
Harry’s stomach sink with dread. “No,” pleads Harry, “they’ll kill me!” Dobby says he won’t throw 
the pudding if Harry promises to remain at the Dursleys’ house during the upcoming school year. 
When Harry again refuses to swear that he won’t return to Hogwarts, Dobby replies, “Then Dobby 
must do it, sir, for Harry Potter’s own good.” Dobby floats the pudding into the living room and, to 
the Dursleys’ shock, drops it on Mrs. Mason’s hat, splattering the guests and walls with cream and 
shattering the dish. Uncle Vernon tells Harry that he’s going to flay him to within an inch of his life 
when the Masons leave. An owl sent by Mafalda Hopkirk at the Ministry of Magic’s Improper Use 
of Magic Office then flies into the living room and drops a letter on Mrs. Mason’s head, making her 
scream like a banshee and run from the house. Mr. Mason storms out, telling the Dursleys that his 
wife is terrified of birds. An enraged Uncle Vernon locks Harry in his room, barely feeding him and 
letting him out only to use the bathroom. 
After not hearing from Harry all summer, Harry’s friend Ron Weasley grows concerned. He and 
his brothers, Fred and George, fly their father’s magical car to Little Whinging. They tie ropes to the 
bars that Uncle Vernon has attached to Harry’s bedroom window and dislodge the bars and part of 
the window. Uncle Vernon storms into the bedroom, grabbing Harry’s leg as he attempts to escape. 
Harry kicks out, sending his uncle flying backwards, and jumps into the car as it flies away. 
(a) What tort claims should be brought? 
(b) What counterarguments and defenses should be raised? 
(c) What factual uncertainties would need to be resolved?  
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CHAPTER 4:  NEGLIGENCE  
A. Injury 
There are four basic elements to a negligence claim: injury, duty, breach, and cause. We start 
with the simplest—injury. Several types of harm can constitute injury under negligence law. One is 
bodily injury, meaning physical harm to your body. Another is property injury, such as damage to 
your land, buildings, or possessions. Then there’s economic injury, including loss of wealth. And 
finally there’s emotional injury, like any distress you experience caused by a tortious act. 
Note that the legal issue of injury is conceptually distinct from that of damages, though there’s 
certainly overlap between the two. Injury is an element that the plaintiff must satisfy in order to state 
a viable negligence claim; only those plaintiffs alleging the right sort of injury caused by the 
defendant’s actions may proceed in litigating their case. Damages, by contrast, are the typical remedy 
that tort law provides to those who establish injury and the remaining elements of negligence. You 
can certainly receive damages for your injuries, but not all damages are designed to compensate you 
for your injuries. We’ll return to damages in Chapter 6. For now, consider the following case as an 
introduction to injury and the remaining elements of a negligence claim. 
 
WALTER v. WAL-MART STORES, INC. 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (2000) 
Calkins, Justice: ã 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. appeals from a judgment…following 
a jury trial awarding damages to Antoinette Walter in the 
amount of $550,000 for her claim of pharmacist malpractice…. 
I. FACTS 
Walter, an eighty-year-old resident of Rockland, was 
diagnosed with a type of cancer which attacks the lymphatic 
system. Dr. Stephen Ross, Walter’s treating physician and a 
board-certified oncologist, termed her condition treatable with 
the proper medication. Dr. Ross prescribed Chlorambucil, a chemotherapy drug, for Walter. On the 
prescription slip, he explicitly called for Chlorambucil, the generic name, because he feared that the 
drug’s brand name, Leukeran, could be confused with other drugs with similar trade names. 
Walter took the prescription for Chlorambucil to the pharmacy in the Wal-Mart store in 
Rockland on May 7, 1997. Henry Lovin, a Maine licensed pharmacist and an employee of Wal-Mart, 
was on duty at the pharmacy. Instead of giving Walter Chlorambucil, as called for in the 
prescription, Lovin gave her a different drug with the brand name of Melphalen. The generic name 
for Melphalen is Alkeran. Lovin did not speak with Walter at the time he filled the prescription, but 
he provided her with an information sheet which described the effects of Melphalen. Melphalen is 
also a chemotherapy drug, but it is a substantially more powerful medication than Chlorambucil. 
Melphalen is typically given in smaller doses over shorter periods of time than is Chlorambucil, and 
doctors monitor it more closely. Melphalen has a very toxic effect on the body, and it substantially 
suppresses bone marrow. It has a longer life in the body than Chlorambucil, which means that any 
side effects from it last longer. 
To the extent that Walter noticed that the information sheet and bottle label read Melphalen, it 
did not make an impression on her. She assumed that the drug she had been given was the same as 
Dr. Ross had prescribed, and she began taking the prescribed dosage. Within seven to ten days of 
starting the drug treatment, Walter began to suffer from nausea and lack of appetite. When she 
referred to the information sheet, Walter saw that such side effects are common for chemotherapy 
drugs. She continued to take the Melphalen. During the third week after starting the medication 
Walter noticed bruises on her arms and legs, and during the fourth week she developed a skin rash 
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on her arms and legs. Although the information sheet warned that bruises and rashes should prompt 
a call to the doctor, Walter waited a few days before attempting to contact Dr. Ross. 
Dr. Ross testified at trial that his notes indicated that Walter should have had blood tests two 
weeks after starting medication and that she was to have scheduled an appointment with him within 
four weeks of beginning the medication. He also testified that because Chlorambucil is slow-acting, 
he does not insist that his patients have blood tests done in fourteen days but only that they have 
blood work periodically. Walter testified that she understood she was to have a follow-up 
appointment with Dr. Ross in four weeks and blood tests sometime before that appointment. 
On the twenty-third day after starting the medication, Walter had blood tests done. She 
attempted to reach Dr. Ross by phone to tell him about the side effects, but she was unsuccessful 
until June 3, 1997. On that day Dr. Ross told her that her blood levels were low and to stop taking 
the medication immediately. He scheduled an appointment for June 5. Walter, however, was rushed 
to the hospital later in the day on June 3 when she suffered gastrointestinal bleeding. Following her 
emergency admission, Walter remained in the hospital five weeks and received numerous blood 
transfusions. She suffered several infections, and a catheter was placed in her chest. The bruising 
and skin rash continued. For a period of time she was unable to eat because of bleeding gums and 
an infection in her mouth. Because of her weakened immune system, Walter’s visitors could not 
come within ten feet of her. 
Prior to receiving the Melphalen, Walter lived independently and was active. Following her 
hospital discharge on July 7, 1997, she was physically weak. She initially had to make daily trips to 
the hospital and later went less frequently. She had to have additional transfusions after she left the 
hospital. Melphalen did have the effect of causing her cancer to go into remission. Walter’s total 
medical bills for her treatment came to $71,042.63. 
The two-day jury trial was held in February 1999. Wal-Mart moved for judgment as a matter of 
law at the close of Walter’s case on the grounds that she had failed to present expert testimony on 
the standard of care by pharmacists, and the motion was denied. At the close of the evidence Walter 
moved for a judgment as a matter of law, and the court granted Walter’s motion concluding that she 
was entitled to judgment on liability. During Walter’s closing argument, Wal-Mart moved for a 
mistrial arguing that certain comments by Walter’s counsel were improper, and the motion was 
denied. The jury awarded Walter $550,000 in damages. Wal-Mart’s post-trial motion for judgment 
as a matter of law or a new trial was denied. [Wal-Mart appealed.] 
II. WALTER’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY 
…The effect of the [trial] court’s grant of Walter’s motion was a determination, as a matter of 
law, that Wal-Mart had a duty to Walter which it breached; that breach caused Walter harm; and 
Walter was not negligent—or if she was negligent, her negligence did not proximately cause her 
harm. The only issue left for the jury was the amount of damages caused by Wal-Mart’s negligence 
and whether those damages should be reduced because of any action or inaction by Walter to take 
reasonable steps to reduce the extent of her injuries.  
A. Wal-Mart’s Representations to the Jury 
Wal-Mart argues that the court erred in granting Walter’s motion for judgment as a matter of 
law because it should have submitted the issues of negligence, proximate cause, and comparative 
negligence to the jury. Walter contends that Wal-Mart…admitted liability in its opening statement 
to the jury.1 Wal-Mart’s opening statement admitted the error made by its pharmacist in filling the 
 
1 Wal-Mart’s counsel began his opening statement by explaining the process of a lawsuit and why Wal-Mart denied 
liability in its answer [to Walter’s complaint]. He then stated: “What I’m here to tell you right now is since the filing of the 
complaint and filing of the answer, Wal-Mart has never denied responsibility for this incident. Never. Going back to what 
happened. [Walter’s attorney] and I are in substantial agreement in terms of what happened…. [We] have a difference of 
opinion as to what constitutes fair, reasonable and just compensation for Mrs. Walter. That’s why we are here. We can’t 
agree. It’s as simple as that. We just can’t agree on that issue. We need your help. It’s not because we are blaming Mrs. Walter. 
It’s not because we are trying to deflect blame. And it’s not because we are trying to sort of make the issues obscure or 
distracting. We are going to put all the cards on the table. There are no secrets. There are no major disputes as to what 
occurred…. The hardest issue and the one that is going to be in your laps at the end of tomorrow is what monetary amount 
represents fair and just compensation for Mrs. Walter? You will be asked to consider medical bills and what she went through 
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prescription but because negligence consists of both law (whether a duty exists and what that duty 
is) and facts (whether the duty was breached), there was no…admission of negligence. Furthermore, 
the statement taken in its entire context, does not contain an unequivocal admission that the mistake 
in filling the prescription caused Walter’s harm…. 
B. Wal-Mart’s Negligence 
Walter had the burden to prove that Wal-Mart, through its pharmacist employee, owed a duty 
to Walter that it breached, thereby causing her harm. In Tremblay v. Kimball, 77 A. 405 (Me. 
1910), we held that pharmacists owe their customers a duty of ordinary care, but that “ordinary care” 
for a pharmacist means that “the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and 
vigilance and the most exact and reliable safeguards” must be taken. 
Lovin, the Wal-Mart pharmacist, readily admitted that he made an error in filling Walter’s 
prescription. He testified that he thought that the brand name for Chlorambucil was Alkeran, and 
he filled the prescription with Alkeran, which is Melphalen. Lovin said that he made a “serious error” 
that did not “satisfy the proper standard of care for a pharmacist.” He admitted that he would have 
discovered the error if he had followed the standard four-step process utilized to check for errors. 
He acknowledged that to comply with the standard of pharmacy care he should have checked the 
stock bottle against the prescription. He further admitted that the standard of practice required that 
he counsel Walter when she picked up the prescription, at which time he would have showed her 
the drug and discussed it with her. He testified that he did not counsel her, but if he had done so, he 
would have discovered the error. He also said that Walter would have no reason to suspect that she 
was given the wrong drug. 
Pursuant to the standard of “the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and 
vigilance and the most exact and reliable safeguards”…, Lovin’s testimony established that the 
standard was breached. Even if we were to determine that the standard of practice for pharmacists 
is the skill and diligence exercised by similar professionals, Lovin’s testimony established that 
standard and the breach of it. None of this evidence was disputed. A jury, acting reasonably, could 
not have found that Wal-Mart was not negligent. 
C. Causation 
In order to establish liability a plaintiff in any negligence action must show that the defendant’s 
negligence was the…cause of the plaintiff’s harm. Wal-Mart argues that Walter’s motion should 
have been denied because she failed to prove that Wal-Mart’s negligence in filling the prescription 
was the cause of her injury. Causation means that there be some reasonable connection between the 
act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered…. 
There was uncontroverted medical evidence that Melphalen, which Wal-Mart provided Walter 
erroneously, caused damage to her body…. Dr. Ross testified that the Melphalen made Walter 
seriously ill, to the point that he was not sure she would survive, and that her lack of energy after her 
release from the hospital was the result of the illness caused by the wrong medication. Wal-Mart’s 
expert oncologist also testified that the side effects of Melphalen caused the lengthy hospitalization, 
and the hospitalization itself likely caused Walter’s malaise and depression after her discharge. 
Wal-Mart[’s]…expert speculated that if a blood test had been done fourteen days after starting 
the medication it might have shown lowered blood levels and, depending on how low those levels 
were, Walter’s physician might have stopped the medication, and if the medication had been 
stopped sooner, the harmful effect may have been less. Wal-Mart’s expert did not testify that there 
would have been no damage if a blood test had been done on the fourteenth day. In fact, in his 
 
during the hospitalization and what she has done [sic] through since then. Wal-Mart is here, and I’m here to ask you as the 
conscience of the community what that figure is. That’s really why we are here…. The evidence in this case will show 
that…Mr. Lovin was given a prescription for Chlorambucil. What came to his mind was Alkeran. And from there the mistake 
was made. And it was sort of on a path of not being able being [sic] corrected in his mind. He was confident that Chlorambucil 
was Alkeran. It was a mistake. And it’s a mistake for which he’s deeply sorry. But that’s irrelevant. The fact is that a mistake 
was made. That he didn’t realize it at the time and wasn’t told of the mistake until June 3rd when he received a call from Dr. 
Ross…. I would ask you to keep your eye on the target: fair and just and reasonable compensation. That’s going to be the 
issue that you will have to decide when you go into the jury room at the end of the evidence.” 
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description of Melphalen, he noted it has a long life in the body and that its side effects last longer.2 
… No reasonable factfinder could have found that Wal-Mart’s negligent act in misfilling the 
prescription was not a substantial cause in bringing about Walter’s suffering. When the totality of 
the evidence adduced in any particular case is so overwhelming that it leaves open to a factfinder, 
acting rationally, only one conclusion on the issue, the issue is then determined as a matter of law. 
The trial court did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law to Walter on the issue of causation.  
D. Comparative Negligence and Mitigation of Damages 
…Under Maine’s comparative negligence statute, the damages owing to a plaintiff may be 
reduced when the plaintiff’s harm is partly the result of the plaintiff’s own fault, and fault is defined 
as the negligence that would give rise to the defense of contributory negligence. If the plaintiff’s fault 
is equal to or greater than that of the defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover damages…. 
[Wal-Mart argued that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider whether 
Walter was at fault for not realizing that she had been given the wrong prescription when she first 
received it. Wal-Mart argued that the jury, had it received this instruction, might have assigned some 
fault to Walter and reduced or eliminated her damages. Because] Lovin testified that Walter “would 
have no way of knowing” that she had been given the wrong medication, and there was no evidence 
that Walter should have been expected to discover Wal-Mart’s negligence[, there was no basis for 
assigning Walter fault. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to give that instruction.]… 
Wal-Mart [also argues that the jury should have been instructed to consider whether] Walter’s 
delay in calling her doctor to report the skin rash and bruising was negligence on her part that 
contributed to her suffering. [Another instruction on the calculation of damages was sufficient to 
inform the jury that it could reduce Walter’s damages if they believed her to be at fault, so there was 
no error in refusing to give Wal-Mart’s preferred instruction.]… 
III. WAL-MART’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Wal-Mart moved for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Walter failed to present 
any expert evidence on the pharmacist’s standard of care. It points out that Lovin was not designated 
as an expert. In this case the testimony of an expert was not necessary. We have said that where 
professional negligence and its harmful results are sufficiently obvious as to lie within common 
knowledge no expert testimony is necessary. The negligence of the pharmacist and the harmful 
results were sufficiently obvious to be within the common knowledge of a lay person. It does not 
take an expert to know that filling a prescription with the wrong drug and failing to take the steps in 
place in that pharmacy to check for the wrong drug is negligence. 
IV. WAL-MART’S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
Wal-Mart moved for a mistrial because of three comments made by Wal-Mart’s counsel during 
closing argument. First, Walter’s attorney stated that the pharmacist attempted to accept 
responsibility but his employer, Wal-Mart, refused to accept responsibility for Walter’s injury. Wal-
Mart objected, and the objection was sustained. The court admonished counsel that the only issue 
was damages and told the jury that they were not to be swayed by any bias or predisposition towards 
one party or the other. Second, Walter’s counsel said that Walter was sent home “not with the smilely 
face as we hear about at Wal-Mart…but with a bottle of poison…a bottle of medication that was not 
meant for her.” Wal-Mart objected and moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied, and the judge 
told the jurors that the issue was damages. Third, while referring to the amount of damages the jury 
could award, during rebuttal, Walter’s counsel told the jury it should consider how much money 
professional basketball players are paid. Wal-Mart objected and the objection was sustained. Wal-
Mart argues that the effect of the three comments was to prejudice the jury against Wal-Mart so that 
it would punish Wal-Mart by the amount of damages. 
 
2 The blood tests alone did not reveal that the wrong medication had been given. Dr. Ross did not discover that she was 
taking the wrong medication until after she was admitted to the hospital. 
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We review a refusal to grant a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. The judge sustained 
the objections to the comments, told the jurors to ignore the comments, and gave curative 
instructions. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion…. 
V. WAL-MART’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
After the verdict Wal-Mart moved for a new trial…. Wal-Mart…contends that the damages 
were excessive and the size of the verdict demonstrates that the judge and jury were biased against 
Wal-Mart. When a court refuses to grant a new trial on the ground of an excessive damage award, 
the ruling will not be reversed except for clear and manifest abuse of discretion…. 
Walter’s total medical bills and expenses equaled $71,042.63. The jury awarded Walter $550,000 
in damages. Presumably, the additional $479,000 of Walter’s recovery is in compensation for her 
pain and suffering. The jury heard several witnesses, including Walter herself, testify about the 
painful treatment she received in the hospital, the long recovery process, and the continuing 
difficulties she faces. In light of this evidence, which must be considered favorably to Walter, the 
jury’s award of damages is rational. Although the verdict may seem large, it reflects the considered 
opinion of the jury within the range of evidence of sufficient probative character….  
QUESTIONS 
1. Let the Master Answer: Is Walter suing Wal-Mart because she claims that the company 
itself was negligent? Do you think Wal-Mart changed its corporate policies after the 
lawsuit? Should it? 
2. Risky Business: Justice Wathen concurred in the court’s judgment, but he and two 
colleagues reached the result on different grounds to Justice Calkins: “In my judgment, 
defense counsel in this case admitted liability in his opening statement when he told the 
jury that Wal-Mart had never denied liability and that the only issue concerned the 
amount of fair and just compensation. Having made that statement, he then sought to 
try the issue of liability behind the jurors’ backs. To countenance such a strategy would 
be to ignore the requirement of the Maine Bar Rules that trial counsel employ ‘such 
means only as are consistent with truth, and shall not seek to mislead the jury by any 
artifice or false statement of fact or law.’” Are you on Team Wathen or Team Calkins? 
And, perhaps more importantly, what do you think Wal-Mart’s lawyer was up to with 
this risky strategy? Was this lawyering at its finest or worst? 
3. Superbad: Is Lovin a bad guy? Is it fair to hold him responsible? Would the opposite 
result be fair?  
 
G.O.A.T. PROBLEM 
Milan Petrovic is one of the world’s top tennis players (perhaps even the greatest of all time, 
depending on who you ask). During the North American Open tennis tournament, he encountered 
a surprisingly talented challenger in the opening round. After Petrovic fell behind in the first set, he 
struck an extra ball towards the back of the court in frustration. Unfortunately for Petrovic, the ball 
happened to hit a line judge, Carmen Garcia, in the neck. Garcia crouched to the ground, holding 
her neck until medics arrived to evaluate her injury. Though she wasn’t severely injured, she did 
experience pain, swelling, and bruising on her neck after the incident. She now wants to sue Petrovic, 
but she’s not sure which claims, if any, would be likely to succeed.  
(a) How would you advise Garcia to proceed? Are there any claims worth pursuing? 
(b) What questions would you ask Garcia in order to discover details that might be 
important to the viability of any claims? 
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B. Duty 
MUSSIVAND v. DAVID 
Supreme Court of Ohio (1989) 
Resnick, Justice: ã 
[Dr. Tofigh Mussivand (right) sued Dr. George David for injuries 
allegedly stemming from sexual relations between David and Dr. Dixie 
West, who was Mussivand’s wife at the time. Mussivand claimed David 
infected West with venereal warts, which West then transmitted to 
Mussivand. Mussivand argued that David was negligent in having sex with 
West without telling her about his infection or failing to take precautions to 
avoid infecting her. David responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing 
that he did not owe Mussivand a duty of care. The trial court granted the 
motion, but the first appellate court reversed that decision.] This case comes 
to us on a dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action…. 
It long has been held that one who has a contagious disease must take the 
necessary steps to prevent the spread of the disease. This standard of care has been imposed by the courts 
in cases concerning the spread of communicable diseases such as tuberculosis…. A similar standard of 
care exists for preventing the spread of a venereal disease. In Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 
1979), the plaintiff alleged that her former paramour was grossly negligent when he infected her with 
gonorrhea…. [T]he court held that “one who negligently exposes another to an infectious or contagious 
disease, which such other person thereby contracts, can be held liable in damages for his actions.” 
Recently several jurisdictions have allowed tort actions for negligent…transmission of genital 
herpes where the person infected with genital herpes fails to disclose to his or her sexual partner that 
he or she is infected with such a disease…. In other words, people with a venereal disease have a 
duty to use reasonable care to avoid infecting others with whom they engage in sexual conduct…. 
Our research reveals, however, that [prior] cases differ from the cause before us in one very 
important aspect: that is, appellee [Mussivand] herein alleges that appellant [David] owed him a 
duty even though appellee was not appellant’s sexual partner and had no direct sexual contact with 
appellant. The issue which we must decide in this case, therefore, is what duty, if any, does a person 
infected with a venereal disease owe to the spouse of his paramour. Determining whether a duty 
exists is crucial since a person’s failure to exercise ordinary care in doing or failing to do something 
will not amount to actionable negligence unless such person owed to someone injured by such 
failure a duty to exercise such ordinary care…. 
The existence of a duty in a negligence action is a question of law for the court to 
determine. There is no formula for ascertaining whether a duty exists. Duty is the court’s expression 
of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff 
is entitled to protection. Any number of considerations may justify the imposition of duty in 
particular circumstances, including the guidance of history, our continually refined concepts of 
morals and justice, the convenience of the rule, and social judgment as to where the loss should fall. 
The common-law duty of due care is that degree of care which an ordinarily reasonable and 
prudent person exercises, or is accustomed to exercising, under the same or similar circumstances. 
A person is to exercise that care necessary to avoid injury to others. 
A person who has a venereal disease does not have the duty to disclose his condition to everyone. 
As has been stated, “[i]t should be made clear that this court is not stating here that herpes victims 
have a specific duty to warn any person of their condition; however, they, like all citizens, are to be 
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, and they 
may be sued in this state for negligence in the omission to do something which a reasonable person 
would do.” Long v. Adams, 333 S.E. 2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). 
We find the reasoning of these other jurisdictions persuasive and accordingly hold that a person 
who knows, or should know, that he or she is infected with a venereal disease has the duty to abstain 
 
ã Tom Simpson, Kay Mansion M.D. (CC BY-NC 2.0). 
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from sexual conduct or, at the minimum, to warn those persons with whom he or she expects to 
have sexual relations of his or her condition. 
There is a strong public policy behind imposition of this duty. In general, we are reminded that 
the health of the people is an economic asset. The law recognizes its preservation as a matter of 
importance to the state. To the individual nothing is more valuable than health. The laws of this 
state have been framed to protect the people, collectively and individually, from the spread of 
communicable diseases. More specifically, we recognize that venereal diseases are often serious, and, 
in some instances, there is no known cure for them. Transmission of a venereal disease is generally 
through sexual contact. The likelihood that one will contract a venereal disease from someone 
infected with such a disease is often high.  
Furthermore, there is statutory support for this duty. R.C. 3701.81(A) states: “No person, 
knowingly or having reasonable cause to believe that he is suffering from a dangerous, contagious 
disease, shall knowingly fail to take reasonable measures to prevent exposing himself to other 
persons, except when seeking medical aid.”… 
Appellant argues, however, that while he may have had a duty to appellee’s wife to disclose his 
condition, this duty does not extend to appellee. The existence of a duty will depend on the 
foreseeability of the injury to appellee. The test for foreseeability is whether a reasonably prudent 
person would have anticipated that an injury was likely to result from the performance or 
nonperformance of an act. Thus whether appellant owed appellee a duty turns on whether a 
reasonably prudent person would have anticipated that appellee would be injured by way of 
appellant’s alleged negligence. In this case appellant, allegedly infected with a venereal disease, 
engaged in sexual relations with a married woman. A reasonably prudent person would anticipate 
that a wife and husband will engage in sexual relations. In addition, Dr. David is a medical doctor 
who, more than most people, should be aware of the method of transmitting a venereal disease, its 
likelihood of spreading through sexual contact, and its potentially devastating effect. If one 
negligently exposes a married person to a sexually transmissible disease without informing that 
person of his exposure, it is reasonable to anticipate that the disease may be transmitted to the married 
person’s spouse. Hence liability to a third party for failure to disclose to the original sexual partner 
turns on whether, under all the circumstances, injury to the third-party spouse was foreseeable…. 
We do not, however, mean to say that appellant, subsequent to his affair with appellee’s wife, 
will be liable to any and all persons with whom she may have sexual contact. A spouse, however, is 
a foreseeable sexual partner. Furthermore, the liability of a person with a sexually transmissible 
disease to a third person, such as a spouse, would be extinguished as soon as the paramour spouse 
knew or should have known that he or she was exposed to or had contracted a venereal disease. She 
or he then would become a conscious and responsible agency which could or should have eliminated 
the hazard. For example, if appellant told appellee’s wife he had a venereal disease or if she noticed 
symptoms of the disease on herself, she then would have the duty to abstain from sexual relations 
or warn her sexual partner. Whether appellee’s wife knew, or should have known, of her exposure 
to a venereal disease is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact…. Accordingly, the trial 
court erred in granting appellant’s motion to dismiss…the negligence cause of action. 
QUESTIONS 
1. In Sickness and in Health: The court purportedly rests its conclusion on the fact that a 
spouse is a foreseeable sexual partner, especially to a paramour. Is this true? Should the 
court have cited data on sexual intimacy between married couples? Or conducted 
factfinding on Dixie and Tofigh’s sex life? What if Dixie had told George that she and 
Tofigh no longer shared a marital bed? What if Dixie and Tofigh called each other 
“hubby” and “wifey” but had never got around to filing marriage paperwork? How much 
work is foreseeability really doing in the analysis? 
2. Discharging Duties: George could’ve “extinguished” his liability by warning Dixie of his 
infection or, presumably, abstaining from sex altogether. Is there anything else he 
could’ve done to discharge his duty? Would wearing a condom have sufficed? 
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3. NMP: According to the court, George is off the hook if the jury finds that Dixie should 
have suspected her exposure to a venereal disease. Why is that the rule? Why shouldn’t 
they both be on the hook for as long as Tofigh was in the dark? 
 
OSTERLIND v. HILL 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (1928) 
Braley, Justice: ã 
This is an action of tort brought by the plaintiff 
as administrator of the estate of Albert T. Osterlind 
to recover damages for the conscious suffering and 
death of his intestate. There are four counts in the 
original declaration and five counts in the amended 
declaration to each of which the defendant 
demurred. The first count of the original 
declaration alleges, that on or about July 4, 1925, the 
defendant was engaged in the business of letting for 
hire pleasure boats and canoes to be used on Lake 
Quannapowitt in the town of Wakefield; that it was 
the duty of the defendant to have a reasonable 
regard for the safety of the persons to whom he let 
boats and canoes; that the defendant in the early morning of July 4, 1925, in wilful, wanton, or 
reckless disregard of the natural and probable consequences, let for hire to the intestate and one 
Ryan a frail and dangerous canoe, well knowing that the intestate and Ryan were then intoxicated, 
and were then manifestly unfit to go upon the lake in the canoe; that, in consequence of the 
defendant’s wilful, wanton, or reckless disregard of his duties, the intestate and Ryan went out in the 
canoe which shortly afterwards was overturned and the intestate after hanging to it for 
approximately one half hour, and making loud calls for assistance, which calls the defendant heard 
and utterly ignored, was obliged to release his hold, and was drowned; that in consequence of the 
defendant’s wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct, the intestate endured great conscious mental 
anguish and great conscious physical suffering from suffocation and drowning. Count two differs 
materially from count one only in so far as negligent conduct is alleged as distinguished from wilful, 
wanton, or reckless conduct…. The amended declaration adds allegations to the effect that the 
plaintiff’s intestate and Ryan were intoxicated and incapacitated to enter into any valid contract or 
to exercise any care for their own safety and that the condition of the intestate was involuntary and 
induced through no fault of his own. 
The trial court sustained demurrers to both the original and amended declarations and reported 
the case for determination by this court…. 
The declaration must set forth facts which, if proved, establish the breach of a legal duty owed 
by the defendant to the intestate…. In the case at bar, however, it is alleged in every count of the 
original and amended declaration that after the canoe was overturned the intestate hung to the canoe 
for approximately one half hour and made loud calls for assistance. On the facts stated in the 
declaration the intestate was not in a helpless condition. He was able to take steps to protect himself. 
The defendant violated no legal duty in renting a canoe to a man in the condition of the 
intestate…. In view of the absence of any duty to refrain from renting a canoe to a person in the 
condition of the intestate, the allegations of involuntary intoxication relating as they do to the issues 
of contributory negligence become immaterial. The allegations of wilful, wanton or reckless conduct 
also add nothing to the plaintiff’s case. The failure of the defendant to respond to the intestate’s 
outcries is immaterial. No legal right of the intestate was infringed. The allegation common to both 
declarations that the canoe was “frail and dangerous” appears to be a general characterization of 
canoes. It is not alleged that the canoe was out of repair and unsafe…. 
 
ã Forest History Society, Fishing from Canoe with Barbless Hook (CC BY-NC 2.0). 
  TORT LAW 92 
QUESTIONS 
1. Couldn’t Care Less: Negligence can have various flavors. A plaintiff might claim, for 
example, that a company was careless in hiring or training an employee, or that a 
doctor’s botched surgery constituted medical malpractice, or that a shopkeeper’s failure 
to clean up spilled milk gave rise to premises liability. There are two distinct forms of 
negligence alleged in Osterlind. Can you spot them? 
2. Blackout: If Osterlind had been blind drunk, should this case come out differently? Why? 
3. Bad Samaritans: Though subject to important exceptions, there’s generally no 
affirmative duty to protect or rescue under tort law. To quote Restatement § 314: “The 
fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for 
another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such 
action.” Does this rule mean we’re bad people? What are the best justifications for this 
legal doctrine?
 
BAKER v. FENNEMAN & BROWN PROPERTIES, LLC 
Court of Appeals of Indiana (2003) 
May, Judge: ã 
Aaron Baker appeals the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment to…Taco Bell…. Baker raises one issue, which we 
restate as whether Taco Bell has a duty to assist a customer 
who falls to the floor and loses consciousness when the 
customer’s fall was not due to any fault of Taco Bell…. 
On August 26, 1999, Baker entered the Taco Bell store in 
Newburgh, Indiana, to purchase a soft drink. Upon entering 
the store, Baker felt nauseous, but he continued to the 
counter, where he ordered a drink. Baker handed the cashier 
money for the drink and suddenly fell backward. Baker’s 
head hit the floor, and he was knocked unconscious and began having convulsions.1  
Baker and Taco Bell disagree regarding whether Taco Bell rendered assistance to Baker. Baker 
claims that when he regained consciousness, he was staring at the ceiling, he had no idea what was 
going on, and he did not know where he was. He claims that no Taco Bell employee called for 
medical assistance or helped him in any way. Taco Bell claims that the cashier walked around the 
counter to Baker, where she waited for his convulsions to stop, and then she asked Baker if he was 
okay and if he needed an ambulance. The employee claims Baker said he was fine and he did not 
need an ambulance, so she walked back around the counter. 
What happened next is undisputed. Moments after Baker stood up, he fell again. This time, 
Baker fell forward and was knocked unconscious. The fall lacerated his chin, knocked out his four 
front teeth, and cracked the seventh vertebra of his neck. When Baker regained consciousness, he 
was choking on the blood and teeth in his mouth. Baker stumbled out of the store to a friend, who 
contacted Baker’s fiance to take him to the hospital. 
Baker filed a complaint against Taco Bell, in which he alleged [that] Taco Bell breached its duty 
to render assistance to him until he could be cared for by others when Taco Bell employees knew or 
should have known that he was ill or injured…. Baker sought damages for medical bills, lost wages, 
pain and suffering, and mental anguish. Taco Bell moved for summary judgment, claiming it owed 
Baker no duty. Baker responded by arguing Taco Bell had a duty to help him…. The trial court 
granted Taco Bell’s motion. When we review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, 
we…determine whether a genuine issue of material fact existed and whether the moving party was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law…. 
 
ã Mike Mozart, Taco Bell (CC BY 2.0). 
1 A doctor determined Baker fell because he experienced “vasovagal syncope.” Vasovagal syncope is a form of syncope 
(fainting) that occurs as a part of a normal physiologic response to stress (often emotional stress). The individual becomes 
lightheaded, nauseated, flushed, feels warm and then may lose consciousness for several seconds. 
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Baker claims Taco Bell had a duty to assist him and that it breached that duty by failing to provide 
assistance to him. Taco Bell argues it had no duty to assist Baker because it was not responsible for 
the instrumentality that caused Baker’s initial injury. We believe Baker is correct. 
To effectively assert a negligence claim, Baker must establish: (1) that Taco Bell had a duty to 
conform its conduct to a standard of care arising from its relationship with Baker, (2) that Taco Bell 
failed to conform its conduct to that standard of care, and (3) that Baker incurred injuries as a 
proximate result of Taco Bell’s breach of its duty. The existence of a duty is a question of law for the 
court to decide. To determine whether a duty exists, we must balance three factors: (1) the 
relationship between the parties; (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured; and 
(3) public policy concerns. 
As a general rule, an individual does not have a duty to aid or protect another person, even if he 
knows that person needs assistance. L.S. Ayres v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1942); Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 314 (“The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is 
necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such 
action.”). However, both common law and statutory exceptions to that general rule exist. See, 
e.g., Restatement § 314B (employer has a duty to protect or aid an injured employee). 
Baker claims Taco Bell had the duty to assist him described under Section 314A of the 
Restatement, which provides the following exception to the general rule that one person need not 
assist another: 
§ 314A. Special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect 
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action:  
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and  
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are 
ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others. 
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests. 
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to 
members of the public who enter in response to his invitation. 
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of 
another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal 
opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the other. 
The duty that arises under Section 314A exists because of the special relationship between the 
parties. The relationships listed in the rule are not intended to be exclusive; nevertheless, some 
courts have restricted the application of § 314A to business invitees. See, e.g., Gilbertson v. 
Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1999) (holding host to an overnight social guest does not 
have a duty under § 314A). In addition, the exception applies only while the relationship exists, so 
once the passenger leaves the train or the guest leaves the hotel, the railroad or hotel no longer has 
a duty to aid or protect an ill or injured individual. But see Kellner v. Lowney, 761 A.2d 421 (N.H. 
2000) (holding motel owner could be liable for injury to boy crossing public highway between two 
portions of motel property because owner should have foreseen the risk to his guests of crossing the 
highway to get from hotel rooms to portion of hotel property where religious services were held). 
In L.S. Ayres, our supreme court considered whether a department store, which was not in any 
way liable for a boy’s initial injury by an escalator, nevertheless could be held liable for aggravation 
of the injuries caused by its employees’ failure to stop the escalator. The court determined 
there may be a legal obligation to take positive or affirmative steps to effect the 
rescue of a person who is helpless and in a situation of peril, when the one 
proceeded against is a master or an invitor or when the injury resulted from use 
of an instrumentality under the control of the defendant. Such an obligation may 
exist although the accident or original injury was caused by the negligence of the 
plaintiff or through that of a third person and without any fault on the part of the 
defendant. Other relationships may impose a like obligation, but it is not 
necessary to pursue that inquiry further at this time. 
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The court noted that the boy “was an invitee and he received his initial injury in using an 
instrumentality provided by” L.S. Ayres and then held L.S. Ayres could be liable for the aggravation 
of the boy’s injury caused by its failure to assist him. 
Taco Bell claims it had no duty to assist Baker because it was not responsible for Baker’s initial 
illness or injury. It argues that, under L.S. Ayres, an Indiana business has a duty to assist a customer 
only if the injury resulted from the use of an instrumentality under the control of the defendant. In 
essence, Taco Bell argues that Indiana law recognizes only a limited duty under § 314A of the 
Restatement. Taco Bell’s argument fails for a number of reasons. 
First, the cases cited by the supreme court in L.S. Ayres suggest the court did not intend to limit 
the application of § 314A to situations where the plaintiff was an invitee and the instrumentality 
causing the injury belonged to the defendant. For example, the court discussed Depue v. Flatau, 111 
N.W. 1 (Minn. 1907), in which a home owner was held liable for aggravation of injuries to a severely 
ill, fainting, and helpless businessman that the home owner sent away unattended on a cold winter 
night. There, as here, the initial illness was not the responsibility of the defendant…. 
Second, when the supreme court had reason later that same year to mention L.S. Ayres in 
another of its opinions, it summarized the holding as follows: “this court recognized a duty to one 
in peril on the defendant’s premises as an invitee even though the peril was created without 
negligence on the part of the defendant.” Jones v. State, 43 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. 1942). That 
summarization suggests the supreme court did not intend, as Taco Bell insists, to limit its holding 
to situations where a plaintiff could prove both that he was an invitee and that the defendant’s 
instrumentality caused the initial injury. 
Third, the Restatement explains: 
The duty to give aid to one who is ill or injured extends to cases where the illness 
or injury is due to natural causes, to pure accident, to the acts of third person, or 
to the negligence of the plaintiff himself, as where a passenger has injured himself 
by clumsily bumping his head against a door. 
A number of the illustrations provided in the Restatement parallel the fact pattern here and 
suggest Taco Bell had a duty to assist Baker. For example,…Illustration 7 provides: 
A is a small child sent by his parents for the day to B’s kindergarten. In the course 
of the day A becomes ill with scarlet fever. Although recognizing that A is 
seriously ill, B does nothing to obtain medical assistance, or to take the child home 
or remove him to a place where help can be obtained. As a result, A’s illness is 
aggravated in a manner which proper medical attention would have avoided. B is 
subject to liability to A for the aggravation of his injuries…. 
Finally, public policy suggests Taco Bell had a duty to provide reasonable care in this situation. 
When a storeowner opens his property to the public, he does so because he hopes to gain some 
economic benefit from the public. Social policy dictates that the storeowner, who is deriving this 
economic benefit from the presence of the customer, should assume the affirmative duty to help 
customers who become ill as a cost of doing business. 
Taco Bell argues placing this duty on businesses is unreasonable because then, in essence, a 
business would be required to hire employees who were trained to diagnose and provide medical 
services. See Br. of Appellee at 14 (“A rule requiring first aid to be delivered to any invitee, no matter 
the type of business and no matter the circumstances that led to the injury, would require an 
impossible and frightening standard of care for persons employed in the service industry.”); id. at 
15 (“Taco Bell sells tacos. Taco Bell does not and has never held itself out to be a medical treatment 
facility. To require Taco Bell to treat these ‘patients’ would be unfair and unsafe for the ‘patient’ and 
the Taco Bell employee alike.”). We disagree. 
As comment f to Section 314A of the Restatement explains: 
The business is not required to take any action beyond that which is reasonable 
under the circumstances. In the case of an ill or injured person, the business will 
seldom be required to do more than give such first aid as it reasonably can, and 
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take reasonable steps to turn the sick man over to a physician, or to those who will 
look after him and see that medical assistance is obtained. A business is not 
required to give any aid to one who is in the hands of apparently competent 
persons who have taken charge of him, or whose friends are present and 
apparently in a position to give him all necessary assistance. 
Accordingly, the duty that arises is a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. 
A high school student employed at Taco Bell would not be expected to provide the type of first aid 
an emergency room doctor would provide, as such an expectation would not be “reasonable.”… 
Moreover, as a practical matter, we fail to see the logic in Taco Bell’s position that it should have 
no duty to aid in these types of situations. First, we find it unlikely customers would patronize a 
business that left another customer who was ill or injured lying on the floor of the business simply 
because the business was not responsible for the customer’s illness or injury. 
Second, imposing on a business a duty to provide reasonable care even when the business is not 
responsible for an illness or injury will rarely force a business to act in circumstances in which it 
should not already have been acting. For example, if, as Taco Bell asserts, a business has no duty to 
assist if it is not responsible for the instrumentality, then: 1) if a customer falls to the ground, an 
employee should determine before offering assistance whether the customer slipped on ice, in which 
case the business has a duty to act, or whether the customer merely passed out from syncope, in 
which case the business has no duty; or 2) if a customer’s face is turning blue, an employee should 
determine before providing assistance whether the person is choking on a food item from the 
business, in which case the employee must offer assistance, or whether the person is having a heart 
attack or choking on a food item purchased from a third party, in which case the employee need not 
offer assistance. By implementing policies and procedures that allow their employees to assist 
injured persons only when the business causes the illness or injury, a business might risk liability 
claims caused by an employee’s failure to act, or failure to act promptly, when an illness or 
injury was in fact caused by an instrumentality of the business. Consequently, we are not placing a 
duty on businesses that they should not have already assumed. 
In sum, Indiana case law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, authority from other jurisdictions, 
and public policy all suggest Taco Bell had a duty, as a business that invited members of the public 
to enter its facility, to provide reasonable assistance to Baker even though Taco Bell was not 
responsible for Baker’s illness. Consequently, we hold Taco Bell had a duty to take reasonable action 
to give aid to Baker after he fell and to care for him until he could be cared for by others. 
Baker asserts Taco Bell provided no assistance. Taco Bell’s employee claims she offered Baker 
assistance, but he refused to accept it. Thus, there is a question of material fact that precludes 
summary judgment on this issue, and we must reverse and remand for trial. Reversed and remanded. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Bad Host: The court notes that some courts have restricted the reach of Restatement 
§ 314A to business invitees, citing the holding in Gilbertson v. Leininger that the host of 
an overnight social guest has no affirmative duty under that section. Do you think this 
distinction between business customers and social guests is defensible?  
2. Yo Quiero Taco Bell: In a too-cute-by-half move, Taco Bell argues in its defense that 
“Taco Bell sells tacos.” While Taco Bell does indeed sell food that arguably passes for a 
taco, why does this legal argument fail? What’s Taco Bell really trying to say, and why 
doesn’t the court buy it? 
3. BFFs: Certain “special” relationships can give rise to affirmative duties. In the words of 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 40: “An actor in a special relationship with another 
owes the other a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope 
of the relationship.” Some relationships more clearly fall within the scope of this rule—
shopkeeper–customer, innkeeper–guest, hospital–patient—but what about close 
friends? Consider Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976), in which Ricky 
Farwell was beaten up after he and his friend had been drinking and followed two girls 
to a restaurant. After the fight, Ricky’s friend drove around while he went to sleep in the 
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back of the car. At around midnight, the friend parked the car at Ricky’s grandparents’ 
home, unsuccessfully attempted to rouse Ricky, and left. Ricky died three days later. 
Should his friend be liable for negligence? The Michigan Supreme Court held that being 
“companions in a social venture” was enough to create a duty to make reasonable efforts 
to get Ricky medical care. Should your wingman be on the hook under these 
circumstances? How far might this principle extend? What if a group of teenagers is 
playing Russian Roulette and one dies when the gun goes off, as in Theobald v. 




BULLOCK v. TAMIAMI TRAIL TOURS, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (1959)  
Rives, Judge: 
The appellants are Negroes, British subjects, natives 
of Jamaica, married to each other, and in their early 
fifties. For more than twenty years the husband has 
been a minister of the Church of England. The wife is a 
musician and teacher. Racial segregation is not 
practiced in the island of Jamaica. Prior to 1956, the 
appellants had left that island on only one trip and that 
was to European countries and South American 
countries which did not segregate the races. They were 
not familiar with the racial segregation practiced in the Southern part of the United States. 
In August 1956, they decided to make an extended visit to the United States, landing in Miami 
and going by bus first to Kansas City and then to New York. They made arrangements for the trip 
through the Mountain Travel Service before leaving Jamaica and bought tickets over the appellee’s 
bus line. When the bus arrived in Perry, Florida, they were sitting together in the forward part of the 
bus usually occupied by white passengers. The husband was dark or black, while the wife, though a 
Negress, appeared to be a white woman. At Perry, Florida, one Milton Poppell entered the bus and 
violently assaulted and beat the husband and slapped the wife. The circumstances are well described 
in the testimony of Poppell, quoted in the margin.1… 
 
1 “Q. Mr. Poppell did you go on a bus in Perry and assault this man right here? A. Yes, I did…. 
“Q. Mr. Poppell, how did you know that the Reverend Bullock was on that bus? A. Well, the police and I were sitting 
down there drinking coffee and I overheard the conversation of the bus driver telling the police that they were on there. He 
didn't say they were on there, he said, talking to them, ‘fellows look what I have got to contend with and nothing I can do 
about it.’ And the police says, ‘our hands are tied too.’… I got up and asked if I could buy a ticket on the bus…. 
“Q. Mr. Poppell have you got anything against colored people, generally? A. Not as long as they stay in their place. 
“Q. Well, why did you assault him? A. Because he was out of his place. 
“Q. How did you know he was out of his place? The bus wasn’t full then, was it? A. Not at that time, it wasn’t, but when 
everybody got on it was full. Whenever I got on it wasn’t full…. 
“Q. Did anything the bus driver say lead you to believe he wasn’t in his place? A. Well, I don’t know whether you would 
figure it was what the bus driver said or what I felt that he was out of his place too…. 
“Q. Mr. Poppell…, you stated that you had nothing against colored people? A. that’s right…. 
“Q. Did you attack the Reverend Bullock simply from the fact he was seated on the bus? A. Well, yes. And I wanted to 
see and as a matter of fact he was with a white woman. 
“Q. What do you mean, with a white woman? A. Well, his wife is supposed to be white, I understand. 
“Q. How did you know who his wife was? Had you ever known the Bullocks before this? A. No. 
“Q. How did you know who his wife was? A. Well, she was pointed out as she came in the bus station. 
“Q. Was it the bus driver that pointed her out? A. I believe he made a remark to the policeman that that was his wife 
coming in…. 
“Q. And she appeared to you to be white at that time? A. Yes, she did. 
“Q. Did he say anything about the man on the bus being married to a white woman? A. I don’t remember. 
“Q. Maybe this will refresh your recollection — did he say the man on the bus was married to a white woman? A. I believe 
he did…. 
The following case describes Black people using outdated language now considered offensive. 
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After reaching New York, the appellants brought suit against the appellee…, claiming that the 
appellee had breached the duties owed to them as passengers by omitting to warn them of a 
foreseeable danger, by failing to protect them from that danger, and by willfully, or at least 
negligently, aggravating the danger…. There the case was tried to the court without a jury…. [T]he 
district court entered judgment for the defendant, feeling that the law of the State of Florida required 
it to do so…[because] the Florida Supreme Court [had] held that a carrier was not liable to a 
passenger for an unprovoked and illegal assault in cases such as this case…. We are not in agreement 
with the district court either as to the Florida law or as to the ultimate facts, inferences or conclusions 
of duty and breach of duty on the part of the appellant carrier…. 
In Hall v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 93 So. 151 (Fla. 1921), the case relied upon by the district 
court as dispositive of the case at bar, a female passenger was assaulted by a male passenger in a 
Pullman berth, they being the only two occupants of the car. Holding that the plaintiff’s proof failed 
to support her allegations that a porter and conductor heard her calls and bells in time to have 
prevented the assault, the court stated: 
The liability of the carrier in such case rests, not upon the tort of the passenger, 
but upon the negligent omission of the carrier through its servants to prevent the 
tort being committed. A failure to do anything which could have been done by the 
servant to prevent the injury renders the carrier liable. But to do something to 
prevent an injury resulting from an assault by a fellow passenger implies 
knowledge on the part of the servant that the act is contemplated by the stranger, 
or by due diligence the servant could have obtained such knowledge, or had the 
opportunity to acquire it sufficiently long in advance of its infliction to have 
prevented it with the force at his command. In guarding a passenger from a danger 
which is not usual or not incident to ordinary travel the carrier is held to the use 
of ordinary and reasonable care and diligence. It is the failure of the carrier 
through its agents to afford the required protection, after they had reasonable 
grounds for believing that violence or the insult was imminent, upon which the 
liability of the carrier rests. It is not the fact of injury to the passenger that fixes 
the carrier’s liability. The injury must have been of such character and inflicted 
under such circumstances as that it might have been reasonably anticipated or 
naturally expected to occur…. 
[T]he rule may be generally stated that a carrier is liable for injury to its passenger caused by a 
fellow passenger or a third party if such injury by its nature could have been “reasonably anticipated” 
or “naturally expected to occur” or “reasonably foreseen” in time to have prevented the injury. If the 
injury could have been reasonably anticipated in time to have prevented its occurrence, the carrier 
is subjected to the highest degree of care to its passenger either to protect him from or to warn him 
of the danger. [Note that the duty to warn is identical to the duty to protect.] 
It was impossible for the driver to have protected the Bullocks from Poppell’s assault after his 
intent became evident, but we think that the district court was clearly erroneous in holding that 
Tamiami could not have reasonably anticipated or foreseen the danger to the Bullocks in time to 
have at least warned them of its imminence. We can visualize no stronger case than this to show a 
situation where two bus drivers and the bus company officials should have reasonably anticipated 
that mischief was hovering about and that the Bullocks were in some danger. 
 
“Q. Now, of the two things, which do you think is the worse, in your opinion[?] A. Well, that’s about fifty-fifty 
proposition…. [H]e was out of his place in my opinion in the front of the bus and he was certainly out of his place being 
married to a white woman. 
“Q. Mr. Poppell when you went in there and asked him to move you didn’t give him a chance to move? A. Well, I 
expected a fight back so I didn’t give him too much a chance. 
“Q. Why did you expect a fight back? A. I didn’t figure he was going to give up his seat. 
“Q. Why did you figure that he wouldn’t give up the seat? A. Well, just a matter of my opinion. 
“Q. Is it a practice that all colored people in Perry have to move back? A. Yes. 
“Q. Why did you expect this to be any different? A. Well, I guess by him riding so far without any trouble. 
“Q. Actually didn’t you know that he had been asked to move? A. Yes, I did. 
“Q. How did you find that out? A. I believe that the bus driver made the statement…. 
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The first driver testified that many people in West Florida would not approve of the Bullocks’ 
being seated together toward the front of the bus. Driver Cunningham stated that there would have 
been less chance of trouble if the Bullocks had been sitting in the back. The first driver, after 
explaining to a complaining passenger that he could not move the Bullocks, heard another passenger 
say something like “they probably will move on down the line.” Both drivers had actual notice of the 
two Company bulletins dated January 31, 1953, and January 23, 1956, the latter plainly warning the 
drivers of possible racial disturbances.2 Certainly, the first driver and, no doubt, Cunningham knew 
the Bullocks were Jamaicans and British Nationals, and it is logical to infer that the drivers knew the 
Bullocks were not experienced with “southern tradition.” All of the appellee’s witnesses testified that 
this was the first instance they knew of in that part of the country where a Negro man and a 
seemingly white woman were seated together on a public carrier. 
Furthermore, this Court will take judicial notice (as the district court should have done) of the 
commonly and generally known fact that the folkways prevalent in Taylor County, Florida, the 
county seat being Perry, would cause a reasonable man, familiar with local customs, to anticipate 
that violence might result if a Negro man and a seemingly white woman should ride into the county 
seated together toward the front of an interurban bus.3  
The next question is whether or not Tamiami, so charged with a duty of foreseeing danger to its 
passengers, took proper precautions to avoid such danger by the “utmost care and diligence of very 
cautious persons.” We think that Tamiami failed to exercise this care in several ways. It should have 
instructed its agency in Jamaica to advise Negroes applying for passage through the southern part 
of the United States of the South’s tradition of segregation. It should have instructed its driver to 
advise Negroes who were obviously foreigners, here known to be such, of segregation customs. The 
driver should have explained to the Bullocks his reasons for wanting them to move. Above all, the 
driver should not, either willfully or negligently, have informed the assailant of the Bullocks’ position 
on the bus and of their apparent color and lack of color…. [W]e conclude that the danger should 
reasonably have been foreseen by Tamiami in time to act with the utmost care to avoid injury to its 
passengers, particularly by warning them and by not doing foolish things to increase their danger, 
and that Tamiami breached the duty owed to its passengers, the appellants. The judgment is 
therefore reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment for each of the 
plaintiffs, appellants, and…to award each of them reasonable compensatory damages, including 
damages for physical injury and mental suffering and humiliation…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Torts and Equality: Did this case challenge racial and gender hierarchies in 1950s 
America? Is tort law—particularly negligence law—an appropriate or effective way to 
mount such challenges? Do you think it had an effect on bus companies’ policies going 
forward? How would you have advised Tamiami Trail Tours to adapt its practices in 
light of this decision? 
2. Eavesdropping: Does it seem to matter to the court whether the bus driver knew that 
Poppell could overhear his conversation with the police? Should it matter?  
3. Judicial Sociology: The court mentions the “southern tradition” of segregation and 
observes that anyone familiar with “folkways” and “local customs” in this part of Florida 
would “anticipate that violence might result if a Negro man and a seemingly white 
woman should ride into the county seated together toward the front of an interurban 
bus.” If courts are to consider such social norms as part of their legal analyses, how 
should they go about discovering and determining them? 
 
 
2 “Under No Circumstances Shall Police Authorities Be Summoned If A Passenger Refuses A Seating Or Reseating 
Request. Should Any Disturbance Arise, Police Authorities May Be Summoned To Quell Such Disturbance.” 
3 …We have the right to make use of knowledge of the popular and general customs of the people of this State, and public 
conditions therein…. 
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LEFFLER v. SHARP 
Supreme Court of Mississippi (2004) 
Cobb, Justice: ã 
On December 4, 2000, Walter Leffler filed suit in the 
Warren County Circuit Court against Kim Free, individually 
and d/b/a Quarter Inn (collectively Free) and Harry Sharp, 
individually, and Sharp Enterprises (collectively Sharp). 
Leffler sought damages for injuries he received when he fell 
through the roof of the premises immediately adjacent to the 
Quarter Inn in Vicksburg, Mississippi. Following discovery 
and the filing of motions for summary judgment by Free and 
Sharp, the trial judge determined that Leffler’s status upon 
entering the roof was that of a trespasser. The motions for 
summary judgment were granted, thereby dismissing all claims against Free and Sharp. Leffler 
appeals arguing the following issue: Whether the trial court erred in finding Leffler to be a trespasser 
and in granting summary judgment to Free and Sharp on that basis, when there were unresolved 
issues of fact regarding legal status and duty owed. 
Leffler visited the Quarter Inn, a restaurant and lounge in Vicksburg, Mississippi, while he was 
in town conducting work on the old Mississippi River bridge. At approximately 10:00 p.m. one 
evening, Leffler and his co-workers arrived at a casino where they gambled and consumed alcoholic 
beverages until 11:30 p.m. They left the casino, went to a local sports bar, and continued to consume 
alcoholic beverages until approximately 2:00 a.m. on February 6, 2000. From the sports bar, they all 
went to the Quarter Inn. Leffler was a first-time visitor to the Quarter Inn. 
While at the Quarter Inn, Leffler noticed an open window leading to the rooftop. (The small 
window is thirty-two and one-half inches from the floor and when fully opened provides a 
maximum opening of twenty-four inches in length and thirty-two inches in width.). After Leffler 
observed individuals on the rooftop, he presumed the area was open to Quarter Inn patrons. 
Although a locked glass door with “NOT AN EXIT” stenciled on the glass was only four feet away, 
Leffler entered the roof through the open window. As he was walking on the rooftop, he fell through 
the roof approximately twenty feet to the ground. 
At the time of the incident, Kim Free owned and managed the Quarter Inn which is located on 
the second floor of a building owned by Sharp Enterprises, Inc. Harry Sharp is the president of Sharp 
Enterprises, Inc. Sharp, individually, has no ownership interest in the property which is the subject 
of this appeal. 
The premises occupied by the Quarter Inn originally included a rooftop terrace, access to which 
was through a glass door inside the premises. In addition, there were at least two windows which 
overlooked the rooftop terrace from a common area of the Quarter Inn. Although previous 
businesses that occupied the present location of the Quarter Inn may have utilized the roof area as 
a part of their business, Free and Sharp assert that the roof was never part of the leased premises. 
The lease agreement offered as proof included the provision that “lessees will not have access to the 
roof terrace at the rear of 1302 Washington Street.” 
Prior to the date of the lease between Sharp and Free, Sharp considered leasing the rooftop area. 
To determine the safety of the roof, Sharp consulted with an architect and structural engineer who 
advised him that the roof was not safe for his intended use. Sharp then informed Free of this defect, 
and the two individuals, along with Jo Jo Saucier (a lessee of the premises with Free, but not a named 
party in the trial court or on appeal) discussed what measures should be taken to secure the roof 
area. The parties then decided that Saucier’s husband would weld bars over the window in order to 
keep people off of the roof. However, neither the bars, nor any other protective measures, were ever 
placed over the window. 
This appeal involves the dispute over whether Leffler should be classified as an invitee, licensee, 
or trespasser at the time the injury occurred. It is undisputed that Leffler was an invitee upon his 
 
ã Yassine Jaï, A Burning Requiem (CC BY 2.0). 
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entrance into the Quarter Inn. The status dispute arises, however, when Leffler entered the roof and 
subsequently fell through it. Although Leffler insists that at the time of his injury he remained an 
invitee, he does argue in the alternative that his status was at least that of an implied licensee. Leffler 
also argues for the sake of argument that if he is a trespasser, the owner of the premises has a duty 
to refrain from willfully and wantonly injuring him. 
Free and Sharp argue that upon Leffler’s entrance onto the roof, he became a trespasser. As a 
result, they maintain that there is no showing that they acted willfully and wantonly, resulting in 
Leffler’s injury. This Court applies a de novo standard of review to a grant of summary judgment by 
the trial court. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom 
the motion has been made. A motion for summary judgment lies only when there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law…. 
Mississippi applies a three-step process to determine premises liability. The first step consists of 
classifying the status of the injured person as an invitee, licensee, or a trespasser. Following this 
identification, the duty which was owed to the injured party is determined. The third step is to 
determine whether this duty was breached by the landowner or business operator. The 
determination of which status a particular plaintiff holds can be a jury question, but where the facts 
are not in dispute the classification becomes a question of law for the trial judge.  
As to the first step, determination of the injured party’s status, this Court has held that as to 
status, an invitee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in answer to the express or 
implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual advantage. A licensee is one who enters 
upon the property of another for his own convenience, pleasure, or benefit pursuant to the license 
or implied permission of the owner whereas a trespasser is one who enters upon another’s premises 
without license, invitation, or other right…[and] merely for his own purposes, pleasure, or 
convenience, or out of curiosity, and without any enticement, allurement, inducement or express or 
implied assurance of safety from the owner or person in charge. 
The second step is to identify the duty owed to the injured party. The owner of the premises is 
not an insurer of the invitee’s safety, but does owe to an invitee the duty to keep the premises 
reasonably safe, and when not reasonably safe, to warn only where there is hidden danger or peril 
that is not in plain and open view. Although licensees and trespassers are different classifications, 
landowners owe licensees and trespassers the same duty, specifically, to refrain from willfully or 
wantonly injuring them. 
Leffler maintains that his status upon his arrival and at the time of the accident was that of an 
invitee of Free, the Quarter Inn, and Sharp, on the premises so that he could have a good time with 
his co-workers by partaking in services provided by the Quarter Inn. In order to receive classification 
as an invitee, this Court held that an invitee answers an invitation to enter the owner’s premises for 
their mutual advantage. Leffler and the Quarter Inn mutually benefited from the fact that Leffler was 
allowed to continue the night’s fun at the Quarter Inn while the restaurant/lounge could continue 
making a profit. 
Leffler maintains that he remained an invitee at the time of his injury since Free and Sharp held 
the roof out as a part of the premises by allowing patrons to enter and use the roof terrace. In a 
deposition, Sharp testified that he and Free discussed what action would best secure the window, 
thereby keeping patrons off the rooftop. Sharp instructed Free that the roof was not part of the lease 
and was not to be used by anyone. In order to secure the window, the parties agreed that bars would 
be welded to the window. Although this safety measure never occurred, the dimensions of the 
window, being 24 inches by 32 inches, and almost 3 feet above the floor, belie any indication that 
patrons were invited to go onto the roof. Leffler asserts that because Sharp anticipated that 
customers might eventually try to utilize the rooftop, a question of fact exists as to whether Free and 
Sharp knew, or reasonably should have known, that customers were gathering on the roof. 
Although Leffler was an invitee at the time he entered the Quarter Inn, he was not an invitee at 
the time of the injury. An invitee who goes beyond the bounds of his invitation loses the status of 
invitee and the rights which accompany that state. Free and Sharp only extended their invitation to 
patrons to come inside the establishment. Upon his entrance to the Quarter Inn, Leffler was an 
invitee, but once he exited the establishment and entered onto the roof terrace, he went beyond the 
bounds of his invitation, therefore losing his invitee status. 
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An occupant is an invitee where the owner of the premises and the occupant receive mutual 
benefits. Neither Free nor Sharp benefited from Leffler’s walk on the roof. In addition to mutual 
benefits, a landowner does not have to insure the invitee’s safety, but the landowner must keep the 
premises reasonably safe, and when not reasonably safe, to warn only where there is hidden danger. 
Free and Sharp kept the Quarter Inn reasonably safe for patrons. Leffler’s accident did not happen 
within the walls of the Quarter Inn, but on a rooftop adjacent to the establishment. Free and Sharp’s 
acts of locking and marking the exit door were done to keep the Quarter Inn safe for patrons. Leffler 
was not an invitee at the location and time of the accident and, therefore, was not owed the duty 
given to an invitee. 
Leffler argues in the alternative that he was a licensee at the time of the accident. A licensee, in 
contrast to a trespasser, enters the property of another pursuant to the license or implied permission 
of the owner but enters for the convenience, pleasure or benefit of the licensee. Leffler entered the 
roof area for his convenience, pleasure and benefit because the bar was hot, crowded, and loud while 
the roof terrace was cool, open, and quiet. 
In an effort to further clarify the distinction between the status of an injured party, this Court 
in Clark v. Moore Memorial United Methodist Church, 538 So.2d 760 (Miss. 1989), distinguished 
between the “invitation” required of an invitee and “permission” required for a licensee. The 
word invitation was defined as “conduct which justifies others in believing that the possessor desires 
them to enter the land,” while permission was defined as “conduct justifying others in believing that 
the possessor is willing that they shall enter, if they desire to do so.” The two terms were further 
clarified with “mere permission, as distinguished from invitation, is sufficient to make the visitor a 
licensee but it does not make him an invitee.” 
Free and Sharp never engaged in conduct signifying to patrons that the roof area was open to 
patrons. No dispute exists that the window was open on the night in question. However, based upon 
the definition of permission, these facts indicate that they did not intend (or grant permission) for 
Leffler or other patrons to enter the roof area through the glass door, or through the open window. 
Although Leffler entered the roof terrace for his own benefit, he lacked permission to enter the roof 
terrace from Free or Sharp. Leffler did not enjoy the status of a licensee. 
Free and Sharp argue that Leffler was a trespasser, citing this Court’s reasoning in Kelley v. 
Sportsmen’s Speedway, 80 So.2d 785 (Miss. 1955): “A trespasser is a person who enters the premises 
of another without license, invitation, or other right, and intrudes for some definite purpose of his own, 
or at his convenience, or merely as an idler with no apparent purpose, other than, perhaps, to satisfy his 
curiosity.” Leffler entered the roof area without invitation or permission from Free or Sharp. On his 
way to the restroom, Leffler had seen two individuals standing outside the window. Returning from 
the restroom, the two individuals had reentered the Quarter Inn. Wanting to escape the crowd, loud 
music, heat, and smoke a cigarette, Leffler entered the roof terrace. There was no sign or indication 
within the Quarter Inn inviting or granting permission to patrons to enter the roof terrace. However, 
a sign on the glass door warned patrons not to use the door as an exit to the roof terrace. 
This Court recently reaffirmed that a trespasser enters another’s property without any 
enticement, allurement, inducement. Leffler was neither enticed nor allured onto the roof by Free 
or Sharp. Although the window was open, Free and Sharp did not entice the patrons to step through 
a high, small, narrow window onto the roof. In addition, neither party has provided evidence that 
Quarter Inn employees were aware that some patrons had entered the roof area. 
The third step in determining premises liability is determination of whether the owner breached 
a duty…. The duty owed to a trespasser is to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring the 
trespasser. To constitute willful or wanton injury, something more is required to impose liability 
than mere inadvertence or lack of attention; there must be a more or less extreme departure from 
ordinary standards of care, and conduct must differ in quality, as well as in degree, from ordinary 
negligence involving a conscious disregard of a known serious danger. Free and Sharp never 
disregarded or took lightly the condition of the roof terrace. In order to keep patrons off of it, Sharp 
kept in his possession the only key to the glass door exiting onto the roof in order to ensure that the 
door remained locked at all times. They not only kept the door locked; they also stenciled in red 
letters “NOT AN EXIT” on the glass door. 
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An owner owes trespassers no duty to keep his premises in a safe condition for their use, and as a 
general rule, he is not held responsible for an injury sustained by a trespasser upon the premises from 
a defect therein. Although the roof terrace was owned by Sharp Enterprises, the roof was not part of 
the lease between Free, Sharp, and Sharp Enterprises. The roof was also not a part of the Quarter Inn. 
Additionally, a landowner need not make it impossible for persons to trespass before he may treat 
intruders as trespassers…. Leffler entered the roof area of the Quarter Inn without invitation or 
permission. Free and Sharp took reasonable steps to make sure access to the roof was denied by 
keeping the door locked and stenciling the letters “NOT AN EXIT” on the door. Although this Court 
is mindful of the fact that Leffler received severe injuries, his status at the time of the incident was that 
of a trespasser, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing his claims…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Distinguishing Duties: Was Leffler a trespasser, an invitee, or a licensee? Did his status 
shift over the course of the night? Why does it matter?  
2. No Smoking: Leffler’s accident occurred in 2000, before many states had banned 
smoking indoors. What if the case had happened today? How might you try to use this 
change in smoking laws to help Leffler win his case?  
3. Writing on the Wall: The court uses the “NOT AN EXIT” stencil to undermine the 
viability of Leffler’s claim. Can you think of an argument why the stencil might have 
helped Leffler argue that he wasn’t a trespasser?  
 
POSECAI v. WAL-MART 
Supreme Court of Louisiana (1999) 
Marcus, Justice: ã 
Shirley Posecai brought suit against Sam’s Wholesale Club 
(“Sam’s”) in Kenner after she was robbed at gunpoint in the store’s 
parking lot. On July 20, 1995, Mrs. Posecai went to Sam’s to make 
an exchange and to do some shopping. She exited the store and 
returned to her parked car at approximately 7:20 p.m. It was not 
dark at the time. As Mrs. Posecai was placing her purchases in the 
trunk, a man who was hiding under her car grabbed her ankle and 
pointed a gun at her. The unknown assailant instructed her to 
hand over her jewelry and her wallet. While begging the robber to spare her life, she gave him her 
purse and all her jewelry. Mrs. Posecai was wearing her most valuable jewelry at the time of the 
robbery because she had attended a downtown luncheon earlier in the day. She lost a two and a half 
carat diamond ring given to her by her husband for their twenty-fifth wedding anniversary, a 
diamond and ruby bracelet and a diamond and gold watch, all valued at close to $19,000. 
When the robber released Mrs. Posecai, she ran back to the store for help. The Kenner Police 
Department was called and two officers came out to investigate the incident. The perpetrator was never 
apprehended and Mrs. Posecai never recovered her jewelry despite searching several pawn shops. 
At the time of this armed robbery, a security guard was stationed inside the store to protect the 
cash office from 5:00 p.m. until the store closed at 8:00 p.m. He could not see outside and Sam’s did 
not have security guards patrolling the parking lot. At trial, the security guard on duty, Kenner Police 
Officer Emile Sanchez, testified that he had worked security detail at Sam’s since 1986 and was not 
aware of any similar criminal incidents occurring in Sam’s parking lot during the nine years prior 
to the robbery of Mrs. Posecai. He further testified that he did not consider Sam’s parking lot to be 
a high crime area, but admitted that he had not conducted a study on the issue. 
The plaintiff presented the testimony of two other Kenner police officers. Officer Russell Moran 
testified that he had patrolled the area around Sam’s from 1993 to 1995. He stated that the 
subdivision behind Sam’s, Lincoln Manor, is generally known as a high crime area, but that the 
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Kenner Police were rarely called out to Sam’s. Officer George Ansardi, the investigating officer, 
similarly testified that Lincoln Manor is a high crime area but explained that Sam’s is not considered 
a high crime location. He further stated that to his knowledge none of the other businesses in the 
area employed security guards at the time of this robbery. 
An expert on crime risk assessment and premises security, David Kent, was qualified and 
testified on behalf of the plaintiff. It was his opinion that the robbery of Mrs. Posecai could have 
been prevented by an exterior security presence. He presented crime data from the Kenner Police 
Department indicating that between 1989 and June of 1995 there were three robberies or “predatory 
offenses” on Sam’s premises, and provided details from the police reports on each of these crimes. 
The first offense occurred at 12:45 a.m. on March 20, 1989, when a delivery man sleeping in his truck 
parked in back of the store was robbed. In May of 1992, a person was mugged in the store’s parking 
lot. Finally, on February 7, 1994, an employee of the store was the victim of a purse snatching, but 
she indicated to the police that the crime was related to a domestic dispute. 
In order to broaden the geographic scope of his crime data analysis, Mr. Kent looked at the crime 
statistics at thirteen businesses on the same block as Sam’s, all of which were either fast food 
restaurants, convenience stores or gas stations. He found a total of eighty-three predatory offenses 
in the six and a half years before Mrs. Posecai was robbed. Mr. Kent concluded that the area around 
Sam’s was “heavily crime impacted,” although he did not compare the crime statistics he found 
around Sam’s to any other area in Kenner or the New Orleans metro area. 
Mrs. Posecai contends that Sam’s was negligent in failing to provide adequate security in the 
parking lot considering the high level of crime in the surrounding area. Seeking to recover for mental 
anguish as well as for her property loss, she alleged that after this incident she had trouble sleeping 
and was afraid to go out by herself at night. After a bench trial, the trial judge held that Sam’s owed 
a duty to provide security in the parking lot because the robbery of the plaintiff was foreseeable and 
could have been prevented by the use of security. A judgment was rendered in favor of Mrs. Posecai, 
awarding $18,968 for her lost jewelry and $10,000 in general damages for her mental anguish. The 
trial judge further ruled that Sam’s was 75% at fault and the unknown perpetrator was only 25% at 
fault. Sam’s appealed. The court of appeal found that the trial judge erred in apportioning fault 
between Sam’s and the criminal who intentionally robbed Mrs. Posecai. It amended the judgment 
to find Sam’s solely at fault for the damages suffered by the plaintiff and affirmed the judgment as 
amended. Upon Sam’s application, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of that decision.  
The sole issue presented for our review is whether Sam’s owed a duty to protect Mrs. Posecai 
from the criminal acts of third parties under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
This court has adopted a duty-risk analysis to determine whether liability exists under the 
particular facts presented. Under this analysis the plaintiff must prove that the conduct in question 
was the cause-in-fact of the resulting harm, the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the 
requisite duty was breached by the defendant and the risk of harm was within the scope of protection 
afforded by the duty breached. Under the duty-risk analysis, all four inquiries must be affirmatively 
answered for plaintiff to recover. 
A threshold issue in any negligence action is whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. 
Whether a duty is owed is a question of law. In deciding whether to impose a duty in a particular 
case, the court must make a policy decision in light of the unique facts and circumstances presented. 
The court may consider various moral, social, and economic factors, including the fairness of 
imposing liability; the economic impact on the defendant and on similarly situated parties; the need 
for an incentive to prevent future harm; the nature of defendant’s activity; the potential for an 
unmanageable flow of litigation; the historical development of precedent; and the direction in which 
society and its institutions are evolving. 
This court has never squarely decided whether business owners owe a duty to protect their 
patrons from crimes perpetrated by third parties. It is therefore helpful to look to the way in which 
other jurisdictions have resolved this question. Most state supreme courts that have considered the 
issue agree that business owners do have a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect invitees 
from foreseeable criminal attacks.  
We now join other states in adopting the rule that although business owners are not the insurers 
of their patrons’ safety, they do have a duty to implement reasonable measures to protect their 
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patrons from criminal acts when those acts are foreseeable. We emphasize, however, that there is 
generally no duty to protect others from the criminal activities of third persons. This duty only arises 
under limited circumstances, when the criminal act in question was reasonably foreseeable to the 
owner of the business. Determining when a crime is foreseeable is therefore a critical inquiry. 
Other jurisdictions have resolved the foreseeability issue in a variety of ways, but four basic 
approaches have emerged. The first approach, although somewhat outdated, is known as the specific 
harm rule. According to this rule, a landowner does not owe a duty to protect patrons from the 
violent acts of third parties unless he is aware of specific, imminent harm about to befall them. 
Courts have generally agreed that this rule is too restrictive in limiting the duty of protection that 
business owners owe their invitees. 
More recently, some courts have adopted a prior similar incidents test. Under this test, 
foreseeability is established by evidence of previous crimes on or near the premises. The idea is that 
a past history of criminal conduct will put the landowner on notice of a future risk. Therefore, courts 
consider the nature and extent of the previous crimes, as well as their recency, frequency, and 
similarity to the crime in question. This approach can lead to arbitrary results because it is applied 
with different standards regarding the number of previous crimes and the degree of similarity 
required to give rise to a duty. 
The third and most common approach used in other jurisdictions is known as the totality of the 
circumstances test. This test takes additional factors into account, such as the nature, condition, and 
location of the land, as well as any other relevant factual circumstances bearing on foreseeability…. 
The application of this test often focuses on the level of crime in the surrounding area and courts 
that apply this test are more willing to see property crimes or minor offenses as precursors to more 
violent crimes. In general, the totality of the circumstances test tends to place a greater duty on 
business owners to foresee the risk of criminal attacks on their property and has been criticized as 
being too broad a standard, effectively imposing an unqualified duty to protect customers in areas 
experiencing any significant level of criminal activity. 
The final standard that has been used to determine foreseeability is a balancing test, an approach 
which has been adopted in California and Tennessee…in response to the perceived unfairness of 
the totality test. The balancing test seeks to address the interests of both business proprietors and 
their customers by balancing the foreseeability of harm against the burden of imposing a duty to 
protect against the criminal acts of third persons…. Under this test, the high degree of foreseeability 
necessary to impose a duty to provide security, will rarely, if ever, be proven in the absence of prior 
similar incidents of crime on the property. 
We agree that a balancing test is the best method for determining when business owners owe a 
duty to provide security for their patrons. The economic and social impact of requiring businesses 
to provide security on their premises is an important factor. Security is a significant monetary 
expense for any business and further increases the cost of doing business in high crime areas that 
are already economically depressed. Moreover, businesses are generally not responsible for the 
endemic crime that plagues our communities, a societal problem that even our law enforcement and 
other government agencies have been unable to solve. At the same time, business owners are in the 
best position to appreciate the crime risks that are posed on their premises and to take reasonable 
precautions to counteract those risks. 
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we adopt the following balancing test to be used in 
deciding whether a business owes a duty of care to protect its customers from the criminal acts of 
third parties. The foreseeability of the crime risk on the defendant’s property and the gravity of the 
risk determine the existence and the extent of the defendant’s duty. The greater the foreseeability 
and gravity of the harm, the greater the duty of care that will be imposed on the business. A very 
high degree of foreseeability is required to give rise to a duty to post security guards, but a lower 
degree of foreseeability may support a duty to implement lesser security measures such as using 
surveillance cameras, installing improved lighting or fencing, or trimming shrubbery. The plaintiff 
has the burden of establishing the duty the defendant owed under the circumstances. 
The foreseeability and gravity of the harm are to be determined by the facts and circumstances 
of the case. The most important factor to be considered is the existence, frequency and similarity of 
prior incidents of crime on the premises, but the location, nature and condition of the property 
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should also be taken into account. It is highly unlikely that a crime risk will be sufficiently foreseeable 
for the imposition of a duty to provide security guards if there have not been previous instances of 
crime on the business’ premises. 
In the instant case, there were only three predatory offenses on Sam’s premises in the six and a 
half years prior to the robbery of Mrs. Posecai. The first of these offenses occurred well after store 
hours, at almost one o’clock in the morning, and involved the robbery of a delivery man who was 
caught unaware as he slept near Sam’s loading dock behind the store. In 1992, a person was mugged 
while walking through the parking lot. Two years later, an employee of the store was attacked in the 
parking lot and her purse was taken, apparently by her husband. A careful consideration of the 
previous incidents of predatory offenses on the property reveals that there was only one other crime 
in Sam’s parking lot, the mugging in 1992, that was perpetrated against a Sam’s customer and that 
bears any similarity to the crime that occurred in this case. Given the large number of customers 
that used Sam’s parking lot, the previous robbery of only one customer in all those years indicates a 
very low crime risk. It is also relevant that Sam’s only operates during daylight hours and must 
provide an accessible parking lot to the multitude of customers that shop at its store each year. 
Although the neighborhood bordering Sam’s is considered a high crime area by local law 
enforcement, the foreseeability and gravity of harm in Sam’s parking lot remained slight. 
We conclude that Sam’s did not possess the requisite degree of foreseeability for the imposition 
of a duty to provide security patrols in its parking lot. Nor was the degree of foreseeability sufficient 
to support a duty to implement lesser security measures. Accordingly, Sam’s owed no duty to protect 
Mrs. Posecai from the criminal acts of third parties under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
Having found that no duty was owed, we do not reach the other elements of the duty-risk analysis 
that must be proven in establishing a negligence claim…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Shirley, You Can’t Be Serious? Why is it even debatable whether Sam’s owed Shirley 
Posecai a duty? Wasn’t it all the robber’s fault?  
2. Deep Pockets: The court picks the balancing test to determine whether business owners 
owe a duty to protect their patrons from crimes committed by third parties, in part 
because security can be expensive. Sam’s parent company, Wal-Mart, was the world’s 
largest company by revenue in 2020, with over $548 billion. Can’t it afford better 
security? Should profitability be relevant when courts determine the duty question?  




TARASOFF v. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
Supreme Court of California (1976) 
Tobriner, Justice: ã 
On October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana 
Tarasoff. Plaintiffs, Tatiana’s parents, allege that two months earlier 
Poddar confided his intention to kill Tatiana to Dr. Lawrence Moore, a 
psychologist employed by the Cowell Memorial Hospital at the 
University of California at Berkeley. They allege that on Moore’s request, 
the campus police briefly detained Poddar, but released him when he 
appeared rational. They further claim that Dr. Harvey Powelson, Moore’s 
superior, then directed that no further action be taken to detain Poddar. 
No one warned plaintiffs of Tatiana’s peril…. 
Plaintiffs’ complaints predicate liability on two grounds: defendants’ 
failure to warn plaintiffs of the impending danger and their failure to 
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The following case discusses stalking. 
  TORT LAW 106 
[confine Poddar under California statutes specifying the conditions under which persons may be 
involuntarily committed for psychological treatment.] Defendants, in turn, assert that they owed no 
duty of reasonable care to Tatiana…. 
We shall explain that defendant therapists cannot escape liability merely because Tatiana herself 
was not their patient. When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession 
should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an 
obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger. The discharge 
of this duty may require the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending upon the 
nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise 
the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary 
under the circumstances. 
In the case at bar, plaintiffs admit that defendant therapists notified the police, but argue on 
appeal that the therapists failed to exercise reasonable care to protect Tatiana in that they did not 
confine Poddar and did not warn Tatiana or others likely to apprise her of the danger. Defendant 
therapists, however, are public employees [who enjoy statutory immunity for certain “discretionary” 
acts, including their failure to confine Poddar]. No specific statutory provision, however, shields 
them from liability based upon failure to warn Tatiana or others likely to apprise her of the danger…. 
Plaintiffs therefore can amend their complaints to allege that, regardless of the therapists’ 
unsuccessful attempt to confine Poddar, since they knew that Poddar was at large and dangerous, 
their failure to warn Tatiana or others likely to apprise her of the danger constituted a breach of the 
therapists’ duty to exercise reasonable care to protect Tatiana. 
Plaintiffs, however, plead no relationship between Poddar and the police defendants which 
would impose upon them any duty to Tatiana, and plaintiffs suggest no other basis for such a duty. 
Plaintiffs have, therefore, failed to show that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the 
police defendants without leave to amend. 
…Plaintiffs’ first cause of action, entitled “Failure to Detain a Dangerous Patient,” alleges that 
on August 20, 1969, Poddar was a voluntary outpatient receiving therapy at Cowell Memorial 
Hospital. Poddar informed Moore, his therapist, that he was going to kill an unnamed girl, readily 
identifiable as Tatiana, when she returned home from spending the summer in Brazil. Moore, with 
the concurrence of Dr. Gold, who had initially examined Poddar, and Dr. Yandell, assistant to the 
director of the department of psychiatry, decided that Poddar should be committed for observation 
in a mental hospital. Moore orally notified Officers Atkinson and Teel of the campus police that he 
would request commitment. He then sent a letter to Police Chief William Beall requesting the 
assistance of the police department in securing Poddar’s confinement. 
Officers Atkinson, Brownrigg, and Halleran took Poddar into custody, but, satisfied that Poddar 
was rational, released him on his promise to stay away from Tatiana. Powelson, director of the 
department of psychiatry at Cowell Memorial Hospital, then asked the police to return Moore’s 
letter, directed that all copies of the letter and notes that Moore had taken as therapist be destroyed, 
and “ordered no action to place Prosenjit Poddar in 72-hour treatment and evaluation facility.” 
Plaintiffs’ second cause of action, entitled “Failure to Warn On a Dangerous Patient,” 
incorporates the allegations of the first cause of action, but adds the assertion that defendants 
negligently permitted Poddar to be released from police custody without “notifying the parents of 
Tatiana Tarasoff that their daughter was in grave danger from Posenjit Poddar.” Poddar persuaded 
Tatiana’s brother to share an apartment with him near Tatiana’s residence; shortly after her return 
from Brazil, Poddar went to her residence and killed her…. 
The second cause of action can be amended to allege that Tatiana’s death proximately resulted 
from defendants’ negligent failure to warn Tatiana or others likely to apprise her of her 
danger…. Defendants, however, contend that in the circumstances of the present case they owed no 
duty of care to Tatiana or her parents and that, in the absence of such duty, they were free to act in 
careless disregard of Tatiana’s life and safety. 
In analyzing this issue, we bear in mind that legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but 
merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for 
damage done. As stated in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968): “The assertion that liability 
must be denied because defendant bears no ‘duty’ to plaintiff begs the essential question—whether 
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the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct. Duty is not 
sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which 
lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.” 
In the landmark case of Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), Justice Peters recognized 
that liability should be imposed “for injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or 
skill”…. Thus, …whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to 
another that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct he would cause danger of 
injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid 
such danger. 
We depart from this fundamental principle only upon the balancing of a number of 
considerations; major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that 
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and 
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing 
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of 
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
The most important of these considerations in establishing duty is foreseeability. As a general 
principle, a defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his 
conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous. As we shall 
explain, however, when the avoidance of foreseeable harm requires a defendant to control the 
conduct of another person, or to warn of such conduct, the common law has traditionally imposed 
liability only if the defendant bears some special relationship to the dangerous person or to the 
potential victim. Since the relationship between a therapist and his patient satisfies this requirement, 
we need not here decide whether foreseeability alone is sufficient to create a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to protect a potential victim of another’s conduct. 
Although…as a general rule, one person owed no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to 
warn those endangered by such conduct, the courts have carved out an exception to this rule in cases 
in which the defendant stands in some special relationship to either the person whose conduct needs 
to be controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct. Applying this 
exception to the present case, we note that a relationship of defendant therapists to either Tatiana 
or Poddar will suffice to establish a duty of care; as explained in section 315 of the Restatement 
Second of Torts, a duty of care may arise from either “(a) a special relation between the actor and 
the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or (b) a 
special relation between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right of protection.” 
Although plaintiffs’ pleadings assert no special relation between Tatiana and defendant 
therapists, they establish as between Poddar and defendant therapists the special relation that arises 
between a patient and his doctor or psychotherapist. Such a relationship may support affirmative 
duties for the benefit of third persons. Thus, for example, a hospital must exercise reasonable care 
to control the behavior of a patient which may endanger other persons. A doctor must also warn a 
patient if the patient’s condition or medication renders certain conduct, such as driving a car, 
dangerous to others.  
Although the California decisions that recognize this duty have involved cases in which the 
defendant stood in a special relationship both to the victim and to the person whose conduct created 
the danger, we do not think that the duty should logically be constricted to such situations. Decisions 
of other jurisdictions hold that the single relationship of a doctor to his patient is sufficient to 
support the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect others against dangers emanating from the 
patient’s illness. The courts hold that a doctor is liable to persons infected by his patient if he 
negligently fails to diagnose a contagious disease, or, having diagnosed the illness, fails to warn 
members of the patient’s family. 
Since it involved a dangerous mental patient, the decision in Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co. 
of Fargo v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967), comes closer to the issue. The Veterans 
Administration arranged for the patient to work on a local farm, but did not inform the farmer of 
the man’s background. The farmer consequently permitted the patient to come and go freely during 
nonworking hours; the patient borrowed a car, drove to his wife’s residence and killed her. 
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Notwithstanding the lack of any “special relationship” between the Veterans Administration and 
the wife, the court found the Veterans Administration liable for the wrongful death of the wife…. 
Defendants contend, however, that imposition of a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect 
third persons is unworkable because therapists cannot accurately predict whether or not a patient 
will resort to violence. In support of this argument amicus representing the American Psychiatric 
Association and other professional societies cites numerous articles which indicate that therapists, 
in the present state of the art, are unable reliably to predict violent acts; their forecasts, amicus claims, 
tend consistently to overpredict violence, and indeed are more often wrong than right. Since 
predictions of violence are often erroneous, amicus concludes, the courts should not render rulings 
that predicate the liability of therapists upon the validity of such predictions…. 
We recognize the difficulty that a therapist encounters in attempting to forecast whether a 
patient presents a serious danger of violence. Obviously, we do not require that the therapist, in 
making that determination, render a perfect performance; the therapist need only exercise that 
reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of 
that professional specialty under similar circumstances. Within the broad range of reasonable 
practice and treatment in which professional opinion and judgment may differ, the therapist is free 
to exercise his or her own best judgment without liability; proof, aided by hindsight, that he or she 
judged wrongly is insufficient to establish negligence. 
In the instant case, however, the pleadings do not raise any question as to failure of defendant 
therapists to predict that Poddar presented a serious danger of violence. On the contrary, the present 
complaints allege that defendant therapists did in fact predict that Poddar would kill, but were 
negligent in failing to warn. 
Amicus contends, however, that even when a therapist does in fact predict that a patient poses a 
serious danger of violence to others, the therapist should be absolved of any responsibility for failing 
to act to protect the potential victim. In our view, however, once a therapist does in fact determine, 
or under applicable professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses 
a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the 
foreseeable victim of that danger. While the discharge of this duty of due care will necessarily vary 
with the facts of each case,1 in each instance the adequacy of the therapist’s conduct must be 
measured against the traditional negligence standard of the rendition of reasonable care under the 
circumstances…. 
The risk that unnecessary warnings may be given is a reasonable price to pay for the lives of 
possible victims that may be saved. We would hesitate to hold that the therapist who is aware that 
his patient expects to attempt to assassinate the President of the United States would not be obligated 
to warn the authorities because the therapist cannot predict with accuracy that his patient will 
commit the crime. 
Defendants further argue that free and open communication is essential to psychotherapy; that 
unless a patient is assured that information revealed by him can and will be held in utmost 
confidence, he will be reluctant to make the full disclosure upon which diagnosis and treatment 
depends. The giving of a warning, defendants contend, constitutes a breach of trust which entails 
the revelation of confidential communications.  
We recognize the public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental illness and in 
protecting the rights of patients to privacy, and the consequent public importance of safeguarding 
the confidential character of psychotherapeutic communication. Against this interest, however, we 
must weigh the public interest in safety from violent assault. The Legislature has undertaken the 
difficult task of balancing the countervailing concerns. In Evidence Code section 1014, it established 
a broad rule of privilege to protect confidential communications between patient and 
psychotherapist. In Evidence Code section 1024, the Legislature created a specific and limited 
 
1 Defendant therapists and amicus also argue that warnings must be given only in those cases in which the therapist 
knows the identity of the victim. We recognize that in some cases it would be unreasonable to require the therapist to 
interrogate his patient to discover the victim’s identity, or to conduct an independent investigation. But there may also be 
cases in which a moment’s reflection will reveal the victim’s identity. The matter thus is one which depends upon the 
circumstances of each case, and should not be governed by any hard and fast rule. 
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exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege: “There is no privilege if the psychotherapist has 
reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be 
dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that disclosure of the 
communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger.”  
We realize that the open and confidential character of psychotherapeutic dialogue encourages 
patients to express threats of violence, few of which are ever executed. Certainly a therapist should 
not be encouraged routinely to reveal such threats; such disclosures could seriously disrupt the 
patient’s relationship with his therapist and with the persons threatened. To the contrary, the 
therapist’s obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a confidence unless such disclosure 
is necessary to avert danger to others, and even then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that 
would preserve the privacy of his patient to the fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the 
threatened danger. 
The revelation of a communication under the above circumstances is not a breach of trust or a 
violation of professional ethics; as stated in the Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical 
Association (1957): “A physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in the course of 
medical attendance unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to 
protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.” We conclude that the public policy 
favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must 
yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege 
ends where the public peril begins. 
Our current crowded and computerized society compels the interdependence of its members. In 
this risk-infested society we can hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result 
from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal. If the exercise of reasonable 
care to protect the threatened victim requires the therapist to warn the endangered party or those 
who can reasonably be expected to notify him, we see no sufficient societal interest that would 
protect and justify concealment. The containment of such risks lies in the public interest. For the 
foregoing reasons, we find that plaintiffs’ complaints can be amended to state a cause of action 
against defendants Moore, Powelson, Gold, and Yandell…for breach of a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to protect Tatiana…. 
Turning now to the police defendants, we conclude that they do not have any such special 
relationship to either Tatiana or to Poddar sufficient to impose upon such defendants a duty to warn 
respecting Poddar’s violent intentions. Plaintiffs suggest no theory, and plead no facts that give rise 
to any duty to warn on the part of the police defendants absent such a special relationship. They 
have thus failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying leave to amend as to the police 
defendants…. 
Mosk, Justice, concurring and dissenting: 
I concur in the result…only because the complaints allege that defendant therapists did in fact 
predict that Poddar would kill and were therefore negligent in failing to warn of that danger. Thus 
the issue here is very narrow: we are not concerned with whether the therapists, pursuant to the 
standards of their profession, “should have” predicted potential violence; they allegedly did so in 
actuality. Under these limited circumstances I agree that a cause of action can be stated…. 
Clark, Justice, dissenting: 
…Policy generally determines duty…. Overwhelming policy considerations weigh against 
imposing a duty on psychotherapists to warn a potential victim against harm. While offering 
virtually no benefit to society, such a duty will frustrate psychiatric treatment, invade fundamental 
patient rights and increase violence…. Assurance of confidentiality is important for three reasons. 
First, without substantial assurance of confidentiality, those requiring treatment will be deterred 
from seeking assistance. It remains an unfortunate fact in our society that people seeking psychiatric 
guidance tend to become stigmatized. Apprehension of such stigma—apparently increased by the 
propensity of people considering treatment to see themselves in the worst possible light—creates a 
well-recognized reluctance to seek aid. This reluctance is alleviated by the psychiatrist’s assurance 
of confidentiality. 
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Second, the guarantee of confidentiality is essential in eliciting the full disclosure necessary for 
effective treatment…. Until a patient can trust his psychiatrist not to violate their confidential 
relationship, the unconscious psychological control mechanism of repression will prevent the recall 
of past experiences.  
Third, even if the patient fully discloses his thoughts, assurance that the confidential relationship 
will not be breached is necessary to maintain his trust in his psychiatrist—the very means by which 
treatment is effected…. Patients will be helped only if they can form a trusting relationship with the 
psychiatrist…. 
Given the importance of confidentiality to the practice of psychiatry, it becomes clear the duty 
to warn imposed by the majority will cripple the use and effectiveness of psychiatry. Many people, 
potentially violent—yet susceptible to treatment—will be deterred from seeking it; those seeking it 
will be inhibited from making revelations necessary to effective treatment; and, forcing the 
psychiatrist to violate the patient’s trust will destroy the interpersonal relationship by which 
treatment is effected…. 
By imposing a duty to warn, the majority contributes to the danger to society of violence by the 
mentally ill and greatly increases the risk of civil commitment—the total deprivation of liberty—of 
those who should not be confined….* 
QUESTIONS 
1. Relationship Status—“It’s Complicated”: Is Tarasoff of the same kin as cases like 
Osterlind and Baker, which explore how certain special relationships can create 
exceptions to the general rule that there’s no affirmative duty to protect or rescue? Or is 
there something slightly different going on here? 
2. Professionals and the Public: Why didn’t the police officers owe the same duty to 
Tarasoff as the therapists? And do you think other professionals should owe similar 
duties? How about clergy, teachers, parents, social workers, or lawyers? Why not extend 
this type of duty to anyone who has a hunch about imminent physical violence? 
3. Institutional Expertise: What do you think about judges playing this role of determining 
professional duties, even if they’re aided by amici (as the court was here)? Do courts have 
the information and abilities to develop a sensible plan to reduce the occurrence of 
violent attacks by people with a mental illness? Is the legislature better positioned? Even 
if they are, can we trust them to regulate effectively in this area?  
 
GRAFF v. BEARD 
Supreme Court of Texas (1993) 
Cornyn, Judge: ã 
We are asked in this case to impose a common-law duty on a 
social host who makes alcohol available to an intoxicated adult 
guest who the host knows will be driving. For the reasons given 
below, we decline to do so…. 
Houston Moos consumed alcohol at a party hosted by the 
Graffs and Hausmons, and allegedly left in his vehicle in an 
intoxicated condition. En route from the party, Moos collided 
 
* A shocking illustration of psychotherapists’ inability to predict dangerousness…is cited and discussed in Ennis, 
Prisoners of Psychiatry: Mental Patients, Psychiatrists, and the Law (1972): “In a well-known study, psychiatrists predicted 
that 989 persons were so dangerous that they could not be kept even in civil mental hospitals, but would have to be kept in 
maximum security hospitals run by the Department of Corrections. Then, because of a United States Supreme Court decision, 
those persons were transferred to civil hospitals. After a year, the Department of Mental Hygiene reported that one-fifth of 
them had been discharged to the community, and over half had agreed to remain as voluntary patients. During the year, only 
7 of the 989 committed or threatened any act that was sufficiently dangerous to require retransfer to the maximum security 
hospital. Seven correct predictions out of almost a thousand is not a very impressive record. Other studies, and there are 
many, have reached the same conclusion: psychiatrists simply cannot predict dangerous behavior.”… 
ã Laura LaRose, Beer Pong (CC BY 2.0). 
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with a motorcycle, injuring Brett Beard. Beard sued both Moos and his hosts for his injuries…. An 
en banc divided court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment [against Beard]…, holding for 
the first time in Texas jurisprudence that social hosts may be liable to third parties for the acts of 
their intoxicated adult guests. 
Under the court of appeals’ standard, a social host violates a legal duty to third parties when the 
host makes an alcoholic beverage available to an adult guest who the host knows is intoxicated and 
will be driving. In practical effect, this duty is twofold. The first aspect of the host’s duty is to prevent 
guests who will be driving from becoming intoxicated. If the host fails to do so, however, a second 
aspect of the duty comes into play—the host must prevent the intoxicated guest from driving. 
The legislatures in most states, including Texas, have enacted dram shop laws that impose a 
statutory duty to third parties on commercial providers under specified circumstances. We have 
recently held that when the legislature enacted the Texas dram shop statute it also imposed a duty 
on the provider that extends to the patron himself. Because the dram shop statute applies only to 
commercial providers, however, it does not govern the duty asserted in this case.  
We think it significant in appraising Beard’s request to recognize common-law social host 
liability that the legislature has considered and declined to create such a duty. A version of the bill 
that eventually became our dram shop statute provided for social host liability. Although that 
version passed the Senate, the House rejected it. The Senate-House conference committee deleted 
social host liability from the bill the legislature eventually enacted. 
The highest courts in only four states have done what we are asked to do today: judicially impose 
a duty to third parties on social hosts who make alcohol available to adult guests.1 In two of these 
states, California and Iowa, the legislatures subsequently abrogated the judicially-created duty. 
Neither of the two remaining jurisdictions, Massachusetts and New Jersey, had dram shop statutes 
when their courts acted. Rather, their courts first imposed a common-law duty to third parties on 
commercial establishments and then extended the duty to social hosts. 
It is fundamental that the existence of a legally cognizable duty is a prerequisite to all tort liability. 
Historically, the law recognized no common-law duty to third parties on the part of a provider of 
alcohol—the rationale being that the consumption of alcohol, rather than the provision of it, 
proximately caused the injury. In El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987), this court 
created a common-law duty to injured third parties on the part of commercial providers, but that 
duty was almost simultaneously superseded by the legislature’s enactment of the dram shop statute. 
The statute became the exclusive basis for the civil liability of commercial providers of alcohol. The 
statutory duty established by the legislature also placed a less onerous burden on commercial 
providers and a correspondingly higher burden of proof on injured parties than the common-law 
duty created by the court: vendors were made legally accountable only when it was apparent at the 
time the patron was served that the patron was “obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented 
a clear danger to himself and others.” It is against this backdrop that we consider whether a 
common-law duty for social hosts should be recognized in Texas.  
Deciding whether to impose a new common-law duty involves complex considerations of public 
policy. We have said that these considerations include social, economic, and political questions, and 
their application to the particular facts at hand. Among other factors, we consider the extent of the 
risk involved, the foreseeability and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the 
actor’s conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences 
of placing the burden on the defendant. We have also emphasized other factors. For example, 
questions of duty have turned on whether one party has superior knowledge of the risk, and whether 
a right to control the actor whose conduct precipitated the harm exists. See e.g., Seagram v. McGuire, 
814 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1991) (declining to recognize a legal duty of an alcohol manufacturer to warn 
consumers against danger of alcoholism because the risk is common knowledge). 
…[W]e deem it appropriate to focus on two tacit assumptions underlying the holding of the 
court of appeals: that the social host can reasonably know of the guest’s alcohol consumption and 
 
1 The majority of cases cited by Justice Gammage address only liability imposed on adults for the acts of intoxicated 
minors. E.g., Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18 (Or. 1971). Provision of alcohol to 
minors is not involved in this case. 
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possible intoxication, and possesses the right to control the conduct of the guest. Under Texas law, 
in the absence of a relationship between the parties giving rise to the right of control, one person is 
under no legal duty to control the conduct of another, even if there exists the practical ability to do 
so. For example, in Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1984), we held that an 
employer breached a duty of care to the public when he directed an intoxicated employee to drive 
home and the employee caused a fatal car crash. While we noted that there is no general duty to 
control the conduct of another, we recognized a duty in that instance because of the employer’s 
authority over the employee…. [O]ur decision in Otis was premised on the employer’s negligent 
exercise of control over the employee, rather than on a general duty to prevent intoxicated individuals 
from driving. 
Instead of focusing on the host’s right of control over the guest, the court of appeals conditioned 
a social host’s duty on the host’s “exclusive control” of the alcohol supply. The court defined 
“exclusive control,” however, as nothing more than a degree of control “greater than that of the guest 
user.” Under the court’s definition, at a barbecue, a wedding reception, a back-yard picnic, a 
pachanga, a Bar Mitzvah—or a variety of other common social settings—the host would always have 
exclusive control over the alcohol supply because the host chooses whether alcohol will be provided 
and the manner in which it will be provided. The duty imposed by the court of appeals would 
apparently attach in any social setting in which alcohol is available regardless of the host’s right to 
control the guest. Thus, as a practical matter, the host has but one choice—whether to make alcohol 
available to guests at all.  
But should the host venture to make alcohol available to adult guests, the court of appeals’ 
standard would allow the host to avoid liability by cutting off the guest’s access to alcohol at some 
point before the guest becomes intoxicated. Implicit in that standard is the assumption that the 
reasonably careful host can accurately determine how much alcohol guests have consumed and 
when they have approached their limit. We believe, though, that it is far from clear that a social host 
can reliably recognize a guest’s level of intoxication. First, it is unlikely that a host can be expected 
to know how much alcohol, if any, a guest has consumed before the guest arrives on the host’s 
premises. Second, in many social settings, the total number of guests present may practically inhibit 
the host from discovering a guest’s approaching intoxication. Third, the condition may be apparent 
in some people but certainly not in all. The point at which intoxication is reached varies from person 
to person, as do the signs of intoxication. One national study, for instance, found that of the drivers 
with a blood alcohol concentration above 0.10%, the legal limit for driving in many states, only one 
half actually exhibited signs of intoxication. The guest, on the other hand, is in a far better position 
to know the amount of alcohol he has consumed, his state of sobriety, and the consequential risk he 
poses to the public. 
This brings us to the second aspect of the duty implicit in the court of appeals’ standard: that 
should the guest become intoxicated, the host must prevent the guest from driving. Unlike the court 
of appeals, however, we cannot assume that guests will respond to a host’s attempts, verbal or 
physical, to prevent the guests from driving. Nor is it clear to us precisely what affirmative actions 
would discharge the host’s duty under the court of appeals’ standard. Would a simple request not to 
drive suffice? Or is more required? Is the host required to physically restrain the guests, take their 
car keys, or disable their vehicles? The problems inherent in this aspect of the court of appeals’ 
holding are obvious. The implications of these unaddressed questions demonstrate the frail 
foundation upon which the court of appeals has constructed social host liability. 
Ideally, guests will drink responsibly, and hosts will monitor their social functions to reduce the 
likelihood of intoxication. Once a guest becomes impaired by alcohol to the point at which he 
becomes a threat to himself and others, we would hope that the host can persuade the guest to take 
public transportation, stay on the premises, or be transported home by an unimpaired driver. But 
we know that too often reality conflicts with ideal behavior. And, given the ultimate power of guests 
to control their own alcohol consumption and the absence of any legal right of the host to control 
the guest, we find the arguments for shifting legal responsibility from the guest to the host, who 
merely makes alcohol available at social gatherings, unconvincing. As the common law has long 
recognized, the imbiber maintains the ultimate power and thus the obligation to control his own 
behavior: to decide to drink or not to drink, to drive or not to drive. We therefore conclude that the 
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common law’s focus should remain on the drinker as the person primarily responsible for his own 
behavior and best able to avoid the foreseeable risks of that behavior…. 
Gammage, Judge, dissenting: 
…The majority errs in holding that the legislature must “create” the duty for social hosts not to 
send intoxicated guests driving in our streets to maim and kill. Logic, legal experience and this 
court’s own earlier decisions dictate a contrary result. The legislature may enact a statute that creates 
a duty. But the legislature’s failure to act does not “un-create” an existing duty. A duty created by 
the common law continues to exist unless and until the legislature changes it, and such an existing 
common law duty applies to the defendants here. 
Consider what earlier relevant Texas cases hold. First and foremost is El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 
732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987). Poole recognizes the common law duty of commercial vendors of 
alcoholic beverages not to serve patrons alcoholic beverages when the liquor licensee knew or should 
have known that the patron was intoxicated and was going to drive a motor vehicle…. The majority 
fails to acknowledge Poole’s rationale that the most important factor in recognizing a duty under the 
common law of negligence is the foreseeability of the risk…. Probably the most quotable line from 
Poole suggests the foreseeability here is analogous to letting a rattlesnake loose on an unsuspecting 
public: “The risk and likelihood of injury from serving alcohol to an intoxicated person whom the 
licensee knows will probably drive a car is as readily foreseen as injury resulting from setting loose 
a live rattlesnake in a shopping mall.” If we substitute “social host” for “licensee,” the statement 
remains equally true…. In addressing the victims of DWI, it is clear the Poole analysis applies with 
equal strength to social hosts who engage in such dangerous conduct. Indeed, 
it is small comfort to the widow whose husband has been killed in an accident 
involving an intoxicated driver to learn that the driver received his drinks from a 
hospitable social host rather than by purchase at a bar. The danger of ultimate 
harm is as equally foreseeable to the reasonably perceptive host as to the 
bartender. The danger and risk to the potential victim on the highway is equally 
as great, regardless of the source of the liquor…. 
The only difference between the commercial vendor and the social host is the relationship to the 
intoxicated driver. The risk and foreseeability of harm to the general public is the same. Balancing the 
relationship factor, in determining whether a duty exists, must tip in favor of the public interest…. 
The majority dismisses Otis Engineering on the ground it was “the employer’s negligent exercise of 
control over the employee” that distinguishes the situation from the social host’s position…. The 
position of the social host is somewhat different, in that the host is serving alcohol to an intoxicated 
person knowing he will drive. In Otis Engineering the control was over the sending (or driving), 
whereas for the social host the control is over the furnishing of the intoxicating beverage. In either 
case the risk is knowingly letting that rattlesnake loose on the public streets and highways. [We have] 
set forth the factors for determining whether to impose a duty and thereby recognize a negligence 
tort action: the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the 
actor’s conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences 
of placing the burden on the defendant, acknowledging foreseeability of the risk is the foremost and 
dominant consideration…. Instead of weighing all factors with an appropriate emphasis on this risk 
and its foreseeability, the majority selects two lesser factors favoring its desired result, and more or 
less dismisses the rest. Once again, both the legislature and the Poole decision have provided the 
answer. Does the social utility of a host’s providing liquor to an obviously intoxicated driver 
outweigh the foreseeability of risk? No, as both the Poole holding and the legislature’s enactment of 
a dram shop act demonstrate. The majority addresses the difficulty of guarding against injury, but 
it ignores the fact that the injury is a consequence of the intoxication. It is not significantly more 
difficult for the social host to refuse to serve alcoholic beverages to the intoxicated guest than it is 
for the bartender to refuse to sell to the drunken patron. Moreover, when the dram shop law 
addresses liability in the commercial context, but fails to address social host liability, the duty 
imposed upon this court to fill the illogical and unjust void in the law is even greater…. 
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The majority dismisses what is perhaps the earliest social host common law duty holding in 
Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18, 23 (Or. 1971), as one of 
the “only a duty owed to minors” case. The Gamma Phi Chapter case did involve intoxication of a 
minor, but it was immaterial whether the third party who was injured in the accident, and to whom 
the duty was owed, was injured by a minor or by an adult drunk. In fact, on a foreseeability analysis, 
it is just as foreseeable that an intoxicated adult driving a vehicle will cause third party injury as it is 
for an intoxicated minor…. A rattlesnake is just as deadly, its bite just as lethal, whether it is a young 
“adolescent” rattlesnake or an older more mature rattlesnake. The duty to the driver on the highway 
to not set the venomous snake loose is the same…. 
The majority confuses issues of proof with issues of whether to recognize the tort duty. The 
majority is concerned that the social host might not be able to persuade or control his intoxicated 
guest to keep him or her from driving. The host, however, clearly does control whether alcohol is 
being served, and in what quantities and form. The answer to the “duty” question is that the host 
should not let the driving guest have the alcohol in intoxicating quantities. If the guest becomes 
inebriated, however, just as with any other dangerous situation one helps create, the host has the 
duty to make every reasonable effort to keep the dangerously intoxicated guest from driving. If the 
guest resists those efforts, then there is a question for the factfinder to resolve whether the host’s 
efforts were all that reasonably could be done under the circumstances.  
The majority expresses concern that “the reasonably careful host” may not be able to detect when 
some guests are intoxicated…. If that is so, then the factfinder should have no difficulty determining 
that the host did not serve them while they were “obviously intoxicated.” The majority further 
asserts…that the “guest…is in a far better position to know the amount of alcohol he has consumed” 
than the host…. This assertion defies common sense, because from personal observation we know 
that most persons, as they become intoxicated, along with losing their dexterity and responsive 
mental faculties, gradually become less and less cognizant of how much they’ve had and how badly 
intoxicated they are…. Intoxicated guests need someone to tell them not to drive. It bears repeating 
that, if the guest did not appear intoxicated, the factfinder should have no trouble concluding that 
the host did not serve alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person. 
If circumstances do not permit the social host to adequately monitor and control the quantity of 
alcoholic beverages a guest consumes, the host still retains absolute control over whether alcoholic 
beverages should be served at all. Lest there be some fear that recognizing social host liability will 
impair the celebrity of every backyard barbecue in Texas, it should not, and its effect should be 
salubrious. Moreover, it should be remembered that the innocent and sober guest en route to the 
party is entitled to the same legal protection from a drunken and dangerous departing guest as any 
other member of the driving public…. 
The majority seeks to…stop the evolving common law dead in its tracks. Virtually all 
jurisdictions have discarded that obsolete “drinker’s fault only” rationale and provided meaningful 
doctrines to protect the public from rattlesnakes in its midst…. This court should…keep both sets 
of rattlesnakes—those created by commercial vendors, and those created by social hosts—off our 
public streets and highways. The drunk who causes the accident is not excused from liability because 
the social host who intoxicated him is also responsible. All culpable parties should be liable—the 
social host who knowingly intoxicated the guest and the guest who drunkenly caused the accident…. 
The television commercial says, “Friends don’t let friends drive drunk.” That is sound public policy. 
But today the majority says, “Intoxicate your friends and send them out upon the public streets and 
highways to drive drunk. Don’t worry, you won’t be liable.” That is, in the kindest term I can muster, 
unsound policy…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Boozy Chaperone: Should adults who supply alcohol to minors owe a legal duty to third 
parties who are then injured when the minor drives drunk? Should you owe a similar 
duty if you lend your twenty-year-old sibling your ID on a Friday night? How do your 
answers to these questions fit with how you see the Graff decision? 
2. Bartender, Pour Me Another: The dissent argues that it’s “not significantly more 
difficult for the social host to refuse to serve alcoholic beverages to the intoxicated guest 
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than it is for the bartender to refuse to sell to the drunken patron.” Do you agree? Is it 
easier in some ways and harder in others? How much should the law be influenced by 
phenomena like social awkwardness and peer pressure? 
3. Hostess with the Mostess: The majority tells us that Massachusetts and New Jersey 
recognize that social hosts who make alcohol available to guests owe a duty to third 
parties, whereas California and Iowa don’t. Do you think people have less fun at parties 
in Boston and Trenton than in Sacramento and Des Moines? Do they host fewer parties? 
Do they fall out with their friends more often? What effects are these legal deviations 
likely to have on peoples’ lives? 
 
C. Breach 
MARTIN v. EVANS 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (1998) 
Newman, Justice: ã 
…This personal injury suit arose from an accident in 
which [Weldon] Evans’ tractor-trailer backed into Appellee 
Anthony Martin. The parties presented conflicting testimony 
relating directly to the issue of Evans’ negligence, and the jury 
concluded that Evans was not negligent. Because the verdict 
rested on a credibility determination, we hold that the trial 
court usurped the jury’s responsibility by disregarding its 
finding that Evans was not negligent…and reinstate the jury’s 
verdict…. 
On May 24, 1989, Evans was driving a tractor-trailer that was forty-five feet long, eight feet wide 
and thirteen feet, six inches tall…. [H]e pulled into the Canonsburg rest stop. Along the left-hand 
side of the parking lot, there were parallel parking spots for trucks. Evans pulled his truck into what 
he believed to be the last parallel parking spot in that row. Because it was the last spot, he had to 
angle the cab of the truck to the trailer to maneuver the truck into the space. 
Evans left the truck running, and went to the restrooms. When he returned, he looked in back 
of the truck before he got into the cab and noticed that no one was parked behind him. He recorded 
the stop in his logbook, which took approximately two minutes, then he prepared to back up. Evans 
testified that he put the truck into reverse and released both the emergency brake for the cab and the 
emergency brake for the tractor. When released, the emergency brakes emit a hissing sound that 
lasts for about two seconds. He activated his four-way flashers, which are similar to an automobile’s 
hazard lights. Then he looked through the side-view mirrors, but because of the angle of the truck 
and the length of the trailer, he could not see directly behind him. He reversed the truck “slower 
than you could walk” until he felt a nudge and saw someone waving at him to stop. He stopped the 
truck and through his right-hand rear view mirror he saw someone fall just to the right, rear of his 
truck. When he got out of his truck to investigate, Evans saw Martin lying on the ground. 
Martin and Rochester Steverson were driving southbound on Interstate 79 on May 24, 1989, 
when they, too, stopped at the Canonsburg rest area. Their truck was an Isuzu box truck that was 
about twenty feet long and ten feet wide. The driver of the truck parked approximately seven to ten 
feet directly behind Evans’ tractor-trailer. Martin was either walking or standing between the Isuzu 
truck and Evans’ tractor-trailer when the tractor-trailer began to back into him. He claimed that he 
tried to get out of the way but was unable to do so. He became pinned between the two vehicles. 
Once he realized what was happening, Steverson put the Isuzu truck into reverse to free Martin, who 
fell to the ground. Martin suffered injuries to his right arm and back. As result, Martin brought a 
negligence action against Evans…. 
 
ã Carl Spencer, Renault Magnum – Reversing (CC BY-NC 2.0). 
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[At trial, the] parties presented conflicting testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding 
the accident. The trial court instructed the jury on negligence, contributory negligence, and 
comparative negligence. The court presented the following interrogatories to the jury…: 
Question 1a 
Do you find that defendant Weldon R. Evans was negligent? 
Yes ____ No ____ 
If you answered “Yes” to Question 1a, go on to Question 1b. If you answered “No” 
to Question 1a, the plaintiff cannot recover and you should not answer any further 
questions and should return to the courtroom. 
 
Question 1b 
Was the defendant’s negligence a substantial factor in bringing about the 
plaintiff’s harm? 
Yes ____ No ____ 
If you answered “Yes” to Question 1b, go on to Question 2a. If you answered “No” 
to Question 1b, the plaintiff cannot recover and you should not answer any further 
questions and should return to the courtroom. 
 
Question 2a 
Do you find that plaintiff Anthony Martin was contributorily negligent? 
Yes ____ No ____ 
If you answered “Yes” to Question 2a, go on to Question 2b. If you answered “No” 
to Question 2a, go on to Question 4. 
 
Question 2b 
Was plaintiff’s contributory negligence a substantial factor in bringing about his 
harm? 
Yes ____ No ____ 
If you answered “Yes” to Question 2b, go on to Question 3. If you answered “No” 
to Question 2b, go on to Question 4. 
The jury answered “No” to Question 1a, therefore, did not answer the remaining questions. The trial 
court molded the jury’s answer into a verdict in favor of Appellants. 
Martin moved for a new trial. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds that the jury’s 
verdict “shocked the Court’s sense of justice.” The court reasoned that because Evans sat in his truck 
for “a couple of minutes” before backing up, he was aware that there were blind spots in his mirrors 
such that he was unable to see directly behind his vehicle, and it was a busy rest area and likely that 
a pedestrian or vehicle could stand or park directly behind him, the jury’s verdict that Evans was not 
negligent was unacceptable. 
Evans appealed to the Superior Court, which concluded…that the trial court properly granted a 
new trial, and thus affirmed. This Court [heard Evans’s appeal] to determine whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in granting a new trial where the parties presented conflicting testimony that 
required a credibility determination. We now reverse. 
A new trial is warranted when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s 
sense of justice…. Negligence is the absence of ordinary care that a reasonably prudent person would 
exercise in the same or similar circumstances. The mere occurrence of an accident does not establish 
negligent conduct. Rather, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the defendant engaged in conduct that deviated from the general standard of care 
expected under the circumstances, and that this deviation proximately caused actual harm. 
The trial court instructed the jury with regard to the definition of negligence as follows: 
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The legal term, negligence, otherwise known as carelessness, is the absence of 
ordinary care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the 
circumstances here presented.  
Negligent conduct may consist either of an act or an omission to act when 
there is a duty to do so. In other words, negligence is the failure to do something 
which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something which a 
reasonably careful person would not do in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances established by the evidence in this case. It is for you to determine 
how a reasonably careful person would act in those circumstances.  
Now, I told you in defining negligence that part of that definition was absence 
of ordinary care. I want to define ordinary care for you. Ordinary care is the care 
a reasonably careful person would use under the circumstances presented in this 
case. It is the duty of every person to use ordinary care not only for his own safety 
and the protection of his property, but also to avoid injury to others. What 
constitutes ordinary care varies according to the particular circumstances and 
conditions existing then and there. The amount of care required by law must be 
in keeping with the degree of danger involved. 
Thus, the trial court called upon the jury to evaluate the testimony and decide whether Evans 
exercised ordinary care under the circumstances. 
The evidence presented to the jury on the issue of whether Evans was negligent in the operation 
of his vehicle was contradictory in several respects, including: (1) whether Evans took the necessary 
precautions prior to moving his tractor-trailer in reverse, specifically, whether he activated his four-
way flashers and released the emergency brakes which emit a loud hissing sound; (2) whether Martin 
or Steverson was driving the Isuzu truck; (3) whether Martin was parked in a legal parking space; 
and (4) Martin’s position when the incident occurred. 
Evans testified that when he pulled into the Canonsburg rest area, he parked in what he believed 
to be the last legal parking space in that particular row. As proof of this, he stated that he had to park 
at an angle to fit his tractor-trailer into the lines. When he returned from the restrooms, he claimed 
that no one was parked behind him. He knew that he only had to back up a couple of feet to be able 
to pull out of the space. After he made a recording in his logbook, he put in the clutch, put the truck 
into low reverse, activated his four-way flashers, and checked his mirrors. Evans further stated that 
although he could not see directly behind him at that moment, he kept his eye on the right mirror 
because he knew he would be able to see out of that side first. According to Evans, he moved his 
tractor-trailer backwards “slower than you could walk.” When he felt a nudge and saw someone 
waving at him to stop in his rear view mirror, he stopped instantly. 
Martin testified that he was driving the Isuzu truck southbound on Interstate 79 on May 24, 
1989, despite the fact that he did not have a valid driver’s license at that time. He claimed that he 
saw his brother Neil Martin, who waved to him to pull off at the next rest area. He stated that he 
pulled into the last parking space and parked approximately ten feet behind the tractor-trailer and 
turned off the ignition. Then, after about a minute and a half, he exited the truck and walked between 
the front of his vehicle and the tractor-trailer. He proceeded about two-thirds of the width of the 
tractor-trailer when he realized that the tractor-trailer was moving towards him. He testified that he 
did not hear the truck’s engine or the release of the emergency brakes, nor did he see any flashing 
lights from the back of the tractor-trailer. After the tractor-trailer pushed him up against the Isuzu 
truck, he claimed that Steverson jumped into the truck, started it, and put it in reverse, at which 
point Martin fell to the ground. Neil Martin corroborated this version of the events. 
Steverson, on the other hand, claimed that he, not Martin, had been driving the truck. Steverson 
testified that he parked the truck approximately ten feet behind the tractor-trailer and turned off the 
ignition. According to Steverson, Martin got out of the passenger’s seat, and walked in front of the 
Isuzu truck and leaned against it while talking to his brother, Neil, for a couple of minutes. When 
Steverson realized that the tractor-trailer was moving towards them and that Martin was caught 
between the two, he started the truck and put it in reverse. 
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State Police Trooper Dennis Spirk, who arrived at the scene of the accident to investigate, 
testified that he interviewed Evans, Steverson and Anthony Martin concerning how the accident 
occurred. When questioned by Trooper Spirk, Evans stated that when he returned from the 
restrooms he walked around the back of his truck before he got into the cab, and that from the cab 
he did not see anything behind him. Trooper Spirk stated that Steverson indicated that he was the 
driver of the smaller truck. In response to questioning, Anthony Martin told Trooper Spirk that he 
was standing between the two trucks, with his back to the tractor-trailer and facing the truck he had 
just exited, when the tractor-trailer backed up and hit him. 
Credibility determinations are within the sole province of the jury. A jury is entitled to believe 
all, part or none of the evidence presented. A jury can believe any part of a witness’ testimony that 
they choose, and may disregard any portion of the testimony that they disbelieve. Consequently, 
because of the conflicting versions of the events surrounding the accident, it was the jury’s duty to 
make a credibility determination and to decide whether Evans exercised ordinary care under the 
circumstances. The jury obviously chose to believe Evans and Steverson, and found that Evans was 
not negligent. 
However, the trial court concluded that “under all of the facts and circumstances of this case, 
even when viewed most favorably to the verdict winner, this Court cannot accept the jury’s 
conclusion that Evans was not negligent.” In support of its conclusion, the trial court cited evidence 
supporting the fact that Evans made no effort during the two minutes after he entered his cab and 
prior to putting his truck in motion, to determine if there was anyone or anything behind his vehicle. 
This, coupled with the facts that the rest area was busy and there were “blind spots” in the mirrors, 
caused the trial court to reach its conclusion. 
However, the evidence equally supports a finding that Evans exercised ordinary care under the 
circumstances. Evans testified that he parked in what he believed to be the last legal parking space 
in the row. In fact, he stated that he had to park his tractor-trailer with the cab at an angle to the 
trailer because it was the last spot and there was barely enough room for his vehicle. When he 
returned to his truck, no one was parked behind him. Before backing up, he activated his four-way 
flashers and released his emergency brakes, which he knew made a loud hissing sound. Then, he 
proceeded to move the truck backwards “slower than you could walk.” Therefore, if the jury were to 
believe Evans’ account of the events, he took the necessary precautions required by the 
circumstances and proceeded with care. 
A resolution of whether Evans was negligent relied upon a credibility determination and the 
jury’s assessment of what constituted ordinary care under the circumstances. Because this 
assessment was solely within the province of the jury, the trial court was not at liberty to reassess the 
evidence and make its own credibility determinations simply because it would have reached a 
different conclusion. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding 
the jury’s credibility determination and substituting its own. The verdict was not so contrary to the 
evidence so as to shock one’s sense of justice. We reverse and reinstate the jury’s verdict. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Jury Duty: Set aside the court’s legal analysis for a moment and focus only on the facts. 
If you were a juror in this case, how would you have voted? Did Evans show ordinary 
care? Had you been in Evans’s position, would you have reversed the truck in the same 
way? Are those last two questions synonymous?  
2. Judicial Paternalism: The trial judge wiped out the jury’s verdict because its answer to 
the breach question “shocked the Court’s sense of justice.” When the issue on the table 
is “ordinary care,” should the judge ever second-guess the jury? Is one person in a robe 
ever justified in overruling what twelve citizens conclude a “reasonably prudent person” 
would do under the circumstances? 
3. Jumping the Gun: Did the jurors in Martin perhaps get ahead of themselves? Maybe 
they felt that, although Evans failed to show ordinary care, Martin was also careless in 
standing behind the truck or ignoring the flashing lights. If that’s what they thought, 
should they have answered the questions differently? Would it have made a difference? 
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PINGARO v. ROSSI 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division (1999) 
Havey, Judge: ã 
A jury awarded $300,000 in damages to plaintiff Ellen Pingaro, a 
meter reader for defendant New Jersey Natural Gas Company (NJNG), 
for injuries she sustained as a result of a dog bite she suffered from a 
German Shepherd owned by defendant Joseph Rossi…. 
[O]n June 27, 1996, [Pingaro was] performing her meter reading 
duties…. When she arrived at Rossi’s house, her data cap, a hand-held 
computer, “beeped” a message: “bad dog, knock.” The data cap provides 
the meter reader with the name of the street and location of the meter and 
at times displays specialized messages pertaining to the customer, such as 
whether a “bad dog” may be present. 
According to plaintiff, she had never been to Rossi’s home before. She 
knocked on Rossi’s door but received no answer. She proceeded to the 
fenced-in backyard, rattled the gate and her keys and yelled “gas company.” There was no response. 
She looked around the backyard for dogs or other animals. After satisfying herself that the yard was 
clear, she unhooked the gate and walked towards the meter. Immediately upon entering the back 
yard two dogs approached her. One dog, a large German Shepard, jumped up, knocked her down 
and bit her on both arms, legs and head. She subdued the dog by hitting it with her flashlight, exited 
the yard and called for help. A nearby construction worker summoned an ambulance which took 
her to Community Medical Center where she received numerous stitches and was released later that 
afternoon. [She required physical therapy and was out of work for six weeks. She also suffered scars 
on her arms and legs, as well as anxiety, fear, and depression related to the incident.]… 
Rossi testified that the dog which attacked plaintiff was kept fenced in his backyard. The only 
gate to the backyard was the gate utilized by plaintiff in entering the yard. He stated that a large 
“Beware of Dog” sign was posted on the gate. 
According to Rossi, over the course of ten years he had spoken with several meter readers about 
his dog and told them they should not enter his yard if no one was home. The meter readers 
responded that they would comply with his request. Rossi noted that this arrangement had worked 
for over ten years, and when he was not at home the meter readers would estimate his bill, leave a 
card for him to mail in or come back at a later date…. 
The so-called “dog bite” statute, N.J.S.A. § 4:19-16, reads in pertinent part: 
The owner of any dog which shall bite a person while such person is on or in a 
public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the 
owner of the dog, shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person 
bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner’s knowledge 
of such viciousness. 
There is no question that plaintiff fulfilled the three elements necessary to establish Rossi’s 
liability under the statute. Rossi was the owner of the dog, the dog bit plaintiff and the bite occurred 
while plaintiff was lawfully on Rossi’s property. Satisfaction of the elements of the statute imposes 
strict liability upon Rossi for damages sustained by plaintiff…. In order for plaintiff to prevail under 
the “dog-bite” statute, she need not prove scienter; that is, that Rossi knew of the dog’s dangerous 
propensities…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Barking Up the Wrong Tree: Rossi offered evidence about the steps he took to ensure 
that his dog didn’t bite visitors to his home. Do you think he showed ordinary care? Do 
you see why the answer to that question is legally irrelevant here? 
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2. What’s Tort Law Up To? Is New Jersey’s “dog bite” statute fair? Does it create good 
incentives? How is it likely to affect behavior in the state? How does it affect the legal 
process of tort law to impose strict liability instead of ordinary negligence liability? 
 
CAMPBELL v. KOVICH 
Court of Appeals of Michigan (2006) 
Per curiam: ã 
…Karie [Campbell] was struck in the eye by an unknown, 
unrecovered object that she alleges was ejected from a lawn mower 
being operated by Ashton [Minish], who was mowing the Koviches’ 
lawn. [After Karie sued Ashton and the Koviches for negligence, the 
trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary disposition.]… 
[P]laintiffs contend that they presented sufficient evidence to 
establish that Ashton breached duties he owed in this case. We 
disagree…. [N]o Michigan authority specifically address[es] what 
degree of care a person mowing a lawn must exercise. In Gore v. Ohio 
Dep’t of Transportation, 774 N.E.2d 817 (Ohio Ct. Cl., 2002), a 
limousine passenger brought an action against the Ohio Department of 
Transportation (ODOT) as the employer of an independent contractor 
that mowed grass on a highway median, alleging that ODOT was liable 
for injuries she sustained when a piece of rubber thrown from a mower struck her in the head. On 
ODOT’s motion for summary judgment, the court held that ODOT was not liable for the 
independent contractor’s negligence. The court also reasoned that “removing debris from the 
mower’s path is a routine precaution, which any careful contractor could be expected to take in the 
exercise of ordinary care.” Thus, Ohio authority persuasively suggests that inspecting a mower’s path 
is what ordinary care requires. 
Adopting the Ohio requirement for ordinary care as our own, there is insufficient evidence that 
Ashton failed to exercise reasonable care. On September 14, 2004, before mowing the Koviches’ 
lawn, Ashton inspected the lawn for a couple of minutes. Karie admitted that while Ashton was 
mowing the lawn, he was not doing anything unusual, but was merely pushing the lawn mower, and 
that he did not appear to be in a hurry and appeared to be watching where he was walking. Before 
Karie was struck, Ashton was watching the area in front of him, and he did not see anything in front 
of the lawn mower. Karie also acknowledged in her deposition that Ashton never acknowledged that 
he had mowed over anything. Under these facts, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether Ashton exercised reasonable care in the operation of the lawn mower…. 
Ashton was not required to exercise extraordinary care. Ordinarily prudent people, when 
mowing a lawn, do not go to such extraordinary lengths that they do more than a brief inspection 
of the lawn before mowing, avoid mowing altogether when other persons are within 75 feet, mow 
only under close parental supervision, or look anywhere but ahead of where they are going while 
mowing. The evidence suggests that Ashton exercised ordinary care, but an accident of unclear 
causation occurred. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, reasonable minds 
could not disagree that Ashton exercised due care. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting 
summary disposition to Ashton…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Grass Is Always Greener: Could Ashton have done anything to make his mowing safer? 
If so, why doesn’t the court hold him responsible for not taking those precautions?  
2. Duty versus Breach: Are you starting to see the relationship between duty and breach? 
When defendants deny that they owed a duty, what are they saying about their need to 
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take care? When they deny that they breached a duty, what are they saying about the 
care they took? How does foreseeability play a key, yet distinct, role in each element? 
 
ZAP PROBLEM 
Twelve-year-old Jameela is swinging a piece of metal wire while she’s walking over a pedestrian 
bridge above Amtrak’s railroad tracks. Jameela’s wire, which is around eight feet long, brushes 
against an electric wire that Amtrak concealed beneath the bridge nearly five feet below the pathway 
where pedestrians walk. When the two wires touch, Jameela suffers serious electrical burns. She sues 
for negligence. In its defense, Amtrak introduces uncontroverted evidence that nobody standing on 
the bridge could see or reach Amtrak’s wire. An expert electrician also testifies that insulating 
Amtrak’s wires would make them ineffective. A safer alternative would be to bury the wires 
underground, but that costly and difficult process would take years to complete. 
(a) Did Amtrak owe Jameela a duty? If so, would it be a duty of ordinary or extraordinary care?  
(b) Assuming there’s a duty, was there a breach of due care?  
(c) In determining breach, would foreseeability play any role?  
(d) Should it matter whether it was customary in the railroad industry to place wires beneath 
bridges in this manner?  
(e) Should we care how hard or expensive safer measures would be for Amtrak to adopt?  
(f) Is it relevant if Amtrak’s wiring complied with or violated relevant safety regulations? 
 
 
FARDELL v. POTTS 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales (1924) 
The Master of the Rolls:ã 
The Court of Appeal to-day delivered judgment 
in this important case….  
In this case the appellant was a Mrs. Fardell, a 
woman, who, while navigating a motor-launch on the 
River Thames collided with the respondent, who was 
navigating a punt, as a result of which the respondent 
was immersed and caught cold. The respondent 
brought an action for damages, in which it was 
alleged that the collision and subsequent immersion 
were caused by the negligent navigation of the appellant. In the Court below the learned judge 
decided that there was evidence on which the jury might find that the defendant had not taken 
reasonable care, and, being of that opinion, very properly left to the Jury the question whether in 
fact she had failed to use reasonable care or not. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded him 
two hundred and fifty pounds damages. This verdict we are asked to set aside on the ground of 
misdirection by the learned judge, the contention being that the case should never have been allowed 
to go to the Jury; and this contention is supported by a somewhat novel proposition, which has been 
ably, though tediously, argued by Sir Ethelred Rutt. 
The Common Law of England has been laboriously built about a mythical figure—the figure of 
‘The Reasonable Man’. In the field of jurisprudence this legendary individual occupies the place 
which in another science is held by the Economic Man, and in social and political discussions by the 
Average or Plain Man. He is an ideal, a standard, the embodiment of all those qualities which we 
demand of the good citizen. No matter what may be the particular department of human life which 
falls to be considered in these Courts, sooner or later we have to face the question: Was this or was 
it not the conduct of a reasonable man? Did the defendant take such care to avoid shooting the 
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plaintiff in the stomach as might reasonably be expected of a reasonable man? (Moocat v. 
Radley (1883) 2 Q.B.) Did the plaintiff take such precautions to inform himself of the circumstances 
as any reasonable man would expect of an ordinary person having the ordinary knowledge of an 
ordinary person of the habits of wild bulls when goaded with garden-forks and the persistent 
agitation of red flags? (Williams v. Dogbody (1841) 2 A.C.) 
I need not multiply examples. It is impossible to travel anywhere or to travel for long in that 
confusing forest of learned judgments which constitutes the Common Law of England without 
encountering the Reasonable Man. He is at every turn, an ever-present help in time of trouble, and 
his apparitions mark the road to equity and right. There has never been a problem, however difficult, 
which His Majesty’s judges have not in the end been able to resolve by asking themselves the simple 
question, ‘Was this or was it not the conduct of a reasonable man?’ and leaving that question to be 
answered by the jury. 
This noble creature stands in singular contrast to his kinsman the Economic Man, whose every 
action is prompted by the single spur of selfish advantage and directed to the single end of monetary 
gain. The Reasonable Man is always thinking of others; prudence is his guide, and ‘Safety First’, if I 
may borrow a contemporary catchword, is his rule of life. All solid virtues are his, save only that 
peculiar quality by which the affection of other men is won. For it will not be pretended that socially 
he is much less objectionable than the Economic Man. Though any given example of his behaviour 
must command our admiration, when taken in the mass his acts create a very different set of 
impressions. He is one who invariably looks where he is going, and is careful to examine the 
immediate foreground before he executes a leap or bound; who neither star-gazes nor is lost in 
meditation when approaching trap-doors or the margin of a dock; who records in every case upon 
the counterfoils of cheques such ample details as are desirable, scrupulously substitutes the word 
‘Order’ for the word ‘Bearer’, crosses the instrument ‘a/c Payee only’, and registers the package in 
which it is despatched; who never mounts a moving omnibus, and does not alight from any car while 
the train is in motion; who investigates exhaustively the bona fides of every mendicant before 
distributing alms, and will inform himself of the history and habits of a dog before administering a 
caress; who believes no gossip, nor repeats it, without firm basis for believing it to be true; who never 
drives his ball till those in front of him have definitely vacated the putting-green which is his own 
objective; who never from one year’s end to another makes an excessive demand upon his wife, his 
neighbours, his servants, his ox, or his ass; who in the way of business looks only for that narrow 
margin of profit which twelve men such as himself would reckon to be ‘fair’, contemplates his fellow-
merchants, their agents, and their goods, with that degree of suspicion and distrust which the law 
deems admirable; who never swears, gambles, or loses his temper; who uses nothing except in 
moderation, and even while he flogs his child is meditating only on the golden mean. Devoid, in 
short, of any human weakness, with not one single saving vice, sans prejudice, procrastination, ill-
nature, avarice, and absence of mind, as careful for his own safety as he is for that of others, his 
excellent but odious character stands like a monument in our Courts of Justice, vainly appealing to 
his fellow-citizens to order their lives after his own example. 
I have called him a myth; and, in so far as there are few, if any, of his mind and temperament to 
be found in the ranks of living men, the title is well chosen. But it is a myth which rests upon solid 
and even, it may be, upon permanent foundations. The Reasonable Man is fed and kept alive by the 
most valued and enduring of our juridical institutions—the common jury. Hateful as he must 
necessarily be to any ordinary citizen who privately considers him, it is a curious paradox that where 
two or three are gathered together in one place they will with one accord pretend an admiration for 
him; and, when they are gathered together in the formidable surroundings of a British jury, they are 
easily persuaded that they themselves are, each and generally, reasonable men. Without stopping to 
consider how strange a chance it must have been that has picked fortuitously from a whole people 
no fewer than twelve examples of a species so rare, they immediately invest themselves with the 
attributes of the Reasonable Man, and are therefore at one with the Courts in their anxiety to support 
the tradition that such a being in fact exists Thus it is that while the Economic Man has under the 
stress of modern conditions almost wholly disappeared from view his Reasonable cousin has gained 
in power with every case in which he has figured. 
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To return, however, as every judge must ultimately return, to the case which is before us—it has 
been urged for the appellant, and my own researches incline me to agree, that in all that mass of 
authorities which bears upon this branch of the law there is no single mention of a reasonable 
woman. It was ably insisted before us that such an omission, extending over a century and more of 
judicial pronouncements, must be something more than a coincidence; that among the innumerable 
tributes to the reasonable man there might be expected at least some passing reference to a 
reasonable person of the opposite sex; that no such reference is found, for the simple reason that no 
such being is contemplated by the law; that legally at least there is no reasonable woman, and that 
therefore in this case the learned judge should have directed the jury that, while there was evidence 
on which they might find that the defendant had not come up to the standard required of a 
reasonable man, her conduct was only what was to be expected of a woman, as such. 
It must be conceded at once that there is merit in this contention, however unpalatable it may at 
first appear. The appellant relies largely on Baxter’s Case, 1639 (2 Bole, at page 100), in which it was 
held that for the purposes of estover the wife of a tenant by the mesne was at law in the same position 
as an ox or other cattle demenant (to which a modern parallel may be found in the statutory 
regulations of many railway companies, whereby, for the purposes of freight, a typewriter is counted 
as a musical instrument). It is probably no mere chance that in our legal text-books the problems 
relating to married women are usually considered immediately after the pages devoted to idiots and 
lunatics. Indeed, there is respectable authority for saying that at Common Law this was the status of 
a woman. Recent legislation has whittled away a great part of this venerable conception, but so far 
as concerns the law of negligence, which is our present consideration, I am persuaded that it remains 
intact. It is no bad thing that the law of the land should here and there conform with the known facts 
of every day experience. The view that there exists a class of beings, illogical, impulsive, careless, 
irresponsible, extravagant, prejudiced, and vain, free for the most part from those worthy and 
repellent excellences which distinguish the Reasonable Man, and devoted to the irrational arts of 
pleasure and attraction, is one which should be as welcome and as well accepted in our Courts as it 
is in our drawing-rooms—and even in Parliament. The odd stipulation is often heard there that 
some new Committee or Council shall consist of so many persons ‘one of which must be a woman’: 
the assumption being that upon scientific principles of selection no woman would be added to a 
body having serious deliberative functions. That assumption, which is at once accepted and resented 
by those who maintain the complete equality of the sexes, is not founded, as they suppose, in some 
prejudice of Man but in the considered judgments of Nature. I find that at Common Law 
a reasonable woman does not exist. The contention of the respondent fails and the appeal must be 
allowed. Costs to be costs in the action, above and below, but not costs in the case. 
Bungay, L. F., and Blow, L. F., concurred. 
QUESTIONS 
1. The Reasonable Man: What do you make of this so-called “Reasonable Man”? Is he 
odious? Is he ordinary? Would you enjoy being around him? Would you admire him? 
2. Curiosity Killed the Juror: Is the “curious paradox” mentioned in Fardell really so 
curious? Can you make sense of it?  
3. The Reasonable Woman: Though we’re told that “at Common Law a reasonable 
woman does not exist,” would tort law be better off replacing the Reasonable Man with her? 
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VAUGHAN v. MENLOVE 
Court of Common Pleas (1837) 
[Defendant owned land next to a group of cottages 
belonging to Plaintiff.]… At the trial it appeared that the 
rick in question had been made by the Defendant near 
the boundary of his own premises; that the hay was in 
such and state when put together, as to give rise to 
discussions on the probability of fire; that though there 
were conflicting opinions on the subject, yet during a 
period of five weeks, the Defendant was repeatedly 
warned of his peril; that his stock was insured; and that 
upon one Occasion, being advised to take the rick down to avoid all danger, he said “he would 
chance it.” He made an aperture or chimney through the rick; but in spite, or perhaps in 
consequence of this precaution, the rick at length burst into flames from the spontaneous heating of 
its materials; the flames communicated to the Defendant’s barn and stables, and thence to the 
Plaintiff’s cottages, which were entirely destroyed[, causing damage worth £500]. ã 
Patteson J. before whom the cause was tried, told the jury that the question for them to consider, 
was, whether the fire had been occasioned by gross negligence on the part of the Defendant; adding, 
that he was bound to proceed with such reasonable caution as a prudent man would have exercised 
under such circumstances. 
A verdict having been found for the Plaintiff, a rule nisi for a new trial was obtained, on the 
ground that the jury should have been directed to consider, not, whether the Defendant had been 
guilty of gross negligence with reference to the standard of ordinary prudence, a standard too 
uncertain to afford any criterion; but whether he had acted bona fide to the best of his judgment; if 
he had, he ought not to be responsible for the misfortune of not possessing the highest order of 
intelligence…. 
Tindal, Judge: 
…It is contended…that the learned Judge was wrong in leaving this to the jury as a case of gross 
negligence, and that the question of negligence was so mixed up with reference to what would be 
the conduct of a man of ordinary prudence that the jury might have thought the latter the rule by 
which they were to decide; that such a rule would he too uncertain to act upon; and that the question 
ought to have been whether the Defendant had acted honestly and bona fide to the best of his own 
judgment. That, however, would leave so vague a line as to afford no rule at all, the degree of 
judgment belonging to each individual being infinitely various: and though it has been urged that 
the care which a prudent man would take, is not an intelligible proposition as a rule of law, yet such 
has always been the rule adopted in cases of bailment…. Though in some cases a greater degree of 
care is exacted than in others, …[t]he care taken by a prudent man has always been the rule laid 
down; and as to the supposed difficulty of applying it, a jury has always been able to say, whether, 
taking that rule as their guide, there has been negligence on the occasion in question. 
Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-extensive with the 
judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual, 
we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of 
ordinary prudence would observe. That was in substance the criterion presented to the jury in this 
case, and therefore the present rule must be discharged….  
Vaughan, Judge: 
…It was, if anything, too favourable to the Defendant to leave it to the jury whether he had been 
guilty of gross negligence; for when the Defendant upon being warned as to the consequences likely 
to ensue from the condition of the rick, said, “he would chance it,” it was manifest he adverted to 
his interest in the insurance office. The conduct of a prudent man has always been the criterion for 
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the jury in such cases: but it is by no means confined to them. In insurance cases, where a captain 
has sold his vessel after damage too extensive for repairs, the question has always been, whether he 
had pursued the course which a prudent man would have pursued under the same circumstance. 
Here, there was not a single witness whose testimony did not go to establish gross negligence in the 
Defendant. He had repeated warnings of what was likely to occur, and the whole calamity was 
occasioned by his procrastination…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Rights and Wrongs: Is Vaughan an example of how someone can act wrongly without 
being blameworthy? Does your answer depend on whether you believe that Menlove 
was really doing the best he could? 
2. Objectivity: There are two distinct ways that we might view the reasonable-person 
standard as objective. Can you see them? 
3. Je Suis Menlove: Most of us are “Menloves” at something. Perhaps you’re a bad driver 
or just generally a clumsy person. What can you do about it to minimize the risks you 
pose to others? 
 
APPELHANS v. McFALL  
Appellate Court of Illinois (2001) 
Byrne, Justice: ã 
 Plaintiff, Maxine Appelhans, …who was 66 years old at 
the time, was walking north [on a rural road with no 
sidewalk] when William [McFall], who was five years old, 
rode his bicycle and struck plaintiff from behind. Plaintiff fell 
and suffered a fractured hip. At the time of the accident, it 
was daylight outside, the pavement was clear and dry, and no 
other pedestrians, automobiles, or bicyclists were present. 
The roadway in the area was straight and flat. 
In count I, plaintiff alleged that William’s parents negligently failed to (1) instruct their son on 
the proper use of his bicycle, or (2) supervise him while he rode his bicycle on a public roadway 
because they knew or should have known that his youth would prevent him from considering the 
safety of pedestrians such as plaintiff…. In count II, plaintiff generally asserted that William 
negligently caused the collision. 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss…. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that 
William’s youth rendered him incapable of negligence and that plaintiff failed to allege specific facts 
that would have put William’s parents on notice that he might ride his bicycle negligently. This 
timely appeal followed. 
The Tender Years Doctrine 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss…admits all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom…. The fact that disposes of this issue is undisputed: William was five 
years old when he collided with plaintiff. 
On appeal, plaintiff contends that we should abandon the well-settled rule that a child is 
incapable of negligence if he is less than seven years old. She argues that we should adopt the 
“Massachusetts Rule,” under which any child will be found capable of negligence if the fact finder 
decides that the child failed to exercise a degree of care that is reasonable for similarly 
situated children. 
Section 283A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) mirrors the Massachusetts 
Rule and provides that “if the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to 
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avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under 
like circumstances.” Comment b to section 283A further provides in relevant part: 
Some courts have endeavored to lay down fixed rules as to a minimum age below 
which the child is incapable of being negligent, and a maximum age above which 
he is to be treated like an adult. Usually these rules have been derived from the old 
rules of the criminal law, by which a child under the age of seven was considered 
incapable of crime, and one over fourteen was considered to be as capable as an 
adult. The prevailing view is that in tort cases no such arbitrary limits can be fixed. 
Undoubtedly there is a minimum age, probably somewhere in the vicinity of four 
years, below which negligence can never be found; but with the great variation in 
the capacities of children and the situations which may arise, it cannot be fixed 
definitely for all cases. 
In 1886, our supreme court held that an injured child who was seven years and three months old 
at the time of the accident “was too young, at the time she was injured, to observe any care for her 
personal safety.” Chicago, St. Louis & Pittsburgh R.R. Co. v. Welsh, 9 N.E. 197 (Ill. 1886). The court 
later expressly adopted the tender years doctrine, which states that a child is incapable 
of…negligence if he is less than seven years old…. The rationale for the tender years doctrine is the 
belief that a child under the age of seven is incapable of recognizing and appreciating risk and is 
therefore deemed incapable of negligence as a matter of law. The child’s immaturity limits his 
liability regardless of whether, as a litigant, he is the plaintiff or the defendant…. 
Defendants contend that we must follow the tender years doctrine simply because Illinois courts 
have applied it for nearly 100 years. Plaintiff responds that profound societal changes since the 
adoption of the rule undermine…stare decisis. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the judiciary that 
crafted the rule did not envision “cable television, video games, the internet, pre-teen gangs, and 
violent crime.” She argues that, in response to these modern-day challenges, children are instructed 
at an early age that they must exercise good judgment for themselves and others and therefore we 
may hold them to a reasonable standard of care based upon their age. 
In reaffirming its preference for the Massachusetts Rule, the Supreme Court of Minnesota [in 
Toetschinger v. Ihnot, 250 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1977)] quoted an opinion it drafted in 1936 [Eckhardt 
v. Hanson, 264 N.W. 776 (Minn. 1936)]: 
Under present-day circumstances a child of tender years is permitted to assume 
many responsibilities. There is much opportunity for him to observe and thus 
become cognizant of the necessity for exercising some degree of care. Compulsory 
school attendance, the radio, the movies, and traffic conditions all tend to have 
this effect. The Illinois rule has no basis in sound reason or logic. It is based upon 
an outworn historical rule of criminal law which refused to acknowledge any 
capacity on the part of any child under seven years of age to distinguish between 
right and wrong. 
The Minnesota high court recognized that children were sufficiently sophisticated in 1936 to be 
held to a reasonable standard of care. As society has changed dramatically since the Eckhardt court 
made its observations, children have become even more sophisticated. Because the tender years 
doctrine is based on the assumption that young children cannot recognize or appreciate risk, the 
rule is increasingly undermined as society more thoroughly educates them on safety issues. We 
find Eckhardt to be persuasive, and it lends great weight to plaintiff’s argument that Illinois children 
under the age of seven may be negligent. 
Plaintiff further contends that the tender years doctrine is unreasonable because it arbitrarily 
sets an age below which a child is presumed to be incapable of negligence. Plaintiff contends that 
the use of an arbitrary age leads to “ridiculous” results because a child does not “magically” know to 
exercise due care after his seventh birthday…. [S]everal jurisdictions have accepted this argument 
and rejected the tender years doctrine accordingly. We agree with plaintiff that the arbitrariness of 
the rule supports its abandonment. However, we reluctantly conclude that the principle of stare 
decisis requires this court to reassert the tender years doctrine. 
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It is well settled that where it is clear that a court has made a mistake in adopting a rule, it should 
not decline to correct it, even though the rule may have been reasserted and acquiesced in for many 
years. No person has a vested right in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain for 
his benefit. However, when a rule of law has been settled, it should be followed unless a party can 
show that serious detriment prejudicial to the public interest is likely to arise. The rule of stare 
decisis is founded upon sound principles in the administration of justice, and a court should not 
depart from rules long recognized as the law merely because the court believes that it might decide 
the issue differently if the question were novel…. The modification in the law that plaintiff advocates 
is…far-reaching…, and we decline to announce such a sweeping change here. Instead, we invite our 
supreme court or the legislature to revisit the viability of the tender years doctrine. 
When a child is between 7 and 14 years old, the trier of fact must consider the “age, capacity, 
intelligence, and experience of the child” in light of the rebuttable presumption that a child between 
the ages of 7 and 14 is incapable of negligence. However, it is well settled in Illinois that a child who 
is 14 years old or who engages in an adult activity is held to an adult standard of care. Because bicycle 
riding on a public street is not an adult activity, a bicyclist between the ages of 7 and 14 is held to a 
reasonable standard of care based upon his age and experience. Therefore, one could argue that, 
when a child under the age of 7 engages in an activity that children between the ages of 7 and 14 
normally pursue, such as riding a bicycle, the child should be held to the standard of care of a 
reasonable 7-year-old. However, we do not answer this question here…. We conclude that the trial 
court correctly dismissed count II of plaintiff’s complaint because William was incapable of 
negligence at the time of the accident. 
Negligent Parental Supervision 
Plaintiff next asserts that William’s parents were negligent for failing to supervise William or 
instruct him on the proper use of his bicycle…. In Illinois, the parent-child relationship does not 
automatically render parents liable for the torts of their minor children. Parents may be liable, 
however, if they do not adequately control or supervise their child. To prove a claim of negligent 
supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior 
conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was likely to occur and (2) the 
parents had the opportunity to control the child…. 
Here, plaintiff alleged that the parents’ mere knowledge of William’s age sufficiently informed 
them that ongoing supervision was necessary. Plaintiff did not assert that the parents knew of a 
specific prior incident where William negligently struck a pedestrian while he rode his bicycle. 
Plaintiff essentially contends that parents should be liable for all negligent acts of their children. 
However, we conclude that holding parents strictly liable for failing to prevent their child’s 
negligence is unreasonable and unsupported by the law. Cf. Chu v. Bowers, 656 N.E.2d 436 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 1995) (“it is in the nature of children to be careless and thoughtless on occasion, and society 
must be ever aware of the need to exercise extraordinary caution when children are present”). 
In Lott v. Strang, 727 N.E.2d 407 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000), the plaintiffs sued the parents of an 
unemancipated minor who caused a traffic collision while he was allegedly intoxicated. In support 
of their negligent parental supervision claim, the plaintiffs alleged that the parents knew that their 
son was likely to drive negligently because he had been at fault in an earlier traffic accident. 
The…Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that section 316 of the Restatement does 
not require parents to prevent their children from ever entering into a situation where they might 
commit a negligent act. The court further noted that the parents had no duty to discipline their child 
and regulate his conduct on a long-term ongoing basis. Parents are not liable for such broadly 
defined omissions. In this case, plaintiff defines the omission in parenting even more broadly than 
the alleged parental negligence addressed in Lott. Furthermore, plaintiff does not allege that the 
parents had an opportunity to follow William to ensure that he rode his bicycle safely. We conclude 
that plaintiff did not allege the two elements of negligent parental supervision…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Breaking the (Piggy) Bank: Why does Maxine sue William for thousands of dollars? Is 
William likely to have that kind of pocket money? 
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2. Biker Gangs: Maxine challenges the tender-years doctrine by pointing to the existence 
of “cable television, video games, the internet, pre-teen gangs, and violent crime.” Is she 
suggesting that five-year-old William was part of some juvenile bicycle gang and that 
this was a drive-by attack? What’s her point? 
3. You Can Never Leave the Family: Notice that William’s parents aren’t subject to 
respondeat superior liability, of the kind we saw in Leichtman and Walter. Instead, 
Maxine’s claim against the parents must show independent carelessness based on their 
allegedly negligent supervision. Why shouldn’t we treat families like firms? Shouldn’t 
parents simply be on the hook when their kids carelessly injure others? 
 
PYRAMID PROBLEM 
Lapo had owned Bellapais Sporting Goods Store for almost a decade when a new bookstore 
opened next-door. As he greeted his new neighbors, he was impressed by their elaborate display 
featuring hundreds of books stacked in a 12-foot-high pyramid at the center of the store. To 
celebrate his own store’s 10-year anniversary, Lapo got the grand idea to set up a similar display 
using footballs, rugby balls, and basketballs instead. As Lapo excitedly described this vision to his 
family over dinner, his husband Simon and their teenage kids pointed out that books are flat and 
well-suited for stacking, whereas balls aren’t so easy to arrange. Lapo countered that all the best 
stores in town had ambitious displays, but Simon still fretted about the structure’s intended size and 
said he was worried about it falling on a customer and hurting someone. Intent on proving his family 
wrong, Lapo watched hours of YouTube videos on erecting displays, worked hard to balance the 
balls precisely, and was quite proud of the finished product. 
A few hours after Lapo finished his project, the Randle family came in to purchase 5-year-old 
Mary her first bicycle. Mary picked out a sleek blue bike and was pedaling around the store while 
her parents chatted with Lapo and began checking out. Unfortunately for everyone involved, the 
display suddenly came crashing down, hurting both Mary and another shopper, Piers. Security 
footage didn’t show anyone touching the display or otherwise causing it to fall. Mary needed stitches 
after one ball knocked her forehead into her new handlebars, while Piers suffered a bad concussion.  
(a) Was Lapo negligent in setting up his display? What standard of care would apply in a 
negligence claim against Lapo? Does it matter that Lapo’s husband and kids told him that 
this was a bad idea? Would your answer change if Lapo was known for being a fun but 
sometimes foolish guy who often seems to make dodgy decisions? 
(b) Could Piers have a viable claim against Lapo for negligence? How about against Mary or 
her parents? 
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LAKE SHORE & MICHIGAN SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. v. MILLER 
Supreme Court of Michigan (1872) 
Christiancy, Chief Justice:* ã 
The defendant in error sued the railroad 
company…for injuries received by her in a 
collision between the locomotive of a passenger 
train and the wagon in which she was riding with 
one Eldridge, the owner of the team and wagon, 
who was driving, or undertook to drive, across the 
railroad track at the crossing of a highway; claiming 
that the collision took place and the injury was 
caused by the negligence of the company…. [T]he 
only negligence which can be claimed in the mode 
of running the train, must rest upon the ground that the company having obscured the view and 
deadened the sound of the approaching train [by piling up wood near the track] were bound for that 
reason, to run at much less than their usual rate of speed in approaching that crossing, or to keep a 
flagman there, or use some other extra means to warn people traveling the highway, of the approach 
of trains from the west…. 
[In general,] if an engineer see a team and carriage, or a man, in the act of crossing the track, far 
enough ahead of him to have ample time…to get entirely out of the way before the approach of the 
engine…, and is not aware that he is deaf or insane, or from some other cause insensible of the 
danger,… he has a right to rely upon the laws of nature and the ordinary course of things, and to 
presume that the man driving the team or walking upon the track, has the use of his senses, and will 
act upon the principles of common sense and the motive of self-preservation common to mankind 
in general; that they will, therefore, get out of the way…; and he, therefore, has the right to go on, 
without checking his speed, until he sees that the team or the man is not likely to get out of the way, 
when it would become his duty to give extra alarm by bell or whistle, and if that is not heeded, then, 
as a last resort, to check his speed or stop his train, if possible, in time to avoid disaster. If however, 
he sees a child of tender years, or any person known to him to be, or from his appearance giving him 
good reason to believe that he is, insane, or badly intoxicated, or otherwise insensible of danger, or 
unable to avoid it, he has no right to assume that he will get out of the way, but should act upon the 
belief that he might not, or would not, and he should therefore take means to stop his train in time.  
A more stringent rule than this—a rule that would require the engineer to check his speed or 
stop his train, whenever he sees a team crossing the track or a man walking on it, far enough ahead 
to get out of the way in time…or which would require the engineer to know the deafness or 
blindness, or acuteness of hearing or sight, or habits of prudence or recklessness or other personal 
peculiarities of all those persons he may see approaching or upon the track…—any such rule, if 
enforced, must effectually put an end to all railroads, as a means of speedy travel or transportation, 
and reduce the speed of trains below that of canal-boats forty years ago; and would effectually defeat 
the object of the legislature in authorizing this mode of conveyance.  
But how are railroad companies, or their engineers or employees, to know the personal 
peculiarities, the infirmities, personal character or station in life, of the hundreds of persons crossing 
or approaching their track? By inspiration or intuition? And if they do not know, then how and why 
shall the company be required to run their road, or regulate their own conduct, or that of their 
servant, by such personal peculiarities of strangers, of which they know nothing?  
These questions suggest their own answers; and these considerations sufficiently show, that the 
[trial] court erred in adopting, as the standard of reasonable care on the part of Eldridge and the 
plaintiff, “such care as persons of their situation or condition in life, would ordinarily exert under 
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like circumstances,” and in charging that “any greater care than this she was not required to 
exercise.”… I think the judgment should be reversed, with costs, and a new trial awarded…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Saying the Quiet Part Out Loud: Is this case about gender? Does Chief Justice 
Christiancy seem to think that gender is relevant to the outcome? 
 
DANIELS v. CLEGG 
Supreme Court of Michigan (1873) 
Christiancy, Chief Justice: ã 
This was an action…brought by Clegg against Daniels. 
[After a jury trial,] the plaintiff recovered a judgment for fifty 
dollars, which Daniels brings to this court by writ of error…. 
On the trial in the circuit the plaintiff gave evidence 
tending to show that while his daughter, aged about twenty 
years, was driving a horse and buggy of the plaintiff’s, …and 
being in great haste to find her father on account of the 
dangerous illness of a sister, she came to a hill which she 
commenced to descend, when she observed the defendant driving on [the same side of the road as 
she was] coming up the hill with two horses and a wagon; that defendant did not turn out for her at 
all, but drove directly on, and although she turned as far as she possibly could to the [side], a collision 
ensued by which the buggy or carriage in which she was riding was overturned and damages, and 
the daughter was thrown out…; that the horse was a gentle family horse, that the buggy was injured 
to the amount of ten dollars, and the horse damaged to the amount of fifty dollars.  
The defendant gave evidence tending to show that [although he was driving on the left side of 
the road, he drove appropriately, and that the accident was the plaintiff’s daughter’s fault]…. 
The trial court was correct in charging [the jury] that “in deciding whether the plaintiff’s 
daughter exercised ordinary care in driving the horse, or was guilty of [contributory] negligence, the 
jury should consider the age of the daughter, and the fact that she was a woman”; and “that she 
would not be guilty of negligence if she used that degree of care that a person of her age and sex 
would ordinarily use”; and in refusing to charge, that “for the purpose of this case, the daughter 
should be held to the same degree of care and skill that would be required of the plaintiff himself, 
had he been driving at the time of the collision.”  
The case, upon this point, does not, as to the defendant, stand upon the same, or even similar 
grounds with respect to the plaintiff’s daughter, as the case of a railroad engineer or conductor in 
respect to person approaching a railroad track while the train is in rapid motion, with teams and 
wagons which cannot be seen, or the persons driving be recognized, until so close to the track as to 
render any knowledge of the character or the capacity of such persons of any avail; as in the case of 
the Lake Shore & Mich. Southern R.R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274 (1872)…. And yet, even in that 
case, as to children upon the track, ahead of the train, who could be seen by the engineer, or other 
persons known to him to be incompetent or deprived of any of their faculties necessary to their 
safety under such circumstances, it was held that the engineer was bound to act with reference to 
the incapacity of such persons thus appearing or known to him, and so far as in his power, to govern 
his train accordingly, until such persons were out of danger. And the same principle [has been] 
recognized with respect to the rights and duties of street railway companies towards children upon, 
or getting on or off, their cars. 
These cases fully recognized the principle that, in deciding upon the degree of diligence to be 
required of children, or other persons more or less incompetent, that incompetency must be taken 
into account; and no higher degree of diligence must be required of such persons than we have a 
right to expect, or than experience has shown such persons generally would be likely to exercise 
under like circumstance; and that other persons to whom that incompetency is apparent, or who 
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know or have good reason to believe it, are bound to exercise towards such persons a 
correspondingly higher degree of care, according to the degree of that incompetency, so far as, under 
the circumstances, it may be reasonably within their power. This principle, thus limited, is one of 
simple justice, of common sense and common humanity, too obvious to require comment, and has 
often been recognized by courts in various forms. 
The charge in this case comes directly within this principle. The defendant saw the plaintiff’s 
daughter approaching, driving the horse and carriage. No one would ordinarily expect, and the 
defendant had no right to expect, from a young woman thus situated, the same amount of 
knowledge, skill, dexterity, steadiness of nerve, or coolness of judgment, in short the same degree of 
competency, which he would expect of ordinary men under like circumstances; nor, consequently, 
would it be just to hold her to the same high degree of care and skill. The incompetency indicated 
by her age or sex—without evidence (of which there is none) of any unusual skill or experience on 
her part—was less in degree, it is true, than in the case of a mere child; but the difference is in degree 
only, and not in principle…. [T]he judgment should be affirmed, with costs. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Baselines: Does the court’s decision effectively give a benefit to women who drive a horse 
and buggy by excusing them for poor driving that injures others? Is that fair to women? 
Is it fair to the people who are injured? 
2. Tropes: Is this case just a historical artefact? It’s easy to treat it that way, given that it was 
written nearly 150 years ago. But have you ever heard someone make a sexist quip about 
“women drivers”? Can we really consign this case to the history books so easily? 
3. Pursuing Equality: Let’s assume that, in 1983, female drivers were on average less able 
to control a horse and buggy than male drivers, perhaps due to common physical 
characteristics or a lack of opportunities or training to drive. Which breach standard 
best serves equality goals? Does a gender-blind “reasonable person” standard undermine 
equality by making driving more expensive and less appealing for women? At the same 
time, does a gender-conscious “reasonable woman” standard reinforce stereotypes and 
essentialize people in ways that undermine equality? 
 
EICHHORN v. MISSOURI, K. & T. RAILWAY CO. 
Supreme Court of Missouri (1895) 
Gantt, Judge: ã 
This is an action to recover damages 
resulting from personal injuries received by 
the plaintiff, a married woman, in attempting 
to board one of defendant’s passenger trains at 
Harriston station, on defendant’s railroad, in 
Cooper county, Mo., on February 19, 1892. 
The petition alleges that on said 19th day of 
February, and for a long time prior thereto, the 
defendant had carelessly and negligently failed 
to construct and maintain any platform or provide any other means suitable and safe to enable 
passengers to get on and off the cars of the defendant at said station; that the plaintiff took passage 
on one of defendant’s passenger trains at Harriston, to go to Pilot Grove; that plaintiff was at the 
time pregnant with child, and while getting aboard of defendant’s train as aforesaid, through the 
carelessness and negligence of the defendant in not having any platform or other suitable and safe 
means for getting onto defendant’s said passenger train, the plaintiff, without any fault on her part, 
slipped from one of the steps of one of the cars in defendant’s said passenger train, and was strained 
and wounded in the spine, and the right side and right arm, leg, and foot…to her damage in the sum 
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of $10,000, for which she asked judgment. The answer was a general denial and a plea of contributory 
negligence, to which the plaintiff replied in a general denial. Upon the trial, the plaintiff got a verdict 
and judgment for $3,000. Defendant…brings the case here by appeal.  
At the trial the following facts were substantially established: …Some time in the month of 
September, 1891, [the Harriston] depot building was destroyed by fire. Thereafter the trains stopped 
at a point north of where the depot had stood originally, and at a place where a county road crossed 
the railroad track. At this point the evidence showed that it was from 30 inches to 3 feet from the 
ground to the lowest step on the passenger coaches. Harriston was a regular station on the line of 
this railroad…. No platform or other means of any kind had been erected or provided by the railroad 
company to aid passengers in getting on and off its cars after the depot was burned. A small pine 
box had at one time been placed by one of the neighbors on the west side of the track, that passengers 
might step on, in order to get on and off the cars. Some time prior to the 19th day of February, 1892, 
the wife of the witness Nixon had stepped on this box in attempting to get on the train, and had 
crushed it; and on the 19th day of February, and for some time prior thereto, this box had not been 
in use, and was not at the place.  
[On the day in question,] Mrs. Meisel preceded the plaintiff into the car, and boarded it without 
any difficulty. The plaintiff, in attempting to get on the train, took hold of the iron bar with her right 
hand, placed her right foot on the step, which was some 30 inches or 3 feet high, and, in attempting 
to get on the cars, she slipped, and fell from the steps, and, in falling, sprained her ankle, and twisted 
her body and spine, and the jar and shock seriously injured her, and caused her much suffering, and 
resulted in a permanent injury to the spine, which has produced a partial paralysis of her entire right 
side…. After her foot had slipped and she had fallen, she testified that the porter came out of the 
cars, stepped down on the east side, where she was standing, and aided her in getting aboard the 
cars. The evidence tends to show that, prior to this date, the plaintiff was a strong, healthy Norwegian 
woman, who, unaided, had done all of her own housework; and the evidence further shows that, 
immediately upon entering the car, she complained of having sprained her ankle; that her right foot 
began to swell, and so pained her that she was forced to unbutton her shoe. A few days afterwards 
she began to discover pains in her spine, just below the shoulders; and when she would attempt to 
lift any article of weight, or lean back suddenly in her chair, the pain in her spine was so intense that 
it would bring on spells of fainting and sickness…. 
Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the court gave the following instructions for the plaintiff, 
over the defendant’s objections:  
(1) …[I]f you…believe from the evidence that plaintiff, while getting aboard said 
train, through the carelessness and negligence of the defendant in not having any 
platform or other reasonably safe and suitable means for getting onto said train, 
and without any fault or negligence on her part, the plaintiff slipped from one of 
the steps of one of the cars in said train, and was [injured] then you will find the 
issues for the plaintiff, unless you further find from the evidence that plaintiff’s 
injuries, if any, were caused by her own negligence contributing directly thereto… 
(2) The jury are instructed that the words ‘carelessly,’ ‘negligently,’ and 
‘negligence,’ used in the instruction, mean the lack of such care and caution as 
reasonable and prudent men would exercise under like circumstances. 
[In addition, at the request of the defendant, the court added the following:] 
The court instructs the jury that if you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff 
was injured in attempting to get upon one of defendant’s trains at Harriston 
station, and that such injury was occasioned in whole or in part by the plaintiff’s 
failure or neglect to exercise such care, caution, and foresight as a woman of 
ordinary care, caution, and foresight would have exercised under the 
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time, then such injury was due to 
the plaintiff’s negligence, and your verdict must be for the defendant…. 
The instructions…very fairly present the only controverted issue in this case. It was the plain 
duty of the defendant to provide suitable, safe, and convenient means for the ingress and egress of 
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its passengers into and out of its trains. It had wholly failed to comply with this obligation…. Carriers 
of passengers should anticipate that both old and young women, feeble and delicate people, as well 
as the strong and robust, will seek passage on their cars, and provide suitable platforms or steps for 
that purpose…. 
As to the criticism of the court’s instructions because it defined negligence to mean the lack of 
such care and caution as reasonable and prudent “men” would exercise under like circumstances, 
instead of “women,” it is only necessary to say the defendant’s own instruction cured this defect, if 
any; but the jury would have been utterly unfit to try any case if they did not understand that “men,” 
in this instruction, was generic, and embraced “women.” The judgment is affirmed.  
QUESTIONS 
1. Gender as a Shield I: The railway company sought a “reasonable woman” standard in 
the jury instructions. Why did it imagine that this might help it escape liability? 
 
TUCKER v. HENNIKER 
Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire (1860) 
CASE, for damages resulting to the plaintiff from 
alleged defects in a public highway in Henniker. On trial, 
it appeared that on the afternoon of July 28, 1858, Dr. 
Jonas Ball hired a horse and carriage at Hillsborough 
Bridge, to go to the village of Henniker, where he arrived 
about sunset, taking the plaintiff and his daughter with 
him. Dr. Ball stopped at the hotel in Henniker; while the 
plaintiff and his daughter started with the horse and 
carriage to go to the plaintiff’s mother’s, about half a mile 
distant; and on the way thither, the plaintiff driving the horse at the time, the accident occurred. 
The defendants…contended that the unskillfulness or want of care of the plaintiff in the 
management of the horse contributed to the accident; and upon this point the court instructed the 
jury, that if the plaintiff were guilty of any fault in the management of the horse, any want of ordinary 
care, skill and prudence in driving or controlling the horse, which contributed to the accident, 
without which the accident would not have occurred, notwithstanding the defect in the highway, 
she could not recover; because she was bound to exercise ordinary care, skill and prudence in 
managing the horse, such care, skill and prudence as ordinary persons like herself were accustomed 
to exercise in managing their horses. To the instructions…the defendants excepted. 
Fowler, Justice:  
…The instructions…although generally correct, contain a single expression in the explanation 
of what constitutes ordinary care and skill, which, in the opinion of the court, might have misled the 
jury as to the proper standard by which to determine it. The plaintiff was bound only to the exercise 
of ordinary care, skill and prudence in the management of her horse; such care, skill and prudence 
as persons or people in general were accustomed to exercise in managing their horses. Common or 
ordinary diligence is defined by Story as “that degree of diligence which men in general exert in 
respect to their own concerns”; “which men of common prudence generally exercise about their 
own affairs in the age and country in which they live.” In a country where women are accustomed, 
as among us, to drive horses and carriages, there can be no doubt that the degree of care, skill and 
prudence required of a woman in managing her horse would be precisely that degree of care, skill 
and prudence which persons of common prudence, or mankind in general, usually exercise, or are 
accustomed to exert, in the management of the horses driven by them. Now the language of the 
charge in the court below might be construed as making the average care, skill and prudence of 
women in managing horses, instead of the average care, skill and prudence of mankind generally, 
including all those accustomed to manage horses, whether men or women, boys or girls, the 
standard by which to determine whether or not the plaintiff had been guilty of any unskillfulness or 
want of care in the management of her horse at the time of the accident. As it may be doubtful 
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whether this average would be higher or lower than that of mankind in general, and as it is not the 
precise standard prescribed by the law, and the jury may possibly have been misled by it, the 
instructions must be held to have been erroneous on this point…. With these views, the verdict 
rendered for the plaintiff must be set aside, and a new trial be granted. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Markedness: In reviewing the trial court’s jury instruction, the appellate court could’ve 
construed “person” as gender-neutral language but instead concluded that using the 
phrase “ordinary persons like herself” erroneously called upon the jury to consider the 
plaintiff’s gender. Would the court have reached the same conclusion about “himself”?  
 
ASBURY v. CHARLOTTE ELECTRIC RAILWAY, LIGHT & POWER CO. 
Supreme Court of North Carolina (1899) 
Montgomery, Justice:  
This action was brought by the feme plaintiff to 
recover damages for injuries received by her, and 
alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the 
defendant. The particular allegation of the complaint is 
that the feme plaintiff was a passenger on one of the 
street cars of the defendant, and while she was in the act 
of disembarking therefrom the servants and agents of 
the defendant in charge of said car negligently caused 
the car to be suddenly started forward, and that the said 
plaintiff, in consequence thereof, was thrown to the 
ground and injured. The defendant denied the imputed 
negligence, and averred that plaintiff was negligent in assuming a dangerous position, and in 
alighting from the car.  
[The plaintiff testified that an obstruction prevented her from getting off directly from the floor 
of the street car to the step or the running board at its exit. As she was trying to get past the 
obstruction, she says the car started with a jerk, and toppled her over. All the evidence of other 
witnesses was that the plaintiff had tripped in exiting the car, perhaps because she stepped on her 
long skirt, but that the car did not move at any relevant point. The defendant objected to various 
jury instructions.]… 
His honor told the jury in his charge that “due care” meant “such care as an ordinarily prudent 
man, placed in circumstances like or similar to those in which the person whose conduct is in 
question was placed, would use.”… 
Under the head of “due care,” the defendant contended, further, that when his honor laid down 
the rule of “the prudent man,” in reference to the conduct of the feme plaintiff at the time of her 
injury, he committed error. The argument was that the definition of “due care” was misleading “as 
the care to be exercised by a woman, when she is placed in a dangerous position, would be greater 
than that required of a man surrounded by the same circumstances; that she is supposed to be less 
able to take care of herself than is a man, and the danger to her will therefore be greater; that, when 
this is the case (that is, when the danger is greater), the law requires a greater degree of care to be 
exercised in avoiding it.” [But] [t]here is nothing in [the precedent defendant cites in support of its 
contention] which even squints toward a holding that a woman is not bound by the rule of “the 
prudent man,” but ordinarily by a stricter rule…. No error. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Gender as a Shield II: Is the railway company in Asbury making the same type of 
argument as the railway company in Eichhorn? Can you see what the companies are up 
to now? 
2. Consistency: Can you favor the Daniels rule but object to the Asbury/Eichhorn rule? 
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LITTLE ROCK & FORT SMITH RAILWAY CO. v. TANKERSLY 
Supreme Court of Arkansas (1890) 
Hemingway, Justice:  
[Plaintiff, a passenger on defendant’s train, 
endeavored to alight therefrom at a station while 
the cars were in motion, and was injured. She 
alleges that the train did not stop long enough to 
permit her to alight before it was again started.] 
Two questions were therefore involved in the 
proper determination of the cause—First. Was 
the injury attributable to any misconduct of the 
defendant? Second. Did the plaintiff contribute 
to it by any negligence on her part?… 
On the law applicable to the negligence of the plaintiff, the [trial court’s jury] charge is subject 
to objection. [The charge was given at the request of the plaintiff, and erred in implying that, if the 
defendant stopped the train for an insufficiently long time,] that would excuse a hazardous attempt 
by plaintiff to alight. That is not the law. The conduct of the plaintiff must be judged from present 
conditions, and upon them the past delinquency of another sheds no light. If it would seem to a 
person of ordinary prudence and caution to be safe to step off, considering the train’s speed, the 
situation of the place of alighting, the opportunity to see where the step was made, and the activity 
of the person making it, and all other circumstances reasonably affecting the safety of the attempt, 
it could not be deemed negligence in the plaintiff to do it. But the failure of a train to stop, does not 
justify an attempt to alight that is hazardous, nor is it an element to be considered in determining in 
any given case whether such attempt was prudent or hazardous…. 
[Moreover, the] eighth instruction asked by the defendant should have been given. The act of 
the plaintiff was to be judged by a comparison with the acts of persons of ordinary prudence under 
similar circumstances. Her age, sex, and physical condition were circumstances necessarily affecting 
her safety in stepping from a moving train, and should have been considered by the jury, in 
connection with all other such circumstances in proof, in determining whether she acted prudently 
or recklessly. A young, active man might prudently alight, when the attempt would be reckless in an 
old or lame man; and any man might do so prudently, when it would be dangerous for a lady in 
female attire to attempt it…. [T]he judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Circumstances: The court concludes that Tankersly’s “age, sex, and physical condition 
were circumstances necessarily affecting her safety in stepping from a moving train, and 
should have been considered by the jury.” When determining ordinary care, does 
considering a person’s sex involve a similar logic to considering their age? How about 
their sex as compared to their physical condition? Are all of these so-called 
“circumstances” analytically similar for purposes of this legal analysis? 
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FOX v. TOWN OF GLASTENBURY 
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut (1860) 
Sanford, Justice: ã 
Action…brought by the plaintiff, [Henry Fox,] as 
administrator of [the estate of] Harriet Fox, to recover 
damages for the loss of her life by reason of the 
negligence of the defendants in not maintaining a 
railing along the sides of a causeway, which was a part 
of a public highway of the town…. The jury rendered 
a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendants moved 
for a new trial for a verdict against evidence.  
[U]pon a very careful examination of the evidence before us, we are satisfied that, however 
negligent the defendants may have been, the unfortunate woman who lost her life, essentially 
contributed to the production of that result by her own culpable imprudence and indiscretion; so 
that upon the well established principles of law, promulgated and recognized by this court in many 
cases, the plaintiff was not entitled to the verdict which he obtained.  
[The facts were these:] [H]aving procured a horse and wagon, [the deceased and her companion, 
Mrs. Clarinda Fox] started to go over the causeway, from the main land to the ferry. There was a 
freshet in the river, and the water had in consequence risen in the cove so as to cover the causeway, 
was rising rapidly, and there was a strong wind…. As they approached the causeway, the cove and 
the condition of the water in it could not have escaped their notice. They saw, and observed, that the 
causeway was entirely submerged, that a swift and strong current of turbid water was passing over 
it, that there was no rail or visible object of any kind, above the surface of the water, on the sides of 
the causeway, by which they could be protected or guided in their course, and the depth of the water 
it was obviously impossible, before they went into it, with any degree of accuracy, to calculate or 
determine. East of the bridge, the water rose to the hubs of the fore wheels of their wagon, but they 
reached the bridge in safety. The bridge was raised about two feet and a half above the level of the 
causeway. On the bridge they stopped, noticed and remarked upon the height of the water and the 
rapidity of its current, and felt some degree of alarm, but concluded to proceed. As they drove from 
the bridge into the water on the west side of it, they began to apprehend the extent of their danger, 
and became frightened; the horse stopped; they urged him forward with the whip, and becoming 
more frightened they probably attempted to turn around, and went off the causeway, nearly at a 
right angle with it, into the deep water on the north side…. [W]e think in driving upon the causeway 
at all, even easterly of the bridge, submerged as they saw it was, and with nothing visible above the 
surface of the water to indicate its true location, these ladies disregarded the dictates of ordinary 
prudence and discretion…. 
On th[e] bridge they were safe; and if they could not, unaided, have turned around and retraced 
their steps, they could, and should have remained where they were, until relieved from their 
unpleasant but not perilous situation. And again, when, after they had entered the water west of the 
bridge, their horse, true to the instincts of his noble nature, faltered, and stood still, they should have 
heeded his kindly admonition and there waited for assistance and deliverance, instead of forcing the 
animal forward to his fate. The boat, by means of which one of them was rescued, with two boys in 
it, was sailing close at hand; a wagon, with two men in it, was approaching the causeway from the 
west; and the residence of Mrs. French, with whom they had just been conversing, was within the 
reach of their voices. Their outcry would have brought almost immediate relief…. 
[T]he attempt of these ladies to pass over this causeway, and especially over the western part of 
it, was an act of rashness, which, upon the well settled principles of law applicable in cases of this 
character, bars all claims in their behalf for damages from the town. We think no person of ordinary 
discretion in their circumstances, and exercising ordinary prudence and discretion, would have 
made such an attempt.  
 
ã Simple Insomnia, Horse and Buggy Riding Through a Flooded River (CC BY 2.0). 
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We are not unmindful of the fact urged upon our attention by the plaintiff’s counsel, that these 
travelers were females. And in that fact, and in the timidity, inexperience, and want of skill which it 
implies, we can find an explanation of their injudicious and fatal attempt to turn around in the water, 
but no reason or excuse for the recklessness of their conduct in driving into it…. If men of ordinary 
prudence and discretion would regard the ability of the party inadequate for the purpose, without 
hazard or danger, the risk should not be assumed…. We think a new trial should be granted. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Gender and Driving: Does Fox again rest on stereotypes about women drivers? If so, 
what work are those stereotypes doing in the court’s legal analysis? What’s the court 
effectively telling the twelve members of the (all-male) jury to remember at the new trial? 
Do they have to consider whether they, as men, would have crossed the causeway, or 
must they instead determine whether a woman driver should have crossed? 
 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE RAILROAD CO. v. LORENTZEN 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (1897) 
Thayer, Judge: ã 
This is a suit to recover damages for injuries sustained at a railroad 
crossing by Mrs. Anna Marie Lorentzen, the defendant in error, who was 
the plaintiff below. Mrs. Lorentzen was riding in a public conveyance, 
termed a ‘hack,’ which was in charge of a driver…. While crossing the 
defendant’s track, the vehicle in which she was riding was struck and 
overturned by an outgoing train of the defendant company, as the plaintiff 
below alleged, because of the neglect of the engineer on the outgoing train 
to ring the bell or sound the whistle…. 
In the course of its charge, the trial court used the following language:  
Probably we would not exact the same degree of care and diligence from a woman 
that we would from a man under the same circumstances. I am inclined to think 
that, if this plaintiff were a man suing for a recovery, I should be constrained to 
advise you that he could be no more relieved from the duty of looking out for the 
train than the driver of the wagon; but this plaintiff being a woman, a person who 
is not accustomed, or very much accustomed, to such places, and to going in this 
fashion from one depot to another, I think it is a matter fairly for your 
consideration whether she used the care and diligence which should be expected 
of a person in her situation, in going across this road. 
An exception was taken to the aforesaid language, whereupon the court further instructed the 
jury as follows:  
I do not state that to you, gentlemen, as a matter of law or proposition of law, but 
simply as a matter for your consideration. I want you to consider whether there is 
less diligence to be exacted or expected from a woman than would be expected 
from a man. In fact, I am not considering any of these propositions as matters of 
law. I am merely explaining them for you to find and pass upon. The facts are with 
you, gentlemen, and not with the court. 
The exception first taken is insisted upon, notwithstanding the explanatory remarks of the court. 
We think, however, that the exception is not well founded. Considering all that was said, it appears 
that the jury was left at liberty to determine, as it had an undoubted right to do, whether, in view of 
the plaintiff’s sex and all the surrounding circumstances, she exercised such care and diligence as 
 
ã MIT-Libraries, Railroad Crossing Signal and Sign, Rutherford Avenue (CC BY-NC 2.0). 
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should reasonably be expected of her. This was the proper test by which to determine if she was 
guilty of any contributory fault…. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Menlove Revisited: Can this case—and indeed many of the other cases in this section—
be squared with the view of ordinary care espoused in Menlove? If the jury determined 
that we should expect “less diligence” from Lorentzen as a woman, why couldn’t 
Menlove’s apparent lack of good judgment immunize him for his carelessness? 
 
DENTON v. MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS RAILWAY CO. 
Supreme Court of Kansas (1916) 
Burch, Justice:  
The action was one for damages for injuries which a 
woman, riding in an automobile driven by her husband, 
sustained by being struck by a switch engine on a street 
crossing in the defendant’s yards in the city of Parsons. 
The plaintiff recovered, and the defendant appeals.  
The plaintiff, her husband, F. M. Denton, her son, E. 
E. Denton, and her son’s wife, occupied the automobile. 
F. M. Denton, sitting on the right-hand side, was driving 
the car. E. E. Denton occupied the front seat with the 
driver. The plaintiff and her daughter-in-law occupied 
the rear seat. [They were driving on a city street across a wide set of 24 railroad tracks.] The plaintiff 
and her husband had not been on the crossing before. The plaintiff’s son was an employé of the 
defendant, was familiar with the crossing, and said to his father that he would look out for trains. 
He testified there was danger in stopping an automobile there because cars were likely to be moved 
at any time. The automobile proceeded as slowly as possible without killing the engine, at a speed of 
about four or five miles per hour…. 
The defendant’s principal contentions are that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law, and that judgment should have been rendered for the defendant on the findings of fact…. 
The plaintiff was required to take the precautions which a reasonably prudent person, not in the 
situation of the automobile driver, but in her situation, would have taken. The argument is that she 
should have stopped the automobile, or should have called her husband’s attention to the conditions 
and requested him to exercise reasonable care. Why should the plaintiff have called her husband’s 
attention to the conditions and exhorted him to use due care? She had confidence in his ability as a 
driver. The conditions were just as obvious to him as to her. He could see and hear all she could see 
and hear. He was responsible for the operation of the automobile, not she, and she had no reason to 
doubt that he was exercising his faculties with diligence. Besides this, there was another observer in 
the front seat with the driver, who was in fact familiar with the crossing. His safety and his wife’s 
safety were at stake, and there is no evidence of any fact indicating to the plaintiff that her son was 
not exercising his faculties of observation with diligence. Why ought the plaintiff to have arrogated 
to herself control over the automobile and commanded it to stop?... Her opportunities of 
observation were not equal to those of her husband. She knew his ability as a driver and trusted him, 
and, what is more, she had the right to trust him.  
In [a previous case in this Court] it was said:  
Common sense would dictate that when a wife goes riding with her children in a 
rig driven by her husband she rightfully relies on him not to drive so as to imperil 
those in his charge. The law does not depart from common sense by requiring her, 
under the circumstances shown here, to impugn her husband’s ability to drive and 
assume the prerogative to dictate to him the manner of driving. 
This doctrine applies to the case of a wife riding in an automobile driven by her husband, unless 
she should know him to be incompetent or under some disability. The judgment…is affirmed.  
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QUESTIONS 
1. Gender Roles: How might Denton support the idea that there are separate spheres for 
men and women? In particular, how might it reinforce the masculinization of public 




ELLISON v. BRADY 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (1991) 
Beezer, Judge: ã 
Kerry Ellison appeals the district court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the Secretary of the Treasury on her 
sexual harassment action brought under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. This appeal presents two important 
issues: (1) what test should be applied to determine whether 
conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of employment and create a hostile working 
environment, and (2) what remedial actions can shield 
employers from liability for sexual harassment by co-workers. The district court held that Ellison 
did not state a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment. We reverse and remand…. 
Kerry Ellison worked as a revenue agent for the Internal Revenue Service in San Mateo, 
California. During her initial training in 1984 she met Sterling Gray, another trainee, who was also 
assigned to the San Mateo office. The two co-workers never became friends, and they did not work 
closely together. Gray’s desk was twenty feet from Ellison’s desk, two rows behind and one row over. 
Revenue agents in the San Mateo office often went to lunch in groups. In June of 1986 when no one 
else was in the office, Gray asked Ellison to lunch. She accepted. Gray had to pick up his son’s 
forgotten lunch, so they stopped by Gray’s house. He gave Ellison a tour of his house. 
Ellison alleges that after the June lunch Gray started to pester her with unnecessary questions 
and hang around her desk. On October 9, 1986, Gray asked Ellison out for a drink after work. She 
declined, but she suggested that they have lunch the following week. She did not want to have lunch 
alone with him, and she tried to stay away from the office during lunch time. One day during the 
following week, Gray uncharacteristically dressed in a three-piece suit and asked Ellison out for 
lunch. Again, she did not accept. 
On October 22, 1986 Gray handed Ellison a note he wrote on a telephone message slip which read:  
I cried over you last night and I’m totally drained today. I have never been in such 
constant term oil (sic). Thank you for talking with me. I could not stand to feel 
your hatred for another day. 
When Ellison realized that Gray wrote the note, she became shocked and frightened and left the 
room. Gray followed her into the hallway and demanded that she talk to him, but she left the 
building. 
Ellison later showed the note to Bonnie Miller, who supervised both Ellison and Gray. Miller 
said “this is sexual harassment.” Ellison asked Miller not to do anything about it. She wanted to try 
to handle it herself. Ellison asked a male co-worker to talk to Gray, to tell him that she was not 
interested in him and to leave her alone. The next day, Thursday, Gray called in sick. 
Ellison did not work on Friday, and on the following Monday, she started four weeks of training in 
St. Louis, Missouri. Gray mailed her a card and a typed, single-spaced, three-page letter. She describes 
this letter as “twenty times, a hundred times weirder” than the prior note. Gray wrote, in part:  
I know that you are worth knowing with or without sex. Leaving aside the hassles 
and disasters of recent weeks. I have enjoyed you so much over these past few 
 
ã HOSTILE ADVANCES: THE KERRY ELLISON STORY (1996). 
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months. Watching you. Experiencing you from O so far away. Admiring your 
style and elan. Don’t you think it odd that two people who have never even talked 
together, alone, are striking off such intense sparks. I will write another letter in 
the near future.1  
Explaining her reaction, Ellison stated: “I just thought he was crazy. I thought he was nuts. I 
didn’t know what he would do next. I was frightened.” She immediately telephoned Miller. Ellison 
told her supervisor that she was frightened and really upset. She requested that Miller transfer either 
her or Gray because she would not be comfortable working in the same office with him. Miller asked 
Ellison to send a copy of the card and letter to San Mateo. Miller then telephoned her supervisor, 
Joe Benton, and discussed the problem. That same day she had a counseling session with Gray. She 
informed him that he was entitled to union representation. During this meeting, she told Gray to 
leave Ellison alone. At Benton’s request, Miller apprised the labor relations department of the 
situation. She also reminded Gray many times over the next few weeks that he must not contact 
Ellison in any way. Gray subsequently transferred to the San Francisco office on November 24, 1986. 
Ellison returned from St. Louis in late November and did not discuss the matter further with Miller. 
After three weeks in San Francisco, Gray filed union grievances requesting a return to the San 
Mateo office. The IRS and the union settled the grievances in Gray’s favor, agreeing to allow him to 
transfer back to the San Mateo office provided that he spend four more months in San Francisco 
and promise not to bother Ellison. On January 28, 1987, Ellison first learned of Gray’s request in a 
letter from Miller explaining that Gray would return to the San Mateo office. The letter indicated 
that management decided to resolve Ellison’s problem with a six-month separation, and that it 
would take additional action if the problem recurred. 
After receiving the letter, Ellison was “frantic.” She filed a formal complaint alleging sexual 
harassment on January 30, 1987 with the IRS. She also obtained permission to transfer to San 
Francisco temporarily when Gray returned. Gray sought joint counseling. He wrote Ellison another 
letter which still sought to maintain the idea that he and Ellison had some type of relationship.  
The IRS employee investigating the allegation agreed with Ellison’s supervisor that Gray’s 
conduct constituted sexual harassment. In its final decision, however, the Treasury Department 
rejected Ellison’s complaint because it believed that the complaint did not describe a pattern or 
practice of sexual harassment covered by the EEOC regulations. After an appeal, the EEOC affirmed 
the Treasury Department’s decision on a different ground. It concluded that the agency took 
adequate action to prevent the repetition of Gray’s conduct. 
Ellison filed a complaint in September of 1987 in federal district court. The court granted the 
government’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Ellison had failed to state a prima 
facie case of sexual harassment due to a hostile working environment. Ellison appeals…. 
The parties ask us to determine if Gray’s conduct, as alleged by Ellison, was sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter the conditions of Ellison’s employment and create an abusive working 
environment. The district court, with little Ninth Circuit case law to look to for guidance, held that 
Ellison did not state a prima facie case of sexual harassment due to a hostile working environment. 
It believed that Gray’s conduct was “isolated and genuinely trivial.” We disagree…. 
The government asks us to apply the reasoning of other courts which have declined to find Title 
VII violations on more egregious facts. In Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986), 
the Seventh Circuit analyzed a female employee’s working conditions for sexual harassment. It 
noted that she was repeatedly propositioned and winked at by her supervisor. When she asked for 
assistance, he asked “what will I get for it?” Co-workers slapped her buttocks and commented that 
she must moan and groan during sex. The court examined the evidence to see if “the demeaning 
conduct and sexual stereotyping caused such anxiety and debilitation to the plaintiff that working 
conditions were ‘poisoned’ within the meaning of Title VII.” The court did not consider the 
environment sufficiently hostile. 
 
1 In the middle of the long letter Gray did say “I am obligated to you so much that if you want me to leave you alone I 
will. If you want me to forget you entirely, I can not do that.” 
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Similarly, in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), the Sixth Circuit 
refused to find a hostile environment where the workplace contained posters of naked and partially 
dressed women, and where a male employee customarily called women “whores,” “cunt,” “pussy,” 
and “tits,” referred to plaintiff as “fat ass,” and specifically stated, “All that bitch needs is a good lay.” 
Over a strong dissent, the majority held that the sexist remarks and the pin-up posters had only a de 
minimis effect and did not seriously affect the plaintiff’s psychological well-being. 
We do not agree with the standards set forth in Scott and Rabidue, and we choose not to follow 
those decisions…. It is the harasser’s conduct which must be pervasive or severe, not the alteration 
in the conditions of employment. Surely, employees need not endure sexual harassment until their 
psychological well-being is seriously affected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and debilitation. 
Although an isolated epithet by itself fails to support a cause of action for a hostile environment, 
Title VII’s protection of employees from sex discrimination comes into play long before the point 
where victims of sexual harassment require psychiatric assistance…. 
[W]e believe that Gray’s conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of 
Ellison’s employment and create an abusive working environment. We first note that the required 
showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness 
or frequency of the conduct. See King v. Bd. Regents Univ. Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(“although a single act can be enough, generally, repeated incidents create a stronger claim of hostile 
environment, with the strength of the claim depending on the number of incidents and the intensity 
of each incident.”). For example, in Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 863 F.2d 
1503 (11th Cir. 1989), the court held that two incidents in which a noose was found hung over an 
employee’s work station were sufficiently severe to constitute a jury question on a racially hostile 
environment. 
Next, we believe that in evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we 
should focus on the perspective of the victim. EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) §615 (1988) 
(courts “should consider the victim’s perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable 
behavior.”) If we only examined whether a reasonable person would engage in allegedly harassing 
conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination. Harassers could 
continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory practice was common, and victims of 
harassment would have no remedy. 
We therefore prefer to analyze harassment from the victim’s perspective. A complete 
understanding of the victim’s view requires, among other things, an analysis of the different 
perspectives of men and women. Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable may offend 
many women. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (“A male 
supervisor might believe, for example, that it is legitimate for him to tell a female subordinate that 
she has a ‘great figure’ or ‘nice legs.’ The female subordinate, however, may find such comments 
offensive”); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987) (“men and women are vulnerable in 
different ways and offended by different behavior”). See also Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and 
Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 Yale L. J. 1177 (1990) 
(men tend to view some forms of sexual harassment as “harmless social interactions to which only 
overly-sensitive women would object”); Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of 
Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1203 (1989) (the characteristically male view depicts 
sexual harassment as comparatively harmless amusement). 
We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a group, but we believe 
that many women share common concerns which men do not necessarily share.2 For example, 
because women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger 
 
2 One writer explains: “While many women hold positive attitudes about uncoerced sex, their greater physical and social 
vulnerability to sexual coercion can make women wary of sexual encounters. Moreover, American women have been raised 
in a society where rape and sex-related violence have reached unprecedented levels, and a vast pornography industry creates 
continuous images of sexual coercion, objectification and violence. Finally, women as a group tend to hold more restrictive 
views of both the situation and type of relationship in which sexual conduct is appropriate. Because of the inequality and 
coercion with which it is so frequently associated in the minds of women, the appearance of sexuality in an unexpected 
context or a setting of ostensible equality can be an anguishing experience.” Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the 
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1205 (1989). 
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incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual 
harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser’s conduct is merely a prelude to violent 
sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum 
without a full appreciation of the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman 
may perceive.  
In order to shield employers from having to accommodate the idiosyncratic concerns of the rare 
hyper-sensitive employee, we hold that a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile 
environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman3 would 
consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive 
working environment.4 Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1900) (sexual 
harassment must detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex as the victim); Yates, 819 
F.2d at 637 (adopting “reasonable woman” standard set out in Rabidue, 805 F.2d 611 (Keith, J. 
dissenting)); Comment, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 
97 Harv. L. Rev. 1449 (1984); cf. State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (adopting 
reasonable woman standard for self defense).  
We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman primarily because we believe that a sex-blind 
reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the 
experiences of women. The reasonable woman standard does not establish a higher level of 
protection for women than men. Cf. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(invalidating under Title VII paternalistic state labor laws restricting employment opportunities for 
women). Instead, a gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment enables women to 
participate in the workplace on an equal footing with men. By acknowledging and not trivializing 
the effects of sexual harassment on reasonable women, courts can work towards ensuring that 
neither men nor women will have to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of 
being allowed to work and make a living. 
We note that the reasonable victim standard we adopt today classifies conduct as unlawful sexual 
harassment even when harassers do not realize that their conduct creates a hostile working 
environment. Well-intentioned compliments by co-workers or supervisors can form the basis of a 
sexual harassment cause of action if a reasonable victim of the same sex as the plaintiff would 
consider the comments sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a condition of employment and create 
an abusive working environment.5 That is because Title VII is not a fault-based tort scheme. Title 
VII is aimed at the consequences or effects of an employment practice and not at the motivation of 
co-workers or employers. To avoid liability under Title VII, employers may have to educate and 
sensitize their workforce to eliminate conduct which a reasonable victim would consider unlawful 
sexual harassment. See 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(f) (“Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of 
sexual harassment.”). 
The facts of this case illustrate the importance of considering the victim’s perspective. Analyzing 
the facts from the alleged harasser’s viewpoint, Gray could be portrayed as a modern-day Cyrano de 
Bergerac wishing no more than to woo Ellison with his words. There is no evidence that Gray 
harbored ill will toward Ellison. He even offered in his “love letter” to leave her alone if she wished. 
Examined in this light, it is not difficult to see why the district court characterized Gray’s conduct 
as isolated and trivial.  
Ellison, however, did not consider the acts to be trivial. Gray’s first note shocked and frightened 
her. After receiving the three-page letter, she became really upset and frightened again. She 
immediately requested that she or Gray be transferred. Her supervisor’s prompt response suggests 
 
3 Of course, where male employees allege that co-workers engage in conduct which creates a hostile environment, the 
appropriate victim’s perspective would be that of a reasonable man. 
4 We realize that the reasonable woman standard will not address conduct which some women find offensive. Conduct 
considered harmless by many today may be considered discriminatory in the future. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. Fortunately, 
the reasonableness inquiry which we adopt today is not static. As the views of reasonable women change, so too does the 
Title VII standard of acceptable behavior. 
5 If sexual comments or sexual advances are in fact welcomed by the recipient, they, of course, do not constitute sexual 
harassment. Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination in employment does not require a totally desexualized work place. 
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that she too did not consider the conduct trivial. When Ellison learned that Gray arranged to return 
to San Mateo, she immediately asked to transfer, and she immediately filed an official complaint. 
We cannot say as a matter of law that Ellison’s reaction was idiosyncratic or hyper-sensitive. We 
believe that a reasonable woman could have had a similar reaction. After receiving the first bizarre 
note from Gray, a person she barely knew, Ellison asked a co-worker to tell Gray to leave her alone. 
Despite her request, Gray sent her a long, passionate, disturbing letter. He told her he had been 
“watching” and “experiencing” her; he made repeated references to sex; he said he would write again. 
Ellison had no way of knowing what Gray would do next. A reasonable woman could consider 
Gray’s conduct, as alleged by Ellison, sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter a condition of 
employment and create an abusive working environment. 
Sexual harassment is a major problem in the workplace. Adopting the victim’s perspective 
ensures that courts will not sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the 
offenders. Congress did not enact Title VII to codify prevailing sexist prejudices. To the contrary, 
Congress designed Title VII to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and a sense of degradation 
which serve to close or discourage employment opportunities for women. We hope that over time 
both men and women will learn what conduct offends reasonable members of the other sex. When 
employers and employees internalize the standard of workplace conduct we establish today, the 
current gap in perception between the sexes will be bridged…. 
Stephens, Judge, dissenting: 
This case comes to us on appeal in the wake of the granting of a summary judgment motion. 
There was no trial, therefore no opportunities for cross examination of the witnesses. In addition, 
there are factual gaps in the record that can only lead by speculation. Consequently, I believe that it 
is an inappropriate case with which to establish a new legal precedent which will be binding in all 
subsequent cases of like nature in the Ninth Circuit. I refer to the majority’s use of the term 
“reasonable woman,” a term I find ambiguous and therefore inadequate. 
Nowhere in section 2000e of Title VII, the section under which the plaintiff in this case brought 
suit, is there any indication that Congress intended to provide for any other than equal treatment in 
the area of civil rights. The legislation is designed to achieve a balanced and generally gender neutral 
and harmonious workplace which would improve production and the quality of the employees’ 
lives. In fact, the Supreme Court has shown a preference against systems that are not gender or race 
neutral, such as hiring quotas. While women may be the most frequent targets of this type of conduct 
that is at issue in this case, they are not the only targets. I believe that it is incumbent upon the court 
in this case to use terminology that will meet the needs of all who seek recourse under this section 
of Title VII. Possible alternatives that are more in line with a gender neutral approach include 
“victim,” “target,” or “person.” 
The term “reasonable man” as it is used in the law of torts, traditionally refers to the average 
adult person, regardless of gender, and the conduct that can reasonably be expected of him or her. 
For the purposes of the legal issues that are being addressed, such a term assumes that it is applicable 
to all persons. Section 2000e of Title VII presupposes the use of a legal term that can apply to all 
persons and the impossibility of a more individually tailored standard. It is clear that the authors of 
the majority opinion intend a difference between the “reasonable woman” and the “reasonable man” 
in Title VII cases on the assumption that men do not have the same sensibilities as women. This is 
not necessarily true. A man’s response to circumstances faced by women and their effect upon 
women can be and in given circumstances may be expected to be understood by men. 
It takes no stretch of the imagination to envision two complaints emanating from the same 
workplace regarding the same conditions, one brought by a woman and the other by a man. 
Application of the “new standard” presents a puzzlement which is born of the assumption that men’s 
eyes do not see what a woman sees through her eyes. I find it surprising that the majority finds no 
need for evidence on any of these subjects. I am not sure whether the majority also concludes that 
the woman and the man in question are also reasonable without evidence on this subject. I am 
irresistibly drawn to the view that the conditions of the workplace itself should be examined as 
affected, among other things, by the conduct of the people working there as to whether the 
workplace as existing is conducive to fulfilling the goals of Title VII…. 
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It is my opinion that the case should be reversed with instructions to proceed to trial. This would 
certainly lead to filling in the factual gaps left by the scanty record, such as what happened at the 
time of or after the visit of Ellison to Gray’s house to cause her to be subsequently fearful of his 
presence. The circumstances existing in the work place where only men are employed are different 
than they are where there are both male and female employees. The existence of the differences is 
readily recognizable and the conduct of employees can be changed appropriately. This is what Title 
VII requires. Whether a man or a woman has sensibilities peculiar to the person and what they are 
is not necessarily known. Until they become known by manifesting themselves in an obvious way, 
they do not become part of the circumstances of the work place. Consequently, the governing 
element in the equation is the workplace itself, not concepts or viewpoints of individual employees. 
This does not conflict with existing legal concepts. 
The creation of the proposed “new standard” which applies only to women will not necessarily 
come to the aid of all potential victims of the type of misconduct that is at issue in this case. I believe 
that a gender neutral standard would greatly contribute to the clarity of this and future cases in the 
same area…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Paul Revisited: Did Ellison have a plausible battery or assault claim against Gray? 
2. Common Care: The court asserts that applying a gender-neutral standard “would run 
the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination” because “[h]arassers could 
continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory practice was common.” Is 
that correct? Even setting aside the question of gender, is what we consider “ordinary” 
or “reasonable” the same as what we consider “common”? 
3. Intersectionality: Given the court’s logic, do you think it would matter if Gray was gay? 
What if Ellison was gay? Or if they were both gay? Should any of this matter to the legal 
standard? 
 
THE T.J. HOOPER 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1932) 
Hand, Judge:ã 
The barges No. 17 and No. 30, belonging to the 
Northern Barge Company, had lifted cargoes of coal at 
Norfolk, Virginia, for New York in March, 1928. They were 
towed by two tugs of the petitioner, the “Montrose” and the 
“Hooper,” and were lost off the Jersey Coast on March 
tenth, in an easterly gale. The cargo owners sued the barges 
under the contracts of carriage; the owner of the barges sued 
the tugs under the towing contract, both for its own loss and 
as bailee of the cargoes; the owner of the tug filed a petition to limit its liability. All the suits were 
joined and heard together, and the judge found that all the vessels were unseaworthy; the tugs, 
because they did not carry radio receiving sets by which they could have seasonably got warnings of 
a change in the weather which should have caused them to seek shelter in the Delaware Breakwater 
en route. He therefore entered an interlocutory decree holding each tug and barge jointly liable to 
each cargo owner, and each tug for half damages for the loss of its barge. The petitioner appealed, 
and the barge owner appealed and filed assignments of error. 
Each tug had three ocean going coal barges in tow, the lost barge being at the end. The 
“Montrose,” which had the No. 17, took an outside course; the “Hooper” with the No. 30, inside. 
The weather was fair without ominous symptoms, as the tows passed the Delaware Breakwater about 
midnight of March eighth, and the barges did not get into serious trouble until they were about 
opposite Atlantic City some sixty or seventy miles to the north. The wind began to freshen in the 
 
ã George L. Smyth, Tugboat on the Monongahela (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0). 
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morning of the ninth and rose to a gale before noon; by afternoon the second barge of the Hooper’s 
tow was out of hand and signaled the tug, which found that not only this barge needed help, but that 
the No. 30 was aleak. Both barges anchored and the crew of the No. 30 rode out the storm until the 
afternoon of the tenth, when she sank, her crew having been meanwhile taken off. The No. 17 sprang 
a leak about the same time; she too anchored at the Montrose’s command and sank on the next 
morning after her crew also had been rescued. The cargoes and the tugs maintain that the barges 
were not fit for their service; the cargoes and the barges that the tugs should have gone into the 
Delaware Breakwater, and besides, did not handle their tows properly. 
The evidence of the condition of the barges was very extensive, the greater part being taken out 
of court. As to each, the fact remains that she foundered in weather that she was bound to 
withstand… As to the cargoes, the charters excused the barges if “reasonable means” were taken to 
make them seaworthy; and the barge owners amended their answers during the trial to allege that 
they had used due diligence in that regard. As will appear, the barges were certainly not seaworthy 
in fact, and we do not think that the record shows affirmatively the exercise of due diligence to 
examine them. The examinations at least of the pumps were perfunctory; had they been sufficient 
the loss would not have occurred…. 
A more difficult issue is as to the tugs. [The issue here is whether the tugboats were 
“unseaworthy” because they did not have working radios that would have allowed their captains to 
receive the weather forecasts and reroute to avoid the storm.] The weather bureau at Arlington 
broadcasts two predictions daily, at ten in the morning and ten in the evening. Apparently there are 
other reports floating about, which come at uncertain hours but which can also be picked up. The 
Arlington report of the morning read as follows: “Moderate north, shifting to east and southeast 
winds, increasing Friday, fair weather to-night.” The substance of this [forecast] reached a tow 
bound north to New York about noon. [With evidence from the forecast and a failing barometer, 
the ship’s master decided to enter the Delaware Breakwater that afternoon. Though he may have 
been overcautious, three other towboats followed him into the Breakwater, also after having received 
the forecast. The boats’ masters all testified at trial.] [T]hey preferred to take no chances, and chances 
they believed there were. Courts have not often such evidence of the opinion of impartial experts, 
formed in the very circumstances and confirmed by their own conduct at the time. 
Moreover, the “Montrose” and the “Hooper” would have had the benefit of the evening report 
from Arlington had they had proper receiving sets. This predicted worse weather [with increased 
wind and rain]…. [I]f the four tows thought the first report enough, the second ought to have laid 
any doubts. The master of the “Montrose” himself, when asked what he would have done had he 
received a substantially similar report, said that he would certainly have put in. The master of the 
“Hooper” was also asked for his opinion, and said that he would have turned back also, but this 
admission is somewhat vitiated by the incorporation in the question of the statement that it was a 
“storm warning,” which the witness seized upon in his answer. All this seems to us to support the 
conclusion of the judge that prudent masters, who had received the second warning, would have 
found the risk more than the exigency warranted; they would have been amply vindicated by what 
followed…. Taking the situation as a whole, it seems to us that these masters would have taken 
undue chances, had they got the broadcasts. 
They did not, because their private radio receiving sets, which were on board, were not in 
working order. These belonged to them personally, and were partly a toy, partly a part of the 
equipment, but neither furnished by the owner, nor supervised by it. It is not fair to say that there 
was a general custom among coastwise carriers so to equip their tugs. One line alone did it; as for 
the rest, they relied upon their crews, so far as they can be said to have relied at all. An adequate 
receiving set suitable for a coastwise tug can now be got at small cost and is reasonably reliable if 
kept up; obviously it is a source of great protection to their tows. Twice every day they can receive 
these predictions, based upon the widest possible information, available to every vessel within two 
or three hundred miles and more. Such a set is the ears of the tug to catch the spoken word, just as 
the master’s binoculars are her eyes to see a storm signal ashore. Whatever may be said as to other 
vessels, tugs towing heavy coal laden barges, strung out for half a mile, have little power to maneuvre, 
and do not, as this case proves, expose themselves to weather which would not turn back stauncher 
craft. They can have at hand protection against dangers of which they can learn in no other way. 
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Is it then a final answer that the business had not yet generally adopted receiving sets? There are, 
no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the general practice of the calling the standard of proper 
diligence…. Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact 
common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole 
calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and 
available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive 
be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are 
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will 
not excuse their omission. But here there was no custom at all as to 
receiving sets; some had them, some did not; the most that can be 
urged is that they had not yet become general. Certainly in such a 
case we need not pause; when some have thought a device 
necessary, at least we may say that they were right, and the others 
too slack…. We hold the tugs [at fault] because had they been 
properly equipped, they would have got the Arlington reports. The 
injury was a direct consequence of this unseaworthiness.ã 
QUESTIONS 
1. Keeping Up with the Hands: The T.J. Hooper, one of America’s most important tort 
decisions, was written by Judge Learned Hand, one of America’s most influential judges. 
(Yes, “Learned Hand” was his real name, not just a workplace nickname. His cousin, 
Augustus Noble Hand, was also a federal judge. Quite the family, in name and 
reputation.) In what way was Judge Hand promoting a reformist agenda for tort law 
through the so-called T.J. Hooper Rule? What role does he think custom should play in 
determining breach? Is custom dispositive or merely probative in establishing 
“reasonable” care? 
2. Twelve Angry Men: Recall that jurors, not judges, usually determine breach. Are jurors 
in a good position to second-guess industry practices? Does it matter which industry? 
 
TORINO PROBLEM 
The year is 2031. A peer-reviewed and industry-funded study has just been released showing 
that switching entirely to self-driving cars in Georgia would reduce vehicle-related accidents by 
87,000 and deaths by 450 each year. The researchers say they’ve finally proved what proponents of 
autonomous vehicles have long touted: car accidents are less likely when artificial intelligence makes 
driving decisions instead of human intelligence. The U.S. Department of Transportation endorses 
the study and declares that Americans should switch to self-driving cars as soon as possible. To 
speed up the transition, the federal government and many states announce rebates and tax breaks 
for anyone who trades in their old car for an autonomous vehicle. 
The year is 2033. Clint, a proud libertarian, likes nothing more than taking his Ford Torino for 
long drives. As he rolls down his window and takes in a deep breath of Oconee County air, he 
mutters to himself, “Ah, this is the American dream.” Caught up in his moment of freedom, he fails 
to notice that he’s drifting over into the left lane. Within seconds he collides into Sally’s oncoming 
self-driving car. Though Clint miraculously emerges unscathed, Sally isn’t so lucky. Her estate sues 
for negligence and hires an expert to discuss the 2031 study and show that, based on tests done at 
the accident scene, an autonomous vehicle wouldn’t have veered into the wrong lane. 
(a) Does Clint’s decision to drive a conventional constitute a negligent act? 
(b) How might the example of tort liability in the tugboat industry bolster or undermine 
your argument?  
 
 
ã Philippe Halsman, Learned Hand, National Portrait Gallery (1957). 
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JOHNSON v. RIVERDALE ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES 
Supreme Court of Georgia (2002) 
Sears, Justice: ã 
Certiorari was granted in this medical malpractice 
action in order to consider the Court of Appeals’ 
ruling forbidding the plaintiff from cross-examining 
the defendants’ expert witness as to how he personally 
would have treated the plaintiffs’ decedent. We 
conclude that because the standard of care in medical 
malpractice cases is that which is employed by the 
medical profession generally, and not what one 
individual physician would do under the same or 
similar circumstances, how a testifying medical 
expert personally would have treated a plaintiff or a plaintiff’s decedent is not relevant to the issue 
of whether a defendant physician committed malpractice. Moreover, we conclude that how a 
testifying medical expert personally would have treated a plaintiff or a plaintiff’s decedent cannot be 
used to impeach the expert’s credibility. Therefore, we affirm. 
The decedent, Clair Johnson, suffered a severe adverse reaction to anesthesia she received during 
surgery. The reaction caused Mrs. Johnson’s oxygen supply to be interrupted, resulting in massive 
brain trauma and death. Her husband, Donald Johnson, along with the administratrix of her estate 
(collectively “Johnson”), sued the anesthesiologist, Dr. Lawhead, and his employer, Riverdale 
Anesthesia Associates, Inc. (collectively “Anesthesia Associates”), alleging malpractice. 
At trial, Johnson alleged that Anesthesia Associates had committed malpractice by failing to 
“pre-oxygenate” Mrs. Johnson. Pre-oxygenation is a procedure where, before surgery, a patient is 
given a measure of pure oxygen, providing her with a reserve to draw from, should her oxygen 
supply be interrupted during surgery. The trial court granted Anesthesia Associates’ motion in 
limine to prevent Johnson from cross-examining the defendants’ medical expert, Dr. Caplan, about 
whether he, personally, would have pre-oxygenated Mrs. Johnson. After the jury found in favor of 
Anesthesia Associates, Johnson appealed, claiming the trial court erred by preventing Johnson from 
cross-examining Dr. Caplan as to whether he would have elected to pre-oxygenate Mrs. Johnson…. 
1. The crux of Johnson’s complaint against Anesthesia Associates was the contention that the 
latter violated the applicable standard of care by failing to pre-oxygenate Mrs. Johnson. Johnson 
attempted to establish this breach of care through the testimony of an expert witness. Johnson 
claimed that if pre-oxygenation had been administered, Mrs. Johnson would have been protected 
against the low oxygen levels that occurred during surgery and that led to her death. For its part, 
Anesthesia Associates claimed that because its decision not to pre-oxygenate Mrs. Johnson was 
consistent with the applicable standard of care, no malpractice occurred. In support of this 
argument, Anesthesia Associates presented the testimony of its own medical expert, Dr. Caplan. 
It is axiomatic that in order to establish medical malpractice, the evidence presented by the 
patient must show a violation of the degree of care and skill required of a physician. Such standard 
of care is that which, under similar conditions and like circumstances, is ordinarily employed by the 
medical profession generally. Thus, in medical malpractice actions, the applicable standard of care 
is that employed by the medical profession generally and not what one individual doctor thought 
was advisable and would have done under the circumstances. 
Accordingly, in cases where expert medical testimony has been presented either to support or to 
rebut a claim that the applicable standard of care was breached, Georgia case law holds that questions 
aimed at determining how the expert would have personally elected to treat the patient are 
irrelevant. The questioning of a medical expert witness should be disallowed as irrelevant when it 
pertains to the expert’s personal views and personal opinions as to the care and treatment he himself 
would have rendered. Contrary to Johnson’s argument, this is true regardless of whether the expert’s 
personal views are sought through direct testimony or cross-examination; as held by the trial court 
 
ã W.P. Paarz, Malpractice Lawsuit, Injury – Scrabble (CC BY-SA 2.0). 
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in this case, a defendant’s expert witness is not required to answer questions on cross-examination 
“as to what course of treatment he personally would have followed.”  
It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Anesthesia Associates’ 
motion in limine to prohibit Johnson from cross-examining the defendant’s expert witness as to 
whether he personally would have pre-oxygenated the decedent, because such questioning was 
irrelevant to the issue of whether Anesthesia Associates breached the applicable standard of care.  
2. Questions aimed at determining how a defendant’s medical expert personally would have 
treated a plaintiff or a plaintiff’s decedent also are irrelevant for purposes of impeaching the expert. 
As explained above, a medical expert’s personal practices are irrelevant to the issues in controversy 
in a malpractice case. It is axiomatic that a witness may not be impeached with irrelevant facts or 
evidence, and cross-examination should be confined to matters that are relevant to the case.  
Moreover, when confronted with the same or similar situation, different physicians will, quite 
naturally, often elect to administer differing treatments, and will exercise their judgments regarding 
a patient’s care differently. However, merely because these procedures and treatments differ, it does 
not automatically follow that one of them fails to comply with the applicable standard of care…. 
[T]estimony showing a mere difference in views between surgeons as to operating techniques, or as 
to medical judgment exercised, is irrelevant in a medical malpractice action when the differing views 
or techniques are both acceptable and customary within the applicable standard of care…. 
Therefore, the trial court did not improperly curtail Johnson’s ability to impeach the testimony of 
Anesthesia Associates’ medical expert, Dr. Caplan, by granting the defendants’ motion in limine…. 
Carley, Justice, dissenting: 
In a one-sentence footnote, the majority overrules Prevost v. Taylor, 396 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1990), which was not even cited by the Court of Appeals. In my opinion, Prevost was simply 
overlooked by the Court of Appeals and should not be overruled by this Court because the rationale 
of that decision is so persuasive: 
It is true, as defendant argues, that the issue in a medical professional negligence 
action is whether the treatment met the standard of care of the profession 
generally and not what any one individual doctor believes is advisable. However, 
those cases cited by defendant involved instances where the only testimony 
presented to support plaintiff’s claim is the individual view of one doctor and no 
testimony was presented as to the standard of care generally practiced by the 
profession. Here, plaintiff did not present the individual opinion of defendant’s 
expert for the purpose of establishing the acceptable standard of care but offered 
it to impeach the expert’s opinion that the surgery performed by defendant met 
the standard of care of the profession generally. Evidence tendered for 
impeachment purposes need not be of the kind or quality required for proving the 
facts.  
Prevost, 396 S.E.2d 17. “The right of a thorough and sifting cross-examination shall belong to every 
party as to the witnesses called against him.” OCGA § 24-9-64. 
Over one hundred years ago, this Court held that it is the trial court’s duty to allow a searching 
and skillful test of the witness’ intelligence, memory, accuracy and veracity, and that it is better for 
cross-examination to be too free than too much restricted. Where the purpose is to impeach or 
discredit the witness, great latitude should be allowed by the trial court in cross-examination…. 
As a general rule, the liability test to be employed by the court and the jury is the 
“standard of care” that a reasonably prudent physician would exercise under the 
same or similar circumstances as the defendant. Therefore, the ultimate test is not 
whether the expert would perform a medical act and/or teach a medical act in the 
same way or a different way as a particular defendant. However, such a line of 
inquiry usually is admissible on the issue of credibility. If, for example, the 
plaintiff’s expert testifies that a defendant deviated from a certain standard of care, 
said expert’s credibility certainly would be severely shaken if, in fact, it can be 
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shown that this expert has performed a medical act in the same or similar manner 
as the defendant. If a defense expert has testified that a defendant’s medical act 
conformed with a certain acceptable standard of care, the credibility of said 
testimony certainly would be severely shaken, if said expert conceded on cross-
examination that he personally does not perform and/or teach the medical act in 
the same manner. 
Pegalis & Wachsman, American Law of Medical Malpractice 2d § 14:7(e) (1993). The identical 
circumstances are present in this case. As demonstrated by an offer of proof, the defendants’ medical 
expert would have testified on cross-examination that he would have pre-oxygenated Mrs. Johnson 
if she had been his patient. Plaintiffs’ counsel also sought to ask Dr. Caplan how he teaches his 
medical students to treat patients in similar situations. Such testimony is particularly relevant to 
credibility here, because Dr. Caplan testified on direct examination that there was nothing that could 
have been done to make it safer for Mrs. Johnson to have the anesthesia. 
A material abridgement or denial of the substantial right of cross-examination of opposing 
witnesses is material error and requires the grant of a new trial. Because the trial court did not allow 
plaintiffs to conduct a thorough and sifting cross-examination of the defendants’ medical expert, I 
dissent to the affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ judgment…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Trust Me, I’m a Doctor: Comparing Johnson with The T.J. Hooper, how does custom 
seem to play a different role when determining breach in cases of medical malpractice? 
What can explain these differing approaches? Is it a justifiable distinction? In what ways 
might it be elitist? In what other circumstances do you think the Anti-T.J. Hooper Rule 
might apply? 
2. The What and the Where: Plaintiffs in malpractice cases often hire experts to establish 
the standard of care. But which experts should they hire? At least two factors are key. 
First, the area of expertise: Should the expert focus on the profession generally or a 
specialty (or even a sub-specialty) within the profession? Second, location: Should 
experts testify as to customs nationally, in similar localities, or in the particular locality 
where the tort allegedly occurred? 
3. Stare Decisis: In Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group, 681 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. 2009), the 
Georgia Supreme Court overruled part of Johnson’s holding. Charting a different course, 
the justices in Condra held that evidence regarding an experts’ personal practices is 
admissible “both as substantive evidence and to impeach the expert’s opinion regarding 
the applicable standard of care.” If you were a juror in a malpractice case, would you 
want to know if the testifying expert follows the practices they say are customary? Why? 
Does it make experts untrustworthy witnesses if they deviate from custom? Does your 
answer depend on whether the expert shows greater or lesser care in their own practice? 
 
DR. DISASTER PROBLEM 
Dr. Julio Vasquez is the head surgeon and CEO at Athenia Hospital. He’s facing a major lawsuit 
arising from an unfortunate series of events. 
Ruth Coleman was rushed to the Athenia Hospital emergency room after sustaining serious 
injuries during a charity bike race. The doctors assess her injuries and hurry her into surgery to stop 
internal bleeding in her abdomen. Dr. Vasquez performs the surgery, stops the bleeding, and does a 
blood transfusion to help Ruth make a full recovery. 
Later that night, Dr. Vasquez is in a minor car accident. Exhausted from a long shift and rushing 
to get home to catch some sleep, he fails to yield on a right turn and collides with Angel Johnson, 
Ruth’s best friend, who was on his way to visit Ruth in the hospital. Dr. Vasquez is fine, but Angel 
suffers whiplash. 
The next day, Ruth isn’t recovering as the doctors expected. Dr. Vasquez runs several tests and 
discovers that the blood given to Ruth post-surgery might have caused an infection. Doctors don’t 
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generally test the blood given to patients during transfusions; instead, they simply administer the 
blood because specialists are supposed to test and treat it ahead of time. Dr. Vasquez, already stressed 
out from the previous day, doesn’t inform Ruth about the potential infection, and nor do his 
colleagues. Instead, he has the surgical interns run tests to diagnose Ruth, hoping that something 
else is causing her symptoms. During their tests, the interns notice a foreign object in Ruth’s 
abdomen. It turns out that the blood given to Ruth during surgery was contaminated and that Dr. 
Vasquez inadvertently left a surgical pad in Ruth’s abdomen during surgery. Shocked at his own 
oversight, Dr. Vasquez immediately assigns Dr. Farmer to take over Ruth’s case. Luckily, Dr. Farmer 
is able to both treat the infection and remove the pad without any serious complications. 
After Ruth’s second surgery, she has to stay at Athenia Hospital for follow-up treatment and 
observation during her recovery. The hospital doesn’t provide any security outside patients’ rooms, 
but there haven’t been any security issues in several years. One day, someone sneaks into Ruth’s 
room and steals her laptop while Ruth was receiving tests in another part of the hospital. After a few 
more weeks of observation, Ruth makes a full recovery. 
Traumatized by the whole ordeal, Ruth wants to sue for as much as possible. Should any of the 
following negligence claims be treated as malpractice, such that breach will be governed by custom? 
(a) Ruth sues Dr. Vasquez for using contaminated blood in the transfusion and for failing 
to inform her as soon as he suspected a contamination. 
(b) Ruth sues Dr. Vasquez for leaving the surgical pad in her abdomen. 
(c) Ruth sues Dr. Vasquez for providing inadequate security in the hospital. 
(d) Angel sues Dr. Vasquez for crashing into him while driving. 
 
UNITED STATES v. CARROLL TOWING CO. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1947) 
Hand, Judge: 
[Three piers in the Hudson River each had 
multiple barges attached to them, with each 
barge tied to the next. The “Anna C.” was the 
innermost barge on the middle pier. It was 
owned by Conners Marine Co., leased by the 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and carried 
flour owned by the United States Government. 
Under the lease terms, Conners was required to 
provide a bargee (an employee charged with 
supervising the vessel, often by living on it) 
daily from 8am–4pm. At all relevant times, the 
Anna C’s bargee was not present on board. 
At around 12pm on January 4, 1944, the 
harbormaster ordered a tugboat named the 
Carroll—which was owned by Carroll Towing Co. and leased by Grace Line, Inc.—to tow away a 
barge on the northernmost pier. To do so, the Carroll crewmen and the harbormaster had to detach 
that barge from the others on the neighboring piers, so they first pulled the ship alongside the 
outermost barge in the Anna C’s chain. After the men checked the lines on the barges on that pier 
and the lines connecting the Anna C. to the pier, the Carroll pulled away. 
Soon after that effort, the entire row of barges broke away from the pier and began floating on 
the river. The Anna C. hit a tanker docked at the neighboring pier. The Anna C. suffered a hole 
below the waterline without anyone noticing and sank soon after. At the lower court, evidence 
indicated that the tugs would have been able to push the Anna C. to shore before it sunk if they had 
been made aware of the hole in the hull. 
The District Court found that Carroll Towing and Grace were equally at fault for negligently 
inspecting the lines holding the Anna C. to the pier. Therefore, they were each liable to Conners for 
half of the value of the damage to the Anna C.  
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Carroll and Grace argued Conners should be liable because there was no bargee on the Anna C. 
during these events. Admiralty law apportioned liability for property damage on a pro rata basis 
among all parties deemed legally responsible. Therefore, if Conners was not at fault, it would not be 
liable for any damage. If Conners was at fault, it would recover only 1/3 from Carroll and 1/3 from 
Grace, and Conners would be responsible for the final third. 
The district judge found the lack of a bargee should not diminish Conners’s recovery because 
the absence did not contribute to the accident. The bargee was not required to anticipate negligence 
by the other men at the pier and thus was not negligent.]… 
[E]ven though we assume that the [Anna C.’s] bargee was responsible for [maintaining the Anna 
C.’s lines connecting it to the pier], there is not the slightest ground for saying that the [Carroll 
crewmen] and the “harbormaster” would have paid any attention to any protest which he might 
have made, had he been there. We do not therefore attribute it as in any degree a fault of the “Anna 
C” that the flotilla broke adrift. Hence she may recover in full against the Carroll Company and the 
Grace Line for any injury she suffered from the contact with the tanker’s propeller, which we shall 
speak of as the “collision damages.” On the other hand, if the bargee had been on board, and had 
done his duty to his employer, he would have gone below at once, examined the injury, and called 
for help from the “Carroll” and the Grace Line tug. Moreover, it is clear that these tugs could have 
kept the barge afloat, until they had safely beached her, and saved her cargo. This would have 
avoided what we shall call the “sinking damages.” Thus, if it was a failure in [Conners’s] proper care 
of its own barge, for the bargee to be absent, the company can recover only one third of the “sinking” 
damages from the Carroll Company and one third from the Grace Line. For this reason the question 
arises whether a barge owner is slack in the care of his barge if the bargee is absent. 
As to the consequences of a bargee’s absence from his barge there have been a number of 
decisions; and we cannot agree that it is never ground for liability even to other vessels who may be 
injured. [Precedent in this area varies greatly with a deep factual analysis in each case.] 
It appears…that there is no general rule to determine when the absence of a bargee or other 
attendant will make the owner of the barge liable for injuries to other vessels if she breaks away from 
her moorings. However, in any cases where he would be so liable for injuries to others, obviously he 
must reduce his damages proportionately, if the injury is to his own barge. It becomes apparent why 
there can be no such general rule, when we consider the grounds for such a liability. Since there are 
occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a 
menace to those about her; the owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against 
resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the 
gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves 
to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, 
L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether 
B > PL. Applied to the situation at bar, the likelihood that a barge will break from her fasts and the 
damage she will do, vary with the place and time; for example, if a storm threatens, the danger is 
greater; so it is, if she is in a crowded harbor where moored barges are constantly being shifted about. 
On the other hand, the barge must not be the bargee’s prison, even though he lives aboard; he must 
go ashore at times. We need not say whether, even in such crowded waters as New York Harbor a 
bargee must be aboard at night at all; it may be that the custom is otherwise,… and that, if so, the 
situation is one where custom should control. We leave that question open; but we hold that it is not 
in all cases a sufficient answer to a bargee’s absence without excuse, during working hours, that he 
has properly made fast his barge to a pier, when he leaves her. In the case at bar the bargee left at five 
o’clock in the afternoon of January 3rd, and the flotilla broke away at about two o’clock in the 
afternoon of the following day, twenty-one hours afterwards. The bargee had been away all the time, 
and we hold that his fabricated story was affirmative evidence that he had no excuse for his absence. 
At the locus in quo—especially during the short January days and in the full tide of war activity—
barges were being constantly “drilled” in and out. Certainly it was not beyond reasonable 
expectation that, with the inevitable haste and bustle, the work might not be done with adequate 
care. In such circumstances we hold—and it is all that we do hold—that it was a fair requirement 
that the Conners Company should have a bargee aboard (unless he had some excuse for his absence), 
during the working hours of daylight…. 
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QUESTIONS 
1. Judging the Judge: Is Judge Hand’s approach in The T.J. Hooper consistent with his 
formula in Carroll Towing? Or did his position change in the intervening fifteen years? 
2. A Hand, an Arm, and a Leg: The “burden of adequate precautions” is one variable in 
the celebrated but controversial “Hand Formula,” which is often framed as a form of 
cost-benefit analysis. What types of burden are appropriate to consider in a breach 
analysis? Is the B in B > PL purely a question of money? 
3. Algebraic Analysis: Two years later, in Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1949), 
Judge Hand stressed that it’s often impossible to conjure a “quantitative estimate” of any 
of the factors comprising the Hand Formula. If mathematical precision is illusory, what’s 
the point of his algebraic approach?  
 
RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL TRUST NATIONAL BANK v. ZAPATA CORP. 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (1988) 
Breyer, Judge:ã 
The issue that this appeal presents is whether Zapata 
Corporation has shown that the system used by Rhode Island 
Hospital Trust National Bank for detecting forged checks—a 
system used by a majority of American banks—lacks the “ordinary 
care” that a bank must exercise under the Uniform Commercial 
Code § 4-406(3), embodied here in Rhode Island General Laws, 
§ 6A-4-406(3). 
[The lower court made the following four determinations:] 
1. In early 1985, a Zapata employee stole some blank checks 
from Zapata. She wrote a large number of forged checks, almost 
all in amounts of $150 to $800 each, on Zapata’s accounts at Rhode 
Island Hospital Trust National Bank. The Bank, from March 
through July 1985, received and paid them. 
2. Bank statements that the Bank regularly sent Zapata first 
began to reflect the forged checks in early April 1985. Zapata failed 
to examine its statements closely until July 1985, when it found the 
forgeries. It immediately notified the Bank, which then stopped 
clearing the checks. The Bank had already processed and paid forged checks totaling $109,247.16. 
3. The Bank will (and legally must) reimburse Zapata in respect to all checks it cleared before April 
25, 1985 (or for at least two weeks after Zapata received the statement that reflected the forgeries). 
4. In respect to checks cleared on and after April 25, the Bank need not reimburse Zapata because 
Zapata failed to “exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine the [bank] statement.” 
The question before us is whether this last-mentioned conclusion is correct or whether Zapata 
can recover for the post-April 24 checks on the theory that, even if it was negligent, so was the Bank. 
To understand the question, one must examine U.C.C. § 4-406, R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-4-406. 
Ordinarily a bank must reimburse an innocent customer for forgeries that it honors, but § 6A-4-406 
makes an important exception to the liability rule. The exception operates in respect to a series of 
forged checks, and it applies once a customer has had a chance to catch the forgeries by examining 
his bank statements and notifying the bank but has failed to do so. 
The statute, in relevant part, reads as follows: 
(1) When a bank sends to its customer a statement of account accompanied by items 
paid in good faith in support of the debit entries or holds the statement and 
items pursuant to a request or instructions of its customer or otherwise in a 
reasonable manner makes the statement and items available to the 
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customer, the customer must exercise reasonable care and promptness to 
examine the statement and items to discover his unauthorized signature or any 
alteration on an item and must notify the bank promptly after discovery thereof. 
(2) If the bank establishes that the customer failed with respect to an item to 
comply with the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (1) the 
customer is precluded from asserting against the bank 
(a) His unauthorized signature or any alteration on the item if the bank also 
establishes that it suffered a loss by reason of such failure; and 
(b) An unauthorized signature or alteration by the same wrongdoer on any 
other item paid in good faith by the bank after the first item and statement 
was available to the customer for a reasonable period not exceeding 
fourteen (14) calendar days and before the bank receives notification 
from the customer of any such unauthorized signature or alteration. 
The statute goes on to specify an important exception to the exception. It says: “(3) The 
preclusion under subsection (2) does not apply if the customer establishes lack of ordinary care on 
the part of the bank in paying the item(s).” Zapata’s specific claim, on this appeal, is that it falls 
within this “exception to the exception”—that the bank’s treatment of the post-April 24 checks 
lacked “ordinary care.”… 
The statute…says that strict bank liability terminates fourteen days after the customer receives 
the bank’s statement unless “the customer establishes lack of ordinary care.” And, the U.C.C. 
commentary makes clear that the statute [places the burden of proof on the customer to demonstrate 
lack of ordinary care.]… 
The record convinces us that Zapata failed to carry its burden of establishing “lack of ordinary 
care” on the part of the Bank. First, the Bank described its ordinary practices as follows: The Bank 
examines all signatures on checks for more than $1,000. It examines signatures on checks between 
$100 and $1,000 (those at issue here) if it has reason to suspect a problem, e.g., if a customer has 
warned it of a possible forgery or if the check was drawn on an account with insufficient funds. It 
examines the signatures of a randomly chosen one percent of all other checks between $100 and 
$1,000. But, it does not examine the signatures on other checks between $100 and $1,000. Through 
expert testimony, the Bank also established that most other banks in the nation follow this practice 
and that banking industry experts recommend it. Indeed, Trust National Bank’s practices are 
conservative in this regard, as most banks set $2,500 or more, not $1,000, as the limit beneath which 
they will not examine each signature. 
This testimony made out a prima facie case of “ordinary care.” Of course, Zapata might still try 
to show that the entire industry’s practice is unreasonable, that it reflects lack of “ordinary care.” The 
T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.). In doing so, however, the prima facie rule 
does impose on the party contesting the standards to establish that they are unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unfair. 
Second, both bank officials and industry experts pointed out that this industry practice, in 
general and in the particular case of the Trust National Bank, saved considerable expense, compared 
with the Bank’s pre-1981 practice of examining each check by hand. To be specific, the change saved 
the Bank about $125,000 annually. Zapata accepts this testimony as accurate. 
Third, both a Bank official and an industry expert testified that changing from an “individual 
signature examination” system to the new “bulk-filing” system led to no significant increase in the 
number of forgeries that went undetected. Philip Schlernitzauer, a Bank vice-president and the 
officer in charge of the Zapata account, testified that under the prior “individual signature 
examination” system, some forgeries still slipped through. The Bank’s loss was about $10,000 to 
$15,000 per year. He also determined through a feasibility study that by implementing a “bulk-filing” 
system in which 99 percent of checks under $1,000 were not individually screened, the loss would 
remain between $10,000 and $15,000. Dr. Lipis, an executive vice-president of a large consulting 
firm to the financial industry, testified that among its purposes was the following: 
Well, it improves the ability to return checks back to customers more correctly, 
simply that the checks do not get misplaced when they are handled; generally [it] 
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can improve the morale within the bank because the signature verification is very 
tedious, very difficult, and not a function that is liked by anybody who does it. In 
addition, it does not impact the amount of forgeries that are produced at the bank. 
Zapata points to no testimony or other evidence tending to contradict these assertions. An 
industry-wide practice that saves money without significantly increasing the number of forged 
checks that the banks erroneously pay is a practice that reflects at least “ordinary care.” 
Fourth, even if one assumes…that the new system meant some increase in the number of 
undetected forged checks, Zapata still could not prevail, for it presented no evidence tending to show 
any such increased loss unreasonable in light of the costs that the new practice would save. Instead, 
it relied simply upon the assertion that costs saved the bank are irrelevant. But, that is not so, for 
what is reasonable or unreasonable insofar as “ordinary care” or “due care” or “negligence” (and the 
like) are concerned is often a matter of costs of prevention compared with correlative risks of loss. 
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (“duty” defined by 
calculating probability of injury times gravity of harm to determine “burden of precaution” that is 
warranted). One does not, for example, coat the base of the Grand Canyon with soft plastic nets to 
catch those who might fall in, or build cars like armored tanks to reduce injuries in accidents even 
though the technology exists. Compare Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 624 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1980) (under Carroll Towing calculus, gravity of accident at nuclear 
reactor merits exercise of “extraordinary vigilance” by employees), with Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979) (under Carroll Towing calculus, Secretary of 
Interior should assure that life systems of oceans not “unreasonably jeopardized” by oil and gas 
extraction activities). In arguing that the Bank provided “no care” in respect to the checks it did not 
examine, Zapata simply assumed the very conclusion (namely, the unreasonableness of a selective 
examination system) that it sought to prove. Aside from this assumption, its evidentiary cupboard 
is bare…. 
We have found a few, more modern cases that arguably support Zapata’s view, but they involve 
practices more obviously unreasonable than those presented here. See, e.g., Hanover Ins. Cos. 
v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1979) (no ordinary care where no examination 
of any size checks, conspicuous forgeries); Perley v. Glastonbury Bank & Trust Co., 368 A.2d 149, 
153 (Conn. 1976) (no ordinary care where no authentication of endorsements of any 
size checks); Indiana Nat’l Corp. v. Faco, Inc., 400 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (checks without 
signatures paid, 30 check copies lost); Medford Irrigation Dist. v. W. Bank, 676 P.2d 329 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1984) (same where no examination of any checks under $5,000)…. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is [a]ffirmed. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Dollars and Sense: Applying the Hand Formula in Zapata arguably makes sense because 
the case has features that are easier to value and easier to estimate. Do you agree? 
2. Utility Maximization: Does it make sense to think of breach as purely a question of 
failing to take cost-justified care? Let’s say that 3,000 people die every year in accidents 
caused by driving while using a cellphone, but that we could trace significant financial 
benefits to business deals conducted during people’s daily commutes. Should a jury be 
invited to consider this profitable use of people’s time while driving? Does this kind of 
analysis also mean that tort law implicitly endorses driving with greater care in wealthy 
neighborhoods? 
3. Playing the Odds: Why shouldn’t we judge reasonable care by simply comparing the 
burden of precaution and gravity of injury (B > L)? How does the P variable guide us 
toward an ex-ante perspective of breach?  
 
BLACK ISLAND PROBLEM 
Black Island, home to one of the world’s most active volcanoes, is owned by the U.S. government, 
which performs environmental research there through the Black Island Research Division (BIRD). 
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BIRD researchers are the island’s only residents, but the government allows tourists to visit for the 
once-in-a-lifetime experience of walking inside a crater. While BIRD’s Special Volcanic Alert System 
(SVAS) measures the volcano’s current activity at any given moment, it doesn’t indicate future risk. 
Instead, BIRD uses SVAS to issue real-time volcanic alert bulletins on its website and to emergency-
response agencies. 
Ed is a geologist at BIRD, and his partner Felicity came for the weekend to enjoy the outdoors. 
When Ed checked SVAS on the morning of her arrival, the system wasn’t showing anything unusual. 
Unfortunately, however, the volcano erupted that afternoon, resulting in 24 deaths and 44 injuries. 
Felicity and Ed were hiking at the time; Ed was killed and Felicity was injured. A volcanologist at the 
University of Pompeii said that the tragedy was “a disaster waiting to happen,” but BIRD’s Scientist-
in-Chief remarked to the press that “assessing volcanic risk robustly is bloody difficult!”  
Felicity sues BIRD, arguing that it negligently failed to anticipate and communicate the risk. 
(a) Can Felicity establish breach? 
(b) What if there had been two eruptions in the past three months, both after the SVAS 
system showed normal readings? 
(c) Does it matter that “assessing volcanic risk robustly is bloody difficult”?  
 
BYRNE v. BOADLE 
Exchequer Court (1863) 
…[T]he evidence adduced on the part of the plaintiff 
was as follows: A witness named Critchley said: “On the 
18th July, I was in Scotland Road, on the right side going 
north, defendant’s shop is on that side. When I was 
opposite to his shop, a barrel of flour fell from a window 
above in defendant’s house and shop, and knocked the 
plaintiff down. He was carried into an adjoining shop. 
A horse and cart came opposite the defendant’s door. 
Barrels of flour were in the cart. I do not think the barrel 
was being lowered by a rope. I cannot say: I did not see 
the barrel until it struck the plaintiff. It was not swinging when it struck the plaintiff. It struck him 
on the shoulder and knocked him towards the shop. No one called out until after the accident.” ã  
The plaintiff said: “On approaching Scotland Place and defendant’s shop, I lost all recollection. 
I felt no blow. I saw nothing to warn me of danger. I was taken home in a cab. I was helpless for a 
fortnight.” (He then described his sufferings.) “I saw the path clear. I did not see any cart opposite 
defendant’s shop.” Another witness said: “I saw a barrel falling. I don’t know how, but from 
defendant’s.” The only other witness was a surgeon, who described the injury which the plaintiff had 
received. It was admitted that the defendant was a dealer in flour. 
It was submitted, on the part of the defendant, that there was no evidence of negligence for the 
jury. The learned Assessor was of that opinion, and nonsuited the plaintiff, reserving leave to him 
to move the Court of Exchequer to enter the verdict for him with 50£. damages, the amount assessed 
by the jury…. 
Pollock, Chief Baron: 
There are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur, and this seems one of them. I 
think it would be wrong to lay down as a rule that in no case can presumption of negligence arise 
from the fact of an accident. Suppose in this case the barrel had rolled out of the warehouse and 
fallen on the plaintiff, how could he possibly ascertain from what cause it occurred? It is the duty of 
persons who keep barrels in a warehouse to take care that they do not roll out, and I think that such 
a case would, beyond all doubt, afford prima facie evidence of negligence. A barrel could not roll out 
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of a warehouse without some negligence, and to say that a plaintiff who is injured by it must call 
witnesses from the warehouse to prove negligence seems to me preposterous. 
So in the building or repairing a house, or putting pots on the chimneys, if a person passing along 
the road is injured by something falling upon him, I think the accident alone would be prima facie 
evidence of negligence. Or if an article calculated to cause damage is put in a wrong place and does 
mischief, I think that those whose duty it was to put it in the right place are prima facie responsible, 
and if there is any state of facts to rebut the presumption of negligence, they must prove them. The 
present case upon the evidence comes to this, a man is passing in front of the premises of a dealer in 
flour, and there falls down upon him a barrel of flour. I think it apparent that the barrel was in the 
custody of the defendant who occupied the premises, and who is responsible for the acts of his 
servants who had the control of it; and in my opinion the fact of its falling is prima facie evidence of 
negligence, and the plaintiff who was injured by it is not bound to shew that it could not fall without 
negligence, but if there are any facts inconsistent with negligence it is for the defendant to prove them. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Well, Duh: Although some people quip that res ipsa loquitor is Latin for “duh,” it 
actually means “the thing speaks for itself.” In Byrne, what is the thing and what is it 
saying for itself?  
2. Res Ipsa’s Role: Carefully ponder the following questions: Is res ipsa loquitor an 
independent tort? Does it change the substantive theory of what it means for the 
defendant’s conduct to be negligent? Does it alter the plaintiff’s burden of production or 
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YBARRA v. SPANGARD 
Supreme Court of California (1944) 
Gibson, Chief Justice: ã 
This is an action for damages for personal injuries alleged 
to have been inflicted on plaintiff by defendants during the 
course of a surgical operation…. 
On October 28, 1939, plaintiff consulted defendant Dr. 
Tilley, who diagnosed his ailment as appendicitis, and made 
arrangements for an appendectomy to be performed by 
defendant Dr. Spangard at a hospital owned and managed by 
defendant Dr. Swift. [Plaintiff was seen and treated by 
multiple employees before being brought into surgery, several 
of whom are defendants in this action.]… [Once in the 
operating room,] Defendant Dr. Reser, the anesthetist, also an employee of Dr. Swift, adjusted 
plaintiff for the operation, pulling his body to the head of the operating table and, according to 
plaintiff’s testimony, laying him back against two hard objects at the top of his shoulders, about an 
inch below his neck. Dr. Reser then administered the anesthetic and plaintiff lost consciousness. 
When he awoke early the following morning he was in his hospital room attended by defendant 
Thompson, the special nurse, and another nurse who was not made a defendant. 
Plaintiff testified that prior to the operation he had never had any pain in, or injury to, his right 
arm or shoulder, but that when he awakened he felt a sharp pain about half way between the neck 
and the point of the right shoulder. He complained to the nurse, and then to Dr. Tilley, who gave 
him…treatments while he remained in the hospital. The pain did not cease, but spread down to the 
lower part of his arm, and after his release from the hospital the condition grew worse. He was unable 
to rotate or lift his arm, and developed paralysis and atrophy of the muscles around the shoulder. 
He received further treatments from Dr. Tilley until March, 1940, and then returned to work, 
wearing his arm in a splint on the advice of Dr. Spangard. 
Plaintiff also consulted Dr. Wilfred Sterling Clark, who had X-ray pictures taken which showed 
an area of diminished sensation below the shoulder and atrophy and wasting away of the muscles 
around the shoulder. In the opinion of Dr. Clark, plaintiff’s condition was due to trauma or injury 
by pressure or strain, applied between his right shoulder and neck. Plaintiff was also examined by 
Dr. Fernando Garduno, who expressed the opinion that plaintiff’s injury was a paralysis of traumatic 
origin, not arising from pathological causes, and not systemic, and that the injury resulted in 
atrophy, loss of use and restriction of motion of the right arm and shoulder. 
Plaintiff’s theory is that the foregoing evidence presents a proper case for the application of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and that the inference of negligence arising therefrom makes the [lower 
court’s decision] improper. Defendants takes the position that, assuming that plaintiff’s condition 
was in fact the result of an injury, there is no showing that the act of any particular defendant, nor 
any particular instrumentality, was the cause thereof. They attack plaintiff’s action as an attempt to 
fix liability “en masse” on various defendants, some of whom were not responsible for the acts of 
others; and they further point to the failure to show which defendants had control of the 
instrumentalities that may have been involved. Their main defense may be briefly stated in two 
propositions: (1) that where there are several defendants, and there is a division of responsibility in 
the use of an instrumentality causing the injury, and the injury might have resulted from the separate 
act of either one of two or more persons, the rule of res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked against any 
one of them; and (2) that where there are several instrumentalities, and no showing is made as to 
which caused the injury or as to the particular defendant in control of it, the doctrine cannot apply. 
We are satisfied, however, that these objections are not well taken in the circumstances of this case. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has three conditions: (1) the accident must be of a kind which 
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency 
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or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to 
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff…. 
There is, however, some uncertainty as to the extent to which res ipsa loquitur may be invoked 
in cases of injury from medical treatment. This is in part due to the tendency, in some decisions, to 
lay undue emphasis on the limitations of the doctrine, and to give too little attention to its basic 
underlying purpose. The result has been that a simple, understandable rule of circumstantial 
evidence, with a sound background of common sense and human experience, has occasionally been 
transformed into a rigid legal formula, which arbitrarily precludes its application in many cases 
where it is most important that it should be applied. If the doctrine is to continue to serve a useful 
purpose, we should not forget that the particular force and justice of the rule, regarded as a 
presumption throwing upon the party charged the duty of producing evidence, consists in the 
circumstance that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically 
accessible to him but inaccessible to the injured person.  
The present case is of a type which comes within the reason and spirit of the doctrine more fully 
perhaps than any other. The passenger sitting awake in a railroad car at the time of a collision, the 
pedestrian walking along the street and struck by a falling object or the debris of an explosion, are 
surely not more entitled to an explanation than the unconscious patient on the operating table. 
Viewed from this aspect, it is difficult to see how the doctrine can, with any justification, be so 
restricted in its statement as to become inapplicable to a patient who submits himself to the care and 
custody of doctors and nurses, is rendered unconscious, and receives some injury from 
instrumentalities used in his treatment. Without the aid of the doctrine a patient who received 
permanent injuries of a serious character, obviously the result of someone’s negligence, would be 
entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to disclose 
the identity of the negligent person and the facts establishing liability. If this were the state of the law 
of negligence, the courts, to avoid gross injustice, would be forced to invoke the principles of 
absolute liability, irrespective of negligence, in actions by persons suffering injuries during the 
course of treatment under anesthesia. But we think this juncture has not yet been reached, and that 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is properly applicable to the case before us. 
The condition that the injury must not have been due to the plaintiff’s voluntary action is of 
course fully satisfied under the evidence produced herein; and the same is true of the condition that 
the accident must be one which ordinarily does not occur unless someone was negligent. We have 
here no problem of negligence in treatment, but of distinct injury to a healthy part of the body not 
the subject of treatment, nor within the area covered by the operation. The decisions in this state 
make it clear that such circumstances raise the inference of negligence, and call upon the defendant 
to explain the unusual result. 
The argument of defendants is simply that plaintiff has not shown an injury caused by an 
instrumentality under a defendant’s control, because he has not shown which of the several 
instrumentalities that he came in contact with while in the hospital caused the injury; and he has not 
shown that any one defendant or his servants had exclusive control over any particular 
instrumentality. Defendants assert that some of them were not the employees of other defendants, 
that some did not stand in any permanent relationship from which liability in tort would follow, and 
that in view of the nature of the injury, the number of defendants and the different functions 
performed by each, they could not all be liable for the wrong, if any. 
We have no doubt that in a modern hospital a patient is quite likely to come under the care of a 
number of persons in different types of contractual and other relationships with each other…. But 
we do not believe that either the number or relationship of the defendants alone determines whether 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. Every defendant in whose custody the plaintiff was placed 
for any period was bound to exercise ordinary care to see that no unnecessary harm came to him 
and each would be liable for failure in this regard. Any defendant who negligently injured him, and 
any defendant charged with his care who so neglected him as to allow injury to occur, would be 
liable. The defendant employers would be liable for the neglect of their employees; and the doctor 
in charge of the operation would be liable for the negligence of those who became his temporary 
servants for the purpose of assisting in the operation. 
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In this connection, it should be noted that while the assisting physicians and nurses may be 
employed by the hospital, or engaged by the patient, they normally become the temporary servants 
or agents of the surgeon in charge while the operation is in progress, and liability may be imposed 
upon him for their negligent acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Thus a surgeon has 
been held liable for the negligence of an assisting nurse who leaves a sponge or other object inside a 
patient, and the fact that the duty of seeing that such mistakes do not occur is delegated to others 
does not absolve the doctor from responsibility for their negligence…. 
It may appear at the trial that, consistent with the principles outlined above, one or more 
defendants will be found liable and others absolved, but this should not preclude the application of 
the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The control, at one time or another, of one or more of the various 
agencies or instrumentalities which might have harmed the plaintiff was in the hands of every 
defendant or of his employees or temporary servants. This, we think, places upon them the burden 
of initial explanation. Plaintiff was rendered unconscious for the purpose of undergoing surgical 
treatment by the defendants; it is manifestly unreasonable for them to insist that he identify any one 
of them as the person who did the alleged negligent act. 
The other aspect of the case which defendants so strongly emphasize is that plaintiff has not 
identified the instrumentality any more than he has the particular guilty defendant. Here, again, 
there is a misconception which, if carried to the extreme for which defendants contend, would 
unreasonably limit the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule. It should be enough that the plaintiff 
can show an injury resulting from an external force applied while he lay unconscious in the hospital; 
this is as clear a case of identification of the instrumentality as the plaintiff may ever be able to make. 
An examination of the recent cases, particularly in this state, discloses that the test of actual 
exclusive control of an instrumentality has not been strictly followed, but exceptions have been 
recognized where the purpose of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would otherwise be defeated. Thus, 
the test has become one of right of control rather than actual control….  
[Given the] liberalization of the tests for res ipsa loquitur, there can be no justification for the 
rejection of the doctrine in the instant case…. [I]f we accept the contention of defendants herein, 
there will rarely be any compensation for patients injured while unconscious. A hospital today 
conducts a highly integrated system of activities, with many persons contributing their 
efforts…. The number of those in whose care the patient is placed is not a good reason for denying 
him all reasonable opportunity to recover for negligent harm. It is rather a good reason for re-
examination of the statement of legal theories which supposedly compel such a shocking result. 
We do not at this time undertake to state the extent to which the reasoning of this case may be 
applied to other situations in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked. We merely hold that 
where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, 
all those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have 
caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an 
explanation of their conduct. The judgment is reversed. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Bend, Don’t Break: How does Ybarra bend the rules of res ipsa loquitor to prevent the 
doctrine from breaking? 
2. Cone of Silence: In what way can Ybarra be justified as an information-forcing rule? 
May res ipsa loquitor always be justified in this way, or is there something special about 
the circumstances in Ybarra? 
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KAMBAT v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL 
Court of Appeals of the State of New York (1997) 
Kaye, Chief Judge:  
In this medical malpractice action, an 18-by-18-inch 
laparotomy pad was discovered in the abdomen of 
plaintiffs’ decedent following a hysterectomy performed 
by defendant physician at defendant hospital. The 
question before us is whether plaintiffs were entitled to 
submit the case to the jury on the theory of res ipsa 
loquitur. Contrary to the trial court and Appellate 
Division, we conclude that the jury could have inferred 
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and 
that defendants’ evidence of due care and alternative 
causes of the injury did not remove the doctrine from the case. The trial court’s refusal to instruct 
the jury regarding res ipsa loquitur thus mandates reversal and a new trial. 
In August 1986, defendant physician Ralph Sperrazza performed an abdominal hysterectomy on 
decedent, Florence Fenzel, at defendant St. Francis Hospital. Ten laparotomy pads were marked and 
available for the operation, and Dr. Sperrazza placed several of these pads in decedent’s peritoneal 
cavity, next to the bowel, during the surgery. The patient was unconscious throughout the 
procedure. 
In the months following the operation decedent’s condition was at first unremarkable. 
Eventually, however, she began to complain of stomach pain, and on November 30, 1986 X-rays 
taken at another hospital revealed a foreign object in her abdomen. On December 5, a laparotomy 
pad measuring 18-by-18 inches—similar to those used during the hysterectomy—was discovered 
fully or partially inside decedent’s bowel, and it was removed by Dr. Robert Barone. This finding 
was so unanticipated that a photographer was called to document it. Decedent’s condition continued 
to deteriorate, and she died on December 29, 1986, from infection-related illnesses. 
Plaintiffs, decedent’s husband and children, commenced this medical malpractice action against 
Dr. Sperrazza and St. Francis Hospital, alleging that defendants were negligent in leaving the 
laparotomy pad inside decedent’s abdomen. At trial, plaintiffs presented evidence that the pad 
removed from decedent was the same type and size as those supplied to St. Francis Hospital in 1986 
and commonly used during hysterectomies. Plaintiffs also adduced testimony that the pads were 
provided only to hospitals with operating rooms, where patients would not have access to them…. 
[D]efendants introduced evidence that standard procedures were followed during the operation, 
and that the number of sponges, medical instruments and laparotomy pads used and removed were 
counted several times, carefully and accurately. Defendants’ experts, moreover, opined that the pad 
had not been left inside decedent but, rather, that she had swallowed it. According to defendants’ 
witnesses, laparotomy pads were frequently left in places accessible to patients in hospitals; decedent 
suffered from chronic depression; overuse of sleeping pills could suppress the gag reflex and permit 
her to swallow the pad; and the human gastrointestinal tract would allow the pad to pass to the small 
bowel. Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, by contrast, agreed that it would be anatomically impossible to 
swallow the laparotomy pad or for a swallowed pad to reach the bowel. 
The trial court denied plaintiffs’ request to charge res ipsa loquitur, and the jury returned a 
defendants’ verdict. Plaintiffs moved to set aside the verdict and either enter judgment in their favor 
or grant a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to deliver the requested charge. The 
court denied the motion, concluding that the lengthy and inconsistent expert testimony 
demonstrated that resolution of the case was not within a lay jury’s experience and, thus, res ipsa 
loquitur was not applicable…. 
Where the actual or specific cause of an accident is unknown, under the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur a jury may in certain circumstances infer negligence merely from the happening of an event 
and the defendant’s relation to it. Res ipsa loquitur simply recognizes what we know from our 
everyday experience: that some accidents by their very nature would ordinarily not happen without 
negligence. 
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Once a plaintiff’s proof establishes the following three conditions, a prima facie case of 
negligence exists and plaintiff is entitled to have res ipsa loquitur charged to the jury. First, the event 
must be of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; second, it 
must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and 
third, it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. 
To rely on res ipsa loquitur a plaintiff need not conclusively eliminate the possibility of all other 
causes of the injury. It is enough that the evidence supporting the three conditions afford a rational 
basis for concluding that it is more likely than not that the injury was caused by defendant’s 
negligence. Stated otherwise, all that is required is that the likelihood of other possible causes of the 
injury be so reduced that the greater probability lies at defendant’s door. Res ipsa loquitur thus 
involves little more than application of the ordinary rules of circumstantial evidence to certain 
unusual events, and it is appropriately charged when, upon a commonsense appraisal of the 
probative value of the circumstantial evidence, the inference of negligence is justified. 
Submission of res ipsa loquitur, moreover, merely permits the jury to infer negligence from the 
circumstances of the occurrence. The jury is thus allowed—but not compelled—to draw the 
permissible inference. In those cases where conflicting inferences may be drawn, choice of inference 
must be made by the jury. 
Here, the Appellate Division majority concluded that plaintiffs’ proof at trial failed to satisfy any 
of the three conditions. With regard to the first requirement in particular, the appellate court agreed 
with the trial court that a lay jury could not determine whether the occurrence was of a kind that 
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence without evaluating the parties’ expert 
testimony and, therefore, res ipsa loquitur did not apply. 
In the typical res ipsa loquitur case, the jury can reasonably draw upon past experience common 
to the community for the conclusion that the adverse event generally would not occur absent 
negligent conduct. In medical malpractice cases, however, the common knowledge and everyday 
experience of lay jurors may be inadequate to support this inference. Courts and commentators across 
the country have come to varying conclusions as to whether expert testimony can be used to educate 
the jury as to the likelihood that the occurrence would take place without negligence where a basis of 
common knowledge is lacking. Courts in this State, as well, have differed as to whether expert 
testimony can supply the necessary foundation for consideration of res ipsa loquitur by a jury. 
Widespread consensus exists, however, that a narrow category of factually simple medical 
malpractice cases requires no expert to enable the jury reasonably to conclude that the accident 
would not happen without negligence. Not surprisingly, the oft-cited example is where a surgeon 
leaves a sponge or foreign object inside the plaintiff’s body. As explained by Prosser and Keeton in 
their classic treatise: “There are, however, some medical and surgical errors on which any layman is 
competent to pass judgment and conclude from common experience that such things do not happen 
if there has been proper skill and care. When an operation leaves a sponge or implement in the 
patient’s interior, the thing speaks for itself without the aid of any expert’s advice.” 
Manifestly, the lay jury here did not require expert testimony to conclude that an 18-by-18-inch 
laparotomy pad is not ordinarily discovered inside a patient’s abdomen following a hysterectomy in 
the absence of negligence. Thus, plaintiffs’ undisputed proof that this occurred satisfied the first 
requirement of res ipsa loquitur. We therefore need not resolve today the question whether res ipsa 
loquitur is applicable in medical malpractice cases in which the jury is incapable of determining 
whether the first res ipsa loquitur condition has been met without the aid of expert testimony. 
Plaintiffs’ expert testimony regarding how the presence of the pad led to decedent’s ultimate 
injury and contradicting defendants’ alternative theory that decedent swallowed the pad did not 
render res ipsa loquitur inapplicable. This evidence was probative of the questions of exclusive 
control and absence of contributory conduct on the part of decedent—the second and third 
foundational elements of res ipsa loquitur. The debate over the use of expert testimony in res ipsa 
loquitur cases, however, centers primarily on the first element, since it is with regard to the 
likelihood that the accident would not happen without negligence that the jury is generally expected 
to draw upon its common knowledge. 
Turning to these remaining res ipsa loquitur conditions, plaintiffs’ evidence that similar pads 
were used during decedent’s surgery, that decedent was unconscious throughout the operation, that 
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laparotomy pads are not accessible to patients and that it would be anatomically impossible to 
swallow such pads sufficed to allow the jury to conclude that defendants had exclusive control of the 
laparotomy pad at the time of the alleged act of negligence and that it did not result from any 
voluntary action by the patient. 
We agree with the Appellate Division dissenters, moreover, that defendants’ evidence tending to 
rebut the three conditions did not disqualify this case from consideration under res ipsa loquitur. 
Plaintiffs were not obligated to eliminate every alternative explanation for the event. Defendants’ 
evidence that they used due care and expert testimony supporting their competing theory that 
decedent might have had access to laparotomy pads and inflicted the injury upon herself by 
swallowing the pad merely raised alternative inferences to be evaluated by the jury in determining 
liability. The undisputed fact remained in evidence that a laparotomy pad measuring 18 inches 
square was discovered in decedent’s abdomen: from this the jury may still be permitted to infer that 
the defendant’s witnesses are not to be believed, that something went wrong with the precautions 
described, that the full truth has not been told. Thus, the inference of negligence could reasonably 
have been drawn upon a commonsense appraisal of the probative value of the circumstantial 
evidence, and it was error to refuse plaintiffs’ request to charge res ipsa loquitur.… Accordingly, the 
orders of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted as to the first 
and second causes of action of the complaint. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Rebutting Res Ipsa: The court notes the three conditions that support the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitor. How does St. Francis Hospital attempt to challenge those conditions 
here? Why wasn’t it ultimately successful? 
2. Recognizing Res Ipsa: Outside of the hospital context, can you think of plausible and 
likely examples of when res ipsa loquitor would apply?  
 
D. Cause 
MUCKLER v. BUCHL 
Supreme Court of Minnesota (1967) 
Sheran, Justice: ã 
 …About 8:30 p.m., on August 11, 1962, plaintiff’s decedent, a 55-
year-old woman, fell down a flight of stairs extending from the landing 
between the first and second floors down to the first floor of the 
Minneapolis apartment house in which she had been a tenant for 7 
years. She broke her hip in the fall and was taken to a hospital where 
she died less than 4 months later…. 
[D]ecedent’s husband commenced an action for death by wrongful 
act against the apartment-house owner. At trial…plaintiff claimed the 
accident was caused by defendant’s negligence in having the stairs too 
dimly lit for safety contrary to a relevant ordinance and to his 
common-law duty. Pursuant to a verdict in favor of plaintiff, 
…judgment for $17,000 was entered…. 
Does the evidence justify a finding that the fall which caused injuries resulting in the death of 
plaintiff’s decedent was caused by the negligence of defendant in failing properly to light the stairway 
in the apartment building where the fall occurred?… 
Were it not for our decision in Majerus v. Guelsow, 113 N.W.2d 450 (Minn. 1962), we would be 
hesitant to affirm the jury’s implicit finding that decedent was caused to fall because of the darkness 
of the stairway, there being no direct evidence on the issue. 
Just before she fell, decedent was walking down the stairs directly behind a departing guest who 
had been visiting her in the second-floor apartment occupied by decedent and her husband. The 
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guest gave the following description of the events occurring between the time she left decedent’s 
apartment and the time the critical injury was sustained: 
Q. As you went out into the hallway and as the door of the apartment was closed, 
how can you describe the condition of the light at that time? 
The Witness: It was dark. I could distinguish the hand rail and I hung onto that 
because I could not tell where the steps were. 
Q. I believe there is one flight of steps there from that second floor landing down 
about five or six steps to a landing between floors; is that your recollection? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Green [plaintiff’s attorney]: Now, you got down to the first floor landing, or 
the landing between floors, without any particular incident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you then make the turn to go down the second flight to the landing on the 
first floor? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell us what happened as you went down that second flight of stairs? 
A. I was being very careful. I couldn’t tell where the steps were so I had to feel my 
way down, and then I don’t know how far I was from the bottom, probably three 
or four steps, and I heard something behind me and I imagined it was Mrs. 
Muckler tripping or falling—I couldn’t tell then—so I instinctively put my hand 
out and there was nothing there, and I heard the scream and the thump and there 
she was. 
Q. At this point where you heard this noise, had Mrs. Muckler been behind you? 
A. Yes, she was behind me. 
Q. Where did Mrs. Muckler then finally wind up? 
A. I heard the thump and the scream almost simultaneously and then the doors 
from the first floor opened so then I could see her. 
Q. Where was she? 
A. Lying on the floor, on the landing. 
If decedent ever said what caused her to fall, the record does not disclose it. 
An electrical engineer who measured the light at the place of the accident at a time when, 
according to the evidence, conditions were substantially the same as those prevailing at the time of 
the event gave testimony from which the jury could infer that the light at and near the place of the 
occurrence measured one-tenth of a foot-candle or less—significantly below the two foot-candles 
required by an ordinance of the city of Minneapolis.  
At the time of the accident the stairway was not lighted by artificial illumination. Defendant’s 
agent was in exclusive control of the switch to the lights which could have been used for this purpose. 
Except for the inadequacy of the lighting, the evidence shows that there was no defect in the 
stairway to which the fall could be attributed. A handrail was in place. 
Decedent, about 55 years of age, was in good health except for a diabetic condition which under 
the evidence the jury could have found to be controlled. Also there was evidence from which the 
jury could have found that decedent did not consume intoxicating liquors on the day of the accident 
or at any other time. There is no evidence indicating that decedent had fallen while descending the 
steps of the apartment building on any prior occasion during the 7 years she lived there as a tenant. 
The evidence is consistent with the theory that decedent fell on the stairway because of the 
darkness. But it is also consistent with the possibility that the fall would have occurred no matter 
what the lighting condition might have been. We can eliminate the diabetic condition as a probable 
explanation of the occurrence in view of the testimony of competent witnesses that decedent was 
not suffering observable symptoms before and as she started down the stairway. The possibility that 
the fall was attributable to intoxication can be eliminated on the basis of testimony to the effect that 
decedent never used intoxicants. But experience tells us that people sometimes fall on stairways even 
though fully alert and in the best of health. We cannot say with certitude that this was not one of 
those instances. 
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Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, as we must, we are 
still working in the field of probability. And the degree of probability of a connection between an 
alleged cause and a given result needed to sustain an affirmative jury finding cannot be defined with 
mathematical certainty. The line separating fact situations where an inference of causation is 
permissible from those in which it is not must, of necessity, reflect the general practical experience 
of the court called upon to make the demarcation. So considered, it seems reasonable that one 
attempting to descend a stairway so dark that the steps are barely discernible would be likely to fall 
because of the darkness. And, the accident having happened, it seems to us more probable that the 
darkened state of the stairway was the precipitating factor for the accident than otherwise. The 
minimum standards for lighting for stairways set by Minneapolis ordinance also suggest an 
experience-tested relationship between lack of adequate lighting on stairs and accidents of the type 
with which we are here concerned. Admittedly, thE case is a close one….  
In Majerus v. Guelsow, 113 N.W.2d 450, negligence on the part of the defendant was proved by 
showing that the stairway which decedent had apparently been using had treads of irregular width 
and risers of irregular height made more hazardous by the absence of a handrail. The principal 
question in the case was whether a causal relationship between these defects and a fall by decedent, 
who was found dead 30 feet from the bottom of the stairs, could be sustained, there being no direct 
evidence as to what happened. In affirming a jury finding of a causal relationship, the court said: 
From the facts and circumstances shown here, a jury could reasonably infer that 
the defect in part of the stairway was the cause of the accident which culminated 
in decedent’s death. It is true that there are other possible inferences, such as, foul 
play resulting in someone pushing him down the stairs, his falling while 
intoxicated, an injury received before he returned to the apartment; but none of 
these creates as reasonable an inference as that reached by the jury. The jury found 
here, based upon evidence as to the time in which alcohol is metabolized and upon 
the testimony of those who last saw the decedent, that intoxication was not a cause 
of the death…. 
The basic problem in Majerus, as here, was to decide whether an event which could be an 
adequate cause of an accident was in fact the cause of it. We think the probabilities are as great in 
the one instance as in the other and therefore resolve our doubts in this borderline situation in favor 
of affirmance…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Leffler Revisited: Did the property owner owe Mrs. Muckler a duty? If her guest had 
fallen too, would the same duty apply? What if Mrs. Muckler didn’t live in the apartment 
building and was instead hurrying down the stairs after committing a burglary?  
2. Causal Connection: Imagine you’re the judge in Muckler and the jury asks you how sure 
they must be that poor lighting caused Mrs. Muckler’s fall. How should you respond? 
3. Lawyering Causation: Muckler is an example of when actual cause is disputed (as 
opposed to proximate cause, which we’ll get to soon). A common way to determine 
actual cause is the “but-for test”: But for defendant’s breach, would the plaintiff’s injury 
have occurred? How does the but-for test apply in this case? How does the plaintiff’s 
theory of breach frame the causation inquiry? 
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BUTTS v. WEISZ 
United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania (2010) 
Conti, Judge: ã 
…[Plaintiff] Levone Butts and her husband, Glen Butts, came to 
know [defendants] Lloyd Weisz and Georgia Weisz when the two 
couples lived in California…. Defendants moved to [Pennsylvania, but 
plaintiff and her husband remained in California.]… On August 21, 
2006, plaintiff and her husband were guests at the [Pennsylvania] home 
of Lloyd Weisz and Georgia Weisz…. Plaintiff and her husband had not 
visited defendants’ home in Pennsylvania prior to August 21, 2006. 
Glenn Butts was eighty-four years old on that date. 
Defendants’ home is described as a “ranch-style” house. The back 
door of the house opened into a landing area. A person entering through 
the back door could proceed straight down a stairwell to the basement, 
or could turn left and proceed up a single eight-inch stair into the kitchen. There was no door 
between the landing and basement stairwell…. There was an overhead lighting fixture at the top of 
the basement steps. The light switch for this lighting fixture was not at the top of the basement 
stairwell, but rather was located outside the landing area above the entryway. 
After arriving at defendants’ home from the airport, the couples entered the home through the 
back door; there was ample light in the landing area at the time they entered…. Defendants gave the 
Butts a tour of the home. The tour was brief, however, because plaintiff and her husband were 
hungry and wanted to eat dinner. Defendants took the Butts out to dinner. In exiting the house the 
couples passed through the back door, and returned through the same door. Georgia Weisz 
intentionally turned off the light in the landing area after returning. 
After dinner, plaintiff and Georgia Weisz sat in the living room of the home, while plaintiff’s 
husband and Lloyd Weisz went into the den area of the home. Plaintiff’s husband entered the living 
room and stated he was going to “use the little boys’ room.” He walked through the home’s dining 
room into the kitchen. Plaintiff asserts that the most direct way to the bathroom from her husband’s 
location was through the foyer, although the path he took also leads to the bathroom. Georgia Weisz 
saw plaintiff’s husband enter the kitchen, and was confused why he went that way. Georgia Weisz, 
however, did not tell him that the other direction was the direct route. Plaintiff’s husband did not 
ask for directions to the bathroom and did not ask that any lights be turned on. Although plaintiff 
believed her husband was going in the wrong direction, any concern she had was assuaged by 
Georgia Weisz’s failure to redirect him. 
Defendants and plaintiff heard a crash from the landing area. They walked to the basement 
stairwell and found plaintiff’s husband unresponsive at the bottom of the steps. No one saw 
plaintiff’s husband fall. Plaintiff attempted to revive her husband, but was unsuccessful. Plaintiff’s 
husband was taken to Jameson Memorial Hospital…[and] pronounced dead of blunt head trauma. 
At all times when plaintiff’s husband passed through the landing area it was amply lit, with the 
exception of when he fell. The lighting was provided either by natural light or by defendants 
triggering the light switch. The lighting fixture at the top of the basement stairwell was turned off at 
the time of the accident. 
Plaintiff retained an architect expert witness, Robert T. Stevens, Jr., R.A. [After both sides 
submitted competing motions on the admissibility of Stevens’s testimony, the court decided] that 
Stevens’ testimony would be limited to offering an opinion regarding a normal person’s gait, the 
dangerousness of a single step, and the possible injuries that could result from that danger: 
THE COURT: At this stage, the nature of the step, the configuration of the step, 
the nature of the lighting, how a person would normally walk, those are matters 
that would be appropriate for Mr. Stevens to opine as to. He is not going to be able 
to opine, however, about the reaching for the light switch, because that’s just too 
speculative. We have no idea if the decedent reached for the switch or didn’t reach 
 
ã Jo Zimny, Down The Basement Stairs (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0). 
  TORT LAW 166 
for the switch. So that would be a matter of pure speculation. Whether what is left 
in terms of the opinion, whether it’s sufficient for proving causation under these 
circumstances, I would have to resolve at a motion for summary judgment. 
DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL: So I understand, Your Honor, at this point your 
ruling is that Mr. Stevens would be allowed to testify, would be allowed to testify 
as to the dangerous condition at the top of the stairs, and that it’s possible that Mr. 
Butts missed the step, and then, fell to his left?  
THE COURT: Depending on the walking; how someone would walk on that kind 
of step, and that if someone did fall, they could fall, and going down the steps 
would be something, too, that could have happened. But the problem you’re going 
to have, quite frankly, is if there’s an equally plausible situation here, I’m not sure 
that that’s sufficient to get past a motion for summary judgment. But I can’t 
resolve that at this stage…. 
Glen Butts, a social guest of defendants, was a gratuitous licensee…. Pennsylvania courts refer 
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 in determining the contours of the duty owed by a 
landowner to a gratuitous licensee. Section 342 makes a possessor of land liable to a licensee for 
physical harm caused by dangerous conditions known to the possessor that are not made safe and 
are not warned of: 
A possesser of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by 
a condition on the land if, but only if, 
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should 
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees and 
should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger and 
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the 
licensees of the condition and risk involved, and 
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the 
risk involved…. 
[A] landowner can only be subject to liability for physical harm if the harm is caused by the 
landowner’s negligence concerning that condition. Pennsylvania courts have adopted the 
Restatement’s ‘substantial factor’ approach concerning legal causation. Negligent conduct is said to 
be a legal cause if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. To be a substantial factor, it 
need not be the sole factor and need not be quantified as considerable or large, so long as it is 
significant or recognizable. The fact that some other cause concurs with the negligence of the 
defendant in producing an injury does not relieve defendant from liability unless he can show that 
such other cause would have produced the injury independently of his negligence…. 
Here, plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence that an alleged breach by defendants caused 
Glen Butts’ death. The evidence presented by plaintiff in responding to defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment with respect to causation, such as evidence of a dangerous single step, the failure 
to leave on lights, and the failure to warn or alert Glen Butts of potential danger, relates to whether 
defendants breached a duty owed to Glen Butts. This evidence does not establish a causal link 
between the alleged breaches of duty and the accident. Plaintiff’s expert architect witness, Stevens, 
offered an opinion about the cause of the accident, i.e., plaintiff’s husband was reaching for a light 
switch, but, upon consideration of defendant’s motion to challenge Stevens’ opinions, the court held 
that such testimony is precluded because it was speculative. For purposes of analyzing the pending 
summary judgment motions, therefore, the court will limit Stevens’ testimony as set forth on the 
record at the June 11, 2009 hearing. 
In moving for summary judgment, defendants argue that Stevens’ testimony, as limited for trial 
purposes, is insufficient to establish causation. Defendants cite Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, 
Ltd., 82 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 1996), in which Fedorcrzyk, a passenger on a cruise ship, slipped and fell in 
a bath tub, and sued the ship’s operator for negligently causing her injuries. The tub had abrasive 
strips, but plaintiff did not know whether her feet were on the strips when she slipped. An expert 
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architect witness opined that the strips failed to provide a sufficiently large area of non-slip surface 
to permit safe use of the tub…. 
The [Fedorcrzyk’s] expert’s testimony was admissible to [the] extent he opined that the less 
adequate the strips the greater the potential to slip, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
recognized that testimony of an increased risk of harm resulting from a party’s negligence does not 
establish that the party’s negligence caused the harm. The court relied upon a hypothetical for 
further explanation: 
 …A company provides a stairway in which some of the stairs are defective and 
some are in fine condition. A person falls on the steps, but does not know which 
step she fell on. No evidence is introduced that tends to prove she stepped on the 
defective step. The injured party simply testified that she walked down the steps 
and fell. We may not reasonably infer that the defective steps probably caused her 
injury merely because she may have stepped on a defective stair. Without evidence 
establishing a likelihood that the injured party stepped on the defective stair, a 
jury would be left to speculate as to the cause of the injury. Simply put, increased 
risk of harm due to a defendant’s negligence, standing alone, does not permit an 
inference that an injury, more probably than not, was caused by the negligence. 
Because the expert’s opinion about the cause of the accident was inadmissible, Fedorczyk did 
not provide direct or circumstantial evidence that the ship operator’s negligence caused her injuries. 
The court granted summary judgment in the ship operator’s favor. 
The evidence in this case is analogous to that presented in Fedorczyk. Stevens’ testimony is 
limited to establishing that the conditions of defendants’ rear entry foyer area increased the risk of 
harm that an individual would fall down the stairwell. Evidence establishing an increased risk of 
harm, however, is not evidence that those conditions caused Glen Butts’ fall. Stevens could not testify 
that Glen Butts could have been reaching for the light because there was no evidence that happened. 
In other words, the expert would have to speculate to render an opinion with respect to causation. 
Like the plaintiff in Fedorczyk, plaintiff’s husband could have fallen for reasons other than 
defendants’ negligence. Since plaintiff’s evidence is not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to causation, summary judgment must be granted in defendants’ favor…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Hidden Dangers: As a social guest, Glen Butts was a licensee in the Weiszes’ home, 
meaning that they owed him a duty to make the premises safe or warn him of hidden 
dangers about which they should’ve known. The court here focused on whether the 
landing was a dangerous condition that caused Glen’s fall. But could Levone Butts have 
advanced a different breach theory based on a failure to warn? How might that have 
altered the causation inquiry under the but-for test? How could the Weiszes have 
countered that theory? 
2. Belt and Suspenders: On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling on 
causation, explaining that “the inference that Mr. Butts fell because there were dim 
lighting conditions and an allegedly dangerous single step was not an appropriate 
inference that the jury could draw or should have been given the opportunity to draw.” 
But the appellate court went one step further, concluding that there would also have 
been no breach based on the single step because premises liability attaches only if the 
possessor of land “should expect that the licensees will not discover or realize the danger” 
and “the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk 
involved.” What circumstances could justify the Third Circuit’s conclusion as to breach? 
3. Stairway to Heaven: Assume that there was compelling evidence that Glen fell while he 
was on the stairwell. Imagine also that there were 100 steps, 51 of which were dangerous 
and 49 of which were safe. Would combining these facts be sufficient to establish 
causation by a preponderance of the evidence? 
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GREEK LIFE PROBLEM 
Viraj got a brand-new, blacked-out Land Rover Defender for his 18th birthday. On his inaugural 
drive to the Sigma Alpha Delta frat party, he took the obligatory video of his steering wheel and the 
all-digital dashboard to post on his Instagram story. While swiping through filters before posting 
the video, he didn’t realize that his foot was laying on the gas quite heavily. He was going 75 mph in 
a 45. As his thumb hovered over the “add to story” button, he hit Kristie’s car.  
Kristie had just turned left out of the Wingster parking lot in her Jeep Wrangler, heading back 
toward the Omega Mu Gamma sorority house. She was too busy eating her lemon pepper wings to 
look before pulling out. Unfortunately, when her car collided with Viraj’s, the vehicles interlocked 
and slid onto the sidewalk, careening into Berry and breaking her leg. 
Berry sues Viraj and Kristie, alleging that they both drove their cars negligently. 
(a) Which driver caused Berry’s injury? Viraj or Kristie? Or did both cause Berry’s injury?  
(b) Should Viraj and Kristie be held jointly liable for Berry’s injury? 
(c) What if the two cars didn’t interlock? Same result?  
(d) If only Viraj had been driving carelessly, could Kristie still be liable? 
(e) Was Viraj or Kristie more at fault for the accident? Does it matter? 
 
WILDFIRE PROBLEM 
Kirby owns 50 acres in South Georgia, and a railroad owned by Gator Railway runs along the 
western edge of her property. Due to a lack of proper maintenance, a passing train gave off an 
inordinate amount of sparks as it passed Kirby’s property one day in August. The sparks started a 
fire. Meanwhile, a few miles to the southwest, a natural forest fire was raging and heading inexorably 
toward Kirby’s property. Both fires grew, and the forest fire eventually reached the railroad fire. 
After the two fires combined into one, flames burned Kirby’s land and destroyed her house. 
(a) Was the railroad fire an actual cause of the damage to Kirby’s property? 
(b) Does the but-for test lead to an equitable or sensible outcome here? 
(c) If the forest fire had burned all of Kirby’s property before the railroad fire got there, 
could Gator Railway be liable for negligence?  
(d) Could Gator Railway be liable if the railroad fire burned the entirety of Kirby’s property 
and then the forest fire also consumed the property ten minutes later? 
(e) Keeping all other facts the same, imagine that, instead of a natural forest fire, a nearby 
camper caused the second fire after failing to extinguish his campfire despite wildfire 
warnings at the campsite. In determining Gator Railway’s potential liability, would this 
change the analysis or result? And could the camper be liable for negligence? 
 
SUMMERS v. TICE 
Supreme Court of California (1948) 
Carter, Justice: ã 
Each of the two defendants appeals from a judgment against them in an 
action for personal injuries…. Plaintiff’s action was against both defendants 
for an injury to his right eye and face as the result of being struck by bird 
shot discharged from a shotgun. The case was tried by the court without a 
jury and the court found that on November 20, 1945, plaintiff and the two 
defendants were hunting quail on the open range. Each of the defendants 
was armed with a 12 gauge shotgun loaded with shells containing 7 ½ size 
shot. Prior to going hunting plaintiff discussed the hunting procedure with 
defendants, indicating that they were to exercise care when shooting and to 
 
ã Don Harrison, NW Mancelona Antrim MI 1956 (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0). 
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“keep in line.” In the course of hunting plaintiff proceeded up a hill, thus placing the hunters at the 
points of a triangle. The view of defendants with reference to plaintiff was unobstructed and they 
knew his location. Defendant Tice flushed a quail which rose in flight to a 10-foot elevation and flew 
between plaintiff and defendants. Both defendants shot at the quail, shooting in plaintiff’s direction. 
At that time defendants were 75 yards from plaintiff. One shot struck plaintiff in his eye and another 
in his upper lip. Finally it was found by the court that as the direct result of the shooting by 
defendants the shots struck plaintiff as above mentioned and that defendants were negligent in so 
shooting and plaintiff was not contributorily negligent…. 
There is evidence that both defendants, at about the same time or one immediately after the 
other, shot at a quail and in so doing shot toward plaintiff who was uphill from them, and that they 
knew his location. That is sufficient from which the trial court could conclude that they acted with 
respect to plaintiff other than as persons of ordinary prudence…. 
Defendant Tice states in his opening brief, “we have decided not to argue the insufficiency of 
negligence on the part of defendant Tice.” It is true he states in his answer to plaintiff’s petition for 
a hearing in this court that he did not concede this point but he does not argue it. Nothing more 
need be said on the subject. 
Defendant Simonson urges that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and assumed the 
risk as a matter of law. He cites no authority for the proposition that by going on a hunting party 
the various hunters assume the risk of negligence on the part of their companions. Such a tenet is 
not reasonable. It is true that plaintiff suggested that they all “stay in line,” presumably abreast, while 
hunting, and he went uphill at somewhat of a right angle to the hunting line, but he also cautioned 
that they use care, and defendants knew plaintiff’s position. We hold, therefore, that the trial court 
was justified in finding that he did not assume the risk or act other than as a person of ordinary 
prudence under the circumstances…. 
The problem presented in this case is whether the judgment against both defendants may stand. 
It is argued by defendants that they are not joint tortfeasors, and thus jointly and severally liable, as 
they were not acting in concert, and that there is not sufficient evidence to show which defendant 
was guilty of the negligence which caused the injuries—the shooting by Tice or that by Simonson. 
Tice argues that there is evidence to show that the shot which struck plaintiff came from Simonson’s 
gun because of admissions allegedly made by him to third persons and no evidence that they came 
from his gun. Further in connection with the latter contention, the court failed to find on plaintiff’s 
allegation in his complaint that he did not know which one was at fault—did not find which 
defendant was guilty of the negligence which caused the injuries to plaintiff. 
Considering the last argument first, we believe it is clear that the court sufficiently found on the 
issue that defendants were jointly liable and that thus the negligence of both was the cause of the 
injury or to that legal effect. It found that both defendants were negligent and “That as a direct and 
proximate result of the shots fired by defendants, and each of them, a birdshot pellet was caused to 
and did lodge in plaintiff’s right eye and that another birdshot pellet was caused to and did lodge in 
plaintiff’s upper lip.” In so doing the court evidently did not give credence to the admissions of 
Simonson to third persons that he fired the shots, which it was justified in doing. It thus determined 
that the negligence of both defendants was the legal cause of the injury—or that both were 
responsible. Implicit in such finding is the assumption that the court was unable to ascertain whether 
the shots were from the gun of one defendant or the other or one shot from each of them. The one 
shot that entered plaintiff’s eye was the major factor in assessing damages and that shot could not 
have come from the gun of both defendants. It was from one or the other only. 
It has been held that where a group of persons are on a hunting party, or otherwise engaged in 
the use of firearms, and two of them are negligent in firing in the direction of a third person who is 
injured thereby, both of those so firing are liable for the injury suffered by the third person, although 
the negligence of only one of them could have caused the injury. The same rule has been applied in 
criminal cases, and both drivers have been held liable for the negligence of one where they engaged 
in a racing contest causing an injury to a third person. These cases speak of the action of defendants 
as being in concert as the ground of decision, yet it would seem they are straining that concept and 
the more reasonable basis appears in Oliver v. Miles, 110 So. 666 (Miss. 1927). There two persons 
were hunting together. Both shot at some partridges and in so doing shot across the highway 
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injuring plaintiff who was travelling on it. The court stated they were acting in concert and thus both 
were liable. The court then stated: “We think that each is liable for the resulting injury to the boy, 
although no one can say definitely who actually shot him. To hold otherwise would be to exonerate 
both from liability, although each was negligent, and the injury resulted from such 
negligence.”… Dean Wigmore has this to say:  
When two or more persons by their acts are possibly the sole cause of a harm, or 
when two or more acts of the same person are possibly the sole cause, and the 
plaintiff has introduced evidence that the one of the two persons, or the one of the 
same person’s two acts, is culpable, then the defendant has the burden of proving 
that the other person, or his other act, was the sole cause of the harm. (b) The real 
reason for the rule that each joint tortfeasor is responsible for the whole damage 
is the practical unfairness of denying the injured person redress simply because 
he cannot prove how much damage each did, when it is certain that between them 
they did all; let them be the ones to apportion it among themselves. Since, then, 
the difficulty of proof is the reason, the rule should apply whenever the harm has 
plural causes, and not merely when they acted in conscious concert. 
When we consider the relative position of the parties and the results that would flow if plaintiff 
was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants only, a requirement that the burden of proof 
on that subject be shifted to defendants becomes manifest. They are both wrongdoers—both 
negligent toward plaintiff. They brought about a situation where the negligence of one of them 
injured the plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he can. The injured 
party has been placed by defendants in the unfair position of pointing to which defendant caused 
the harm. If one can escape the other may also and plaintiff is remediless. Ordinarily defendants are 
in a far better position to offer evidence to determine which one caused the injury. This reasoning 
has recently found favor in this court. In a quite analogous situation this court held that a patient 
injured while unconscious on an operating table in a hospital could hold all or any of the persons 
who had any connection with the operation even though he could not select the particular acts by 
the particular person which led to his disability. Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944). There 
the court was considering whether the patient could avail himself of res ipsa loquitur, rather than 
where the burden of proof lay, yet the effect of the decision is that plaintiff has made out a case when 
he has produced evidence which gives rise to an inference of negligence which was the proximate 
cause of the injury. It is up to defendants to explain the cause of the injury. It was there said: “If the 
doctrine is to continue to serve a useful purpose, we should not forget that the particular force and 
justice of the rule, regarded as a presumption throwing upon the party charged the duty of producing 
evidence, consists in the circumstance that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or 
innocent, is practically accessible to him but inaccessible to the injured person.” Similarly in the 
instant case plaintiff is not able to establish which of defendants caused his injury…. 
In addition to that, however, it should be pointed out that the same reasons of policy and justice 
shift the burden to each of defendants to absolve himself if he can—relieving the wronged person of 
the duty of apportioning the injury to a particular defendant, apply here where we are concerned 
with whether plaintiff is required to supply evidence for the apportionment of damages. If 
defendants are independent tortfeasors and thus each liable for the damage caused by him alone, 
and, at least, where the matter of apportionment is incapable of proof, the innocent wronged party 
should not be deprived of his right to redress. The wrongdoers should be left to work out between 
themselves any apportionment….  
It is urged that plaintiff now has changed the theory of his case in claiming a concert of action; 
that he did not plead or prove such concert. From what has been said it is clear that there has been 
no change in theory. The joint liability, as well as the lack of knowledge as to which defendant was 
liable, was pleaded and the proof developed the case under either theory. We have seen that for the 
reasons of policy discussed herein, the case is based upon the legal proposition that, under the 
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circumstances here presented, each defendant is liable for the whole damage whether they are 
deemed to be acting in concert or independently. The judgment is affirmed.ã 
QUESTIONS 
1. Shots Fired! The court tells us that “[o]ne shot struck plaintiff in his eye and another in 
his upper lip.” Do we know whether these two injuries were from the same gun or 
different guns? Would the answer affect the liability puzzle that Summers presents? 
2. Shifting Burdens: The Summers court’s theory, which comes to be known as alternative 
causation or alternative liability, allows multiple defendants to be held jointly and 
severally liable when: (1) each defendant acted in a nearly identically careless manner 
toward the plaintiff; (2) one of the defendants caused the plaintiff’s injury; (3) the 
plaintiff isn’t at fault; and (4) the plaintiff’s failure of proof isn’t due to their lack of 
diligence. Does this remind you of another doctrine we’ve studied that also touches upon 
issues of proof? What’s the difference here? What are the similarities? 
3. Hunting Party: How does the Summers rule effectively modify a plaintiff’s usual burden 
of proof? Would the rule still have force if there were three shooters? Or five? Or ten? 
 
 
ã Wela Quan, Summers v. Tice, NY Bar Picture Book (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). 
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SINDELL v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES 
Supreme Court of California (1980) 
Mosk, Justice: ã 
This case involves a complex problem both timely and 
significant: may a plaintiff, injured as the result of a drug 
administered to her mother during pregnancy, who 
knows the type of drug involved but cannot identify the 
manufacturer of the precise product, hold liable for her 
injuries a maker of a drug produced from an identical 
formula? 
Plaintiff Judith Sindell brought an action against 
eleven drug companies and Does 1 through 100, on behalf 
of herself and other women similarly situated…. Between 
1941 and 1971, defendants were engaged in the business 
of manufacturing, promoting, and marketing diethylstilbesterol (DES), a drug which is a synthetic 
compound of the female hormone estrogen. The drug was administered to plaintiff’s mother and 
the mothers of the class she represents,1 for the purpose of preventing miscarriage. In 1947, the Food 
and Drug Administration authorized the marketing of DES as a miscarriage preventative, but only 
on an experimental basis, with a requirement that the drug contain a warning label to that effect. 
DES may cause cancerous vaginal and cervical growths in the daughters exposed to it before 
birth, because their mothers took the drug during pregnancy. The form of cancer from which these 
daughters suffer is known as adenocarcinoma, and it manifests itself after a minimum latent period 
of 10 or 12 years. It is a fast-spreading and deadly disease, and radical surgery is required to prevent 
it from spreading. DES also causes adenosis, precancerous vaginal and cervical growths which may 
spread to other areas of the body. The treatment for adenosis is cauterization, surgery, or 
cryosurgery. Women who suffer from this condition must be monitored by biopsy or colposcopic 
examination twice a year, a painful and expensive procedure. Thousands of women whose mothers 
received DES during pregnancy are unaware of the effects of the drug. 
In 1971, the Food and Drug Administration ordered defendants to cease marketing and 
promoting DES for the purpose of preventing miscarriages, and to warn physicians and the public 
that the drug should not be used by pregnant women because of the danger to their unborn children. 
During the period defendants marketed DES, they knew or should have known that it was a 
carcinogenic substance, that there was a grave danger after varying periods of latency it would cause 
cancerous and precancerous growths in the daughters of the mothers who took it, and that it was 
ineffective to prevent miscarriage. Nevertheless, defendants continued to advertise and market the 
drug as a miscarriage preventative. They failed to test DES for efficacy and safety; the tests performed 
by others, upon which they relied, indicated that it was not safe or effective. In violation of the 
authorization of the Food and Drug Administration, defendants marketed DES on an unlimited 
basis rather than as an experimental drug, and they failed to warn of its potential danger.  
Because of defendants’ advertised assurances that DES was safe and effective to prevent 
miscarriage, plaintiff was exposed to the drug prior to her birth. She became aware of the danger 
from such exposure within one year of the time she filed her complaint. As a result of the DES 
ingested by her mother, plaintiff developed a malignant bladder tumor which was removed by 
surgery. She suffers from adenosis and must constantly be monitored by biopsy or colposcopy to 
insure early warning of further malignancy. 
 
ã DES Daughter, desPLEX (CC BY-SA 2.0). 
1 The plaintiff class alleged consists of “girls and women who are residents of California and who have been exposed to 
DES before birth and who may or may not know that fact or the dangers” to which they were exposed. Defendants are also 
sued as representatives of a class of drug manufacturers which sold DES after 1941. 
The following case discusses miscarriages. 
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The first cause of action alleges that defendants were jointly and individually negligent in that 
they manufactured, marketed and promoted DES as a safe and efficacious drug to prevent 
miscarriage, without adequate testing or warning, and without monitoring or reporting its effects. 
A separate cause of action alleges that defendants are jointly liable regardless of which particular 
brand of DES was ingested by plaintiff’s mother because defendants collaborated in marketing, 
promoting and testing the drug, relied upon each other’s tests, and adhered to an industry-wide safety 
standard. DES was produced from a common and mutually agreed upon formula as a fungible drug 
interchangeable with other brands of the same product; defendants knew or should have known that 
it was customary for doctors to prescribe the drug by its generic rather than its brand name and that 
pharmacists filled prescriptions from whatever brand of the drug happened to be in stock…. 
Each cause of action alleges that defendants are jointly liable because they acted in concert, on 
the basis of express and implied agreements, and in reliance upon and ratification and exploitation 
of each other’s testing and marketing methods. 
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages of $1 million and punitive damages of $10 million for 
herself. For the members of her class, she prays for equitable relief in the form of an order that 
defendants warn physicians and others of the danger of DES and the necessity of performing certain 
tests to determine the presence of disease caused by the drug, and that they establish free clinics in 
California to perform such tests. 
Defendants demurred to the complaint. While the complaint did not expressly allege that 
plaintiff could not identify the manufacturer of the precise drug ingested by her mother, she stated 
in her points and authorities in opposition to the demurrers filed by some of the defendants that she 
was unable to make the identification, and the trial court sustained the demurrers of these 
defendants without leave to amend on the ground that plaintiff did not and stated she could not 
identify which defendant had manufactured the drug responsible for her injuries…. This appeal 
involves only five of ten defendants named in the complaint.2… 
This case is but one of a number filed throughout the country seeking to hold drug 
manufacturers liable for injuries allegedly resulting from DES prescribed to the plaintiffs’ mothers 
since 1947. According to a note in the Fordham Law Review, estimates of the number of women who 
took the drug during pregnancy range from 1 ½ million to 3 million. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, 
of the daughters of these women suffer from adenocarcinoma, and the incidence of vaginal adenosis 
among them is 30 to 90 percent. Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 
Fordham L. Rev. 963 (1978). Most of the cases are still pending. With two exceptions, those that 
have been decided resulted in judgments in favor of the drug company defendants because of the 
failure of the plaintiffs to identify the manufacturer of the DES prescribed to their mothers. The 
same result was reached in a recent California case. The present action is another attempt to 
overcome this obstacle to recovery. 
We begin with the proposition that, as a general rule, the imposition of liability depends upon a 
showing by the plaintiff that his or her injuries were caused by the act of the defendant or by an 
instrumentality under the defendant’s control…. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. 
Plaintiff’s complaint suggests several bases upon which defendants may be held liable for her injuries 
even though she cannot demonstrate the name of the manufacturer which produced the DES 
actually taken by her mother. The first of these theories, classically illustrated by Summers v. Tice, 
199 P.2d 1 (1948), places the burden of proof of causation upon tortious defendants in certain 
circumstances. The second basis of liability emerging from the complaint is that defendants acted in 
concert to cause injury to plaintiff. There is a third and novel approach to the problem, sometimes 
called the theory of “enterprise liability,” but which we prefer to designate by the more accurate term 
of “industry-wide” liability, which might obviate the necessity for identifying the manufacturer of 
the injury-causing drug. We shall conclude that these doctrines, as previously interpreted, may not 
be applied to hold defendants liable under the allegations of this complaint. However, we shall 
 
2 Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Company, E.R. Squibb and Sons, the Upjohn Company, and Rexall Drug Company 
are respondents. The action was dismissed or the appeal abandoned on various grounds as to other defendants named in the 
complaint; e.g., one defendant demonstrated it had not manufactured DES during the period plaintiff’s mother took the drug. 
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propose and adopt a fourth basis for permitting the action to be tried, grounded upon an extension 
of the Summers doctrine. 
I 
Plaintiff places primary reliance upon cases which hold that if a party cannot identify which of 
two or more defendants caused an injury, the burden of proof may shift to the defendants to show 
that they were not responsible for the harm. This principle is sometimes referred to as the 
“alternative liability” theory. 
The celebrated case of Summers v. Tice, a unanimous opinion of this court, best exemplifies the 
rule. In Summers, the plaintiff was injured when two hunters negligently shot in his direction. It 
could not be determined which of them had fired the shot that actually caused the injury to the 
plaintiff’s eye, but both defendants were nevertheless held jointly and severally liable for the whole 
of the damages. We reasoned that both were wrongdoers, both were negligent toward the plaintiff, 
and that it would be unfair to require plaintiff to isolate the defendant responsible, because if the 
one pointed out were to escape liability, the other might also, and the plaintiff-victim would be shorn 
of any remedy. In these circumstances, we held, the burden of proof shifted to the defendants, “each 
to absolve himself if he can.” We stated that under these or similar circumstances a defendant is 
ordinarily in a “far better position” to offer evidence to determine whether he or another defendant 
caused the injury. 
In Summers, we relied upon Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). There, the plaintiff was 
injured while he was unconscious during the course of surgery. He sought damages against several 
doctors and a nurse who attended him while he was unconscious. We held that it would be 
unreasonable to require him to identify the particular defendant who had performed the alleged 
negligent act because he was unconscious at the time of the injury and the defendants exercised control 
over the instrumentalities which caused the harm. Therefore, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, 
an inference of negligence arose that defendants were required to meet by explaining their conduct…. 
Defendants assert that these principles are inapplicable here. First, they insist that a predicate to 
shifting the burden of proof under Summers-Ybarra is that the defendants must have greater access 
to information regarding the cause of the injuries than the plaintiff, whereas in the present case the 
reverse appears. [We disagree.]… 
Because many years elapsed between the time the drug was taken and the manifestation of 
plaintiff’s injuries she, and many other daughters of mothers who took DES, are unable to make 
such identification. Certainly there can be no implication that plaintiff is at fault in failing to do so—
the event occurred while plaintiff was in utero, a generation ago.  
On the other hand, it cannot be said with assurance that defendants have the means to make the 
identification…. Nor…[is] the absence of evidence on this subject…due to the fault of 
defendants…. [T]he difficulty or impossibility of identification results primarily from the passage 
of time rather than from their allegedly negligent acts of failing to provide adequate warnings…. 
It is important to observe, however, that while defendants do not have means superior to plaintiff 
to identify the maker of the precise drug taken by her mother, they may in some instances be able to 
prove that they did not manufacture the injury-causing substance. In the present case, for example, 
one of the original defendants was dismissed from the action upon proof that it did not manufacture 
DES until after plaintiff was born. 
Thus we conclude the fact defendants do not have greater access to information that might 
establish the identity of the manufacturer of the DES which injured plaintiff does not per se prevent 
application of the Summers rule. 
Nevertheless, …[t]here is an important difference between the situation involved 
in Summers and the present case. There, all the parties who were or could have been responsible for 
the harm to the plaintiff were joined as defendants. Here, by contrast, there are approximately 200 
drug companies which made DES, any of which might have manufactured the injury-producing 
drug. Defendants maintain that, while in Summers there was a 50 percent chance that one of the two 
defendants was responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, here since any one of 200 companies which 
manufactured DES might have made the product that harmed plaintiff, there is no rational basis 
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upon which to infer that any defendant in this action caused plaintiff’s injuries, nor even a 
reasonable possibility that they were responsible.  
These arguments are persuasive if we measure the chance that any one of the defendants supplied 
the injury-causing drug by the number of possible tortfeasors. In such a context, the possibility that 
any of the five defendants supplied the DES to plaintiff’s mother is so remote that it would be unfair 
to require each defendant to exonerate itself. There may be a substantial likelihood that none of the 
five defendants joined in the action made the DES which caused the injury, and that the offending 
producer not named would escape liability altogether. While we propose, infra, an adaptation of the 
rule in Summers which will substantially overcome these difficulties, defendants appear to be correct 
that the rule, as previously applied, cannot relieve plaintiff of the burden of proving the identity of 
the manufacturer which made the drug causing her injuries.  
II 
The second principle upon which plaintiff relies is the so-called “concert of action” theory…. 
The elements of this doctrine are prescribed in section 876 of the Restatement Second of Torts…[:] 
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is 
subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant 
to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a 
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so 
to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in 
accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, 
constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. 
With respect to this doctrine, Prosser, Law of Torts § 46 (1971), states that “those who, in 
pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it 
by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt 
his acts done for their benefit, are equally liable with him. Express agreement is not necessary, and 
all that is required is that there be a tacit understanding.” 
Plaintiff…alleges that defendants’ wrongful conduct “is the result of planned and concerted 
action, express and implied agreements, collaboration in, reliance upon, acquiescence in and 
ratification, exploitation and adoption of each other’s testing, marketing methods, lack of warnings 
and other acts or omissions” and that “acting individually and in concert, defendants promoted, 
approved, authorized, acquiesced in, and reaped profits from sales” of DES. These allegations, 
plaintiff claims, state a “tacit understanding” among defendants to commit a tortious act against her. 
In our view, this litany of charges is insufficient to allege a cause of action under the rules stated 
above. The gravamen of the charge of concert is that defendants failed to adequately test the drug or 
to give sufficient warning of its dangers and that they relied upon the tests performed by one another 
and took advantage of each others’ promotional and marketing techniques. These allegations do not 
amount to a charge that there was a tacit understanding or a common plan among defendants to fail 
to conduct adequate tests or give sufficient warnings, and that they substantially aided and 
encouraged one another in these omissions…. 
III 
A third theory upon which plaintiff relies is the concept of industry-wide liability, or according 
to the terminology of the parties, “enterprise liability.” This theory was suggested in Hall v. E.I. Du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). In that case, plaintiffs were 13 
children injured by the explosion of blasting caps in 12 separate incidents which occurred in 10 
different states between 1955 and 1959. The defendants were six blasting cap manufacturers, 
comprising virtually the entire blasting cap industry in the United States, and their trade association. 
There were, however, a number of Canadian blasting cap manufacturers which could have supplied 
the caps. The gravamen of the complaint was that the practice of the industry of omitting a warning 
on individual blasting caps and of failing to take other safety measures created an unreasonable risk 
of harm, resulting in the plaintiffs’ injuries. The complaint did not identify a particular manufacturer 
of a cap which caused a particular injury…. 
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We decline to apply this theory in the present case. At least 200 manufacturers produced 
DES; Hall, which involved 6 manufacturers representing the entire blasting cap industry in the 
United States, cautioned against application of the doctrine espoused therein to a large number of 
producers. Moreover, in Hall, the conclusion that the defendants jointly controlled the risk was 
based upon allegations that they had delegated some functions relating to safety to a trade 
association. There are no such allegations here, and we have concluded above that plaintiff has failed 
to allege liability on a concert of action theory. 
Equally important, the drug industry is closely regulated by the Food and Drug Administration, 
which actively controls the testing and manufacture of drugs and the method by which they are 
marketed, including the contents of warning labels. To a considerable degree, therefore, the 
standards followed by drug manufacturers are suggested or compelled by the government. 
Adherence to those standards cannot, of course, absolve a manufacturer of liability to which it would 
otherwise be subject. But since the government plays such a pervasive role in formulating the criteria 
for the testing and marketing of drugs, it would be unfair to impose upon a manufacturer liability 
for injuries resulting from the use of a drug which it did not supply simply because it followed the 
standards of the industry.  
IV 
If we were confined to the theories of Summers and Hall, we would be constrained to hold that 
the judgment must be sustained. Should we require that plaintiff identify the manufacturer which 
supplied the DES used by her mother or that all DES manufacturers be joined in the action, she 
would effectively be precluded from any recovery. As defendants candidly admit, there is little 
likelihood that all the manufacturers who made DES at the time in question are still in business or 
that they are subject to the jurisdiction of the California courts. There are, however, forceful 
arguments in favor of holding that plaintiff has a cause of action. 
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science and technology create 
fungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer. 
The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to 
those injured by such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs. Just as Justice 
Traynor in his landmark concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 
436 (1944), recognized that in an era of mass production and complex marketing methods the 
traditional standard of negligence was insufficient to govern the obligations of manufacturer to 
consumer, so should we acknowledge that some adaptation of the rules of causation and liability 
may be appropriate in these recurring circumstances…. 
The most persuasive reason for finding plaintiff states a cause of action is that advanced 
in Summers: as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the 
cost of the injury. Here, as in Summers, plaintiff is not at fault in failing to provide evidence of 
causation, and although the absence of such evidence is not attributable to the defendants either, 
their conduct in marketing a drug the effects of which are delayed for many years played a significant 
role in creating the unavailability of proof. 
From a broader policy standpoint, defendants are better able to bear the cost of injury resulting 
from the manufacture of a defective product. As was said by Justice Traynor in Escola, “the cost of 
an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, 
and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among 
the public as a cost of doing business.” The manufacturer is in the best position to discover and 
guard against defects in its products and to warn of harmful effects; thus, holding it liable for defects 
and failure to warn of harmful effects will provide an incentive to product safety. These 
considerations are particularly significant where medication is involved, for the consumer is 
virtually helpless to protect himself from serious, sometimes permanent, sometimes fatal, injuries 
caused by deleterious drugs. 
Where, as here, all defendants produced a drug from an identical formula and the manufacturer of 
the DES which caused plaintiff’s injuries cannot be identified through no fault of plaintiff, a 
modification of the rule of Summers is warranted. As we have seen, an undiluted Summers rationale is 
inappropriate to shift the burden of proof of causation to defendants because if we measure the chance 
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that any particular manufacturer supplied the injury-causing product by the number of producers of 
DES, there is a possibility that none of the five defendants in this case produced the offending substance 
and that the responsible manufacturer, not named in the action, will escape liability. 
But we approach the issue of causation from a different perspective: we hold it to be reasonable in 
the present context to measure the likelihood that any of the defendants supplied the product which 
allegedly injured plaintiff by the percentage which the DES sold by each of them for the purpose of 
preventing miscarriage bears to the entire production of the drug sold by all for that purpose. Plaintiff 
asserts in her briefs that Eli Lilly and Company and five or six other companies produced 90 percent 
of the DES marketed. If at trial this is established to be the fact, then there is a corresponding 
likelihood that this comparative handful of producers manufactured the DES which caused plaintiff’s 
injuries, and only a 10 percent likelihood that the offending producer would escape liability.  
If plaintiff joins in the action the manufacturers of a substantial share of the DES which her 
mother might have taken, the injustice of shifting the burden of proof to defendants to demonstrate 
that they could not have made the substance which injured plaintiff is significantly diminished. 
While 75 to 80 percent of the market is suggested as the requirement by the Fordham Comment, we 
hold only that a substantial percentage is required. 
The presence in the action of a substantial share of the appropriate market also provides a ready 
means to apportion damages among the defendants. Each defendant will be held liable for the 
proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it 
could not have made the product which caused plaintiff’s injuries. In the present case, as we have 
seen, one DES manufacturer was dismissed from the action upon filing a declaration that it had not 
manufactured DES until after plaintiff was born. Once plaintiff has met her burden of joining the 
required defendants, they in turn may cross-complain against other DES manufacturers, not joined 
in the action, which they can allege might have supplied the injury-causing product. 
Under this approach, each manufacturer’s liability would approximate its responsibility for the 
injuries caused by its own products. Some minor discrepancy in the correlation between market 
share and liability is inevitable; therefore, a defendant may be held liable for a somewhat different 
percentage of the damage than its share of the appropriate market would justify. It is probably 
impossible, with the passage of time, to determine market share with mathematical exactitude. But 
just as a jury cannot be expected to determine the precise relationship between fault and liability in 
applying the doctrine of comparative fault or partial indemnity, the difficulty of apportioning 
damages among the defendant producers in exact relation to their market share does not seriously 
militate against the rule we adopt. As we said in Summers with regard to the liability of independent 
tortfeasors, where a correct division of liability cannot be made “the trier of fact may make it the 
best it can.” 
We are not unmindful of the practical problems involved in defining the market and 
determining market share,3 but these are largely matters of proof which properly cannot be 
determined at the pleading stage of these proceedings. Defendants urge that it would be both unfair 
and contrary to public policy to hold them liable for plaintiff’s injuries in the absence of proof that 
one of them supplied the drug responsible for the damage. Most of their arguments, however, are 
based upon the assumption that one manufacturer would be held responsible for the products of 
another or for those of all other manufacturers if plaintiff ultimately prevails. But under the rule we 
adopt, each manufacturer’s liability for an injury would be approximately equivalent to the damage 
caused by the DES it manufactured. The judgments are reversed. 
Richardson, Justice, dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent. In these consolidated cases the majority adopts a wholly new theory which 
contains these ingredients: The plaintiffs were not alive at the time of the commission of the tortious 
acts. They sue a generation later. They are permitted to receive substantial damages from multiple 
defendants without any proof that any defendant caused or even probably caused plaintiffs’ injuries. 
 
3 Defendants assert that there are no figures available to determine market share, that DES was provided for a number 
of uses other than to prevent miscarriage and it would be difficult to ascertain what proportion of the drug was used as a 
miscarriage preventative, and that the establishment of a time frame and area for market share would pose problems. 
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Although the majority purports to change only the required burden of proof by shifting it from 
plaintiffs to defendants, the effect of its holding is to guarantee that plaintiffs will prevail on the 
causation issue because defendants are no more capable of disproving factual causation than 
plaintiffs are of proving it. “Market share” liability thus represents a new high water mark in tort 
law. The ramifications seem almost limitless…. In my view, the majority’s departure from 
traditional tort doctrine is unwise…. 
The “market share” thesis may be paraphrased. Plaintiffs have been hurt by someone who made 
DES. Because of the lapse of time no one can prove who made it. Perhaps it was not the named 
defendants who made it, but they did make some. Although DES was apparently safe at the time it 
was used, it was subsequently proven unsafe as to some daughters of some users. Plaintiffs have 
suffered injury and defendants are wealthy. There should be a remedy. Strict products liability is 
unavailable because the element of causation is lacking. Strike that requirement and label what 
remains “alternative” liability, “industry-wide” liability, or “market share” liability, proving thereby 
that if you hit the square peg hard and often enough the round holes will really become square, 
although you may splinter the board in the process…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Pheasants to Pharma: Why can’t the Sindell court rely on Summers and call it a day? In 
terms of proving causation, how might Sindell provide a less radical rule than Summers? 
2. What’s Tort Law Up To? Does Sindell’s market-share liability serve the goals of tort law? 
 
DRAG SUPERSTAR PROBLEM 
Paul and Michelle are competing in America’s Next Drag Superstar, an annual drag race in the 
residential neighborhood of Beverley Hills. As they hurtle toward the finish line, Michelle loses 
control of her car and crashes into Carson, who’s walking his dog nearby. Ross, a friend of Paul’s 
who attends all his races, watches in horror from the crowd. 
(a) Who should Carson sue?  
(b) What’s Carson’s best theory of liability as to each potential defendant? 
 
UNION PUMP CO. v. ALLBRITTON 
Supreme Court of Texas (1995) 
Owen, Justice: ã 
The issue in this case is whether the condition, act, or 
omission of which a personal injury plaintiff complains was, 
as a matter of law, too remote to constitute legal causation. 
Plaintiff brought suit alleging negligence…, and the trial 
court granted summary judgment for the defendant. The 
court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the 
plaintiff raised issues of fact concerning [proximate cause]. 
Because we conclude that there was no legal causation as a 
matter of law, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and render judgment that plaintiff take nothing. 
On the night of September 4, 1989, a fire occurred at Texaco Chemical Company’s facility in Port 
Arthur, Texas. A pump manufactured by Union Pump Company caught fire and ignited the 
surrounding area. This particular pump had caught on fire twice before. Sue Allbritton, a trainee 
employee of Texaco Chemical, had just finished her shift and was about to leave the plant when the 
fire erupted. She and her supervisor Felipe Subia, Jr., were directed to and did assist in abating the fire. 
Approximately two hours later, the fire was extinguished. However, there appeared to be a 
problem with a nitrogen purge valve, and Subia was instructed to block in the valve. Viewing the 
 
ã Lady Dragonfly, Emergency Fire Crews (CC BY 2.0). 
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facts in a light most favorable to Allbritton, there was some evidence that an emergency situation 
existed at that point in time. Allbritton asked if she could accompany Subia and was allowed to do 
so. To get to the nitrogen purge valve, Allbritton followed Subia over an aboveground pipe rack, 
which was approximately two and one-half feet high, rather than going around it. It is undisputed 
that this was not the safer route, but it was the shorter one. Upon reaching the valve, Subia and 
Allbritton were notified that it was not necessary to block it off. Instead of returning by the route 
around the pipe rack, Subia chose to walk across it, and Allbritton followed. Allbritton was injured 
when she hopped or slipped off the pipe rack. There is evidence that the pipe rack was wet because 
of the fire and that Allbritton and Subia were still wearing fireman’s hip boots and other firefighting 
gear when the injury occurred. Subia admitted that he chose to walk over the pipe rack rather than 
taking a safer alternative route because he had a “bad habit” of doing so. 
Allbritton sued Union Pump, alleging…that the defective pump was a [proximate cause] of her 
injuries. But for the pump fire, she asserts, she would never have walked over the pipe rack, which 
was wet with water or firefighting foam…. The question before this Court is whether Union Pump 
established as a matter of law that neither its conduct nor its product was a legal cause of Allbritton’s 
injuries. Stated another way, was Union Pump correct in contending that there was no causative 
link between the defective pump and Allbritton’s injuries as a matter of law? 
Negligence requires a showing of proximate cause…. At some point in the causal chain, the 
defendant’s conduct or product may be too remotely connected with the plaintiff’s injury to 
constitute legal causation…. [D]efining the limits of legal causation eventually mandates weighing 
of policy considerations. [Consider] Springall v. Fredericksburg Hospital & Clinic, 225 S.W.2d 232 
(Tex. Ct.. App. 1949), in which the court of appeals observed: 
The law does not hold one legally responsible for the remote results of his 
wrongful acts and therefore a line must be drawn between immediate and remote 
causes. The doctrine of “proximate cause” is employed to determine and fix this 
line and “is the result of an effort by the courts to avoid, as far as possible the 
metaphysical and philosophical niceties in the age-old discussion of causation, 
and to lay down a rule of general application which will, as nearly as may be done 
by a general rule, apply a practical test, the test of common experience, to human 
conduct when determining legal rights and legal liability. 
Drawing the line between where legal causation may exist and where, as a matter of law, it 
cannot, has generated a considerable body of law. Our Court has considered where the limits of legal 
causation should lie in the factually analogous case of Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 
1991). The threshold issue was whether causation was negated as a matter of law in an action where 
negligence and product liability theories were asserted. Perez, an employee of the Texas Highway 
Department, was driving a truck pulling a flashing arrow sign behind a highway sweeping operation 
to warn traffic of the highway maintenance. The sign malfunctioned when wires connecting it to the 
generator became loose, as they had the previous day. Perez got out of the truck to push the wire 
connections back together, and an oncoming vehicle, whose driver was asleep, struck the sign, which 
in turn struck Perez. Perez’s survivors brought suit against the manufacturer of the sign. In holding 
that any defect in the sign was not the legal cause of Perez’s injuries, we found a comment to 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 431, instructive on the issue of legal causation: 
In order to be a legal cause of another’s harm, it is not enough that the harm would 
not have occurred had the actor not been negligent. The negligence must also be 
a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm. The word “substantial” 
is used to denote the fact that the defendant’s conduct has such an effect in 
producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that 
word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility, 
rather than in the so-called “philosophic sense,” which includes every one of the 
great number of events without which any happening would not have occurred. 
As this Court explained in Lear Siegler, the connection between the defendant and the plaintiff’s 
injuries simply may be too attenuated to constitute legal cause. Legal cause is not established if the 
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defendant’s conduct or product does no more than furnish the condition that makes the plaintiff’s 
injury possible…. 
This Court similarly considered the parameters of legal causation in Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 
117 (Tex. 1968). In Bell, two cars collided, and a trailer attached to one of them disengaged and 
overturned into the opposite lane. A number of people gathered, and three of them were attempting 
to move the trailer when they were struck by another vehicle. This Court held that the parties to the 
first accident were not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries, reasoning: 
All acts and omissions charged against respondents had run their course and were 
complete. Their negligence did not actively contribute in any way to the injuries 
involved in this suit. It simply created a condition which attracted the plaintiffs to 
the scene, where they were injured by a third party…. 
Even if the pump fire were in some sense a “philosophic” or “but for” cause of Allbritton’s 
injuries, the forces generated by the fire had come to rest when she fell off the pipe rack. The fire had 
been extinguished, and Allbritton was walking away from the scene. Viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Allbritton, the pump fire did no more than create the condition that made 
Allbritton’s injuries possible. We conclude that the circumstances surrounding her injuries are too 
remotely connected with Union Pump’s conduct or pump to constitute a legal cause of her 
injuries. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals…. 
Cornyn, Justice, concurring: 
I concur in the Court’s judgment, but for different reasons than those given in its opinion. I 
would hold that although the defective pump was a cause-in-fact of Sue Allbritton’s injury, neither 
Union Pump’s negligence nor the defective pump was a legal cause of her injury. Because the Court’s 
opinion conflates foreseeability and other policy issues with its cause-in-fact analysis, I do not join 
its opinion…. 
This case does not present a question of cause-in-fact. The pump defect clearly was a “but for” 
cause of Allbritton’s injuries: assuming the truth of Allbritton’s allegations, as we must in this 
summary judgment case, if the pump had not been defective, there would have been no fire, and 
Allbritton would have gone home uninjured at the end of her shift…. 
But determining that the defect was the cause-in-fact of Allbritton’s injuries does not end the 
inquiry. We must decide whether the pump defect meets the second prong of [proximate cause]. In 
proximate cause, this other element is foreseeability, but it also incorporates policy driven decisions 
such as when subsequent events will be treated as intervening causes. In this case, the injury to 
Allbritton was not foreseeable. Allbritton’s injuries were the result of a needlessly dangerous 
shortcut taken after the crisis had subsided.1 Holding Union Pump liable for Allbritton’s failure to 
use proper care in exiting the area of the fire after the crisis has ended is akin to holding it liable for 
an auto accident she suffered on the way home, even though the accident probably would not have 
occurred had she left after her normal shift. Foreseeability allows us to cut off Union Pump’s liability 
at some point; I would do so at the point the crisis had abated or at the point that Allbritton and 
Subia departed from their usual, safe path…. 
Spector, Justice, dissenting: 
 …The record reflects that at the time Sue Allbritton’s injury occurred, the forces generated by 
the fire in question had not come to rest. Rather, the emergency situation was continuing. The whole 
area of the fire was covered in water and foam; in at least some places, the water was almost knee-
deep. Allbritton was still wearing hip boots and other gear, as required to fight the fire. Viewing all 
the evidence in the light most favorable to Allbritton, I agree with Justice Cornyn that the pump 
defect was… a “but-for” cause…and was therefore a cause in fact [of Allbritton’s injury]. 
This case is markedly different from the two main cases on which the majority relies: Lear Siegler, 
Inc. v. Perez and Bell v. Campbell. In each of those cases, a defendant’s negligence simply created a 
 
1 My conclusion might be different had Allbritton taken the shortcut under emergency conditions because it is 
foreseeable that workers might take extraordinary risks in trying to extinguish a dangerous fire. 
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condition that attracted an individual to the scene, where a negligent third party inflicted an injury. 
Here, in contrast, there was no negligent third party. To whatever extent Allbritton’s own negligence 
may have contributed to her injury, a jury should be allowed to allocate comparative responsibility…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. One Step at a Time: Pause before getting to proximate cause. Was the defective pump 
an actual cause of Allbritton’s injury? 
2. Commuting Conundrums: Do you think Union Pump should be liable for Allbritton’s 
injury? What if she’d crashed her car while driving home and could show that she 
wouldn’t have been injured had she not stayed late at work to deal with the defective 
pump? What if the crash instead happened on her way to fight the fire? 
3. Cutting Corners: Justice Cornyn’s concurrence wants to focus on Allbritton’s decision 
to take a shortcut. To which element does he think this fact is relevant? How does the 
dissent differ on this score? 
 
JOLLEY v. SUTTON LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL 
House of Lords (2000) 
Steyn, Lord:ã 
My Lords, On 8 April 1990, in the grounds of a 
block of council flats owned and occupied by the 
London Borough of Sutton, Justin Jolley, then a 
schoolboy aged 14, sustained serious spinal injuries 
in an accident. It arose when a small abandoned 
cabin cruiser [a boat], which had been left lying in 
the grounds of the block of flats, fell on Justin as he 
lay underneath it while attempting to repair and 
paint it. As a result he is now a paraplegic. He 
claimed damages in tort from the council…. After 
a seven day trial in 1998 Mr. Geoffrey Brice, Q.C., a Deputy High Court Judge, gave judgment for 
Justin but reduced the damages by 25 per cent. by virtue of a finding of contributory negligence. The 
judge awarded damages in the sum of £621,710…. The council appealed. The Court of Appeal 
unanimously reversed the judge’s conclusions on the merits and entered judgment for the council…. 
The council own and occupy the common parts of a block of council flats known as Hayling 
Court at North Cheam in Surrey. In 1987 a boat was brought on a trailer to the grounds of Hayling 
Court. It was placed on a grassed area where children played. The boat was abandoned. It was 
exposed to the elements and became derelict and rotten. It was neither covered nor fenced around. 
The trailer was by the side of the boat. In December 1988 the council placed a sticker on the boat 
which was in a form used for abandoned cars. It read “Danger do not touch this vehicle unless you 
are the owner” and stated that it would be removed within seven days unless claimed by its owner. 
Complaints about the boat were made to the council by residents of the block of flats. In the early 
Summer of 1989 when he was 13 Justin and a friend, Karl Warnham, saw the boat when they were 
walking past the flats. In February 1990 the two boys returned to the boat, planning to repair it and 
take it to Cornwall to sail it. Justin was by then 14 years old. They swivelled the boat round, and 
lifted the front end of the boat onto the trailer so as to be able to get under the boat to repair the hull. 
The trailer supports made holes in the wooden structure of the boat. Accordingly, the boys pulled 
the boat off the trailer. In order to repair the holes in the hull, Justin took a car jack and some wood 
from his home and the boys jacked the front of the abandoned boat up some 2 ½ feet. In that position 
the boys painted part of the boat, and attempted to repair holes with wood, nails and glue. On one 
occasion one of the boys put his foot through the structure. Justin and Karl had worked on the boat 
on about five occasions over some six weeks from February 1990 until the date of the accident. On 
 
ã UK Parliament, Passing of House of Lords Act 1999 (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0). 
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8 April 1990 Justin and Karl were underneath the jacked up boat working on it. After a while Justin 
noticed that Karl had crawled out from under the boat. Justin remained. The boat seemed to rock 
above him. He tried to get out from under the boat but before he could do so it came down onto 
him and caused him to suffer a broken back and consequent paraplegia. The immediate cause of the 
collapse was that the boat toppled off the jack and other material upon which it was propped. It was 
not established that the derelict or rotten condition of the boat was causative of the collapse. 
In a careful and detailed judgment the judge analysed the evidence and made detailed findings 
of fact. He then quoted the relevant statutory provisions. Section 2(2) of the Occupiers’ Liability Act 
1957 defines the “common duty of care” as: “a duty to take such care as in all the circumstances of 
the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the 
purposes for which he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be there.” Sub-section (3) provides: 
“The circumstances relevant for the present purpose include the degree of care, and of want of care, 
which would ordinarily be looked for in such a visitor, so that (for example) in proper cases…an 
occupier must be prepared for children to be less careful than adults.” 
The judge observed that it has long been established that children are or may be attracted to 
meddle with objects on premises or property which constitute a danger when meddled with. He 
stated in very general terms that the occupier is under a duty to protect a child from danger caused 
by meddling with such an object by taking reasonable steps in the circumstances including, where 
appropriate, removing the object altogether so as to avoid the prospect of injury….  
The judge then recorded his conclusions: 
Did the boat present a trap or allurement to the plaintiff and Karl and one which 
presented a danger of physical injury to them? If so, was this state of affairs 
reasonably foreseeable to the defendants such that they ought to have taken 
measure in good time to protect boys such as the plaintiff from such danger? One 
must keep well in mind that this case is concerned with boys aged 13 and 14. The 
boat was on a grassed area outside a block of council flats in an area where there 
were abandoned cars. I have no doubt that the presence of the boat was something 
which one ought to anticipate would be an attraction to children of differing ages. 
Younger children might simply play on it and in its rotting condition might suffer 
injury, perhaps of a quite minor nature. Mr. Palmer stressed that these two boys 
were not so much playing with the boat as working on it. I do not believe any such 
distinction assists the defendants. Play can take the form of mimicking adult 
behaviour. It was reasonably foreseeable that children including those of the age 
of the plaintiff would meddle with the boat at risk of some physical injury. So far 
as this type of accident was concerned, it is really only likely to occur if the child 
was a young teenage boy with strength and ability to raise the boat and prop it up. 
Abandoned cars were clearly treated by the defendants as a potential source of 
danger and this abandoned boat must also have fallen into that category. Although 
the warning DANGER contained on the stickers is not conclusive as to whether a 
particular object presented a danger it is at least a pointer in that direction. 
There was no reason in fact or in law preventing the defendants from 
removing and disposing of the boat well before the accident (as actually occurred 
after it). As owners and occupiers of the Hayling Court estate they were entitled 
to remove and dispose of abandoned motor cars and an abandoned boat. Further 
they had statutory powers as a local authority under section 6 of the Refuse 
Disposal (Amenity) Act 1978 to remove and dispose of this abandoned boat. I find 
that is what the defendants ought to have done, not merely because the boat was 
an eyesore but because it was a trap or allurement to children. 
The judge summed up his conclusion as follows: 
I find that the type of accident and injury which occurred in this case was 
reasonably foreseeable (albeit that it involved significant meddling with the boat 
by two young teenage boys and that the injuries proved to be very severe) and that 
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the actions of the plaintiff and/or Karl did not amount to a novus actus. 
Accordingly, I find the defendants in breach of their duty to the plaintiff as 
occupiers and (subject to the point on contributory negligence considered below) 
liable to the plaintiff for the injury, loss and damage which he has sustained. 
I have set out these findings of fact at length because the interpretation of the judge’s finding 
became controversial during the hearing of the appeal in the House. 
The leading judgment in the Court of Appeal was given by Lord Woolf M.R. He cited extensively 
[The Wagon Mound cases]: 
The judge attached importance to the presence of the boat as being both an 
allurement and a trap. While this can be of significance in some cases it is only 
part of the background to this case. There can be no dispute that, if this boat was 
left in this position, children would be attracted by it and would play with it. This 
was conceded. It was also a trap in the sense that it was not immediately apparent 
that it was in a rotten condition, that is in a condition where it could prove 
dangerous because a child could find that a plank or planks gave way. It was a 
combination of these two features that made it the duty of the council to have the 
boat removed. They failed to do this and in that respect they were negligent. 
However, these features, the attractiveness of the boat to children and its 
dangerous condition, were not established to be part of the causes of the accident. 
The immediate cause of the accident was that the two boys jacked and propped 
the boat up so that they could work underneath it and did so in a way that meant 
that the boat was unstable and could and did fall on the plaintiff. 
The question which has to be asked is: was this accident in the words of Lord 
Pearce “of a different type and kind from anything that a defender could have 
foreseen?” In answering this question it is necessary to have well in mind that the 
council should have appreciated that it is difficult to anticipate what children will 
do when playing with a boat of this sort. Boats, like cars, if they were left 
“abandoned” in an area where children have access, will certainly attract children 
to play with them. But what the plaintiff was engaged on was an activity very 
different from normal play. 
Even making full allowance for the unpredictability of children’s behaviour, 
I am driven to conclude that it was not reasonably foreseeable that an accident 
could occur as a result of the boys deciding to work under a propped up boat. Nor 
could any reasonably similar accident have been foreseen. Ironically the state of 
the boat was so poor that it made it less likely that it would be repairable or that 
boys would embark on doing the necessary repairs. The photographs of the boat 
and the evidence of Mr. Hall indicate that it was a fairly heavy structure. It would 
be by no means easy for the boat to be moved or raised. In deciding whether the 
accident was foreseeable it is important not only to consider the precise accident 
which occurred but the class of accident…. 
…[T]he Court of Appeal never squarely addressed the question whether the judge’s critical 
finding was open to him on the evidence. For my part the judge’s reasons for that finding are 
convincing in the context of teenage boys attracted by an obviously abandoned boat. And I do not 
regard what they did as so very different from normal play. The judge’s observation that play can 
take the form of mimicking adult behaviour is a perceptive one. It is true, of course, that one is not 
dealing with a challenge to an issue of primary fact. The issue whether an accident of the particular 
type was reasonably foreseeable is technically a secondary fact but perhaps it is more illuminating to 
call it an informed opinion by the judge in the light of all the circumstances of the case. In my view 
it was an opinion which is justified by the particular circumstances of the case. Counsel has not 
persuaded me that the judge’s view was wrong. And I would hold that the Court of Appeal was not 
entitled to disturb the judge’s findings of fact…. 
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Very little needs to be said about the law. The decision in this case has turned on the detailed 
findings of fact at first instance on the particular circumstances of this case. Two general 
observations are, however, appropriate. First, in this corner of the law the results of decided cases 
are inevitably very fact-sensitive. Both counsel nevertheless at times invited your Lordships to 
compare the facts of the present case with the facts of other decided cases. That is a sterile exercise. 
Precedent is a valuable stabilising influence in our legal system. But, comparing the facts of and 
outcomes of cases in this branch of the law is a misuse of the only proper use of precedent, viz to 
identify the relevant rule to apply to the facts as found. 
Secondly, Lord Woolf M.R. made an observation casting doubt on part of Lord Reid’s speech 
in Hughes v. Lord Advocate [1963] A.C. 837. The defendants left a manhole uncovered and protected 
only by a tent and paraffin lamp. A child climbed down the hole. When he came out he kicked over 
one of the lamps. It fell into the hole and caused an explosion. The child was burned. The Court of 
Session held that there was no liability. The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of 
Session. In the present case Lord Woolf cited the following parts of [that case]: 
So we have (first) a duty owned by the workmen, (secondly) the fact that if they 
had done as they ought to have done there would have been no accident, and 
(thirdly) the fact that the injuries suffered by the appellant, though perhaps 
different in degree, did not differ in kind from injuries which might have resulted 
from an accident of a foreseeable nature. The ground on which this case has been 
decided against the appellant is that the accident was of an unforeseeable type. Of 
course, the pursuer has to prove that the defender’s fault caused the accident and 
there could be a case where the intrusion of a new and unexpected factor could be 
regarded as the cause of the accident rather than the fault of the defender. But that 
is not this case. The cause of this accident was a known source of danger, the lamp, 
but it behaved in an unpredictable way. This accident was caused by a known 
source of danger, but caused in a way which could not have been foreseen and in 
my judgment, that affords no defence. 
Lord Woolf M.R. observed that he had difficulty in reconciling these remarks with the approach 
in The Wagon Mound (No. 1) [1961] A.C. 388. It is true that in The Wagon Mound (No. 1) Viscount 
Simonds at one stage observed: 
“If, as admittedly it is, B’s liability (culpability) depends on the reasonable 
foreseeability of the consequent damage, how is that to be determined except by 
the foreseeability of the damage which in fact happened - the damage in suit?” 
But this is to take one sentence in the judgment in The Wagon Mound (No. 1) out of context. 
Viscount Simonds was in no way suggesting that the precise manner of which the injury occurred 
nor its extent had to be foreseeable. And Lord Reid was saying no more. The speech of Lord Reid 
in Hughes v. Lord Advocate [1963] A.C. 837 is in harmony with the other judgments. It is not in 
conflict with The Wagon Mound (No. 1). The scope of the two modifiers—the precise manner in 
which the injury came about and its extent—is not definitively answered by either The Wagon 
Mound (No. 1) or Hughes v. Lord Advocate. It requires determination in the context of an intense 
focus on the circumstances of each case. 
My Lords, I would restore the wise decision of Mr. Geoffrey Brice, Q.C., the Deputy High Court 
judge. I would allow the appeal. I would further remit the case to the Court of Appeal to enable it to 
consider what course it should adopt on any application in regard to the determination of any issue 
relating to quantum of damages. 
Hoffmann, Lord: 
My Lords,…It is…agreed that the plaintiff must show that the injury which he suffered fell 
within the scope of the council’s duty and that in cases of physical injury, the scope of the duty is 
determined by whether or not the injury fell within a description which could be said to have been 
reasonably foreseeable. Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 of course established the general 
principle that reasonable foreseeability of physical injury to another generates a duty of care. The 
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further proposition that reasonable foreseeability also governs the question of whether the injury 
comes within the scope of that duty had to wait until The Wagon Mound (No. 1) for authoritative 
recognition. Until then, there was a view that the determination of liability involved a two-stage 
process. The existence of a duty depended upon whether injury of some kind was foreseeable. Once 
such a duty had been established, the defendant was liable for any injury which had been “directly 
caused” by an act in breach of that duty, whether such injury was reasonably foreseeable or not. But 
the present law is that unless the injury is of a description which was reasonably foreseeable, it is 
(according to taste) “outside the scope of the duty” or “too remote.” 
It is also agreed that what must have been foreseen is not the precise injury which occurred but 
injury of a given description. The foreseeability is not as to the particulars but the genus. And the 
description is formulated by reference to the nature of the risk which ought to have been foreseen. 
So, in Hughes v. Lord Advocate [1963] A.C. 837 the foreseeable risk was that a child would be injured 
by falling in the hole or being burned by a lamp or by a combination of both. The House of Lords 
decided that the injury which actually materialised fell within this description, notwithstanding that 
it involved an unanticipated explosion of the lamp and consequent injuries of unexpected severity…. 
The short point in the present appeal is therefore whether the judge was right in saying in general 
terms that the risk was that children would “meddle with the boat at the risk of some physical injury” 
of whether the Court of Appeal were right in saying that the only foreseeable risk was of “children 
who were drawn to the boat climbing upon it and being injured by the rotten planking giving way 
beneath them.” Was the wider risk, which would include within its description the accident which 
actually happened, reasonably foreseeable?…  
[Counsel for the borough] says that apart from its rotten planking, the boat was simply a heavy 
object like any other. It was no more likely to cause injury to the children than any other heavy object 
they might be able to get hold of. He draws the analogy of a man who negligently leaves a loaded 
gun where children play with it and one child injures another by dropping it on his toe. The injury 
does not fall within the scope of the risk created by the fact that it is a gun rather than some other 
heavy but innocuous object…. 
I think that in a case like this, analogies from other imaginary facts are seldom helpful. Likewise 
analogies from real facts in other cases: I entirely agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Steyn 
in deploring the citation of cases which do nothing to illuminate any principle but are said to 
constitute analogous facts. In the present case, the rotten condition of the boat had a significance 
beyond the particular danger it created. It proclaimed the boat and its trailer as abandoned, res nullius, 
there for the taking, to make of them whatever use the rich fantasy life of children might suggest…. 
[I]t has been repeatedly said in cases about children that their ingenuity in finding unexpected 
ways of doing mischief to themselves and others should never be underestimated. For these reasons, 
I think that the judge’s broad description of the risk as being that children would “meddle with the 
boat at the risk of some physical injury” was the correct one to adopt on the facts of this case. The 
actual injury fell within that description and I would therefore allow the appeal….  
QUESTIONS 
1. Philosophizing Foreseeability: What does the court mean when it says that 
“foreseeability is not as to the particulars but the genus”? 
2. Kids Will Be Kids: What was the risk that the council ought to have foreseen? Was it 
kids playing in the boat? Kids attempting to repair the boat so that they could take it to 
Cornwall and fight pirates? Something else? 
3. Jolley Good Show: Imagine that the boys successfully repair the boat. En route to the 
Cornish coast, they stop at a gas station to buy a pasty (not a typo… Google it) and see 
that the wooden hull is crumbling. As they try to stop the boat from slipping off the 
trailer, Justin severely hurts his hand. Did the council’s carelessness proximately cause 
his injuries? 
 
  TORT LAW 186 
DATE NIGHT(MARE) PROBLEM 
A few lads were on hole 17 at the legendary Ocean Course at Kiawah Island. Derrick thought it 
would be funny to hit his ball into the water, and naturally his friends egged him on and opened 
their Snapchats to record. He swung hard and struck his ball perfectly. Destiny, who owns a house 
on the water, was riding by on her hydrofoil surfboard, and Derrick’s ball struck their left eye. 
Destiny was supposed to go out on a date that night. But their eye was swollen shut, so they 
canceled their plans, threw on some shades and a hoodie, and went to the bar to drink away their 
sorrows. On their drive home, they were going below the speed limit in their lane when they hit a 
cyclist, Grady, who was dressed in all black and riding without bike lights or reflectors. After Destiny 
hit Grady, they swerved and hit a light pole and whacked their right eye on the steering wheel. 
Grady bruised his hip in the fall. After flicking off Destiny, he was hobbling toward the opposite 
lane to retrieve his bike when something hit his head. Bryce, an 8-year-old boy, had his feet dangling 
from the passenger window of a minivan driving in the other direction. The blow from Bryce’s feet 
knocked Grady unconscious. The minivan pulled over. Then, in Kiawah fashion, the weather 
changed suddenly. A lightning bolt struck a tree that promptly fell on Destiny’s car and the minivan. 
(a) For which injuries might Derrick be held liable? Which injuries did he proximately cause? 
(b) How about Grady?  
(c) And Destiny? 
(d) Is anyone else on the hook for negligence? 
 
TIKTOK CHALLENGE PROBLEM 
Devi was on her daily commute, riding the New York subway home to Brooklyn from her office 
in Manhattan. As she stepped off the train and onto the platform at her station, she saw a crowd of 
teenagers skateboarding toward her to complete a new viral TikTok challenge, achieved by jumping 
onto trains after the doors have started closing. The train doors closed, but another passenger on the 
platform saw one teen hurtling toward the train and yelled, “Open the doors, open the doors! Hold 
the train!” Though the driver’s view of the platform was partially blocked by a pillar, the train doors 
suddenly burst opened and then began to close again slowly. The teen sped up, plowed into Devi, 
and jumped over her body through the closing doors. The train pulled away. Devi, meanwhile, lay 
in agony on the platform. She suffered a serious ankle injury and won’t be able to continue her 
longtime hobby of marathon running, even after surgery to repair the damage. Footage of the whole 
event went viral online, yet the TikTok teen was never identified. Devi sues New York City Transport 
(NYCT), which operates the subway, for negligence. 
(a) Did NYCT owe Devi a duty? If so, did it breach that duty? 
(b) If so, was that breach an actual and proximate cause of Devi’s injuries? Imagine NYCT 
argues that “the reopening and closing of the doors, if it were in fact a negligent act, 
might be expected to cause injury to a passenger falling from the train or becoming 
entangled in the doors, but it simply could not be expected that because the doors were 
reopened the unidentified teen would run directly into the plaintiff.” Are you persuaded? 
(c) Does it matter whether this accident was reasonably foreseeable to the driver? If so, how? 
(d) Should we be concerned about the policy implications of imposing liability in a case like 
this? NYCT makes the following argument: “The concepts of duty and proximate cause 
rest upon considerations of sound public policy. If NYCT were to be exposed to liability 
merely because train doors are opened, or not opened, in every instance where persons 
are running to catch trains, operation of the transit system would be impossible, and 
defendant would be cast as an insurer of its passengers.” Do you share this worry? 
(e) Once you’ve read the next two cases and problem, return to Devi’s lawsuit. Was the 
TikTok teen’s intervening conduct the superseding cause of Devi’s injuries? Even 
assuming that the train driver was negligent, did his act merely furnish the conditions 
for an unrelated and unforeseeable act that caused Devi’s injuries? 
(f) If Devi also sues the passenger who yelled, might she have a better negligence claim? 
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PALSGRAF v. LONG ISLAND RAILROAD CO. 
Court of Appeals of the State of New York (1928) 
Cardozo, Chief Judge:ã 
Plaintiff was standing on a platform of 
defendant’s railroad after buying a ticket to 
go to Rockaway Beach. A train stopped at the 
station, bound for another place. Two men 
ran forward to catch it. One of the men 
reached the platform of the car without 
mishap, though the train was already 
moving. The other man, carrying a package, 
jumped aboard the car, but seemed unsteady 
as if about to fall. A guard on the car, who had 
held the door open, reached forward to 
help him in, and another guard on the platform pushed him from 
behind. In this act, the package was dislodged, and fell upon the rails. 
It was a package of small size, about fifteen inches long, and was 
covered by a newspaper. In fact it contained fireworks, but there was 
nothing in its appearance to give notice of its contents. The fireworks 
when they fell exploded. The shock of the explosion threw down some 
scales at the other end of the platform, many feet away. The scales 
struck the plaintiff, causing injuries for which she sues. 
The conduct of the defendant’s guard, if a wrong in its relation to 
the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, 
standing far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at all. Nothing 
in the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency 
of peril to persons thus removed. Negligence is not actionable unless it 
involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a 
right. Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do. Negligence 
is the absence of care, according to the circumstances. The plaintiff as 
she stood upon the platform of the station might claim to be protected 
against intentional invasion of her bodily security. Such invasion is not 
charged. She might claim to be protected against unintentional 
invasion by conduct involving in the thought of reasonable men an 
unreasonable hazard that such invasion would ensue. These, from the 
point of view of the law, were the bounds of her immunity, with 
perhaps some rare exceptions, survivals for the most part of ancient 
forms of liability, where conduct is held to be at the peril of the actor. If 
no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent 
and harmless, at least to outward seeming, with reference to her, did 
not take to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong, 
though apparently not one involving the risk of bodily insecurity, with 
reference to some one else. In every instance, before negligence can be 
predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a 
duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which would 
have averted or avoided the injury. The ideas of negligence and duty 
are strictly correlative. The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong 
personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty 
to another. 
A different conclusion will involve us, and swiftly too, in a maze of 
contradictions. A guard stumbles over a package which has been left 
 
ã Bomb Blast Injures 13 in Station Crowd, N.Y. Times (Aug. 25, 1924). 
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upon a platform. It seems to be a bundle of newspapers. It turns out to be a can of dynamite. To the 
eye of ordinary vigilance, the bundle is abandoned waste, which may be kicked or trod on with 
impunity. Is a passenger at the other end of the platform protected by the law against the 
unsuspected hazard concealed beneath the waste? If not, is the result to be any different, so far as 
the distant passenger is concerned, when the guard stumbles over a valise which a truckman or a 
porter has left upon the walk? The passenger far away, if the victim of a wrong at all, has a cause of 
action, not derivative, but original and primary. His claim to be protected against invasion of his 
bodily security is neither greater nor less because the act resulting in the invasion is a wrong to 
another far removed. In this case, the rights that are said to have been violated, the interests said to 
have been invaded, are not even of the same order. The man was not injured in his person nor even 
put in danger. The purpose of the act, as well as its effect, was to make his person safe. If there was a 
wrong to him at all, which may very well be doubted, it was a wrong to a property interest only, the 
safety of his package. Out of this wrong to property, which threatened injury to nothing else, there 
has passed, we are told, to the plaintiff by derivation or succession a right of action for the invasion 
of an interest of another order, the right to bodily security. The diversity of interests emphasizes the 
futility of the effort to build the plaintiff’s right upon the basis of a wrong to some one else. The gain 
is one of emphasis, for a like result would follow if the interests were the same. Even then, the orbit 
of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty. One who 
jostles one’s neighbor in a crowd does not invade the rights of others standing at the outer fringe 
when the unintended contact casts a bomb upon the ground. The wrongdoer as to them is the man 
who carries the bomb, not the one who explodes it without suspicion of the danger. Life will have to 
be made over, and human nature transformed, before prevision so extravagant can be accepted as 
the norm of conduct, the customary standard to which behavior must conform. 
The argument for the plaintiff is built upon the shifting meanings of such words as “wrong” and 
“wrongful,” and shares their instability. What the plaintiff must show is “a wrong” to herself, i.e., a 
violation of her own right, and not merely a wrong to some one else, nor conduct “wrongful” because 
unsocial, but not “a wrong” to any one. We are told that one who drives at reckless speed through a 
crowded city street is guilty of a negligent act and, therefore, of a wrongful one irrespective of the 
consequences. Negligent the act is, and wrongful in the sense that it is unsocial, but wrongful and 
unsocial in relation to other travelers, only because the eye of vigilance perceives the risk of damage. 
If the same act were to be committed on a speedway or a race course, it would lose its wrongful 
quality. The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; 
it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension. This does not mean, of course, 
that one who launches a destructive force is always relieved of liability if the force, though known to 
be destructive, pursues an unexpected path. It was not necessary that the defendant should have had 
notice of the particular method in which an accident would occur, if the possibility of an accident 
was clear to the ordinarily prudent eye. Some acts, such as shooting, are so imminently dangerous 
to any one who may come within reach of the missile, however unexpectedly, as to impose a duty of 
prevision not far from that of an insurer. Even today, and much oftener in earlier stages of the law, 
one acts sometimes at one’s peril. Under this head, it may be, fall certain cases of what is known as 
transferred intent, an act willfully dangerous to A resulting by misadventure in injury to B. These 
cases aside, wrong is defined in terms of the natural or probable, at least when unintentional. The 
range of reasonable apprehension is at times a question for the court, and at times, if varying 
inferences are possible, a question for the jury. Here, by concession, there was nothing in the 
situation to suggest to the most cautious mind that the parcel wrapped in newspaper would spread 
wreckage through the station. If the guard had thrown it down knowingly and willfully, he would 
not have threatened the plaintiff’s safety, so far as appearances could warn him. His conduct would 
not have involved, even then, an unreasonable probability of invasion of her bodily security. Liability 
can be no greater where the act is inadvertent. 
Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation. Negligence in the abstract, apart from things 
related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all. Negligence is not a tort unless it 
results in the commission of a wrong, and the commission of a wrong imports the violation of a 
right, in this case, we are told, the right to be protected against interference with one’s bodily 
security. But bodily security is protected, not against all forms of interference or aggression, but only 
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against some. One who seeks redress at law does not make out a cause of action by showing without 
more that there has been damage to his person. If the harm was not willful, he must show that the 
act as to him had possibilities of danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected 
against the doing of it though the harm was unintended. Affront to personality is still the keynote of 
the wrong. Confirmation of this view will be found in the history and development of the action on 
the case. Negligence as a basis of civil liability was unknown to mediaeval law. For damage to the 
person, the sole remedy was trespass, and trespass did not lie in the absence of aggression, and that 
direct and personal. Liability for other damage, as where a servant without orders from the master 
does or omits something to the damage of another, is a plant of later growth. When it emerged out 
of the legal soil, it was thought of as a variant of trespass, an offshoot of the parent stock. This appears 
in the form of action, which was known as trespass on the case. The victim does not sue derivatively, 
or by right of subrogation, to vindicate an interest invaded in the person of another. Thus to view 
his cause of action is to ignore the fundamental difference between tort and crime. He sues for breach 
of a duty owing to himself. 
The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us. The question of 
liability is always anterior to the question of the measure of the consequences that go with liability. 
If there is no tort to be redressed, there is no occasion to consider what damage might be recovered 
if there were a finding of a tort. We may assume, without deciding, that negligence, not at large or 
in the abstract, but in relation to the plaintiff, would entail liability for any and all consequences, 
however novel or extraordinary. There is room for argument that a distinction is to be drawn 
according to the diversity of interests invaded by the act, as where conduct negligent in that it 
threatens an insignificant invasion of an interest in property results in an unforseeable invasion of 
an interest of another order, as, e.g., one of bodily security. Perhaps other distinctions may be 
necessary. We do not go into the question now. The consequences to be followed must first be rooted 
in a wrong. 
The judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term should be reversed, and the 
complaint dismissed, with costs in all courts. ã 
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Andrews, Judge, dissenting: 
Assisting a passenger to board a train, the defendant’s servant negligently knocked a package 
from his arms. It fell between the platform and the cars. Of its contents the servant knew and could 
know nothing. A violent explosion followed. The concussion broke some scales standing a 
considerable distance away. In falling they injured the plaintiff, an intending passenger. 
Upon these facts may she recover the damages she has suffered in an action brought against the 
master? The result we shall reach depends upon our theory as to the nature of negligence. Is it a 
relative concept—the breach of some duty owing to a particular person or to particular persons? Or 
where there is an act which unreasonably threatens the safety of others, is the doer liable for all its 
proximate consequences, even where they result in injury to one who would generally be thought to 
be outside the radius of danger? This is not a mere dispute as to words. We might not believe that 
to the average mind the dropping of the bundle would seem to involve the probability of harm to 
the plaintiff standing many feet away whatever might be the case as to the owner or to one so near 
as to be likely to be struck by its fall. If, however, we adopt the second hypothesis we have to inquire 
only as to the relation between cause and effect. We deal in terms of proximate cause, not of 
negligence. 
Negligence may be defined roughly as an act or omission which unreasonably does or may affect 
the rights of others, or which unreasonably fails to protect oneself from the dangers resulting from 
such acts. Here I confine myself to the first branch of the definition. Nor do I comment on the word 
“unreasonable.” For present purposes it sufficiently describes that average of conduct that society 
requires of its members…. 
But we are told [by one scholar] that there is no negligence unless there is in the particular case 
a legal duty to take care, and this duty must be one which is owed to the plaintiff himself and not 
merely to others. This, I think too narrow a conception. Where there is the unreasonable act, and 
some right that may be affected there is negligence whether damage does or does not result. That is 
immaterial. Should we drive down Broadway at a reckless speed, we are negligent whether we strike 
an approaching car or miss it by an inch. The act itself is wrongful. It is a wrong not only to those 
who happen to be within the radius of danger but to all who might have been there—a wrong to the 
public at large. Such is the language of the street. Such the language of the courts when speaking of 
contributory negligence. Such again and again their language in speaking of the duty of some 
defendant and discussing proximate cause in cases where such a discussion is wholly irrelevant on 
any other theory. As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes many years ago, “the measure of the defendant’s 
duty in determining whether a wrong has been committed is one thing, the measure of liability when 
a wrong has been committed is another.” Spade v. Lynn Boston R.R. Co., 52 N.E. 747 (Mass. 1899). 
Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to 
protect A, B or C alone. 
It may well be that there is no such thing as negligence in the abstract. “Proof of negligence in 
the air, so to speak, will not do.” In an empty world negligence would not exist. It does involve a 
relationship between man and his fellows. But not merely a relationship between man and those 
whom he might reasonably expect his act would injure. Rather, a relationship between him and 
those whom he does in fact injure. If his act has a tendency to harm some one, it harms him a mile 
away as surely as it does those on the scene. We now permit children to recover for the negligent 
killing of the father. It was never prevented on the theory that no duty was owing to them. A husband 
may be compensated for the loss of his wife’s services. To say that the wrongdoer was negligent as 
to the husband as well as to the wife is merely an attempt to fit facts to theory. An insurance company 
paying a fire loss recovers its payment of the negligent incendiary. We speak of subrogation—of 
suing in the right of the insured. Behind the cloud of words is the fact they hide, that the act, wrongful 
as to the insured, has also injured the company. Even if it be true that the fault of father, wife or 
insured will prevent recovery, it is because we consider the original negligence not the proximate 
cause of the injury. 
In the well-known Polemis Case, 3 K.B. 560 (1921), Scrutton, L.J., said that the dropping of a 
plank was negligent for it might injure “workman or cargo or ship.” Because of either possibility the 
owner of the vessel was to be made good for his loss. The act being wrongful the doer was liable for 
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its proximate results. Criticized and explained as this statement may have been, I think it states the 
law as it should be and as it is. 
The proposition is this. Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those 
acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. Not only is he wronged 
to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he 
be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone. There needs be duty due the one 
complaining but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as to him harm might be 
expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those 
in fact injured may complain. We have never, I think, held otherwise. Indeed in the Di Caprio case 
we said that a breach of a general ordinance defining the degree of care to be exercised in one’s 
calling is evidence of negligence as to every one. We did not limit this statement to those who might 
be expected to be exposed to danger. Unreasonable risk being taken, its consequences are not 
confined to those who might probably be hurt. 
If this be so, we do not have a plaintiff suing by “derivation or succession.” Her action is original 
and primary. Her claim is for a breach of duty to herself—not that she is subrogated to any right of 
action of the owner of the parcel or of a passenger standing at the scene of the explosion. 
The right to recover damages rests on additional considerations. The plaintiff’s rights must be 
injured, and this injury must be caused by the negligence. We build a dam, but are negligent as to 
its foundations. Breaking, it injures property down stream. We are not liable if all this happened 
because of some reason other than the insecure foundation. But when injuries do result from our 
unlawful act we are liable for the consequences. It does not matter that they are unusual, unexpected, 
unforeseen and unforeseeable. But there is one limitation. The damages must be so connected with 
the negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former. 
These two words have never been given an inclusive definition. What is a cause in a legal sense, 
still more what is a proximate cause, depend in each case upon many considerations, as does the 
existence of negligence itself. Any philosophical doctrine of causation does not help us. A boy throws 
a stone into a pond. The ripples spread. The water level rises. The history of that pond is altered to 
all eternity. It will be altered by other causes also. Yet it will be forever the resultant of all causes 
combined. Each one will have an influence. How great only omniscience can say. You may speak of 
a chain, or if you please, a net. An analogy is of little aid. Each cause brings about future events. 
Without each the future would not be the same. Each is proximate in the sense it is essential. But 
that is not what we mean by the word. Nor on the other hand do we mean sole cause. There is no 
such thing. 
Should analogy be thought helpful, however, I prefer that of a stream. The spring, starting on its 
journey, is joined by tributary after tributary. The river, reaching the ocean, comes from a hundred 
sources. No man may say whence any drop of water is derived. Yet for a time distinction may be 
possible. Into the clear creek, brown swamp water flows from the left. Later, from the right comes 
water stained by its clay bed. The three may remain for a space, sharply divided. But at last, inevitably 
no trace of separation remains. They are so commingled that all distinction is lost. 
As we have said, we cannot trace the effect of an act to the end, if end there is. Again, however, 
we may trace it part of the way. A murder at Sarajevo may be the necessary antecedent to an 
assassination in London twenty years hence. An overturned lantern may burn all Chicago. We may 
follow the fire from the shed to the last building. We rightly say the fire started by the lantern caused 
its destruction. 
A cause, but not the proximate cause. What we do mean by the word “proximate” is, that because 
of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a 
series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics. Take our rule as to 
fires. Sparks from my burning haystack set on fire my house and my neighbor’s. I may recover from 
a negligent railroad. He may not. Yet the wrongful act as directly harmed the one as the other. We 
may regret that the line was drawn just where it was, but drawn somewhere it had to be. We said the 
act of the railroad was not the proximate cause of our neighbor’s fire. Cause it surely was. The words 
we used were simply indicative of our notions of public policy. Other courts think differently. But 
somewhere they reach the point where they cannot say the stream comes from any one source. 
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Take the illustration given in an unpublished manuscript by a distinguished and helpful writer 
on the law of torts. A chauffeur negligently collides with another car which is filled with dynamite, 
although he could not know it. An explosion follows. A, walking on the sidewalk nearby, is killed. 
B, sitting in a window of a building opposite, is cut by flying glass. C, likewise sitting in a window a 
block away, is similarly injured. And a further illustration. A nursemaid, ten blocks away, startled 
by the noise, involuntarily drops a baby from her arms to the walk. We are told that C may not 
recover while A may. As to B it is a question for court or jury. We will all agree that the baby might 
not. Because, we are again told, the chauffeur had no reason to believe his conduct involved any risk 
of injuring either C or the baby. As to them he was not negligent. 
But the chauffeur, being negligent in risking the collision, his belief that the scope of the harm 
he might do would be limited is immaterial. His act unreasonably jeopardized the safety of any one 
who might be affected by it. C’s injury and that of the baby were directly traceable to the collision. 
Without that, the injury would not have happened. C had the right to sit in his office, secure from 
such dangers. The baby was entitled to use the sidewalk with reasonable safety. 
The true theory is, it seems to me, that the injury to C, if in truth he is to be denied recovery, and 
the injury to the baby is that their several injuries were not the proximate result of the negligence. 
And here not what the chauffeur had reason to believe would be the result of his conduct, but what 
the prudent would foresee, may have a bearing. May have some bearing, for the problem of 
proximate cause is not to be solved by any one consideration. 
It is all a question of expediency. There are no fixed rules to govern our judgment. There are 
simply matters of which we may take account. We have in a somewhat different connection spoken 
of “the stream of events.” We have asked whether that stream was deflected—whether it was forced 
into new and unexpected channels. This is rather rhetoric than law. There is in truth little to guide 
us other than common sense. 
There are some hints that may help us. The proximate cause, involved as it may be with many 
other causes, must be, at the least, something without which the event would not happen. The court 
must ask itself whether there was a natural and continuous sequence between cause and effect. Was 
the one a substantial factor in producing the other? Was there a direct connection between them, 
without too many intervening causes? Is the effect of cause on result not too attenuated? Is the cause 
likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to produce the result? Or by the exercise of prudent 
foresight could the result be foreseen? Is the result too remote from the cause, and here we consider 
remoteness in time and space. Clearly we must so consider, for the greater the distance either in time 
or space, the more surely do other causes intervene to affect the result. When a lantern is overturned 
the firing of a shed is a fairly direct consequence. Many things contribute to the spread of the 
conflagration—the force of the wind, the direction and width of streets, the character of intervening 
structures, other factors. We draw an uncertain and wavering line, but draw it we must as best we 
can. Once again, it is all a question of fair judgment, always keeping in mind the fact that we 
endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general 
understanding of mankind. 
Here another question must be answered. In the case supposed it is said, and said correctly, that 
the chauffeur is liable for the direct effect of the explosion although he had no reason to suppose it 
would follow a collision. The fact that the injury occurred in a different manner than that which 
might have been expected does not prevent the chauffeur’s negligence from being in law the cause 
of the injury. But the natural results of a negligent act—the results which a prudent man would or 
should foresee—do have a bearing upon the decision as to proximate cause. We have said so 
repeatedly. What should be foreseen? No human foresight would suggest that a collision itself might 
injure one a block away. On the contrary, given an explosion, such a possibility might be reasonably 
expected. I think the direct connection, the foresight of which the courts speak, assumes prevision 
of the explosion, for the immediate results of which, at least, the chauffeur is responsible. 
It may be said this is unjust. Why? In fairness he should make good every injury flowing from 
his negligence. Not because of tenderness toward him we say he need not answer for all that follows 
his wrong. We look back to the catastrophe, the fire kindled by the spark, or the explosion. We trace 
the consequences—not indefinitely, but to a certain point. And to aid us in fixing that point we ask 
what might ordinarily be expected to follow the fire or the explosion. 
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This last suggestion is the factor which must determine the case before us. The act upon which 
defendant’s liability rests is knocking an apparently harmless package onto the platform. The act 
was negligent. For its proximate consequences the defendant is liable. If its contents were broken, to 
the owner; if it fell upon and crushed a passenger’s foot, then to him. If it exploded and injured one 
in the immediate vicinity, to him also as to A in the illustration. Mrs. Palsgraf was standing some 
distance away. How far cannot be told from the record—apparently twenty-five or thirty feet. 
Perhaps less. Except for the explosion, she would not have been injured. We are told by the appellant 
in his brief “it cannot be denied that the explosion was the direct cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” So 
it was a substantial factor in producing the result—there was here a natural and continuous 
sequence—direct connection. The only intervening cause was that instead of blowing her to the 
ground the concussion smashed the weighing machine which in turn fell upon her. There was no 
remoteness in time, little in space. And surely, given such an explosion as here it needed no great 
foresight to predict that the natural result would be to injure one on the platform at no greater 
distance from its scene than was the plaintiff. Just how no one might be able to predict. Whether by 
flying fragments, by broken glass, by wreckage of machines or structures no one could say. But injury 
in some form was most probable. 
Under these circumstances I cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s injuries were not 
the proximate result of the negligence. That is all we have before us. The court refused to so charge. 
No request was made to submit the matter to the jury as a question of fact, even would that have 
been proper upon the record before us. The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Aligning the Elements: Which element of negligence does Judge Cardozo (left) believe 
is central to this case? Is he concerned about proximate cause? Or does he conclude that 
something else is amiss with Mrs. Palsgraf’s claim? Does Judge Andrews (right) agree? 
2. Minimum Outcome Changer: If you could pick just two facts that were crucial to Judge 
Cardozo’s decision, what would they be? Put differently, which two facts could you 
change just a little to cure the deficiency he perceives with Mrs. Palsgraf’s claim? 
3. Proximity and Pragmatism: What does Judge Andrews mean when he talks about 
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FAST EDDIE’S v. HALL 
Court of Appeals of Indiana (1997) 
Baker, Judge: ã 
Appellant-defendant Fast Eddie’s…appeals the 
trial court’s denial of its motions for summary 
judgment on a complaint filed by the plaintiff-
appellee Judy Hall, as executor of the estate of Teresa 
Hall (Estate). Teresa Hall died after one of Fast 
Eddie’s patrons shot and killed her. On appeal, Fast 
Eddie’s argues that it did not owe Hall a common law 
duty to protect her from another patron’s unexpected 
criminal acts of sexual assault and murder. 
Additionally, Fast Eddie’s argues that its actions were not the proximate cause of Hall’s death…. 
[O]n the evening of June 4, 1993, Teresa Hall, Michael Lamb and John Schooley were patrons at 
Fast Eddie’s. Schooley and Lamb arrived together around 7:00 p.m. and began to consume alcoholic 
beverages. Sometime later in the evening, Hall arrived at the tavern and began to drink and socialize 
with Schooley. At one point in the evening, after Schooley stepped outside the bar for moment, 
Lamb began to make advances toward Hall. At about the same time, the on-duty manager, Rita 
Stephens, noticed that Hall had become heavily intoxicated and was having difficulty sitting up on 
her bar stool. As a result, Stephens asked Lamb to take Hall out of the tavern. Lamb did as Stephens 
requested and escorted Hall to Schooley’s car and returned to the bar. Schooley then drove Hall to 
his trailer in Terre Haute. After they arrived, Hall passed out in the passenger’s seat of Schooley’s 
car. Schooley then went inside his trailer and passed out on the couch. 
Shortly thereafter, Lamb purchased a six-pack of beer from the tavern and drove to his home. 
After discovering that his wife was not there, he drove to Schooley’s trailer. As he approached the 
trailer, he noticed Hall passed out in the passenger’s seat of Schooley’s car. Lamb removed Hall’s 
body and placed her in his car. He then drove to the Riley Conservation Club where he shot Hall in 
the abdomen and head, killing her. When Hall’s body was found, her blood alcohol was .23%, her 
skirt was twisted over her hips and her breasts were partially exposed. Lamb later confessed to killing 
Hall and pled guilty to her murder. 
On September 30, 1994, Judy Hall, as administrator of the Estate of Teresa Hall, filed a complaint 
against Fast Eddie’s alleging that it was negligent per se for violating Indiana’s Dram Shop Act, by 
serving Lamb and Hall alcoholic beverages when they were visibly intoxicated. The Estate further 
argued that Fast Eddie’s breached its common law duty of care to provide for Hall’s safety by failing 
to protect her from Lamb’s criminal acts of sexual assault and murder. 
In response, Fast Eddie’s filed a motion for summary judgment in which it argued that it did not 
violate the Dram Shop Act because it did not serve Lamb or Hall any alcohol on the night of Hall’s 
murder. It further argued that even if Lamb was served, he was not visibly intoxicated. Additionally, 
Fast Eddie’s argued that it did not owe Hall a common law duty to protect her from Lamb’s 
unforeseeable criminal acts of sexual assault and murder because they were not reasonably 
foreseeable. The trial court, however, denied the motion. 
Thereafter, on May 30, 1996, Fast Eddie’s filed a second motion for summary judgment in which 
it argued that its alleged act of serving Lamb and Hall in violation of the Dram Shop Act was not the 
proximate cause of Hall’s death. Specifically, it argued that sexual assault and murder were not the 
natural and probable consequences of Lamb’s alleged intoxication. The trial court, again, denied 
Fast Eddie’s motion. Thereafter, the trial court certified both of Fast Eddie’s motions for summary 
judgment for interlocutory appeal…and this court accepted jurisdiction on February 7, 1997. 
Fast Eddie’s contends that the trial court erroneously denied its motions for summary judgment. 
Specifically, it argues that it did not have a common law duty to protect Hall from Lamb’s 
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The following case discusses sexual assault. 
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unforeseeable criminal acts of sexual assault and murder. Alternatively, it argues that it did not 
gratuitously assume a common law duty to protect Hall from Lamb by asking Lamb to remove Hall 
from the tavern. Finally, Fast Eddie’s argues that its alleged violation of Indiana’s Dram Shop Act 
was not the proximate cause of Hall’s death…. 
I. Fast Eddie’s Common Law Duty 
First we address Fast Eddie’s contention that it did not owe Hall a common law duty to protect 
her from Lamb’s criminal acts of sexual assault and murder. In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a 
claim for negligence, she must show that: (1) the defendant owed her a duty to exercise reasonable 
care; (2) the defendant breached that duty by failing to conform its conduct to the requisite standard 
of care; and (3) the plaintiff sustained injuries which were the proximate cause of the defendant’s 
breach. However, absent a duty, there can be no negligence. 
This court has previously held that a proprietor of a tavern owes its patrons a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to protect them from the foreseeable acts of other patrons. However, a proprietor of 
a tavern is not required to protect its patrons from unexpected criminal acts unless particular facts 
make it reasonably foreseeable that the criminal act will occur. These include the prior actions of the 
assailant either on the day the act occurred or on a previous occasion. However, a criminal act is not 
foreseeable merely because a patron was served beyond the point of intoxication…. 
[T]he Estate offered evidence that Fast Eddies was a “run down[,] kind of dirty” tavern with a 
reputation for fighting, theft and accidents. It also submitted evidence that Lamb and Hall consumed 
large amounts of alcohol on the night of Hall’s murder and that Hall became physically helpless due 
to her intoxicated state. Additionally, the Estate submitted evidence that Lamb made advances 
toward Hall shortly before Schooley took her home and that Rona Slater, a waitress at Fast Eddie’s, 
had personal knowledge that Lamb’s “sexual drive increased” when he became intoxicated. Finally, 
the Estate offered evidence that one or more of the bartenders on duty that evening had knowledge 
that Lamb carried a gun. 
Even accepting all of the Estate’s evidence as true, none of it demonstrates that Lamb’s sexual 
assault and murder of Hall were foreseeable. First, it does not follow that because Lamb’s sexual 
drive increased when he was intoxicated and that he showed an interest in Hall, he would 
intentionally harm Hall absent some evidence which would show his propensity for sexual assault 
or murder. It also does not follow that because Fast Eddie’s had a reputation for violence, that every 
patron, including Lamb, is violent. Further, even if fighting had occurred at the tavern in the past, 
the Estate offered no evidence that Lamb had been involved in any of the prior altercations. Finally, 
Hall’s death was not foreseeable merely because Lamb carried a gun. Therefore, the evidence most 
favorable to Hall supports Fast Eddie’s contention that it had no knowledge of Lamb’s propensity to 
commit sexual assault or murder. As a result, Fast Eddie’s had no duty to protect Hall from Lamb’s 
intentional criminal acts. See L.W. v. Western Golf Ass’n, 675 N.E.2d 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1997) (foundation could not have reasonably foreseen that male scholarship recipient would rape 
female recipient in foundation’s coed house where recipients were required to live, because it had 
no knowledge that male recipient had propensity for violence or sexual assault). 
II. Assumption of a Duty 
…A duty of care may be created by gratuitous or voluntary assumption…. [T]he Estate contends 
that the manager’s act of telling Lamb to take Hall out of the tavern, evidences Fast Eddie’s intent to 
assume a duty to provide for Hall’s safety…. Here, Fast Eddie’s only action was to order Lamb to 
take Hall out of the tavern. However, this act is not an affirmative step to provide for Hall’s safety. 
Without some affirmative action on the part of a tavern owner or its employees to provide for its 
patron’s safety, we refuse to impute a duty. Were we to do otherwise, we would, in essence, require 
tavern owners to be the guarantors of each departing patron’s safety, which we refuse to do…. 
III. Proximate Cause of Hall’s Assault and Murder 
Finally, Fast Eddie’s argues that the trial court erroneously denied its motion for summary 
judgment because its alleged violation of the Dram Shop Act was not the proximate cause of Hall’s 
sexual assault and death. According to the Dram Shop Act, a provider of alcoholic beverages is not 
liable in a civil action unless: 
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(1) the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage had actual knowledge that the 
person to whom the alcoholic beverage was furnished was visibly intoxicated at 
the time the alcoholic beverage was furnished; and, 
(2) the intoxication of the person to whom the alcoholic beverage was furnished 
was a proximate cause of the death, injury, or damage alleged in the complaint. 
Thus, even though a proprietor may have a statutory duty to refrain from providing alcoholic 
beverages to intoxicated persons, it will not be liable unless the alleged violation is the proximate 
cause of a patron’s death or injury. 
Proximate cause is the limitation which courts have placed on the actor’s responsibility for the 
consequences of his act or failure to act. A party’s act is the proximate cause of an injury if it is the 
natural and probable consequence of the act and should have been reasonably foreseen and 
anticipated in light of the circumstances. However, a willful, malicious criminal act of a third party 
is an intervening act which breaks the causal chain between the alleged negligence and the resulting 
harm. Although proximate cause is generally a question of fact, it becomes a question of law where 
only a single conclusion can be drawn from the facts. 
Here, even assuming Fast Eddie’s breached its statutory duty under the Dram Shop Act, its 
breach was not the proximate cause of Hall’s sexual assault and death. First, the chain of causation 
in the instant case is extremely tenuous. Although Lamb initially escorted Hall out of the tavern, he 
returned to the bar after Schooley drove Hall to his trailer. It was later in the evening, however, when 
Lamb left the tavern, returned home to discover his wife’s absence, decided to proceed to Schooley’s 
home, found Hall passed out in Schooley’s car and killed her. The tavern could not have reasonably 
foreseen this series of events which culminated in Hall’s unfortunate death. Additionally, even if the 
chain of causation were stronger, Lamb’s intentional criminal acts were the intervening cause of 
Hall’s death which broke the causal chain between Fast Eddie’s negligence and Hall’s sexual assault 
and death. Therefore, Fast Eddie’s alleged violation of the statute was not the proximate cause of 
Hall’s sexual assault and death. 
Finally, we reject the Estate’s contention that Lamb’s intoxication was the proximate cause of 
Hall’s death. In support of its contention, the Estate submitted Lamb’s deposition testimony that his 
intoxication caused him to shoot Hall. The Estate concludes that this evidence creates a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding the proximate cause of Hall’s death. We disagree. 
Unlike automobile accidents which occur as the result of alcoholic beverage consumption, 
assault and murder are intentional acts of volition which are the result of an assailant’s deliberate 
design. Here, Hall died because Lamb deliberately decided to kill her. This criminal intent would 
have been present whether or not Lamb was intoxicated. Thus, despite Lamb’s contention, we find 
as a matter of law that Hall’s death was the result of Lamb’s deliberate design and volitional act and 
not his intoxication…. The trial court’s denial of summary judgment is reversed. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Mussivand Revisited: In the earlier case of Mussivand v. David, could Dr. David have 
argued that Dr. West’s intentional act (having sex with Dr. Mussivand) was an 
intervening cause that “broke the causal chain” between David’s negligence and 
Mussivand’s infection? Are these cases analogous or would you distinguish them?  
2. Baker Revisited: Notice the distinct points that Hall’s estate unsuccessfully makes in 
arguing that Fast Eddie’s owed an affirmative duty to protect. Why do they fail? How is 
what happened to Hall in Fast Eddie’s different from what happened to Baker in Taco Bell?  
3. On or Off the Hook: The Restatement (Third) of Torts rejects the doctrine of intervening 
cause (sometimes called “superseding cause”), relying instead on rules of apportionment. 
Under these rules, when a third party’s intervening act makes them substantially more 
culpable than the defendant, the defendant will be liable for a smaller share of the 
plaintiff’s damages. What distinguishes this regime from the rule applied in Fast Eddie’s? 
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TARGET PRACTICE PROBLEM 
Cameron and Xavier, both eighteen-year-old high-school seniors, are staying at Cameron’s 
family cabin for the weekend. On Saturday night, the pair decided to dip into Cameron’s parents’ 
alcohol stash in the basement. After enjoying a few beers, they decide it would be fun to shoot their 
empty cans off of the dock. Both Cameron and Xavier had been hunting with their families since 
they were kids, and they often shot at cans for target practice while they were at the cabin. They 
assembled their cans, got their rifles from the safe, and took turns shooting cans at the end of the 
dock. They were having a great time until Cameron shot at her last can, and the bullet ricocheted off 
of the boat beside the dock and then hit Xavier’s foot. In the chaos that followed, Cameron’s rifle 
slid off the dock and into the lake. Luckily, Xavier survived with minimal long-term injuries, but his 
family wants to sue Cameron for negligence to cover his hospital fees. 
Two years later, a group of kids was swimming in the lake when nine-year-old Uri found the 
long-abandoned rifle. Excited to show his dad what he’d found, Uri ran out of the water carrying 
the rifle. He tripped and fell, and the gun went off. The bullet caught Uri’s dad in the leg, and he 
suffered serious injuries that mean he’ll forever walk with a limp. Uri’s family discovers the gun 
belonged to Cameron and wants to hold her liable for negligently leaving a loaded gun in the lake. 
(a) Is Cameron liable for negligence in both cases? If not, what makes Xavier’s case different 
from Uri’s dad’s case? Did Cameron play an equal role in causing both injuries?  
(b) Should Cameron’s parents be worried about facing any liability? 
 
E. Negligence Per Se 
DALAL v. CITY OF NEW YORK 
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division (1999) 
Per Curiam: ã 
The instant action arises out of an automobile 
accident that occurred at the intersection of Booth 
Street and 66th Avenue in Queens. The action against 
the defendant City of New York was discontinued 
prior to trial. At trial, the plaintiff testified that he 
stopped at the stop sign controlling traffic on 66th 
Avenue, and looked both ways for a distance of about 
one block, without seeing anything, before he 
proceeded into the intersection. When he was about 
halfway through the intersection, his vehicle was 
struck on the driver’s side by a vehicle operated by Alicia Ramdhani-Mack (hereinafter the defendant). 
The plaintiff further testified that he never saw the defendant’s car until impact. The defendant testified 
that she was about 10 to 15 feet away from the intersection when she noticed the plaintiff’s vehicle, 
which was about 14 feet behind the stop sign but moving, and that about 5 to 7 seconds elapsed from 
the time that she observed the plaintiff’s vehicle until the collision. She stated that she attempted to 
swerve out of the way, but could not avoid the collision. The defendant further testified that although 
she was nearsighted and required prescription glasses, she was not wearing her glasses at the time of 
the accident. She claimed she was still able to see while driving. There was no evidence that either driver 
was speeding. The jury returned a verdict finding that only the plaintiff was negligent, and that his 
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in refusing to charge that the defendant’s 
violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509(3) was negligence per se, and erred in refusing to allow 
him to cross-examine the defendant on that issue. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509(3) provides that 
“no person shall operate any motor vehicle in violation of any restriction contained on his license”. 
 
ã Versageek, Crunch! (CC BY-SA 2.0). 
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The defendant testified at her examination before trial that her New York State driver’s license 
contained a restriction requiring her to wear corrective lenses while driving. 
It is well established that an unexcused violation of a statutory standard of care, if unexplained, 
constitutes negligence per se. The defendant’s reliance upon the principle that operating a motor 
vehicle without a license is not negligence per se is misplaced. The absence or possession of a driver’s 
license relates only to the authority for operating the vehicle and not to the manner 
thereof. However, a restriction placed upon the license requiring the wearing of glasses when driving 
relates directly to the actual operation of the vehicle. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509(3) provides that 
no one shall operate a vehicle in violation of any restriction contained on his or her license, and also 
relates to the manner in which the vehicle is being operated. Thus, the statute sets up a standard of 
care, the unexcused violation of which is negligence per se. The trial court erred, therefore, in 
refusing the plaintiffs request to charge…. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to a new trial. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Lawbreaking and Lawmaking: What’s the significance of Ramdhani-Mack’s violation of 
§ 509(3)? Which element of negligence does it affect? And what effect does it have? Does 
it mean that Dalal wins his negligence claim?  
2. Brown-Eyed Girl: Would Dalal be entitled to an instruction on negligence per se if 
Ramdhani-Mack had lied about her eye color when applying for her driver’s license? 
Would it matter whether there was a provision of New York’s Vehicle and Traffic Law 
that penalized people for putting false information on their applications? 
3. Negligence Por Que? Why does the doctrine of negligence per se exist? What values does 
it serve? What benefits or drawbacks does it have? 
 
BAYNE v. TODD SHIPYARDS CORP. 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin (1977) 
Brachtenbach, Justice: ã 
Plaintiff sued for personal injuries sustained 
while unloading goods being delivered to 
defendant’s premises. Plaintiff was not an employee 
of the defendant, but rather of the trucking company 
engaged in the delivery. While unloading those 
goods, plaintiff fell from a loading platform. Plaintiff 
contended that the defendant’s loading platform 
lacked a guardrail required by a safety standard 
regulation promulgated by the Department of Labor 
and Industries, pursuant to statute. The trial court 
refused to instruct that violation of that administrative regulation was negligence per se, but did 
instruct that it was evidence of negligence…. [T]he Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for the 
defendant…. We granted review limited to the sole issue whether violation of an administrative safety 
regulation is negligence per se or only evidence of negligence. We reverse. 
The statute in effect at the time of the injury imposed a duty upon the Director of Labor and 
Industries to promulgate safety regulations to furnish workers a place of work which is as safe as is 
reasonable and practicable under the circumstances, surroundings and conditions…. Pursuant to 
this authority, the Director of Labor and Industries adopted WAC 296-25-515: 
(1) All elevated walks, runways or platforms, except on loading or unloading sides 
of platforms, if four feet or more from the floor level, shall be provided with a 
standard railing on platforms. If height exceeds six feet, a toe-board shall be 
provided, to prevent material from rolling or falling off. 
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We have long been committed to the principle that violation of an applicable statute or ordinance 
is negligence per se. This is the majority rule. However, the courts are divided on the question whether 
violation of an administrative regulation is evidence of negligence or negligence per se. 
By our decision in Kness v. Truck Trailer Equip. Co., 501 P.2d 285 (Wash. 1972), we already have 
aligned ourselves with those jurisdictions which hold that under appropriate circumstances 
violation of an administrative order is negligence per se. In Kness a regulation had been adopted 
limiting the hours of work for a minor. The regulation was based on a rather broad statute 
authorizing the administrative establishment of standards of wages and conditions of labor for 
women and minors. In holding violation of the regulation was negligence per se we said: 
In deciding whether violation of a public law or regulation shall be considered in 
determining liability, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965) properly 
states the rules: 
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the 
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose 
purpose is found to be exclusively or in part 
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and 
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and 
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and 
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results. 
This court has substantially adhered to these principles in a number of cases. 
In this case we had a somewhat more specific statutory directive to adopt standards of safety to 
make safe the place of work of workmen…. We perceive no reason why such a regulation should be 
of any less force, effect or significance than a municipal ordinance…. 
Defendant contends that plaintiff was not within the protected class because he was not an 
employee of the defendant. The statute requires a safe place of work for workmen. It does not limit 
it to employees of the defendant employer. A worker who is lawfully on the premises in pursuit of 
his own employment and at the invitation of the third party, defendant here, is entitled to the benefit 
of the statute and the regulation. See Pierson v. Holly Sugar Corp., 237 P.2d 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951), 
which so holds, stating that the regulation was a safeguard for the public generally which necessarily 
included a workman making a delivery who was not an employee of the defendant. Extension of the 
protection of the regulation to the public generally is not before us…. 
The judgment is reversed and a new trial ordered. 
Hicks, Justice, dissenting: 
I dissent. Administrative agencies have a penchant for spawning regulations without end. As a 
Member of Congress, I served on a subcommittee that had occasion to evaluate regulations 
promulgated under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). While these regulations were 
generally most appropriate, they were unnecessary, impractical or picayunish (Mickey Mouse) often 
enough to give me concern as to making violation of any one of them negligence per se in every 
instance in a damage action. 
The court is setting policy in this case and I have no quarrel with that. However, I am more 
comfortable with the rule that violation of administrative regulations be submitted to the trier of 
fact as evidence of negligence, as the trial court did in this case, rather than to be submitted as 
negligence as a matter of law. In my view, when violations of regulations are submitted as evidence 
of negligence, the trier of fact has a better opportunity to use common sense and reach a more nearly 
just result between the parties. 
Until this case, the state of the law in this jurisdiction did not compel the result the majority 
reaches…. In the instant case, [the regulations] do no more than provide an administratively 
approved standard of safety. By the fiat of this court, the violation of such administratively 
promulgated standard now becomes negligence as a matter of law in every instance in a damage 
action. I believe the better course to be to…submit the regulation to the trier of fact only as evidence 
of an approved standard, as the trial court did in this case…. 
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QUESTIONS 
1. Who Cares? Todd Shipyards doesn’t dispute that it violated the regulation, so why is it 
still arguing that negligence per se doesn’t apply? Even if it didn’t apply, could Bayne still 
point to the regulatory violation in making his case? 
2. Steamboat Willie: Why does Justice Hicks bring up Mickey Mouse in his dissent? What 
does it have to do with the doctrine of negligence per se? 
3. Hooky: Suppose Bayne’s daughter leaves school early and makes the rounds with him at 
work. She falls from the loading platform. Negligence per se? 
 
VICTOR v. HEDGES 
California Court of Appeal (1999) 
Dau, Justice: ã 
Plaintiff Stephani Victor appeals from the judgment 
entered in favor of defendants Michael Hedges and 
Thermtech, Inc. (collectively, “Hedges”), following the 
grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and 
from the denial of her motion for new trial. Michael 
Hedges parked his auto on the sidewalk in front of his 
apartment building. Plaintiff and Hedges were standing on 
the sidewalk behind the car, when an inattentive motorist 
drove over the curb and into plaintiff, seriously injuring 
her. We are required to decide whether a statute 
prohibiting the parking of a vehicle on a sidewalk may be employed to fix upon Hedges the 
presumption of negligence in the circumstances of this case and whether reasonable people could 
conclude that he subjected plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm. We hold the statute in question 
was not designed to prevent the type of occurrence that resulted in plaintiffs injury, and plaintiff has 
failed to raise a triable issue of fact that an ordinarily prudent person in Hedges’s place would have 
foreseen an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff. Accordingly, we affirm. 
Plaintiff brought an action for damages alleging that…defendant Thermtech owned a certain 
Ford Explorer and defendant Hedges was driving that vehicle with the owner’s consent, that 
defendant Mark Williams was driving a Ford Aerostar van, and that defendants negligently operated 
and controlled these vehicles so as to cause a collision with plaintiff, who was lawfully upon the 
sidewalk in the City of Hermosa Beach. 
The undisputed facts showed that at approximately 10:00 p.m. Hedges had parked his Ford 
Explorer on the sidewalk in front of his apartment building, parallel to, and with the driver’s side 
tires three to four feet from, the curb line of Hermosa Avenue in Hermosa Beach. Hedges did this 
to show plaintiff his new compact disk player, which was located in the rear of the Explorer. Due to 
construction, northbound traffic along Hermosa Avenue was routed into a single lane along the east 
curb. There was some gravel on the road, and the surface was rough with bumps and potholes. 
Immediately before the accident Williams was northbound on Hermosa Avenue, approaching the 
intersection with First Street, in his Aerostar van. He looked down at the tape deck and, with his 
right hand, fast forwarded a cassette for approximately two seconds. The steering wheel jostled about 
an inch each way, Williams’s van drifted to the right, and the front and rear passenger side tires hit 
the First Street curb, causing them to blow out; the van continued in its path. Hedges and plaintiff 
were standing at the rear of the Explorer, with plaintiff nearer the curb and Hedges to her right, 
when Williams’s van ran into plaintiff and the Explorer about 30 feet from the First Street curb…. 
Plaintiff’s claim against Hedges and Thermtech is based on theories of negligence per se and 
common law negligence. Defendants argued in the court below that a necessary element of plaintiffs 
case under either theory—proximate cause—could not be established…. [W]e will address the 
negligence per se issue before coming to that of ordinary negligence. We do this, even though the 
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proximate cause argument (which is focused on foreseeability) made by the parties is common to 
both, for the following reason: If Hedges is not to be presumed negligent, and we will conclude that 
he is not, the ordinary negligence analysis may proceed uncontaminated by the infraction charge…. 
Plaintiff argues that Hedges must be presumed negligent because he violated Vehicle Code 
section 22500, subdivision (f), which prohibits parking on a sidewalk. 
Section 669, subdivision (a) of the Evidence Code provides: “The failure of a person to exercise 
due care is presumed if: (1) He violated a statute (2) The violation proximately caused death or 
injury to person or property; (3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which 
the statute was designed to prevent; and (4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his 
person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute was adopted.” 
With respect to paragraphs (3) and (4), the Law Revision Commission Comments state: “Whether 
the death or injury involved in an action resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the 
statute was designed to prevent and whether the plaintiff was one of the class of persons for whose 
protection the statute was adopted are questions of law. 
At the time of the accident, section 22500 provided: “No person shall stop, park, or leave standing 
any vehicle whether attended or unattended, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other 
traffic or in compliance with the directions of a peace officer or official traffic control device, in any 
of the following places:…(f) On a sidewalk, except electric carts when authorized by local ordinance, 
as specified in Section 21114.5.” We are required to determine the nature of the occurrence that 
section 22500, subdivision (f) was designed to prevent…. 
Section 22500 designates twelve categories of locations where stopping, standing or parking a 
vehicle is prohibited. The Legislature specified certain of these with pedestrians obviously in mind. 
“On a sidewalk,” which the Code defines as “that portion of a highway, other than the roadway, set 
apart by curbs, barriers, markings or other delineation for pedestrian travel,” is one of these. Others 
are: “on a crosswalk”; “between a safety zone and the adjacent right-hand curb”; “alongside curb 
space authorized for the loading and unloading of passengers of a bus engaged as a common carrier 
in local transportation”; and “in front of that portion of a curb that has been cut down, lowered, or 
constructed to provide wheelchair accessibility to the sidewalk.” With the exception of “on a 
sidewalk,” vehicles normally operate within each of these designated categories, and, for these, the 
section’s prohibition appears designed both to prevent vehicular obstruction of pedestrian traffic 
and to lessen the danger of vehicle-pedestrian collision. Thus pedestrians finding it necessary to walk 
around a vehicle that is illegally parked, stopped or left standing may be put at increased risk of 
injury from unsure footing, from another vehicle in the roadway, or from the sudden movement of 
the vehicle that had been at rest. Hedges’s parked automobile did not obstruct plaintiffs way and 
increase her risk of injury in this fashion. 
Injury to a pedestrian on a sidewalk, resulting from contact with a vehicle that has been parked, 
stopped or left standing there, can also occur when the vehicle is at rest or when it is again put in 
motion. The Legislature’s 1998 amendment to subdivision (f) appears to reflect an awareness that a 
vehicle at rest, even if partially on the sidewalk, can cause injury to a passing pedestrian. In this 
situation, the pedestrian, insufficiently aware of the presence of the vehicle, walks into it, or a portion 
of it, and is injured. That is not what occurred in the case at bar. Here, plaintiff was inspecting the 
Explorer’s compact disk player when she was struck by another vehicle, which ran into her and the 
Explorer. 
We conclude that subdivision (f) of section 22500 was designed to prevent (1) vehicular 
obstruction of pedestrian traffic on sidewalks, and (2) injury to pedestrians that might occur when 
a pedestrian (a) walks around the obstructing vehicle and is injured by another hazard, (b) walks 
into the obstructing vehicle, or (c) is struck when the vehicle, previously at rest on the sidewalk, is 
put in motion. The section was not designed to prevent the type of occurrence that resulted in 
plaintiffs injury in this case—being struck on the sidewalk by a vehicle other than the illegally parked 
vehicle. Accordingly, the court correctly denied to plaintiff the presumption…that defendants failed 
to exercise due care. 
We turn now to the issue of ordinary negligence…. Negligence is conduct which falls below the 
standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. Only 
those circumstances which the actor perceives or should perceive at the time of his or her action are 
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to be considered in determining whether the actor should recognize the risks that are involved in 
his or her conduct. The actor is required to give his surroundings the attention which the average 
person in the community would give under like circumstances and such superior attention as the 
actor himself or herself has…. 
Plaintiff contends the following undisputed facts are sufficient to defeat defendants’ summary 
judgment motion: Hedges took plaintiff to the sidewalk in front of his apartment at about 10:00 
p.m., to see the compact disk player in his car, and stood with plaintiff on the sidewalk within three 
to four feet of the curb, knowing that the street was undergoing construction, such that traffic was 
reduced to one lane and the surface of the road had some gravel upon it and was bumpy. In the half-
block south of his apartment building Hedges had observed between five and ten dirt mounds; the 
mounds were six to eight feet in height and four to five feet on the other side of the traffic lane. 
Hedges acknowledged that due to bumps and potholes in the street, sometimes his car would act a 
little “squirrelly,” causing “momentary loss of control of the vehicle for a split second.”… 
The cases relied upon by the parties are focused upon determining whether the defendant’s 
conduct was the cause of the injury, and we believe that in the case at bar the proper focus lies 
elsewhere. There is a clear distinction between the problem of foreseeability of intervening causes in 
determining whether the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of an injury, and the problem 
of foreseeability in determining whether the defendant was negligent at all. In the latter case the 
problem is whether or not the defendant’s conduct was wrongful toward the plaintiff, while in the 
former it is whether he should be relieved of responsibility for an admitted wrong because another’s 
wrongful conduct also contributed to the injury. Where it is contended that the element of 
foreseeability is determinative of proximate cause, the court should approach the problem as one of 
determining the nature of the duty and the scope of the risk of the negligent conduct. 
For Hedges to be liable for negligence, his conduct must have fallen below the standard 
established by law for the protection of those in plaintiff’s situation against unreasonable risk of 
harm. Plaintiff argues that Hedges should have foreseen the likelihood that another vehicle would 
lose control and come onto the public sidewalk where he and plaintiff were standing, a few feet from 
the curb. This, says the plaintiff, was negligence because it was near a road made hazardous by 
construction activity, which Hedges knew about, and it was foreseeable that these conditions could 
cause a car to lose control and run onto the curb. 
In the circumstances of this case these facts do not raise a triable issue that Hedges’s conduct was 
wrongful toward the plaintiff. Reasonable people would not conclude, from these facts, that Hedges’s 
act of taking plaintiff to the sidewalk subjected her to an unreasonable risk of harm. Plaintiff relies 
solely upon Hedges’s knowledge of the following road conditions to establish his negligence: the 
street was undergoing construction; traffic was reduced to one lane; the road surface was bumpy 
and had some gravel upon it; and there were dirt mounds four to five feet to the left of the traffic 
lane. Plaintiffs expert declared that these and other factors—deficient size of lane of travel, according 
to applicable manuals and specifications, inadequate delineation of the left side of the roadway, and 
the asphalt overhang at the gutter—“biased” the Williams van to the right side of the road, and that 
the van’s drift to the right could be predicted by traffic engineering human factors. But Hedges is 
not shown to have had the special knowledge of an expert, and his conduct is not judged by that 
standard. Thus, knowledge of the “bias” condition of the roadway, or of what could have been 
predicted by using traffic engineering human factors, is superior knowledge that Hedges is not 
chargeable with. There is no evidence in the record that Hedges was aware of any prior accident in 
this area, and there is no evidence raising a triable issue of fact that an ordinarily prudent person 
would have understood that he or she was subjecting plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm by 
standing on the public sidewalk at this location…. 
We conclude that under the undisputed facts here there can be no reasonable difference of 
opinion as to whether Hedges subjected plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm or as to the 
foreseeability that a driver would become distracted and, due to road conditions that only qualified 
experts would be able to detect, run up on the sidewalk in the stretch of road in front of Hedges’s 
apartment. We conclude that defendants were entitled to summary judgment…. 
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QUESTIONS 
1. Realizing Risks: Is Victor in the class of persons that § 22500 was meant to protect? If 
so, why doesn’t negligence per se apply? Consider Judge Cardozo’s words in DeHaen v. 
Rockwood Sprinkler Co. of Massachusetts, 179 N.E. 764 (N.Y. 1932): “The hazard out of 
which the accident ensued must have been the particular hazard or class of hazards that 
the statutory safeguard in the thought and purpose of the Legislature was intended to 
correct.” Is this the idea that sinks Victor’s argument? 
2. Fast Eddie’s Revisited: Would the Dram Shop Act in Fast Eddie’s have supported an 
instruction on negligence per se? How would you use Victor to make your argument? 
3. It’s Not All Downhill from Here: Following Victor’s accident, both of her legs were 
amputated to save her life. Years later, she told an interviewer: “People say do you want 
your legs back? Yes! I would love to go for a run, or dance, or stand up in the shower, 
you know. But I wouldn’t take my legs back if that meant trading what I have and what 
I’ve learned through all of this experience. I wouldn’t trade that for anything.” After 
multiple surgeries and years of recovery, she decided to take an adaptive skiing lesson. 
Now, as a five-time Paralympic medalist in alpine skiing, her story certainly didn’t end 
with defeat in the California Court of Appeal. 
 
F. Comparative Fault 
UNITED STATES v. RELIABLE TRANSFER CO. 
Supreme Court of the United States (1975) 
Stewart, Justice: 
[A tanker owned by Reliable Transfer Co. 
got stranded on a sandbar. Reliable Transfer 
sued the United States for failing to maintain 
a flashing light that would have allowed the 
tanker’s captain to avoid the sandbar. The 
district court attributed 25% of the fault to the 
U.S. Coast Guard for failure to keep a working 
light there and 75% of the fault to the boat’s 
captain. The district court stated:] 
The fault of the vessel was more egregious than the fault of the Coast Guard…. 
Equipped with look-out, chart, searchlight, radio-telephone, and radar, [the 
captain] made use of nothing except his own guesswork judgment. After turning 
in a loop toward the north so as to pass [another ship], he should have made sure 
of his position before setting his new…course. The fact that a northwest gale 
blowing at 45 knots with eight to ten foot seas made it difficult to see, emphasizes 
the need for caution rather than excusing a turn into the unknown. 
The [district] court held, however, that the settled admiralty rule of divided damages required 
each party to bear one-half of the damages to the vessel….  
The precise origins of the divided damages rule are shrouded in the mists of history…. [I]n 1855 
this Court adopted the rule of equal division of damages in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 
U.S. 170 (1854). The rule was adopted because it was then the prevailing rule in England, because it 
had become the majority rule in the lower federal courts, and because it seemed the most just and 
equitable, and best tended to induce care and vigilance on both sides, in the navigation. There can 
be no question that subsequent history and experience have conspicuously eroded the rule’s 
foundations…. England has long since abandoned the rule and now follows the Brussels Collision 
Liability Convention of 1910 that provides for the apportionment of damages on the basis of 
“degree” of fault whenever it is possible to do so. Indeed, the United States is now virtually alone 
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among the world’s major maritime nations in not adhering to the Convention with its rule of 
proportional fault—a fact that encourages transoceanic forum shopping. 
While the lower federal courts originally adhered to the divided damages rule, they have more 
recently followed it only grudgingly, terming it “unfair,” “illogical,” “arbitrary,” “archaic and 
frequently unjust.” Judge Learned Hand was a particularly stern critic of the rule. Dissenting 
in National Bulk Carriers v. United States, 183 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1950), he wrote: “An equal division 
of damages in this case would be plainly unjust; they ought to be divided in some such proportion 
as five to one. And so they could be but for our obstinate cleaving to the ancient rule which has been 
abrogated by nearly all civilized nations.” And Judge Hand had all but invited this Court to overturn 
the rule when, in an earlier opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, he stated that 
“we have no power to divest ourselves of this vestigial relic; we can only go so far as to close our eyes 
to doubtful delinquencies.” Oriental Trading & Transport Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 173 F. 2d 108 (1949). 
Some courts, even bolder, have simply ignored the rule… 
The divided damages rule has been said to be justified by the difficulty of determining 
comparative degrees of negligence when both parties are concededly guilty of contributing fault. 
Although there is some force in this argument, it cannot justify an equal division of damages in every 
case of collision based on mutual fault. When it is impossible fairly to allocate degrees of fault, the 
division of damages equally between wrongdoing parties is an equitable solution. But the rule is 
unnecessarily crude and inequitable in a case like this one where an allocation of disparate 
proportional fault has been made. Potential problems of proof in some cases hardly require 
adherence to an archaic and unfair rule in all cases. Every other major maritime nation has evidently 
been able to apply a rule of comparative negligence without serious problems, and in our own 
admiralty law a rule of comparative negligence has long been applied with no untoward difficulties 
in personal injury actions. 
The argument has also been made that the divided damages rule promotes out-of-court 
settlements, because when it becomes apparent that both vessels are at fault, both parties can readily 
agree to divide the damages—thus avoiding the expense and delay of prolonged litigation and the 
concomitant burden on the courts. It would be far more difficult, it is argued, for the parties to agree 
on who was more at fault and to apportion damages accordingly. But the argument is hardly 
persuasive. For if the fault of the two parties is markedly disproportionate, it is in the interest of the 
slightly negligent party to litigate the controversy in the hope that the major-minor fault rule may 
eventually persuade a court to absolve it of all liability. And if, on the other hand, it appears after a 
realistic assessment of the situation that the fault of both parties is roughly equal, then there is no 
reason why a rule that apportions damages would be any less likely to induce a settlement than a 
rule that always divides damages equally. Experience with comparative negligence in the personal 
injury area teaches that a rule of fairness in court will produce fair out-of-court settlements. But even 
if this argument were more persuasive than it is, it could hardly be accepted. For, at bottom, it asks 
us to continue the operation of an archaic rule because its facile application out of court yields quick, 
though inequitable, settlements, and relieves the courts of some litigation. Congestion in the courts 
cannot justify a legal rule that produces unjust results in litigation simply to encourage speedy out-
of-court accommodations…. 
We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause property damage 
in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties 
proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault, and that liability for such damages is to be 
allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure 
the comparative degree of their fault…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. The Demise of Divided Damages: What’s the most compelling argument in favor of 
simply dividing damages? Was it right for the Supreme Court to jettison this rule?  
2. Splitting the Baby: The Court says that the rule of comparative fault should give way to 
divided damages “when it is not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of 
their fault.” In practice, when would that exception apply? Or, perhaps more cynically, 
is it ever possible to fairly measure the parties’ comparative degrees of fault? 
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3. Contributory Negligence: If the plaintiff bringing a lawsuit is also at fault for their 
injuries due to their own negligence, why shouldn’t they be barred from recovering 
anything at all? If you think that rule seems unfair, how can you explain its prevalence 
in many states as recently as the 1990s? Indeed, the all-or-nothing regime of 
contributory negligence remains the rule in several states and the District of Columbia. 
 
HUNT v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION 
Court of Claims of Ohio (1997) 
Strausbaugh, Judge: ã 
In her complaint, plaintiff, Lesa Hunt, alleges that 
defendant, Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
(“ODRC”), negligently instructed and trained her to operate 
a snowblower, and that she was not provided with 
supervision while she was operating the snowblower. 
Plaintiff alleges that as a result, she inserted her hand in the 
chute in an attempt to unclog the snowblower, thereby 
causing her bodily injury…. 
At the time of the accident, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody and control of defendant…. 
On January 23, 1995, plaintiff was operating a Gravely snowblower while working with the outside 
yard crew. Carl Jenkins was the corrections officer in charge of the yard crew. Plaintiff and fellow 
inmate, Claudia DeJesus, were assigned to clear the sidewalks of two streets with the snowblower. 
While plaintiff was operating the snowblower, the chute became clogged with snow. Plaintiff put the 
snowblower in neutral and turned the “Power Take Off” (“PTO”) switch to the “off” position. The 
PTO switch shut down the blower. After visually inspecting the chute, plaintiff inserted her hand 
inside the chute and began cleaning out the packed snow. As she was removing the snow, the 
machine caught plaintiff’s gloved hand and started pulling it into the chute. Although her glove 
remained caught in the chute, and plaintiff was able to pull her hand out, her right index, middle 
and third fingers were partially severed. 
Prior to her assignment on that day, plaintiff and DeJesus had been instructed by Officer Jenkins 
on how to operate the snowblower. The training session lasted approximately ten minutes. This was 
the first time that Officer Jenkins had trained anyone to operate the snowblower, in spite of the fact 
that he had no prior experience operating the snowblower. Although Officer Jenkins did not read 
the operator’s manual, he had been trained one week prior to the accident by Woody Meyers, head 
of the maintenance department, who had instructed him that if the chute became clogged, to push 
the PTO switch in, turn the power switch off with the key, and clean out the snow with water or 
some device. Meyers cautioned against placing one’s hand down the chute. 
The court finds that Officer Jenkins, in good faith, believed that he had instructed plaintiff on all 
of the above. However, even if he did instruct plaintiff in this manner, there was insufficient 
emphasis placed on the importance of the safety instructions. The court finds that plaintiff was 
under the impression that she needed only to push the PTO switch into the “off’ position. Plaintiff 
did not consider the snowblower a dangerous machine and did not realize that there were moving 
parts that could still be spinning for a period of time after the snowblower was turned off. The court 
finds that plaintiff was not made aware that the engine should also be shut off prior to cleaning out 
packed snow and that she should never place her hand in the chute. 
Plaintiff’s claim sets forth a single cognizable action, sounding in negligence…. In the special 
relationship between the state and its prisoners, the state owes prisoners a duty of reasonable care 
and protection from unreasonable risks of harm. Reasonable care is that which would be utilized by 
an ordinarily prudent person under certain circumstances. An inmate laborer, such as plaintiff in 
the case at bar, is not an employee of the state…. 
 
ã Rob Lee, Tatiana Snowblowing (CC BY-ND 2.0). 
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The court finds that defendant owed plaintiff a duty to warn her of the potential risks associated 
with the operation of the snowblower. The court further finds that plaintiff received inadequate 
safety training concerning what actions to take in the event that the snowblower became clogged. 
The operation of the machine was relatively new to both plaintiff and Officer Jenkins. Therefore, 
plaintiff should have received more detailed and hands-on safety training with the snowblower. It is 
not unreasonable to expect that a new user of such a machine may believe that the blades would 
immediately shut off by putting the PTO switch in the “off’ position, without being specifically 
warned also to turn the ignition switch to the “off’ position and wait for the blades to stop. The court 
finds that defendant did not adequately instruct plaintiff on the proper operation of the snowblower, 
and defendant is therefore negligent, since it breached its duty of reasonable care to protect plaintiff 
from harm. 
Although the court finds that defendant was negligent, Ohio’s comparative negligence 
statute bars a plaintiff from recovery if his or her actions were a greater cause (more than fifty 
percent) of his injuries than any acts of defendant. In this case, the court finds that although 
plaintiff’s own negligence was not a greater causative factor, it constituted forty percent of the cause 
of her injuries. 
The court finds that plaintiff disregarded a potential hazard and failed to use common sense 
when she inserted her hand in the chute of the snowblower. The court concludes that plaintiff has 
proven that defendant breached its duty of reasonable care; however, the contributory negligence 
attributable to plaintiff is forty percent. Judgment is hereby rendered for plaintiff. A trial on the issue 
of damages will be scheduled in the near future. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Round Numbers: The judge concludes that Hunt was 40% at fault for her own injuries. 
Why 40%? Why not 30%? Or 57%? Where are these nice round numbers coming from? 
2. Do the Math: The Supreme Court in Reliable Transfer applied a rule of “pure” 
comparative fault—i.e., when more than one party is at fault, liability is “allocated among 
the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault,” regardless of the 
percentage share assigned to each party. How is Ohio’s rule of “modified” comparative 
fault different? Had the judge concluded that Hunt was 50% at fault, how much would 
she have received in damages? What if she was 51% at fault? 
 
BOOZY BORIS PROBLEM 
Boris drives home drunk from the pub and hits a traffic light. Dr. Jeremy successfully treats 
Boris’s serious injuries and then puts him on oxygen because he’s struggling to breathe. Due to Dr. 
Jeremy’s carelessness, however, Boris suffers brain damage when the oxygen is temporarily cut. 
Should Boris’s fault in getting injured in the first place limit any damages he could recover? Or is 
the reason for him needing emergency care irrelevant when the case is about Dr. Jeremy’s 
carelessness in providing that care? 
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 
Factors for Assigning Shares of Responsibility (2000) 
Factors for assigning percentages of responsibility to each person 
whose legal responsibility has been established includeã  
(a) the nature of the person’s risk-creating conduct, including any 
awareness or indifference with respect to the risks created by 
the conduct and any intent with respect to the harm created by 
the conduct; and 
(b) the strength of the causal connection between the person’s risk-creating conduct and the harm. 
 
ã Valberg Lárusson, Tomato Juice Crumb Cake (CC BY 2.0); Alexander Savin, Räyskälä Skydive (CC BY 2.0). 
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POST-WORKOUT PROBLEM 
Mo is driving home from the gym after lifting heavy weights for several hours. As he turns onto 
the highway, he suddenly feels some soreness in his bulging bicep. Only then does he remember that 
he didn’t stretch properly after his workout. He parks his car on the highway shoulder and gets out 
to give himself some room to move. His car isn’t blocking any traffic, but it’s very close to the edge 
of the fast lane. Within minutes, Alex clips the side of Mo’s car with her motorbike, leading her to 
fall and suffer horrendous injuries. Mo, who had just completed his first set of lunges, was unscathed. 
Alex later admits that, after pulling an all-nighter playing videogames and then driving for two 
hours, she had dozed off just before the collision. Alex sues Mo for negligence, producing evidence 
that she suffered $1 million in compensable damages due to her injuries. 
(a) What’s Alex likely to recover under systems of contributory negligence, pure 
comparative fault, and modified comparative fault? First give the rule, then your opinion 
of the likely result. 
(b) After doing this exercise, does the rule of divided damages seem more or less attractive? 
 
G. Assumption of the Risk
JONES v. DRESSEL 
Supreme Court of Colorado (1981) 
Erickson, Justice:  
…In an action for damages by the plaintiff for 
personal injuries sustained in an airplane crash, the 
trial court granted the defendants’ motion for 
partial summary judgment. Summary judgment 
was based upon the execution of an exculpatory 
agreement which the court held insulated the 
defendants from liability for simple negligence 
involving the crash of an airplane…. 
On November 17, 1973, the plaintiff, William 
Michael Jones, who was then seventeen years old, 
signed a contract with the defendant, Free Flight Sport Aviation, Inc. (Free Flight).1 The contract 
allowed Jones to use Free Flight’s recreational skydiving facilities, which included use of an airplane 
to ferry skydivers to the parachute jumping site. A covenant not to sue and a clause exempting Free 
Flight from liability were included in the contract: 
2A. EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY. The plaintiff exempts and releases the 
Corporation, its, owners, officers, agents, servants, employees, and lessors from 
any and all liability, claims, demands or actions or causes of action whatsoever 
arising out of any damage, loss or injury to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property 
while upon the premises or aircraft of the Corporation or while participating in 
any of the activities contemplated by this Agreement, whether such loss, damage, 
or injury results from the negligence of the Corporation, its officers, agents, 
servants, employees, or lessors or from some other cause. 
 
1 Even though Jones’ mother had ratified the terms of this contract on November 16, 1973, it should be noted that the 
approval by a parent does not necessarily validate an infant child’s contract. 
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The contract also contained an alternative provision which would have permitted Jones to use 
Free Flight’s facilities at an increased cost, but without releasing Free Flight from liability for 
negligence.2 
On December 28, 1973, Jones attained the age of eighteen. Ten months later, on October 19, 
1974, he suffered serious personal injuries in an airplane crash which occurred shortly after takeoff 
from Littleton Airport. Free Flight furnished the airplane as part of its skydiving operation.  
On November 21, 1975, nearly two years after attaining his majority, Jones filed suit against Free 
Flight alleging negligence and willful and wanton misconduct as the cause of the airplane crash. The 
defendants included the owners and operators of the airplane, the airport, and Free Flight. Based 
upon the exculpatory agreement, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. 
Jones asserts three grounds for reversal of the summary judgment. First, he claims that he 
disaffirmed the contract with Free Flight within a reasonable time after he attained his majority by 
filing suit. Second, he asserts that the exculpatory agreement is void as a matter of public policy. 
Third, he contends that inasmuch as an exculpatory agreement must be strictly construed against 
the party seeking to avoid liability for negligence, the injuries which he sustained as a result of the 
airplane crash were beyond the scope of the agreement…. 
Ratification 
As a matter of public policy, the courts have protected minors from improvident and imprudent 
contractual commitments by declaring that the contract of a minor is voidable at the election of the 
minor after he attains his majority. A minor may disaffirm a contract made during his minority 
within a reasonable time after attaining his majority or he may, after becoming of legal age, by acts 
recognizing the contract, ratify it…. What act constitutes ratification or disaffirmance is ordinarily 
a question of law to be determined by the trial court…. We conclude…that the trial court properly 
determined that Jones ratified the contract, as a matter of law, by accepting the benefits of the 
contract when he used Free Flight’s facilities on October 19, 1974…. 
The Contract 
Jones’ assertion that his contract with Free Flight is void as a matter of public policy, raises two 
issues: (A) whether the contract with Free Flight is an adhesion contract; and (B) the validity of the 
exculpatory provisions of the contract…. 
An adhesion contract is a contract drafted unilaterally by a business enterprise and forced upon 
an unwilling and often unknowing public for services that cannot readily be obtained elsewhere. An 
adhesion contract is generally not bargained for, but is imposed on the public for a necessary service 
on a take or leave it basis…. There must be a showing that the parties were greatly disparate in 
bargaining power, that there was no opportunity for negotiation, or that the services could not be 
obtained elsewhere…. 
We conclude that the record in the instant case supports the trial court’s determination that the 
contract between Jones and Free Flight was not an adhesion contract as a matter of law. Jones 
contends that this was an adhesion contract because he was not allowed to select the alternative 
provision which would have allowed him to participate in the activities without releasing Free Flight 
from liability for its negligence, and that a genuine issue as to his lack of choice precluded the entry 
 
2 The record indicates that the alternative provision of the contract was crossed out when Jones signed the contract. 
However, the record does not establish that Free Flight would have prohibited Jones from participating in skydiving activities 
if the alternative provision had not been crossed out. 
2B. ALTERNATE PROVISION. In consideration of the deletion of the provisions, 2A, 3, 4, and 5 
herein regarding ASSUMPTION OF RISK, EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY, COVENANT NOT TO 
SUE, INDEMNITY AGAINST THIRD PARTY CLAIMS, and CONTINUATION OF 
OBLIGATIONS, the Participant has paid the additional sum of $50.00 upon execution of this 
agreement, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the Corporation. 
2C. It is understood that acceptance of this ALTERNATIVE PROVISION does not constitute a 
contract of insurance, but only waives Corporation’s contractual defenses which would otherwise be 
available. 
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of summary judgment. We disagree…. [T]he fact that a contract is a printed form contract and 
offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis does not alone cause it to be an adhesion contract. We also 
agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that nothing in the record establishes a disparity in 
bargaining power, or that the services provided by Free Flight could not be obtained elsewhere. 
Jones asserts that the exculpatory agreement is void as a matter of public policy. We disagree. 
The defendants contend that Barker v. Colorado Region, 532 P.2d 372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974), is 
dispositive of the issue of the validity of the exculpatory agreement. In Barker, the court of appeals 
held that an exculpatory clause in a contract relating to recreational activities will be given effect 
where the intention of the parties is expressed in sufficiently clear and unequivocal language and 
does not fall within any of the categories where the public interest is directly involved. 
Jones, however, claims that summary judgment should not have been granted…. First, he argues 
that because exculpatory agreements must be strictly construed against the party seeking exemption, 
the agreement here does not insulate the defendants from liability for negligence in connection with 
a crash that occurred prior to the time that Jones made a parachute jump…. [Second], he contends 
that Free Flight…cannot contract away its liability for negligence in the performance of a duty 
imposed by law or where the public interest requires performance. 
The determination of the sufficiency and validity of an exculpatory agreement is a question of 
law for the court to determine…. An exculpatory agreement, which attempts to insulate a party from 
liability from his own negligence, must be closely scrutinized, and in no event will such an agreement 
provide a shield against a claim for willful and wanton negligence…. In determining whether an 
exculpatory agreement is valid, there are four factors which a court must consider: (1) the existence 
of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly 
entered into; and (4) whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous 
language. Measured against the four factors which determine the validity of an exculpatory 
agreement, we conclude that the trial court correctly held, as a matter of law, that the exculpatory 
agreement was valid…. 
The duty to the public factor is not present in this case. In Tunkl v. Regents of University of 
California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963), the California Supreme Court stated: 
In placing particular contracts within or without the category of those affected with 
a public interest, the courts have revealed a rough outline of that type of transaction 
in which exculpatory provisions will be held invalid. Thus the attempted but 
invalid exemption involves a transaction which exhibits some or all of the following 
characteristics. [1.] It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for 
public regulation. [2.] The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a 
service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical 
necessity for some members of the public. [3.] The party holds himself out as 
willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least 
for any member coming within certain established standards. [4.] As a result of the 
essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party 
invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against 
any member of the public who seeks his services. [5.] In exercising a superior 
bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion 
contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay 
additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. [6.] Finally, as 
a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under 
the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents. 
In light of the foregoing factors, we conclude that the contract between Jones and Free Flight 
does not fall within the category of agreements affecting the public interest…. While it is not 
necessary for a contract to embody all of the characteristics set forth in Tunkl to meet the test, we 
conclude that an insufficient number of these characteristics are present in the instant case to 
establish that the contract between Jones and Free Flight affected the public interest. The service 
provided by Free Flight was not a matter of practical necessity for even some members of the public; 
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because the service provided by Free Flight was not an essential service, it did not possess a decisive 
advantage of bargaining strength over Jones; and the contract was not an adhesion contract. 
Finally, …we note that there was no disagreement between the parties that the contract was fairly 
entered into. Likewise, the agreement expressed the parties’ intention in clear and unambiguous 
language; the contract used the word “negligence” and specifically included injuries sustained “while 
upon the aircraft of the Corporation.” 
We conclude that the exculpatory agreement was not void as a matter of public policy…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Read the Fine Print: Looking at the terms of Free Flight’s liability waiver, was the 
company’s alleged negligence in crashing the airplane covered? Would the waiver apply 
if William had instead been hit by a carelessly driven Free Flight van while waiting for 
his mother in the parking lot after skydiving? What if he got food poisoning after eating 
bad sushi in Free Flight’s cafeteria before boarding the plane? 
2. Take It or Leave It: If similar exculpatory terms were found in every skydiving contract 
in Colorado, would William have a stronger argument that Free Flight’s liability waiver 
was a contract of adhesion? Would it have been a winning argument? 
3. Freefall Fanatics: If Coloradans were devoted skydivers, such that 93% of all residents 
in the Centennial State did at least one jump before their twenty-first birthday, would 
this case come out differently? 
 
DALURY v. S-K-I, LTD. 
Supreme Court of Vermont (1995) 
Johnson, Justice: ã 
We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment for defendants S-K-I, Ltd. and Killington, Ltd. in 
a case involving an injury to a skier at a resort operated by 
defendants. We hold that the exculpatory agreements 
which defendants require skiers to sign, releasing 
defendants from all liability resulting from negligence, are 
void as contrary to public policy. 
While skiing at Killington Ski Area, plaintiff Robert 
Dalury sustained serious injuries when he collided with a 
metal pole that formed part of the control maze for a ski 
lift line. Before the season started, Dalury had purchased a midweek season pass and signed a form 
releasing the ski area from liability. The relevant portion reads: 
RELEASE FROM LIABILITY AND CONDITIONS OF USE 
1. I accept and understand that Alpine Skiing is a hazardous sport with many 
dangers and risks and that injuries are a common and ordinary occurrence of the 
sport. As a condition of being permitted to use the ski area premises, I freely accept 
and voluntarily assume the risks of injury or property damage and release 
Killington Ltd., its employees and agents from any and all liability for personal 
injury or property damage resulting from negligence, conditions of the premises, 
operations of the ski area, actions or omissions of employees or agents of the ski 
area or from my participation in skiing at the area, accepting myself the full 
responsibility for any and all such damage or injury of any kind which may result. 
Plaintiff also signed a photo identification card that contained this same language. 
Dalury and his wife filed a complaint against defendants, alleging negligent design, construction, 
and replacement of the maze pole. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
 
ã Jonas Bengtsson, Ski Lift (CC BY 2.0). 
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release of liability barred the negligence action. The trial court, without specifically addressing 
plaintiffs’ contention that the release was contrary to public policy, found that the language of the 
release clearly absolved defendants of liability for their own negligence. 
The trial court based its decision on Douglass v. Skiing Standards, Inc., 459 A.2d 97 (Vt. 1983), in 
which we held that an exculpatory agreement was sufficient to bar a negligence action by a 
professional freestyle skier who was injured in a skiing competition, and two subsequent decisions 
of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. See Estate of Geller v. Mount Snow 
Ltd., No. 89-66 (D. Vt. May 21, 1991) (summary judgment granted where plaintiff recreational 
skier signed release on back of ski pass); Barenthein v. Killington, Ltd., No. 86-33 (D. Vt. June 17, 
1987) (summary judgment granted where plaintiff signed equipment rental agreement which 
contained a release). The trial court did not view the distinction between professional and 
recreational skiing as significant, and granted summary judgment on the ground that the release was 
clear and unambiguous. 
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the release was ambiguous as to whose liability was waived 
and that it is unenforceable as a matter of law because it violates public policy. We agree with 
defendants that the release was quite clear in its terms. Because we hold the agreement is 
unenforceable, we proceed to a discussion of the public policy that supports our holding. 
This is a case of first impression in Vermont. While we have recognized the existence of a public 
policy exception to the validity of exculpatory agreements, in most of our cases, enforceability has 
turned on whether the language of the agreement was sufficiently clear to reflect the parties’ intent. 
Even well-drafted exculpatory agreements, however, may be void because they violate public 
policy. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B (1965), an exculpatory agreement 
should be upheld if it is (1) freely and fairly made, (2) between parties who are in an equal bargaining 
position, and (3) there is no social interest with which it interferes. The critical issue here concerns 
the social interests that are affected. 
Courts and commentators have struggled to develop a useful formula for analyzing the public 
policy issue. The formula has been the subject of great debate during the whole course of the 
common law, and it had proven impossible to articulate a precise definition because the social forces 
that have led to such characterization are volatile and dynamic. The leading judicial formula for 
determining whether an exculpatory agreement violates public policy was set forth by Justice 
Tobriner of the California Supreme Court [in Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 
1963)]. An agreement is invalid if it exhibits some or all of the [the six Tunkl factors outlined above 
in Jones v. Dressel.]… 
Numerous courts have adopted and applied the Tunkl factors. See Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. 
Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988) (release for school district’s interscholastic 
athletics violated public policy); Kyriazis v. Univ. of W. Va., 450 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1994) (release 
for state university-sponsored club rugby was invalid because “[w]hen a state university provides 
recreational activities to its students, it fulfills its educational mission, and performs a public 
service”). Other courts have incorporated the Tunkl factors into their decisions. The Colorado 
Supreme Court [in Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981)] concluded, based on 
the Tunkl factors, that no duty to the public was involved in air service for a parachute jump, because 
that sort of service does not affect the public interest. Using a similar formula, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court concluded that a ski resort’s sponsorship of an Ironman Decathlon competition did 
not invoke the public interest. Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754 P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1988). 
On the other hand, the Virginia Supreme Court recently concluded, in the context of a “Teflon 
Man Triathlon” competition, that a preinjury release from liability for negligence is void as against 
public policy because it is simply wrong to put one party to a contract at the mercy of the other’s 
negligence. The court stated: “To hold that it was competent for one party to put the other parties 
to the contract at the mercy of its own misconduct can never be lawfully done where an enlightened 
system of jurisprudence prevails. Public policy forbids it, and contracts against public policy are 
void.” Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Community Ass’n, 418 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1992). 
Having reviewed these various formulations of the public policy exception, we accept them as 
relevant considerations, but not as rigid factors that, if met, preclude further analysis. Instead, we 
recognize that no single formula will reach the relevant public policy issues in every factual context. 
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Like the court in Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522 (Md. 1994), we conclude that ultimately the 
“determination of what constitutes the public interest must be made considering the totality of the 
circumstances of any given case against the backdrop of current societal expectations.” 
Defendants urge us to uphold the exculpatory agreement on the ground that ski resorts do not 
provide an essential public service. They argue that they owe no duty to plaintiff to permit him to 
use their private lands for skiing, and that the terms and conditions of entry ought to be left entirely 
within their control. Because skiing, like other recreational sports, is not a necessity of life, 
defendants contend that the sale of a lift ticket is a purely private matter, implicating no public 
interest. See, e.g., Milligan, 754 P.2d at 1066 (“Generally, a private recreational business does not 
qualify as a service demanding a special duty to the public, nor are its services of a special, highly 
necessary or essential nature.”). We disagree. 
Whether or not defendants provide an essential public service does not resolve the public policy 
question in the recreational sports context. The defendants’ area is a facility open to the public. They 
advertise and invite skiers and nonskiers of every level of skiing ability to their premises for the price 
of a ticket. At oral argument, defendants conceded that thousands of people buy lift tickets every 
day throughout the season. Thousands of people ride lifts, buy services, and ski the trails. Each ticket 
sale may be, for some purposes, a purely private transaction. But when a substantial number of such 
sales take place as a result of the seller’s general invitation to the public to utilize the facilities and 
services in question, a legitimate public interest arises. 
The major public policy implications are those underlying the law of premises liability. In 
Vermont, a business owner has a duty of active care to make sure that its premises are in safe and 
suitable condition for its customers. We have recognized this duty of care where the defendant’s 
routine business practice creates a foreseeable hazard for its customers. The business invitee has a 
right to assume that the premises, aside from obvious dangers, are reasonably safe for the purpose 
for which he is upon them, and that proper precaution has been taken to make them so. We have 
already held that a ski area owes its customers the same duty as any other business—to keep its 
premises reasonably safe. 
The policy rationale is to place responsibility for maintenance of the land on those who own or 
control it, with the ultimate goal of keeping accidents to the minimum level possible. Defendants, 
not recreational skiers, have the expertise and opportunity to foresee and control hazards, and to 
guard against the negligence of their agents and employees. They alone can properly maintain and 
inspect their premises, and train their employees in risk management. They alone can insure against 
risks and effectively spread the cost of insurance among their thousands of customers. Skiers, on the 
other hand, are not in a position to discover and correct risks of harm, and they cannot insure against 
the ski area’s negligence. 
If defendants were permitted to obtain broad waivers of their liability, an important incentive 
for ski areas to manage risk would be removed with the public bearing the cost of the resulting 
injuries. It is illogical, in these circumstances, to undermine the public policy underlying business 
invitee law and allow skiers to bear risks they have no ability or right to control. 
For these reasons, we disagree with the decisions of the United States District Court for the 
District of Vermont, upholding exculpatory agreements similar to the one at issue here. We do not 
accept the proposition that because ski resorts do not provide an essential public service, such 
agreements do not affect the public interest. A recognition of the principles underlying the duty to 
business invitees makes clear the inadequacy of relying upon the essential public service factor in 
the analysis of public recreation cases. While interference with an essential public service surely 
affects the public interest, those services do not represent the universe of activities that implicate 
public concerns. 
Moreover, reliance on the private nature of defendants’ property would be inconsistent with 
societal expectations about privately owned facilities that are open to the general public. Indeed, 
when a facility becomes a place of public accommodation, it renders a service which has become of 
public interest in the manner of the innkeepers and common carriers of old. Defendants are not 
completely unfettered, as they argue, in their ability to set the terms and conditions of admission. 
Defendants’ facility may be privately owned, but that characteristic no longer overcomes a myriad 
of legitimate public interests. Public accommodations laws that prohibit discrimination against 
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potential users of the facility are just one example of limitations imposed by law that affect the terms 
and conditions of entry…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Sport the Difference: Why do Jones and Dalury come out differently? Is Colorado just filled 
with rugged individualists and Vermont with fussy paternalists? 
2. Proceed at Your Own Risk: One possible difference is that skydiving arguably carries 
greater risk of serious injuries on per-capita basis. But which way would that cut? Should 
public policy make it easier or harder to waive liability for riskier activities?  
3. Where Ought the Obligation Be? Do you think Dalury comes out the same way if it 
happened in Georgia, not Vermont? Why might we care about an activity’s popularity 
in a particular state? In thinking this through, consider the possible relevance of Judge 
Cardozo’s words in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916): “We 
have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences 
of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the 
source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law.” 
 
SMOLLETT v. SKAYTING DEVELOPMENT CORP. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (1986) 
Hunter, Judge:ã 
On February 15, 1981, Helene Smollett and 
her husband attended a fundraiser at a skating 
rink owned by Skayting Development 
Corporation. Smollett, who was thirty-three 
years old at that time, is an experienced skater. 
Although she had not skated for the two years 
before she went to the appellant’s rink, she had 
skated over fifty times in her life. 
When Smollett and her husband entered the 
rink, they noticed that there were no guardrails. 
They discussed this with the owner, Les Cooper, 
who told them that this design was the practice 
at many new rinks to further safety by avoiding 
the use of guardrails which could become loose and collapse unexpectedly. Smollett did not take 
skating lessons although they were offered to everyone at the fundraiser. 
The skating area, which had a polyurethane surface, was raised three to five inches higher than 
the surrounding floor, which was carpeted. Smollett skated for about ninety minutes, until 7:50 p.m., 
without mishap. The rink was not overcrowded, with fifty to one hundred people skating. There 
were eight skateguards working that night and at least two were on the skating floor. Several signs 
reading “skate at your own risk” were posted in the rink. The skaters included many children and 
inexperienced skaters. At 7:50 p.m. Smollett’s husband wished to leave. She told him she would join 
him after she took two last turns around the rink. On her last lap, Smollett skated behind a young 
child who fell. To avoid the child and a skater on her left, she swerved to the right onto the carpeted 
area. She fell and broke her left wrist. Her injury required surgery on the day of the accident and 
again one year later. 
Smollett and her husband filed this suit against the rink. As a defense, Skayting asserted that 
Smollett had assumed the risk of injury. [At trial] the jury returned a verdict for Smollett but made 
no award to her husband. Because the jury found Smollett 50% at fault, her award was reduced from 
$50,000 to $25,000. The court denied Skayting’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
or, in the alternative, for a new trial…. 
 
ã Memphis Heritage, Skating Rink 12-1976 (CC BY 2.0). 
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We hold that it was error to deny the skating rink’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict because there was insufficient evidence to find that Smollett had not assumed the risk of 
injury. The Virgin Islands has enacted a comparative negligence statute, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 1451, 
and thereby removed the contributory negligence bar to recovery. Assumption of risk is still 
available as a complete defense to a negligence claim but it has been limited by enactment of the 
comparative negligence statute. Assumption of risk, to the extent it incorporates the concept of fault 
on the part of the actor and, therefore, overlaps with contributory negligence, is no longer available 
as a defense. However, assumption of risk can still be applied to non-negligent conduct which 
constitutes waiver or consent but which involved no negligence. In such cases the absolute bar to 
recovery remains. 
The evidence in this case shows that Smollett fully understood the risk of harm to herself and 
voluntarily chose to enter the area of risk. She, therefore, implicitly assumed the risk of injury. 
Smollett admitted that she was aware that there were no guardrails, that the skating area was covered 
with a smooth surface and was elevated, and that the area around the rink was carpeted. All of these 
circumstances were clearly visible as was the fact that young and inexperienced skaters were at the 
rink that day. 
Smollett contends that she did not assume the risk because she was not aware of the dangerous 
condition created by the combination of three circumstances at the rink: 1) lack of guardrails; 
2) elevated skating area; 3) difference in coefficient of friction between the skating surface and the 
surrounding carpeted area. We believe that Smollett was aware of the risk of falling when going from 
the skating area to the surrounding carpeted area. To reach the rink she had to walk on the carpeted 
area with her skates and, therefore, she had to be aware that the carpet slowed down the wheels on 
the skates. She had skated many times before and knew that other skaters might fall down in her path. 
We conclude that Smollett assumed the risk of injury. We will reverse the judgment of the district 
court denying a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and direct the district court to enter judgment 
for Skayting Development Corporation.  
Mansmann, Judge, dissenting: 
…I believe that the defendant has not demonstrated that the record lacks a minimum quantum 
of evidence from which a jury could reasonably have afforded relief. Therefore, I would affirm the 
judgment of the district court. 
Assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense which has traditionally been considered an 
absolute bar to recovery. Although the Virgin Islands has enacted a contributory negligence statute 
which permits recovery on a pro rata basis where the plaintiff’s negligence does not exceed that of 
the defendant, the assumption of the risk doctrine is nonetheless an available, although limited, 
defense. As we noted in Keegan v. Anchor Inns, Inc., 606 F.2d 35 (3d Cir.1979), the assumption of 
the risk doctrine “embraces two distinct concepts—one akin to waiver or consent, the other a species 
of negligence.” To the extent that the assumption of risk doctrine involves a negligence theory, the 
doctrine has been replaced by the Virgin Islands contributory negligence statute. To the extent that 
the theory involves a consent or waiver principle, it remains a viable defense. 
In Keegan, we explained that portion of the assumption of the risk theory which continues to 
operate as an absolute bar to recovery. 
Assumption of risk in its primary and strict sense involves voluntary exposure to 
an obvious or known danger which negates liability. Under this concept recovery 
is barred because the plaintiff is assumed to have relieved the defendant of any duty 
to protect him. 
The defendant, who asserts the assumption of the risk defense in its primary sense, has the 
burden of demonstrating that no duty was owed plaintiff. Defendant can sustain its burden by 
proving that plaintiff knew of the risk, appreciated its character, and voluntarily chose to accept it. 
The defendant must also demonstrate that the plaintiff’s conduct in knowingly and voluntarily 
confronting the risk was reasonable. 
The defendant here claims that the jury’s failure to find assumption of the risk was against the 
clear weight of the evidence…. The plaintiff admits that she was aware of the separate hazards which 
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contributed to her injuries: the lack of guardrails, the elevation of the skating surface, and the 
different textures of the carpeted surface and the polyurethaned skating floor. The plaintiff 
maintains, however, that the defendant is relying impermissibly on the assumption of the risk 
doctrine in its secondary sense—as a theory of negligence. The plaintiff also alleges that there is 
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict…. 
While the evidence does indicate that the plaintiff knew of the separate hazards, there is no 
evidence that the plaintiff knew of and appreciated how the various hazards could work in 
combination. The majority speculates that the plaintiff must have known of the risk because she had 
walked on the carpeted area with her skates and was aware, therefore, that the carpet slowed her rate 
of speed. The majority’s speculation suggests only that the plaintiff was aware of the separate hazard 
of the carpeted area. It does not address the issue of the plaintiff’s knowledge of the risk created by 
the combined hazards…. 
In addition, there is evidence in the record which tends to counter a finding of waiver or consent. 
The plaintiff and her husband did ask Les Cooper, owner of the defendant skating rink, about the 
safety of the rink in the absence of guardrails. They were told that the no-guardrail design was used 
for safety reasons. In light of this representation, I cannot say that all reasonable people would 
conclude that the combined hazard was so obvious that the plaintiff assumed the risk and that the 
defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff…. 
In addition, there is evidence in the record which tends to counter a finding of waiver or consent. 
The plaintiff and her husband did ask Les Cooper, owner of the defendant skating rink, about the 
safety of the rink in the absence of guardrails. They were told that the no-guardrail design was used 
for safety reasons. In light of this representation, I cannot say that all reasonable people would 
conclude that the combined hazard was so obvious that the plaintiff assumed the risk and that the 
defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. 
Because there is room for doubt on the questions of the plaintiff’s knowledge and understanding 
and the reasonableness of her conduct, we should not disturb the jury’s verdict. I would find that 
the district court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of the 
assumption of the risk doctrine….  
QUESTIONS 
1. The Stakes: What result flows the court’s conclusion that Smollett assumed the risk of 
her injuries? How would that result be different from a determination that she was 
comparatively at fault? Which regime favors defendants? 
2. Dead Heat: Is there anything about the Virgin Islands’ comparative-fault statute that 
might explain why the jury initially split the damages so cleanly down the middle? 
3. Check Yo Self: By concluding that Smollett assumed the risk of her injuries, is the Third 
Circuit saying that she wasn’t careless and partly at fault for the accident? Do you think 
she was acting without reasonable care for her own safety?  
 
AVILA v. CITRUS COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT 
Supreme Court of California (2006) 
Werdegar, Justice:ã 
During an intercollegiate baseball game at a 
community college, one of the home team’s 
batters is hit by a pitch. In the next half-inning, 
the home team’s pitcher allegedly retaliates with 
an inside pitch and hits a visiting batter in the 
head. The visiting batter is injured, he sues, and 
the courts must umpire the dispute. 
 
ã Phoca2004, Bean Ball (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0). 
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Jose Luis Avila, a Rio Hondo Community College (Rio Hondo) student, played baseball for the 
Rio Hondo Roadrunners. On January 5, 2001, Rio Hondo was playing a preseason road game against 
the Citrus Community College Owls (Citrus College). During the game, a Roadrunners pitcher hit 
a Citrus College batter with a pitch; when Avila came to bat in the top of the next inning, the Citrus 
College pitcher hit him in the head with a pitch, cracking his batting helmet. Avila alleges the pitch 
was an intentional “beanball” thrown in retaliation for the previous hit batter or, at a minimum, was 
thrown negligently.  
Avila staggered, felt dizzy, and was in pain. The Rio Hondo manager told him to go to first base. 
Avila did so, and when he complained to the Rio Hondo first base coach, he was told to stay in the 
game. At second base, he still felt pain, numbness, and dizziness. A Citrus College player yelled to 
the Rio Hondo dugout that the Roadrunners needed a pinch runner. Avila walked off the field and 
went to the Rio Hondo bench. No one tended to his injuries. As a result, Avila suffered unspecified 
serious personal injuries. 
Avila sued both schools, his manager, the helmet manufacturer, and various other entities and 
organizations. Only the claims against the Citrus Community College District (the District) are 
before us. Avila alleged that the District was negligent in failing to summon or provide medical care 
for him when he was obviously in need of it, failing to supervise and control the Citrus College 
pitcher, failing to provide umpires or other supervisory personnel to control the game and prevent 
retaliatory or reckless pitching, and failing to provide adequate equipment to safeguard him from 
serious head injury. Avila also alleged that the District acted negligently by failing to take reasonable 
steps to train and supervise its managers, trainers, employees, and agents in providing medical care 
to injured players and by conducting an illegal preseason game in violation of community college 
baseball rules designed to protect participants such as Avila. 
The District demurred, contending it…owed no duty of care to Avila. The trial court sustained 
the demurrer and dismissed the action against the District. A divided Court of Appeal reversed…. 
We granted the District’s petition for review to…address the extent of a college’s duty in these 
circumstances…. 
To recover for negligence, Avila must demonstrate, inter alia, that the District breached a duty 
of care it owed him. Generally, each person has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the 
circumstances and is liable to those injured by the failure to do so…. 
The existence of duty is not an immutable fact of nature but only an expression of the sum total 
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to 
protection. Thus, the existence and scope of a defendant’s duty is an issue of law, to be decided by a 
court not a jury. When the injury is to a sporting participant, the considerations of policy and the 
question of duty necessarily become intertwined with the question of assumption of risk. 
The traditional version of the assumption of risk doctrine required proof that the plaintiff 
voluntarily accepted a specific known and appreciated risk. The doctrine depended on the actual 
subjective knowledge of the given plaintiff and, where the elements were met, was an absolute 
defense to liability for injuries arising from the known risk. 
California’s abandonment of the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative 
negligence led to a reconceptualization of the assumption of risk…. [T]here are in fact two species of 
assumption of risk: primary and secondary. Primary assumption of the risk arises when, as a matter 
of law and policy, a defendant owes no duty to protect a plaintiff from particular harms.1 Applied in 
the sporting context, it precludes liability for injuries arising from those risks deemed inherent in a 
sport; as a matter of law, others have no legal duty to eliminate those risks or otherwise protect a 
sports participant from them. Under this duty approach, a court need not ask what risks a particular 
plaintiff subjectively knew of and chose to encounter, but instead must evaluate the fundamental 
nature of the sport and the defendant’s role in or relationship to that sport in order to determine 
whether the defendant owes a duty to protect a plaintiff from the particular risk of harm…. 
 
1 Secondary assumption of the risk arises when the defendant still owes a duty of care, but the plaintiff knowingly 
encounters the risks attendant on the defendant’s breach of that duty. We deal here with an issue of primary, not secondary, 
assumption of the risk. 
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Here, the host school’s role is a mixed one: its players are coparticipants, its coaches and 
managers have supervisorial authority over the conduct of the game, and other representatives of 
the school are responsible for the condition of the playing facility. We have previously established 
that coparticipants have a duty not to act recklessly, outside the bounds of the sport, and coaches 
and instructors have a duty not to increase the risks inherent in sports participation; we also have 
noted in dicta that those responsible for maintaining athletic facilities have a similar duty not to 
increase the inherent risks, albeit in the context of businesses selling recreational opportunities. In 
contrast, those with no relation to the sport have no such duty. 
In interscholastic and intercollegiate competition, the host school is not a disinterested, 
uninvolved party vis-a-vis the athletes it invites to compete on its grounds. Without a visiting team, 
there can be no competition. Intercollegiate competition allows a school to, on the smallest scale, 
offer its students the benefits of athletic participation and, on the largest scale, reap the economic 
and marketing benefits that derive from maintenance of a major sports program. These benefits 
justify removing a host school from the broad class of those with no connection to a sporting contest 
and no duty to the participants. In light of those benefits, we hold that in interscholastic and 
intercollegiate competition, the host school and its agents owe a duty to home and visiting players 
alike to, at a minimum, not increase the risks inherent in the sport. Schools and universities are 
already vicariously liable for breaches by the coaches they employ, who owe a duty to their own 
athletes not to increase the risks of sports participation. No reason appears to conclude 
intercollegiate athletics will be harmed by making visiting players, necessary coparticipants in any 
game, additional beneficiaries of the limited duty not to increase the risks of participation. Thus, we 
disagree with the Court of Appeal dissent, which argued that the District is little more than a passive 
provider of facilities and therefore should have no obligation to visiting players. 
We consider next whether Avila has alleged facts supporting breach of the duty not to enhance 
the inherent risks of his sport. Though it numbers them differently, Avila’s complaint in essence 
alleges four ways in which the District breached a duty to Avila by: (1) conducting the game at all; 
(2) failing to control the Citrus College pitcher; (3) failing to provide umpires to supervise and 
control the game; and (4) failing to provide medical care. The District’s demurrer was properly 
sustained if, and only if, each of these alleged breaches, assumed to be true, falls outside any duty 
owed by the District and within the inherent risks of the sport assumed by Avila.  
With respect to the first of these, conducting the game, Avila cites unspecified “community 
college baseball rules” prohibiting preseason games. But the only consequence of the District’s 
hosting the game was that it exposed Avila, who chose to participate, to the ordinary inherent risks 
of the sport of baseball. Nothing about the bare fact of the District’s hosting the game enhanced 
those ordinary risks, so its doing so, whether or not in violation of the alleged rules, does not 
constitute a breach of its duty not to enhance the ordinary risks of baseball. Nor did the District owe 
any separate duty to Avila not to host the game. 
The second alleged breach, the failure to supervise and control the Citrus College pitcher, is 
barred by primary assumption of the risk. Being hit by a pitch is an inherent risk of baseball. The 
dangers of being hit by a pitch, often thrown at speeds approaching 100 miles per hour, are apparent 
and well known: being hit can result in serious injury or, on rare tragic occasions, death.2 
Being intentionally hit is likewise an inherent risk of the sport, so accepted by custom that a pitch 
intentionally thrown at a batter has its own terminology: “brushback,” “beanball,” “chin music.” In 
turn, those pitchers notorious for throwing at hitters are “headhunters.” Pitchers intentionally throw 
at batters to disrupt a batter’s timing or back him away from home plate, to retaliate after a teammate 
has been hit, or to punish a batter for having hit a home run. Some of the most respected baseball 
managers and pitchers have openly discussed the fundamental place throwing at batters has in their 
sport. In George Will’s study of the game, Men at Work, one-time Oakland Athletics and current St. 
Louis Cardinals manager Tony La Russa details the strategic importance of ordering selective 
intentional throwing at opposing batters, principally to retaliate for one’s own players being hit. As 
Los Angeles Dodgers Hall of Fame pitcher Don Drysdale and New York Giants All Star pitcher Sal 
 
2 Most famously, in August 1920, Cleveland Indians shortstop Roy Chapman was hit by a pitch from the New York 
Yankees’ Carl Mays. He died the next day. At least seven other batters in organized baseball have been killed by pitches. 
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“The Barber” Maglie have explained, intentionally throwing at batters can also be an integral part of 
pitching tactics, a tool to help get batters out by upsetting their frame of mind.3 Drysdale and Maglie 
are not alone; past and future Hall of Famers, from Early Wynn and Bob Gibson to Pedro Martinez 
and Roger Clemens, have relied on the actual or threatened willingness to throw at batters to aid 
their pitching. Yankees Aced by Red Sox, L.A. Times (May 31, 2001) (relating Martinez’s assertion 
that he would even throw at Babe Ruth).  
While these examples relate principally to professional baseball, there is nothing legally 
significant about the level of play in this case. The laws of physics that make a thrown baseball 
dangerous and the strategic benefits that arise from disrupting a batter’s timing are only minimally 
dependent on the skill level of the participants, and we see no reason to distinguish between 
collegiate and professional baseball in applying primary assumption of the risk. 
It is true that intentionally throwing at a batter is forbidden by the rules of baseball. But even 
when a participant’s conduct violates a rule of the game and may subject the violator to internal 
sanctions prescribed by the sport itself, imposition of legal liability for such conduct might well alter 
fundamentally the nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging in activity 
that falls close to, but on the permissible side of, a prescribed rule. It is one thing for an umpire to 
punish a pitcher who hits a batter by ejecting him from the game, or for a league to suspend the 
pitcher; it is quite another for tort law to chill any pitcher from throwing inside, i.e., close to the 
batter’s body—a permissible and essential part of the sport—for fear of a suit over an errant pitch. 
For better or worse, being intentionally thrown at is a fundamental part and inherent risk of the 
sport of baseball.4 It is not the function of tort law to police such conduct…. 
[A]n athlete does not assume the risk of a coparticipant’s intentional or reckless conduct totally 
outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport. Here, even if the Citrus College 
pitcher intentionally threw at Avila, his conduct did not fall outside the range of ordinary activity 
involved in the sport. The District owed no duty to Avila to prevent the Citrus College pitcher from 
hitting batters, even intentionally. Consequently, the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk bars 
any claim predicated on the allegation that the Citrus College pitcher negligently or intentionally 
threw at Avila. 
The dissent suggests primary assumption of the risk should not extend to an intentional tort 
such as battery and that Avila should have been granted leave to amend to allege a proper battery 
claim. Amendment would have been futile. Absence of consent is an element of battery. One who 
enters into a sport, game or contest may be taken to consent to physical contacts consistent with the 
understood rules of the game. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992) (“It may be accurate to 
suggest that an individual who voluntarily engages in a potentially dangerous activity or sport 
‘consents to’ or ‘agrees to assume’ the risks inherent in the activity”); Ritchie-Gamester v. City of 
Berkley, 597 N.W.2d 517 (Mich. 1999) (“The act of stepping onto the field may be described as 
‘consent to the inherent risks of the activity.’”) Thus, the boxer who steps into the ring consents to 
his opponent’s jabs; the football player who steps onto the gridiron consents to his opponent’s hard 
tackle; the hockey goalie who takes the ice consents to face his opponent’s slapshots; and, here, the 
baseball player who steps to the plate consents to the possibility the opposing pitcher may throw 
near or at him. The complaint establishes Avila voluntarily participated in the baseball game; as 
such, his consent would bar any battery claim as a matter of law. 
The third way in which Avila alleges the District breached its duty of care, by failing to provide 
umpires, likewise did not increase the risks inherent in the game. Baseball may be played with 
umpires, as between professionals at the World Series, or without, as between children in the sandlot. 
Avila argues that providing umpires would have made the game safer, because an umpire might have 
 
3 As Maglie explained the strategy: “You have to make the batter afraid of the ball or, anyway, aware that he can get hurt. 
A good time is when the count is two balls and two strikes. He’s looking to swing. You knock him down then and he gets up 
shaking. Now throw a curve to him and you have your out.” Maglie’s nickname is attributed to his propensity for shaving 
batters’ chins with his pitches. Similarly for Drysdale: “The knockdown pitch upsets a hitter’s timing, like a change-up. It’s 
not a weapon. It’s a tactic.” 
4 The conclusion that being intentionally hit by a pitch is an inherent risk of baseball extends only to situations such as 
that alleged here, where the hit batter is at the plate. Allegations that a pitcher intentionally hit a batter who was still in the 
on deck circle, or elsewhere, would present an entirely different scenario. 
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issued a warning and threatened ejections after the first batter was hit. Whatever the likelihood of this 
happening and the difficulty of showing causation, the argument overlooks a key point. The District 
owed a duty not to increase the risks inherent in the sport, not a duty to decrease the risks. While the 
provision of umpires might—might—have reduced the risk of a retaliatory beanball, Avila has alleged 
no facts supporting imposition of a duty on the District to reduce that risk. 
Finally, Avila alleges that the District breached a duty to him by failing to provide medical care 
after he was injured…. [H]e argues that because the District placed him in peril through the actions 
of the Citrus College pitcher, it had a duty to ensure he received medical attention. 
In some circumstances, the common law imposes a duty on those who injure others to mitigate 
the resulting harm…. [A]n actor who knows or has reason to know that by his conduct, whether 
tortious or innocent, he has caused such bodily harm to another as to make him helpless and in 
danger of further harm is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent such further harm. In 
Brooks v. E. J. Willig Truck Transp. Co., 255 P.2d 802 (1953), we recognized and applied this 
principle, holding in the context of a hit-and-run death that “one who negligently injures another 
and renders him helpless is bound to use reasonable care to prevent any further harm which the 
actor realizes or should realize threatens the injured person.” 
Avila’s proposed extension of Brooks to this case encounters at least three main difficulties. First, 
Avila has not alleged a basis on which to conclude the District caused his injury. Universities 
ordinarily are not vicariously liable for the actions of their student-athletes during competition. 
While Avila argues the District should be responsible for the Citrus College pitcher’s conduct if the 
Citrus College coaches ordered or condoned a retaliatory pitch, the complaint notably lacks any 
allegation they did so. 
Second, even if Avila might have amended his complaint to add such an allegation, Brooks and 
the common law duty it recognizes are confined to situations where the injured party is helpless. 
The complaint establishes that Avila was able to make it to first and then second base under his own 
power, and was able to alert his own first base coach to his condition. These allegations cast serious 
doubt on whether Avila was sufficiently helpless so as to warrant imposing a [Brooks-type] duty on 
the District. 
Third, even if we were to impose a duty, the face of the complaint establishes that Avila’s own 
Rio Hondo coaches and trainers were present. They, not Citrus College’s coaches, had exclusive 
authority to determine whether Avila needed to be removed from the game for a pinch runner in 
order to receive medical attention.5 Likewise, to the extent Avila argues a Citrus-College-provided 
umpire could have insisted Avila receive medical treatment, there is no basis for concluding a home 
team umpire would have been authorized to overrule the medical judgments of Rio Hondo’s 
trainers. Thus, even if the District were responsible for causing Avila’s injury, at most it would have 
had a duty to ensure that Avila’s coaches and trainers were aware he had been injured so they could 
decide how best to attend to him. The complaint indicates Avila alerted his own first base coach to 
how he was feeling, and when he arrived at second base, a Citrus College player, recognizing Avila 
was injured, alerted the Rio Hondo bench, at which point Rio Hondo removed Avila from the game. 
If the District had a duty, it satisfied that duty. In the possibly apocryphal words of New York 
Yankees catcher Yogi Berra, “It ain’t over till it’s over,” but this means that for Avila’s complaint 
against Citrus College, it’s over.  
Kennard, Justice, concurring and dissenting: 
…[T]he majority holds that a baseball pitcher owes no duty to refrain from intentionally 
throwing a baseball at an opposing player’s head. This is a startling conclusion. It is contrary to the 
official view in the sport that such conduct “should be—and is—condemned by everybody.” Official 
Rules of Major League Baseball, rule 8.02(d).  
Central to the majority’s holding is its reliance on the legal rule that there is no duty to avoid 
risks “inherent” in a recreational sport…. Unlike good wine, this rule has not improved with age. I 
have repeatedly voiced my disagreement with this court’s adoption of that rule, which is tearing at 
 
5 Any departure from this rule would lead to chaos, as teams asserted a legal duty to remove their opponents’ “injured” 
star players from competition in order to evaluate them and provide any necessary medical care. 
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the fabric of tort law because it distorts the negligence concept of due care to encompass reckless 
and intentional conduct. Moreover, because the question of what is “inherent” in a sport is 
amorphous and fact-intensive, it is impossible for trial courts to discern, at an early stage in the 
proceedings, which risks are inherent in a given sport. As explained below, this case illustrates that 
the no-duty-for-sports rule is unworkable and unfair…. 
The first, third, and fourth of the legal theories alleged in Avila’s complaint can be disposed of 
without resort to the no-duty-for-sports rule. Avila’s first theory of liability (that the District conducted 
an illegal preseason game) fails because, as the majority explains, the District did not breach any duty 
to Avila by conducting the game, irrespective of whether community college rules permitted it to be 
played. Avila’s third theory (that the District failed to provide umpires) must be rejected because 
baseball games are often played without umpires, and there is no reason to impose on community 
colleges a duty to provide them. And Avila’s fourth theory (that the District failed to provide medical 
care) fails because, as the majority points out, the District had no duty to provide medical care when 
Avila’s team came equipped with its own trainers, who were present to treat his injuries. 
Avila’s second theory of liability (that the District failed to supervise and control the Citrus 
pitcher) presents a more difficult question. As the majority notes, colleges “ordinarily are not 
vicariously liable for the actions of their student-athletes during competition.” Although Avila now 
argues that the District would be liable if its coaches ordered or allowed a retaliatory pitch aimed at 
Avila’s head, his complaint does not expressly allege that they did so. Thus, his failure to do so 
justifies the trial court’s decision to sustain the District’s demurrer. But the trial court should have 
given Avila at least one opportunity to amend his original complaint to include such an allegation. 
The majority, however, upholds the trial court’s sustaining of the District’s demurrer without 
leave to amend. Relying on the no-duty-for-sports rule, the majority, in essence, concludes that even 
if the District’s coaches had ordered the Citrus pitcher to hit Avila in the head with a pitched ball, 
the District is not liable for Avila’s injuries because the risk that a batter will be injured by a pitch 
intentionally thrown at his head is “an inherent risk of the sport.” According to the majority, “[s]ome 
of the most respected baseball managers and pitchers have openly discussed the fundamental place 
[that] throwing at batters has in their sport.” The majority acknowledges that those comments were 
made in the context of professional baseball. The majority then proceeds to hold that throwing at 
batters is a risk as inherent in college baseball as it is in professional baseball. My concerns are 
threefold. 
First, the determination whether being hit by a pitched ball intentionally aimed at one’s head is 
an inherent risk of baseball, whether professional or intercollegiate, is a question of fact to be 
determined in the trial court…. Here, the trial court never heard, and thus never considered, the 
comments from professional baseball managers and pitchers on which the majority relies; indeed, 
not only did the District offer no evidence on this issue, but the District did not even argue that 
Avila’s complaint was barred by the no-duty-for-sports rule. Undeterred, the majority has done its 
own research and made its own factual findings on this issue, thus invading the province of the trial 
court. I recognize that this court must take judicial notice of facts and propositions of generalized 
knowledge that are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute. But 
the majority’s assertion that intentionally throwing a ball at a batter’s head is inherent in 
intercollegiate baseball is not a fact so “universally known” that it cannot reasonably be the subject 
of dispute. 
Had Avila been given the opportunity in the trial court, he might well have called expert 
witnesses who could have refuted the majority’s factual determination that aiming at a batter’s head 
is inherent in professional baseball. And he could have pointed to the official comments 
accompanying Major League Baseball’s rule 8.02(d), which prohibits pitchers from trying to hit the 
batter: “To pitch at a batter’s head is unsportsmanlike and highly dangerous. It should be—and is—
condemned by everybody. Umpires should act without hesitation in enforcement of this rule.”  
Alternatively, Avila could have called expert witnesses to refute the majority’s finding, which is 
unsupported by any citation of authority, that the conduct in question is as inherent in 
intercollegiate baseball as it is in professional baseball. And he could have pointed out that, unlike 
the rules of professional baseball, the rules of the National Collegiate Athletic Association provide 
that a pitcher who intentionally throws at a batter is not only ejected from the game in which the 
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pitch was thrown, but is also suspended for the team’s next four games, and a pitcher who 
intentionally throws at a batter on three occasions must be suspended for the remainder of the 
season. (Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assn., NCAA Baseball Rules (Dec. 2005) rule 5, § 16(d).)  
I turn to my second concern…. [T]he majority imposes on trial courts the obligation to decide—
in ruling on a demurrer—a question of fact: that is, whether a particular sports injury arises from an 
activity inherent in the game. Questions of fact cannot be decided on demurrer, however; they must 
be decided on summary judgment or at trial. Thus, the no-duty-for-sports rule is unworkable 
because it forces trial courts to decide questions of fact at the demurrer stage when the only method 
available to them is suitable only for deciding questions of law. 
My third concern is that the majority’s application of the no-duty-for-sports rule to include 
pitches intentionally thrown at a batter’s head is an ill-conceived expansion of that rule into 
intentional torts. In Knight, the plaintiff alleged only that the defendant acted negligently, and the 
plurality there justified the no-duty-for-sports rule with the comment that a baseball player should 
not be held liable “for an injury resulting from a carelessly thrown ball or bat during a baseball game.” 
Here, however, the majority applies that rule to hold that the trial court properly sustained the 
District’s demurrer to Avila’s cause of action alleging an intentional tort, in which he alleged that the 
pitch that hit him “was thrown in a deliberate retaliatory fashion, with reckless disregard for the 
safety of plaintiff.” Even if I were to accept the majority’s misguided no-duty-for-sports rule, I would 
apply it only to causes of action for negligence, not for intentional torts. 
I would analyze Avila’s claim under the traditional doctrine of assumption of risk. Under that 
doctrine, the pertinent inquiry is not what risk is inherent in a particular sport; rather, it is what risk 
the plaintiff consciously and voluntarily assumed. That issue, as I explained earlier, is not one 
involving a duty of care owed to another, to be resolved on demurrer; rather, it is an affirmative 
defense, to be resolved on summary judgment or at trial.  
Under traditional assumption-of-risk analysis, sports participants owe each other a duty to 
refrain from unreasonably risky conduct that may cause harm. Intentionally hitting another person 
in the head with a hard object thrown at a high speed is highly dangerous and is potentially tortious, 
no matter whether the object is a ball thrown on a baseball field or is a rock thrown on a city street. 
Thus, if the District here was complicit in a decision by the pitcher to hit Avila in the head with the 
baseball, it may be held liable for Avila’s injuries if Avila did not assume the risk that the pitcher 
would hit him in this manner. But, as I explained earlier, Avila has thus far not alleged that coaches 
employed by the District either advised or condoned any such act. Thus, the trial court properly 
sustained the District’s demurrer; but Avila should be given leave to amend his original complaint 
to allege that the District was legally responsible for the pitcher’s decision to aim the baseball at 
Avila’s head.  
If Avila were to amend his complaint to allege the District’s complicity in the pitcher’s decision 
to hit him in the head with the baseball, the District should be permitted to deny liability on the 
ground that Avila assumed the risk of an intentional hit in the head during the game: that is, he 
voluntarily accepted that risk with knowledge and appreciation of that risk. Whether Avila assumed 
that risk is a question of fact that has no bearing on the District’s duty of care toward Avila…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Assuming Risks: What’s the difference between primary and secondary assumption of 
risk? And how do they both differ from the assumption of risk raised by Jones and 
Dalury? Can multiple types of assumption of risk be relevant in a single case? 
2. Beanball: How can conduct both violate a sport’s rules and be an inherent risk of that 
sport? And how do we decide if a risk is inherent? Does the level of play matter? What if 
this had happened six years earlier, when Avila was playing in a Little League game? 
3. Karma’s a Pitch: Does it matter why the Roadrunners pitcher threw the beanball? What 
if he threw it because his boyfriend recently cheated on him with Avila? 
  
  TORT LAW 222 
CHAPTER 5:  STRICT LIABILITY  
A. Ultrahazardous Activities 
RYLANDS v. FLETCHER 
House of Lords (1868) 
Cairns, Lord Chancellor: 
My Lords, in this case the Plaintiff…is the occupier of a mine and 
works under a close of land. The Defendants are the owners of a mill 
in his neighbourhood, and they proposed to make a reservoir for the 
purpose of keeping and storing water to be used about their mill upon 
another close of land, which, for the purposes of this case, may be taken 
as being adjoining to the close of the Plaintiff, although, in point of fact, 
some intervening land lay between the two. Underneath the close of 
land of the Defendants on which they proposed to construct their 
reservoir there were certain old and disused mining passages and 
works. There were five vertical shafts, and some horizontal shafts 
communicating with them. The vertical shafts had been filled up with 
soil and rubbish, and it does not appear that any person was aware of the existence either of the 
vertical shafts or of the horizontal works communicating with them. In the course of the working 
by the Plaintiff of his mine, he had gradually worked through the seams of coal underneath the close, 
and had come into contact with the old and disused works underneath the close of the Defendants. 
In that state of things the reservoir of the Defendants was constructed. It was constructed by 
them through the agency and inspection of an engineer and contractor. Personally, the Defendants 
appear to have taken no part in the works, or to have been aware of any want of security connected 
with them. As regards the engineer and the contractor, we must take it from the case that they did 
not exercise, as far as they were concerned, that reasonable care and caution which they might have 
exercised, taking notice, as they appear to have taken notice, of the vertical shafts filled up in the 
manner which I have mentioned. However, my Lords, when the reservoir was constructed, and 
filled, or partly filled, with water, the weight of the water bearing upon the disused and imperfectly 
filled-up vertical shafts, broke through those shafts. The water passed down them and into the 
horizontal workings, and from the horizontal workings under the close of the Defendants it passed 
on into the workings under the close of the Plaintiff, and flooded his mine, causing considerable 
damage, for which this action was brought.  
The Court of Exchequer, when the special case stating the facts to which I have referred, was 
argued, was of opinion that the Plaintiff had established no cause of action. The Court of Exchequer 
Chamber, before which an appeal from this judgment was argued, was of a contrary opinion, and 
the Judges there unanimously arrived at the conclusion that there was a cause of action, and that the 
Plaintiff was entitled to damages.  
My Lords, the principles on which this case must be determined appear to me to be extremely 
simple. The Defendants, treating them as the owners or occupiers of the close on which the reservoir 
was constructed, might lawfully have used that close for any purpose for which it might in the 
ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be used; and if, in what I may term the natural user of that 
land, there had been any accumulation of water, either on the surface or underground, and if, by the 
operation of the laws of nature, that accumulation of water had passed off into the close occupied 
by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff could not have complained that that result had taken place. If he had 
desired to guard himself against it, it would have lain upon him to have done so, by leaving, or by 
interposing, some barrier between his close and the close of the Defendants in order to have 
prevented that operation of the laws of nature…. 
On the other hand if the Defendants, not stopping at the natural use of their close, had desired to 
use it for any purpose which I may term a non-natural use, for the purpose of introducing into the 
close that which in its natural condition was not in or upon it, for the purpose of introducing water 
either above or below ground in quantities and in a manner not the result of any work or operation 
on or under the land—and if in consequence of their doing so, or in consequence of any imperfection 
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in the mode of their doing so, the water came to escape and to pass off into the close of the Plaintiff, 
then it appears to me that that which the Defendants were doing they were doing at their own peril; 
and, if in the course of their doing it, the evil arose to which I have referred, the evil, namely, of the 
escape of the water and its passing away to the close of the Plaintiff and injuring the Plaintiff, then for 
the consequence of that, in my opinion, the Defendants would be liable…. My Lords, these simple 
principles, if they are well founded, as it appears to me they are, really dispose of this case.  
The same result is arrived at on the principles referred to by Mr. Justice Blackburn in his 
judgment, in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, where he states the opinion of that Court as to the 
law in these words:  
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, 
brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it 
escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is prima facie 
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He 
can excuse himself by shewing that the escape was owing to the Plaintiff’s default; 
or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; 
but as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse 
would be sufficient. The general rule, as above stated, seems on principle just. The 
person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, 
or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbour’s reservoir, or whose 
cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbour’s privy, or whose habitation is made 
unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbour’s alkali works, is 
damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable and just that 
the neighbour who has brought something on his own property (which was not 
naturally there), harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, 
but which he knows will be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour’s, should be 
obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining 
it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have 
accrued, and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there, so that no 
mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequence. And 
upon authority this we think is established to be the law, whether the things so 
brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches. 
 My Lords, in that opinion, I must say I entirely concur. Therefore, I have to move your 
Lordships that the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber be affirmed, and that the present 
appeal be dismissed with costs. 
Cranworth, Lord, concurring: 
 My Lords, I concur with my noble and learned friend in thinking that the rule of law was 
correctly stated by Mr. Justice Blackburn in delivering the opinion of the Exchequer Chamber. If a 
person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it should escape, may cause damage to 
his neighbour, he does so at his peril. If it does escape, and cause damage, he is responsible, however 
careful he may have been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage. In 
considering whether a Defendant is liable to a Plaintiff for damage which the Plaintiff may have 
sustained, the question in general is not whether the Defendant has acted with due care and caution, 
but whether his acts have occasioned the damage…. [T]he doctrine is founded on good sense. For 
when one person, in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is 
obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer. He is bound…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Pingaro Revisited: How is Rylands like Pingaro? How is it different? 
2. Leffler Revisited: How is Rylands like Leffler? How is it different? 
3. Menlove Revisited: Could Menlove have been decided on similar grounds to Rylands? 
Are spontaneously combusting haystacks like leaky reservoirs? 
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KLEIN v. PYRODYNE CORP. 
Supreme Court of Washington (1991) 
Guy, Justice: 
The plaintiffs in this case are persons injured when 
an aerial shell at a public fireworks exhibition went 
astray and exploded near them. The defendant is the 
pyrotechnic company hired to set up and discharge 
the fireworks. The issue before this court is whether 
pyrotechnicians are strictly liable for damages caused 
by fireworks displays. We hold that they are. 
Defendant Pyrodyne Corporation (Pyrodyne) is a 
general contractor for aerial fireworks at public 
fireworks displays. Pyrodyne contracted to procure 
fireworks, to provide pyrotechnic operators, and to display the fireworks at the Western Washington 
State Fairgrounds in Puyallup, Washington, on July 4, 1987. All operators of the fireworks display 
were Pyrodyne employees acting within the scope of their employment duties. 
As required by Washington statute, Pyrodyne purchased a $1 million insurance policy prior to 
the fireworks show. The policy provided $1 million coverage for each occurrence of bodily injury or 
property damage liability. Plaintiffs allege that Pyrodyne failed to carry out a number of the other 
statutory and regulatory requirements in preparing for and setting off the fireworks. For example, 
they allege that Pyrodyne failed to properly bury the mortar tubes prior to detonation, failed to 
provide a diagram of the display and surrounding environment to the local government, failed to 
provide crowd control monitors, and failed to keep the invitees at the mandated safe distance. 
During the fireworks display, one of the 5-inch mortars was knocked into a horizontal position. 
From this position an aerial shell inside was ignited and discharged. The shell flew 500 feet in a 
trajectory parallel to the earth and exploded near the crowd of onlookers. Plaintiffs Danny and 
Marion Klein were injured by the explosion. Mr. Klein’s clothing was set on fire, and he suffered 
facial burns and serious injury to his eyes. 
The parties provide conflicting explanations of the cause of the improper horizontal discharge 
of the shell. Pyrodyne argues that the accident was caused by a 5-inch shell detonating in its 
aboveground mortar tube without ever leaving the ground. Pyrodyne asserts that this detonation 
caused another mortar tube to be knocked over, ignited, and shot off horizontally. In contrast, the 
Kleins contend that the misdirected shell resulted because Pyrodyne’s employees improperly set up 
the display. They further note that because all of the evidence exploded, there is no means of proving 
the cause of the misfire. 
The Kleins brought suit against Pyrodyne under [a theory of] strict liability…. The trial court 
denied Pyrodyne’s summary judgment motion regarding the Kleins’ strict liability claim, holding 
that Pyrodyne was strictly liable without fault and ordering summary judgment in favor of the Kleins 
on the issue of liability…. Pyrodyne is appealing solely as to the trial court’s holding that strict 
liability is the appropriate standard of liability for pyrotechnicians…. 
I. Fireworks Displays as Abnormally Dangerous Activities 
The Kleins contend that strict liability is the appropriate standard to determine the culpability 
of Pyrodyne because Pyrodyne was participating in an abnormally dangerous activity…. The 
modern doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities derives from Fletcher v. 
Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), in which the defendant’s reservoir flooded mine shafts on the 
plaintiff’s adjoining land. Rylands v. Fletcher has come to stand for the rule that the defendant will 
be liable when he damages another by a thing or activity unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the 
place where it is maintained, in the light of the character of that place and its surroundings. 
The basic principle of Rylands v. Fletcher has been accepted by the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts. Section 519 of the Restatement provides that any party carrying on an “abnormally dangerous 
activity” is strictly liable for ensuing damages. The test for what constitutes such an activity is stated 
in section 520 of the Restatement. Both Restatement sections have been adopted by this court, and 
determination of whether an activity is an “abnormally dangerous activity” is a question of law. 
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Section 520 of the Restatement lists six factors that are to be considered in determining whether an 
activity is “abnormally dangerous.” The factors are as follows: 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels 
of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and 
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous 
attributes. 
…[T]he comments to section 520 explain how these factors should be evaluated: 
Any one of them is not necessarily sufficient of itself in a particular case, and 
ordinarily several of them will be required for strict liability. On the other hand, it 
is not necessary that each of them be present, especially if others weigh heavily. 
Because of the interplay of these various factors, it is not possible to reduce 
abnormally dangerous activities to any definition. The essential question is 
whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because 
of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability 
for the harm that results from it, even though it is carried on with all reasonable 
care. 
Examination of these factors persuades us that fireworks displays are abnormally dangerous 
activities justifying the imposition of strict liability. 
We find that the factors stated in clauses (a), (b), and (c) are all present in the case of fireworks 
displays. Anytime a person ignites aerial shells or rockets with the intention of sending them aloft 
to explode in the presence of large crowds of people, a high risk of serious personal injury or property 
damage is created. That risk arises because of the possibility that a shell or rocket will malfunction 
or be misdirected. Furthermore, no matter how much care pyrotechnicians exercise, they cannot 
entirely eliminate the high risk inherent in setting off powerful explosives such as fireworks near 
crowds. 
The dangerousness of fireworks displays is evidenced by the elaborate scheme of administrative 
regulations with which pyrotechnicians must comply. Pyrotechnicians must be licensed to conduct 
public displays of special fireworks. To obtain such a license, the pyrotechnician must take and pass 
a written examination administered by the director of fire protection, and must submit evidence of 
qualifications and experience, including participation in the firing of at least six public displays as 
an assistant, at least one of which shall have been in the current or preceding year. The 
pyrotechnician’s application for a license must be investigated by the director of fire protection, who 
must confirm that the applicant is competent and experienced. Licensed pyrotechnicians are 
charged with ensuring that the display is set up in accordance with all rules and regulations. 
Regulations also govern such matters as the way in which the fireworks at public displays are 
constructed, stored, installed, and fired. The necessity for such regulations demonstrates the 
dangerousness of fireworks displays. 
Pyrodyne argues that if the regulations are complied with, then the high degree of risk otherwise 
inherent in the displays can be eliminated. Although we recognize that the high risk can be reduced, 
we do not agree that it can be eliminated. Setting off powerful fireworks near large crowds remains 
a highly risky activity even when the safety precautions mandated by statutes and regulations are 
followed. The Legislature appears to agree, for it has declared that in order to obtain a license to 
conduct a public fireworks display, a pyrotechnician must first obtain a surety bond or a certificate 
of insurance, the amount of which must be at least $1 million for each event. 
The factors stated in clauses (a), (b), and (c) together, and sometimes one of them alone, express 
what is commonly meant by saying an activity is ultrahazardous. As the Restatement explains, 
however, “liability for abnormally dangerous activities is not a matter of these three factors alone, 
and those stated in Clauses (d), (e), and (f) must still be taken into account.” 
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The factor expressed in clause (d) concerns the extent to which the activity is not a matter “of 
common usage.” The Restatement explains that “an activity is a matter of common usage if it is 
customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community.” As 
examples of activities that are not matters of common usage, the Restatement comments offer 
driving a tank, blasting, the manufacture, storage, transportation, and use of high explosives, and 
drilling for oil. The deciding characteristic is that few persons engage in these activities. Likewise, 
relatively few persons conduct public fireworks displays. Therefore, presenting public fireworks 
displays is not a matter of common usage. 
Pyrodyne argues that the factor stated in clause (d) is not met because fireworks are a common 
way to celebrate the Fourth of July. We reject this argument. Although fireworks are frequently and 
regularly enjoyed by the public, few persons set off special fireworks displays. Indeed, the general 
public is prohibited by statute from making public fireworks displays insofar as anyone wishing to 
do so must first obtain a license. 
The factor stated in clause (e) requires analysis of the appropriateness of the activity to the place 
where it was carried on. In this case, the fireworks display was conducted at the Puyallup 
Fairgrounds. Although some locations—such as over water—may be safer, the Puyallup 
Fairgrounds is an appropriate place for a fireworks show because the audience can be seated at a 
reasonable distance from the display. Therefore, the clause (e) factor is not present in this case. 
The factor stated in clause (f) requires analysis of the extent to which the value of fireworks to 
the community outweighs its dangerous attributes. We do not find that this factor is present here. 
This country has a long-standing tradition of fireworks on the Fourth of July. That tradition suggests 
that we as a society have decided that the value of fireworks on the day celebrating our national 
independence and unity outweighs the risks of injuries and damage. 
In sum, we find that setting off public fireworks displays satisfies four of the six conditions under 
the Restatement test; that is, it is an activity that is not “of common usage” and that presents an 
ineliminably high risk of serious bodily injury or property damage. We therefore hold that 
conducting public fireworks displays is an abnormally dangerous activity justifying the imposition 
of strict liability. 
This conclusion is consistent with the results reached in cases involving damages caused by 
detonating dynamite. This court has recognized that parties detonating dynamite are strictly liable 
for the damages caused by such blasting. See Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645 (Wash. 
1954). There are a number of similarities between fireworks and dynamite. Both activities involve 
licensed experts intentionally igniting for profit explosives that have great potential for causing 
damage. Moreover, after the explosion no evidence remains as to the original explosive. The notable 
difference between fireworks and dynamite is that with fireworks the public is invited to watch the 
display and with dynamite the public is generally prohibited from being near the blasting location. 
Because detonating dynamite is subject to strict liability, and because of the similarities between 
fireworks and dynamite, strict liability is also an appropriate standard for determining the standard 
of liability for pyrotechnicians for any damages caused by their fireworks displays. 
II. Public Policy and Strict Liability For Fireworks Displays 
Policy considerations also support imposing strict liability on pyrotechnicians for damages 
caused by their public fireworks displays, although such considerations are not alone sufficient to 
justify that conclusion. Most basic is the question as to who should bear the loss when an innocent 
person suffers injury through the nonculpable but abnormally dangerous activities of another. In 
the case of public fireworks displays, fairness weighs in favor of requiring the pyrotechnicians who 
present the displays to bear the loss rather than the unfortunate spectators who suffer the injuries. 
In addition, the rule of strict liability rests not only upon the ultimate idea of rectifying a wrong and 
putting the burden where it should belong as a matter of abstract justice, that is, upon the one of the 
two innocent parties whose acts instigated or made the harm possible, but it also rests on problems 
of proof: One of these common features is that the person harmed would encounter a difficult 
problem of proof if some other standard of liability were applied. For example, the disasters caused 
by those who engage in abnormally dangerous or extra-hazardous activities frequently destroy all 
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evidence of what in fact occurred, other than that the activity was being carried on. Certainly this is 
true with explosions of dynamite, large quantities of gasoline, or other explosives. 
In the present case, all evidence was destroyed as to what caused the misfire of the shell that 
injured the Kleins. Therefore, the problem of proof this case presents for the plaintiffs also supports 
imposing strict liability on Pyrodyne. 
III. Statutory Strict Liability for Fireworks 
As well as holding Pyrodyne strictly liable on the basis that fireworks displays are abnormally 
dangerous activities, we also hold that RCW 70.77.285 imposes statutory strict liability. The statute, 
which mandates insurance coverage to pay for all damages resulting from fireworks displays, 
establishes strict liability for any ensuing injuries. 
An example of a statute which the appellate court has held to be a strict liability statute is RCW 
16.08.040, which reads in part: 
The owner of any dog which shall bite any person shall be liable for such damages 
as may be suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of 
such dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness. 
The court in Beeler v. Hickman, 750 P.2d 1282 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988), held that the language of 
the statute clearly established strict liability for the owner of the dog. Although RCW 70.77.285 does 
not establish strict liability in the same language as the dog bite statute, it nonetheless provides that 
pyrotechnicians shall pay for all damages to persons or property resulting from fireworks displays. 
RCW 70.77.285 has been amended twice since it was enacted in 1961. Neither amendment 
changed the original disjunctive language mandating liability insurance coverage for “all damages 
to persons or property or any negligence on the part of the applicant.” The statutory language clearly 
indicates that the Legislature intended pyrotechnicians to carry insurance to cover any damages 
incurred as a result of the fireworks display. The rule of construction applied to the disjunctive “or” 
mandates that by use of “or,” a failure to comply with any requirement in the statute imposes 
liability. Thus, by utilizing the disjunctive “or” the Legislature indicated that damages will be owed 
for all injuries caused by the fireworks display, regardless of whether they resulted from the 
pyrotechnician’s negligence.  
Furthermore, no part of a statute should be deemed inoperative or superfluous unless it is the 
result of obvious mistake or error. This requires that every word, clause, and sentence of a statute be 
given effect, if possible. Pursuant to this requirement, both clauses of RCW 70.77.285 should be 
given effect. Therefore, it is necessary to interpret the statute as mandating coverage of all damages 
caused by fireworks displays, regardless of whether those damages were caused by negligence of the 
pyrotechnicians. 
IV. Possible Negligent Manufacture as an Intervening Force 
Pyrodyne argues that even if there is strict liability for fireworks, its liability under the facts of 
this case is cut off by the manufacturer’s negligence, the existence of which we assume for purposes 
of evaluating the propriety of the trial court’s summary judgment. According to Pyrodyne, a shell 
detonated without leaving the mortar box because it was negligently manufactured. This detonation, 
Pyrodyne asserts, was what caused the misfire of the second shell, which in turn resulted in the 
Kleins’ injuries. Pyrodyne reasons that the manufacturer’s negligence acted as an intervening or 
outside force that cuts off Pyrodyne’s liability…. 
We note that the Restatement (Second) of Torts takes a position contrary to that advocated by 
Pyrodyne. Section 522 of the Restatement provides that: “One carrying on an abnormally dangerous 
activity is subject to strict liability for the resulting harm although it is caused by the unexpectable 
(a) innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a third person.” The comment to section 522 explains 
that “if the risk from an abnormally dangerous activity ripens into injury, it is immaterial that the 
harm occurs through the unexpectable action of a human being.” 
Thus, on the one hand, Pyrodyne urges us to adopt the view that any intervention by an outside 
force beyond the defendant’s control is sufficient to relieve the defendant from strict liability for an 
abnormally dangerous activity. On the other hand, section 522 provides that no negligent 
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intervention by a third person will relieve the defendant from strict liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities. We reject both positions…. 
We hold that intervening acts of third persons serve to relieve the defendant from strict liability 
for abnormally dangerous activities only if those acts were unforeseeable in relation to the 
extraordinary risk created by the activity. The rationale for this rule is that it encourages those who 
conduct abnormally dangerous activities to anticipate and take precautions against the possible 
negligence of third persons. Where the third person’s negligence is beyond the actor’s control, this 
rule…nonetheless imposes strict liability if the third person negligence was reasonably foreseeable. 
Such a result allocates the economic burden of injuries arising from the foreseeable negligence of 
third persons to the party best able to plan for it and to bear it—the actor carrying on the abnormally 
dangerous activity.  
In the present case, negligence on the part of the fireworks manufacturer is readily foreseeable 
in relation to the extraordinary risk created by conducting a public fireworks display. Therefore, 
even if such negligence may properly be regarded as an intervening cause, an issue we need not 
decide, it cannot function to relieve Pyrodyne from liability. This is not to say, however, that in a 
proper case a defendant in a strict liability action could not pursue a claim against a third party and 
enforce a right of contribution to an extent proportionate to that party’s fault.  
We hold that Pyrodyne Corporation is strictly liable for all damages suffered as a result of the 
July 1987 fireworks display. Detonating fireworks displays constitutes an abnormally dangerous 
activity warranting strict liability. Public policy also supports this conclusion. Furthermore, RCW 
70.77.285 mandates the payment of all damages caused by fireworks displays, regardless of whether 
those damages were due to the pyrotechnicians’ negligence. This establishes the standard of strict 
liability for pyrotechnicians. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Dolliver, Justice, concurring: 
I concur fully with the result reached by the majority. In my opinion the statute, RCW 70.77.285, 
is decisive. While I harbor some belief the Legislature may not have intended the result reached by 
the majority, legislative intent is irrelevant when the language of the statute is plain on its face. 
I am not in agreement, however, with the analysis reached by the majority relative to the 
application of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520, which characterizes fireworks displays as 
“abnormally dangerous.”… 
I first note that no other jurisdiction has adopted a common law rule of strict liability for 
fireworks displays. While this state regularly does things differently from its companion 
jurisdictions and, indeed, its uniqueness is many times a source of justifiable pride, extreme care 
should be exercised before embarking on a new doctrine foreign to this state as well as to all others…. 
The majority claims [Restatement § 520] factors (a), (b), (c), and (d) are present while factors (e) 
and (f) are not present. I agree factors (e) and (f) do not apply for the reasons given by the majority. 
I also agree factors (a) and (b) are present. Where I disagree with the majority is in whether factors 
(c) and (d) are present. The majority says yes, I say no. 
Fireworks, no less than motor vehicles, for example, are high risk instrumentalities. In reality, all 
instrumentalities inevitably involve some degree of risk. Nothing in human life is risk free. The real 
issue is whether the hazard can be reduced to acceptable limits. This analysis is particularly apt 
where, as here, the likelihood of injury to significant numbers of persons is great unless the risk is 
significantly reduced. Blasting at some remove from civilization is one thing; public, urban fireworks 
displays are another matter. 
It is apparent the Legislature, recognizing the dangers of public fireworks displays, attempted to 
regulate comprehensively fireworks displays. There are strict and specific safety and licensing 
provisions…. The Legislature has made the determination, through the legislative process, that in 
fact the “high degree of risk” inherent in public fireworks displays can adequately be reduced by the 
“reasonable care” required by the statute. This being so, I do not believe this court should use a 
random case, as here, to tamper with this legislative judgment. Factor (c) has not been met. 
In discussing factor (d), the majority states that since “few persons set off special fireworks 
displays” they are not a matter of common usage. I believe the majority misconstrues factor (d). The 
Restatement comment on clause (d) discusses activities carried on by only a few 
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persons, e.g., blasting, the transportation of high explosives, the drilling of oil wells. What is 
significant is that each of the activities used for illustrative purposes is not only an activity which is 
not a matter of common usage, but it is also a solitary activity. In contrast to the large crowds which 
attend public fireworks displays, the examples listed in comment d are not for spectators and are 
done away from the public. The viewing of a public fireworks display is in fact, in the words of the 
comment on clause (d), “customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in 
the community.” None of the examples in the comment are in any way similar to public fireworks 
displays. While it is true the setting up and setting off of the fireworks in public displays are done by 
very few people, the more important “activity” is viewing the fireworks display. I would find factor 
(d) is not met. 
I also disagree with the majority’s treatment of the six factors as acting only in favor of strict 
liability. Properly construed, each of the factors may also mitigate against strict liability…. The 
majority concedes “the value of fireworks to the community outweighs its dangerous attributes.” 
Properly construed, therefore, factor (f) is not merely a nullity in the strict liability analysis, but 
should actually mitigate against the imposition of strict liability…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Strict in Theory, Fatal in Fact? How do plaintiffs benefit by establishing strict liability? 
How does it effectively eliminate an element of negligence? Do you think that Klein 
could also have established negligence here? What effect might strict liability have on 
out-of-court settlements? And will imposing strict liability likely encourage fireworks 
companies to be more careful in the future? 
2. Condemnation or Cost Allocation? The justices look to § 520 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts to determine whether fireworks displays are abnormally dangerous 
activities. On what points do they agree and disagree? In particular, how does factor (f) 
have different implications for Justice Guy and Justice Dolliver? Do they have divergent 
views on whether strict liability signals disapproval of ultrahazardous activities? 
3. Keep It Simple, Stupid: Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, an activity is 
abnormally dangerous if it (1) creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical 
harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and (2) isn’t a matter of 
common usage. Does this create a meaningful difference from the earlier standard? 
 
FOSTER v. PRESTON MILL CO. 
Supreme Court of Washington (1954) 
Hamley, Justice:ã 
Blasting operations conducted by Preston Mill 
Company frightened [a] mother mink owned by B.W. 
Foster, and caused the mink to kill their kittens. 
Foster brought this action against the company to 
recover damages…[and] judgment was rendered for 
plaintiff in the sum of $1,953.68. The theory adopted 
by the [trial] court was that, after defendant received 
notice of the effect which its blasting operations were 
having upon the mink, it was absolutely liable for all 
damages of that nature thereafter sustained…. 
Respondent’s mink ranch is located in a rural area [on about]…seven and one-half acres on 
which are located seven sheds for growing mink…. The period of each year during which mink 
kittens are born, known as the whelping season, begins about May 1st. The kittens are born during 
a period of about two and one-half weeks, and are left with their mothers until they are six weeks 
old. During this period, the mothers are very excitable. If disturbed by noises, smoke, or dogs and 
 
ã Network for Animal Freedom, Mink I Bur (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0). 
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cats, they run back and forth in their cages and frequently destroy their young. However, mink 
become accustomed to disturbances of this kind, if continued over a period of time…. 
Appellant and several other companies have been engaged in logging in the adjacent area for 
more than fifty years. Early in May, 1951, appellant began the construction of a road to gain access 
to certain timber which it desired to cut. The road was located about two and one-quarter miles 
southwest of the mink ranch, and about twenty-five hundred feet above the ranch, along the side of 
what is known as Rattlesnake Ledge. It was necessary to use explosives to build the road. The 
customary types of explosives were used, and the customary methods of blasting were followed…. 
The procedure used was to set off blasts twice a day—at noon and at the end of the work day. 
Roy A. Peterson, the manager of the ranch in 1951, testified that the blasting resulted in “a 
tremendous vibration, is all. Boxes would rattle on the cages.” The mother mink would then run 
back and forth in their cages, and many of them would kill their kittens…. 
Before the 1951 whelping season had far progressed, the mink mothers, according to Peterson’s 
estimate, had killed thirty-five or forty of their kittens. He then told the manager of appellant 
company what had happened. He did not request that the blasting be stopped. After some 
discussion, however, appellant’s manager indicated that the shots would be made as light as possible. 
The amount of explosives used in a normal shot was then reduced [to lessen the vibration.] 
Officials of appellant company testified that it would have been impractical to entirely cease 
road-building during the several weeks required for the mink to whelp and wean their young. Such 
a delay would have made it necessary to run the logging operation another season, with attendant 
expense. It would also have disrupted the company’s log production schedule and consequently the 
operation of its lumber mill. 
In this action, respondent sought and recovered judgment only for such damages as were 
claimed to have been sustained as a result of blasting operations conducted after appellant received 
notice that its activity was causing loss of mink kittens. 
The primary question [on appeal] is whether, on these facts, the judgment against appellant is 
sustainable on the theory of absolute liability. 
The modern doctrine of strict liability for dangerous substances and activities stems from Justice 
Blackburn’s decision in Rylands v. Fletcher…. As applied to blasting operations, the doctrine has 
quite uniformly been held to establish liability, irrespective of negligence, for property damage 
sustained as a result of casting rocks or other debris on adjoining or neighboring premises. 
There is a division of judicial opinion as to whether the doctrine of absolute liability should apply 
where the damage from blasting is caused, not by the casting of rocks and debris, but by concussion, 
vibration, or jarring. This court has adopted the view that the doctrine applies in such cases. Patrick 
v. Smith, 134 Pac. 1076 (Wash. 1913). In the Patrick case, it was held that contractors who set off an 
exceedingly large blast of powder, causing the earth for a considerable distance to shake violently, 
were liable to an adjoining owner whose well was damaged and water supply lost, without regard to 
their negligence in setting off the blast, although there was no physical invasion of the property…. 
However the authorities may be divided on the point just discussed, they appear to be agreed 
that strict liability should be confined to consequences which lie within the extraordinary risk whose 
existence calls for such responsibility. This limitation on the doctrine is indicated in the italicized 
portion of the rule as set forth in Restatement of Torts: 
Except as stated in §§ 521-4, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable 
to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to 
be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting 
thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost 
care is exercised to prevent the harm. 
This restriction which has been placed upon the application of the doctrine of absolute liability 
is based upon considerations of policy. As Professor Prosser has said: 
It is one thing to say that a dangerous enterprise must pay its way within 
reasonable limits, and quite another to say that it must bear responsibility for 
every extreme of harm that it may cause. The same practical necessity for the 
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restriction of liability within some reasonable bounds, which arises in connection 
with problems of “proximate cause” in negligence cases, demands here that some 
limit be set. This limitation has been expressed by saying that the defendant’s duty 
to insure safety extends only to certain consequences. More commonly, it is said 
that the defendant’s conduct is not the “proximate cause” of the damage. But 
ordinarily in such cases no question of causation is involved, and the limitation is 
one of the policy underlying liability. 
Applying this principle to the case before us, the question comes down to this: Is the risk that 
any unusual vibration or noise may cause wild animals, which are being raised for commercial 
purposes, to kill their young, one of the things which make the activity of blasting ultrahazardous? 
We have found nothing in the decisional law which would support an affirmative answer to this 
question. The decided cases, as well as common experience, indicate that the thing which makes 
blasting ultrahazardous is the risk that property or persons may be damaged or injured by coming 
into direct contact with flying debris, or by being directly affected by vibrations of the earth or 
concussions of the air. 
Where, as a result of blasting operations, a horse has become frightened and has trampled or 
otherwise injured a person, recovery of damages has been upheld on the theory of negligence. Klein 
v. Phelps Lbr. Co., 135 Pac. 226 (1913). But we have found no case where recovery of damages caused 
by a frightened farm animal has been sustained on the ground of absolute liability…. 
The relatively moderate vibration and noise which appellant’s blasting produced at a distance of 
two and a quarter miles was no more than a usual incident of the ordinary life of the community. 
The trial court specifically found that the blasting did not unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment 
of their property by nearby landowners, except in the case of respondent’s mink ranch. It is the 
exceedingly nervous disposition of mink, rather than the normal risks inherent in blasting 
operations, which therefore must, as a matter of sound policy, bear the responsibility for the loss 
here sustained…. 
It is our conclusion that the risk of causing harm of the kind here experienced, as a result of the 
relatively minor vibration, concussion, and noise from distant blasting, is not the kind of risk which 
makes the activity of blasting ultrahazardous. The doctrine of absolute liability is therefore 
inapplicable under the facts of this case, and respondent is not entitled to recover damages. The 
judgment is reversed. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Jolley Revisited: How is Foster like Jolley? Does it also have parallels with Victor? 
2. Hindsight: Would Foster have prevailed if the theory behind the claim had been 
negligence, not strict liability? 
 
PYROMANIA PROBLEM 
John sells perfume for Christine De Orr. One day, on his way to make a delivery, he stops to buy 
some tools at Ole’s Home Center. Leonard sneaks up to John’s truck in the parking lot, pops a 
gasoline-soaked rag in the exhaust pipe, and sets the rag alight. After the truck explodes, fire burns 
the hardware store to the ground. The store’s owner, Ole, wants to sue John on a theory of strict 
liability. What’s John’s best rebuttal? 
(a) John’s decision to leave his truck unattended wasn’t negligent. 
(b) Transporting the perfume wasn’t an actual cause of the fire that destroyed the store. 
(c) Leonard’s acts mean that Ole can’t establish proximate cause. 
(d) Delivering perfume isn’t an abnormally dangerous activity. 
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CHAPTER 6:  DAMAGES  
A. Compensatory Damages 
KENTON v. HYATT HOTELS CORP. 
Supreme Court of Missouri (1985) 
Dowd, Judge:ã 
[Two skywalks above the Hyatt Regency Hotel 
lobby in Kansas City, Missouri, collapsed onto the 
crowded lobby floor. Many injured victims sued Hyatt 
and agreed to a partial settlement, leaving only the issue 
of damages for the jury. In exchange, the victims agreed 
not to present evidence regarding the construction and 
maintenance of the skywalks. They also agreed to a cap 
on the total punitive damages. Plaintiff-respondent Kay 
Kenton was one victim. She had completed two years of 
law school at the time of the accident. The jury awarded 
her $4,000,000 in compensatory damages. Defendants 
sought a new trial, arguing that the award was excessive. 
The trial judge sustained a motion for a new trial unless 
the plaintiff agreed to a $250,000 remittitur—a procedural tool by which the judge offers the plaintiff 
the option of accepting a lower award instead of re-trying an entire case. Plaintiff accepted the 
remittitur, and both sides appealed.]…  
We affirm the judgment of the trial court, in all respects, except remittitur; we…reinstate the 
verdict and enter judgment for plaintiff for the verdict sum of $4,000,000…. 
I 
Appellants’ first point is that the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning events at the 
hotel on July 17, 1981. They contend: “Such evidence was not relevant to any issue relating to 
respondent’s damages, because appellants admitted that respondent’s injuries were caused by the 
accident. Because the evidence was inflammatory and prejudicial to appellants the jury’s verdict was 
based upon improper passion and prejudice and was greatly enhanced.”… 
[A fire captain who responded to the collapse and a TV reporter who witnessed the disaster were 
permitted to testify about the chaos and devastation of that day. The trial court also let some 
videotape evidence from the scene into evidence, with certain gruesome parts edited out.] 
Respondent’s sister, Ann Kenton, who was with her on the evening of the disaster, testified as to 
her observations of that occurrence…. Ann described the sounds she heard coming from people in 
and around the skywalks after the collapse: “…It was hysterical, hysteria. There were grown men 
crying for help and there was nothing I could do for them. There were people crushed everywhere, 
blood, and I looked in the area where she had been and there was rubble and bodies and I couldn’t 
pick her out of the bodies. And the moans and screams.” Ann later found respondent slumped in a 
chair to the west of the skywalks, and respondent was carried outside and placed on a gurney or a 
stretcher. 
Still photographs of the scene were admitted into evidence, some in color and some in black and 
white. Ann Kenton identified Exhibit 4K as the area where respondent had been and described it 
thus: “…There were people sticking halfway out from under the skywalk, from here up there were 
grown men screaming for help, moaning and I walked through the blood, or there was blood 
everywhere. And the rescue people were pulling out whoever was more alive than others, I suppose.” 
None of the admitted photographs show any dead or injured persons…. 
Appellants argue that the testimony concerning the events of July 17, 1981, was neither probative 
nor material to the issue of respondent’s compensation; it was an attempt to incite the jury with 
evidence of how she was injured; and that the “slight probative value the testimony may have had 
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concerning the nature of Ms. Kenton’s injuries was outweighed completely by the gruesome and 
highly inflammatory nature of the evidence.”… 
Respondent says that…the evidence was not offered or received as bearing on appellants’ 
conduct which was not an issue, but was offered instead for the purpose of showing how respondent 
was injured, both physically and mentally, as well as her location at the time her injuries were 
sustained. Begley v. Adaber Realty & Investment Company, 358 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1962), held that 
photographs of ductwork which fell upon plaintiff, taken after it had fallen and had been removed 
to a parking lot, was admissible to show the type of construction, the presence or absence of straps, 
and what type of object struck plaintiff. Respondent was similarly entitled to show the force, violence 
and traumatic circumstances of this tragic occurrence as bearing upon the nature, extent and 
duration of her injuries…. Even though photographs are gruesome and depict serious injuries they 
need not be excluded if they satisfy the rules as to the admission of demonstrative evidence. 
The evidence of respondent’s injuries is that she suffered a cervical fracture which produced an 
initial paralysis of her body. In addition, Dr. Walter Menninger stated that she was subjected to the 
most severe psychosocial stressor imaginable, Grade 7, and the traumatic event and the crippling 
effects it produced caused a dramatic and profound psychic trauma which is continuing in nature. 
Dr. Francisco Gomez, respondent’s treating psychiatrist, and Dr. Menninger classified her psychiatric 
injury as post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic and severe. Dr. Menninger testified further that she 
exhibited symptoms characteristic of a post-traumatic stress disorder: re-experiencing the trauma by 
either recurrent recollections, recurrent dreams, or suddenly acting or feeling as if the event was 
happening; and a numbing of responsiveness or reduced involvement with the external world 
sometime afterward. Certainly, the jury was entitled to consider the evidence of the scene of the 
collapse, the utter chaos that prevailed, and the effect upon respondent of being pinned beneath the 
debris, amidst blood, dead and injured bodies, and the sheer terror of the voices around her, in 
evaluating her physical and mental injuries for the purpose of fixing her compensation. The evidence 
was relevant, material, and appropriate. Its probative value far outweighed any prejudicial effect it 
might have had on the jury. There was no error in admitting the evidence…. 
II 
[Appellants’ second argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to exclude the testimony of 
two law school professors that respondent was unable to return to law school or to practice law.]… 
Appellants conclude that because of these (claimed) errors the jury considered evidence 
incompetent in itself and as foundation for economic projections of respondent’s future wage loss, 
and the award was greatly and improperly enhanced by the use of this evidence. 
[The professors testified to the rigors of law school, stating that law students spend 48 hours per 
week to prepare for classes and that with Kenton’s medical condition, she could not function as a 
law student. Another professor testified that respondent perhaps could return as a part-time student 
but would be unlikely to find part-time employment after graduation. A lawyer who suffered 
disabilities from polio testified for Hyatt, stating that, with accommodations, Kenton could finish 
law school and practice law, but he did concede that her job opportunities would be narrowed by 
her disabilities.] 
The trial court properly determined that expert testimony was needed to inform the jury as to 
the physical and mental rigors of a person attending law school and practicing law. Members of the 
jury would not ordinarily have knowledge of that subject, and certainly the two professors, being 
actively engaged in that field would have superior knowledge and expertise thereof by reason of their 
education and experience…. In addition to stating their knowledge and experience in the practice 
of law, and in teaching law school courses, both professors reviewed respondent’s academic records, 
medical records, and reports which were in evidence without objection. [One of the professors who 
testified] had also personally met and interviewed respondent. There was thus a sufficient factual 
basis for them to give their opinions. They were not…giving medical opinions…. 
Appellants also say that the testimony of the two professors permitted respondent’s economist, 
Dr. Ward, to base his opinion as to her projection of economic losses on incompetent evidence…. 
[We disagree.] The jury [properly] had the function of evaluating all the evidence of economic loss, 
both appellants’ and respondent’s, and the weight to be given thereto…. 
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III 
[Appellants’ third argument is] that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a remittitur of 
$2,000,000. They contend that as a matter of law the jury’s verdict greatly exceeded the upper limits 
of “fair and reasonable compensation,” the proper measure of damages, and that the verdict was, as 
the trial court itself recognized, the erroneous product of a mistaken evaluation of highly incendiary 
evidence and was improperly disproportionate to awards for comparable or more severe injuries. 
Taking respondent’s evidence in the light most favorable to her, as this court must do, her loss 
of income and the reasonably anticipated future loss of income because of the injuries sustained was 
testified to…have been between $1,605,846 as a low, to a high of $2,164,642. 
The evidence shows that, to the time of trial, respondent’s hospital, medical and therapy expenses 
incurred amounted to at least $80,000; her future physical therapy and cost of an electronic device 
(T.E.N.S.) was from $189,759 to $250,000; her homemaking assistance and care, $307,228 to 
$614,457; her future medical and supplemental insurance, $100,679. This evidence places the low of 
these items at $677,666, and the high at $1,045,136. The economic loss, present and future medical, 
and therapy expenses thus shows a range of between $2,283,512 to $3,209,778. 
Respondent’s age was 28 years at the time of trial. She has a life expectancy of 51.8 years. The 
nature and extent of respondent’s injuries, is shown by the following evidence, all shown to have been 
permanent. She suffered a broken neck with permanent spinal cord damage [with miraculous surgical 
treatment, she avoided becoming a permanent quadriplegic]; she has spasticity and weakness in all 
four limbs, inability to walk without crutches, and must wear a knee cage to prevent buckling of the 
left knee; lack of endurance and easy fatigability; reduced vital capacity and impaired breathing 
muscles; sensory loss of much of her body below her neck, including female parts. She will not enjoy 
a normal sexual life or have children normally; she has impaired bladder and bowel function with 
periods of incontinence. Her bladder condition causes her to retain urine which will eventually 
produce renal or kidney damage; psychic and emotional trauma diagnosed as chronic and severe 
post-traumatic stress syndrome, which will require continued psychiatric care; destruction of her 
athletic lifestyle which will prevent her from ever again playing tennis, skiing, running, jogging, 
playing softball, raquetball, hiking, backpacking and riding horses; and a commitment to 2 to 4 hours 
a day to maintain her present limited muscle function. There was some evidence that respondent’s 
cost of therapy and the T.E.N.S. unit would increase over her lifetime, and her income would also 
increase should she be employed as a lawyer, these being the effects of inflation. 
The jury was entitled to consider the intangibles of the evidence of respondent’s past and future 
pain and suffering, the destruction of her previous lifestyle, along with the evidence of economic 
loss. All of the matters going to the nature and extent of respondent’s injuries were primarily for the 
jury’s consideration because it is in a far better position to appraise them for the assessment of 
damages which would fairly and reasonably compensate her. In Fowler v. Park Corporation, 673 
S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1984), the plaintiff suffered the loss of both legs above the knees. He was 19 years 
old, with a life expectancy of 50 years. He had not successfully used prosthetic devices; he would 
need constant care and medical attention, and had doubtful employability. He did not introduce 
evidence of economic damage other than showing that he stood to lose one million dollars in 
earnings based upon present wage levels, and the court said that he would obviously be incapable of 
leading a normal social life. The jury awarded $6 million to Fowler for his damages, and this court 
declined to interfere with the amount of the verdict. 
Appellants cite Chrisler v. Holiday Valley, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), wherein the 
plaintiff, 17 years old, was rendered a quadriplegic by reason of a diving accident, and the jury 
returned a verdict of $2.3 million, which was affirmed. That case does not aid appellants. There was 
apparently no evidence of economic loss by the plaintiff, but importantly, the court said: 
In most litigation, and particularly in personal injury actions, there is a large range 
between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness. Within that range 
a jury has virtually unfettered discretion to determine the damages incurred and 
is under no obligation to, and is in fact prohibited from, specifying what amounts 
have been attributed to each of the various elements of damage. Past and future 
pain and suffering, embarrassment and humiliation, future care and medical 
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treatment, loss of or reduction in employment opportunities and many other 
factors, do not lend themselves to precise calculation. 
There is no exact formula to determine whether a verdict is excessive; each case is considered on 
its own facts. The ultimate test is what fairly and reasonably compensates plaintiff for the injuries 
sustained. In making this determination consideration is given to the nature and extent of the 
injuries, diminished earning capacity, economic conditions, plaintiff’s age, and a comparison of the 
compensation awarded and permitted in cases of comparable injuries…. 
Turning to the merits of this case, we believe that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering 
a remittitur of $250,000 after a verdict of $4,000,000 under the circumstances of this case. This 
amount represents a miniscule percentage (6.25%) of the total verdict which demonstrates judicial 
hairsplitting and shows the extremes to which the remittitur practice has fallen. [Because of outcomes 
like this,] remittitur shall no longer be employed in Missouri…. Accordingly, the verdict of the jury 
is affirmed and the cause is remanded with directions to set aside the order of remittitur and to 
reinstate the verdict and enter judgment for the plaintiff, Kay Kenton, in the sum of $4,000,000.00.ã 
QUESTIONS 
1. What’s Tort Law Up To? Why do we award compensatory damages? How does this 
remedy serve the goals of tort law? 
2. Show Me the Money: What’s the difference between the economic and non-economic 
losses discussed in Kenton? Is it that only the former are readily quantifiable? 
3. Career Planning: How granular should we be with our lost-income predictions? Should 
it matter, for example, if Kenton had a high GPA, if Kansas City firms have many female 
partners, or if she told her friends that she dreamed of becoming a public defender? 
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McMILLAN v. CITY OF NEW YORK 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (2008) 
Weinstein, Judge: 
James McMillan, the claimant, was rendered a quadriplegic in the crash 
of a ferryboat operated negligently by the City of New York. He sued for 
pain, suffering and cost of necessary medical care. 
A critical factor in determining claimant’s damages is his estimated life 
expectancy. In a trial before the court and an advisory jury, statistical 
evidence was introduced suggesting that a spinal cord-injured “African-
American” was likely to survive for fewer years than persons of other 
“races” with similar injuries. The parties characterized claimant as an 
“African-American.” 
The question posed is whether such “racially” based statistics and other compilations may be 
relied upon to find a shorter life expectancy for a person characterized as an “African-American,” 
than for one in the general American population of mixed “ethnic” and “racial” backgrounds. The 
answer is “no.” “Racially” based life expectancy and related data may not be utilized to find a reduced 
life expectancy for a claimant in computing damages based on predictions of life expectancy. As 
indicated below, the unreliability of “race” as a predictor of life expectancy as well as normative 
constitutional requirements of equal treatment and due process support this conclusion. 
The court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law disregarded all “race”-based computations of 
life expectancy and applied predictions for the general male population, and particularly those 
suffering from quadriplegia. Properly rejected in predicting life expectancy were “racially” based 
statistics. 
I. Factual Unreliability of “Race”-Based Statistics 
In the United States, there has been “racial mixing” among “Whites,” “Africans,” “Native 
Americans,” and individuals of other “racial” and “ethnic” backgrounds for more than three and a 
half centuries. See, e.g., Annette Gordon-Reed, The Hemingses of Monticello: An American Family 
660 (2008) (Thomas Jefferson fathered children with his “mixed blood” slave Sally Hemings. “[T]he 
choices the children of Sally Hemings and Thomas Jefferson made would separate their lines forever. 
Three would live in the white world, and one would remain in the black world.”); Gregory Howard 
Williams, Life on the Color Line: The True Story of a White Boy Who Discovered He Was Black (1996). 
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (approving separation of “Whites” and “Blacks” on the 
grounds of “social” inferiority) the plaintiff was apparently 7/8th “White” and 1/8th “Black.” See also 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (“racial” inferiority of “Blacks,” who could not be citizens). 
Clear-eyed observers of the American scene scoff at the use of “blood” in characterizing “race.” See, 
e.g., Mark Twain, Pudd’nhead Wilson (1894) (“White” and “Black” babies who looked “White” taken 
home by wrong mothers and raised inadvertently in “wrong ‘racial’ categories”). 
Statistical reliance on “race” leads to such questions as whether Plessy would have been 
categorized today as “African-American” for life expectancy purposes. In a more recent example, 
“racially” characterizing for statistical purposes in a negligence lawsuit the current Democrat Party 
presidential candidate, born of a “White” American mother and an “African” citizen of Kenya, 
would be considered absurd by most Americans. See Colm Tóibín, James Baldwin & Barack Obama, 
N.Y. Rev., Oct. 23, 2008, at 18 (“When Obama was a child, he wrote, ‘my father…was black as pitch, 
my mother white as milk.’”). Reliance on “race”-based statistics in estimating life expectancy of 
individuals for purposes of calculating damages is not scientifically acceptable in our current 
heterogeneous population. As indicated below, “race” is largely a social construct inappropriate in 
assessing damages in a negligence suit. 
A. “Race” as Biological Fiction 
Franz Boas, the great Columbia University Anthropologist, pointed out that “[e]very 
classification of mankind must be more or less artificial”; he exposed much of the false cant of 
“racial” homogeneity when he declared that “no racial group is genetically ‘pure.’” Quoted in Keay 
Davidson, Franz Boas in 3 American National Biography 83 (1999). See also The Shaping of 
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American Anthropology, 1883–1911, A Franz Boas Reader 273 (George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., 1974) 
(“if we base our inferences entirely on the results of anatomical study, it would seem that there is no 
reason to believe that the bulk of the people constituting two distinct races might not be 
approximately on the same level” as to mental ability); Scott L. Malcomson, One Drop of Blood: The 
American Misadventure of Race 277 (2000) (“within the premodern written records of, globally 
speaking, light-skinned people, references to white people as white people, as a race, are remarkably 
scarce”); Orlando Patterson, Rituals of Blood: Consequences of Slavery in Two American Centuries 
155–58, 165–66 (1998) (intermarriage); The Concept of Race xi (Ashley Montagu, ed., 1964) (“the 
biological concept of race has become unacceptable to a growing number of biologists”); Douglas S. 
Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid, Segregation and the Making of the Underclass 9 
(1993) (“Our fundamental argument is that racial segregation—and its characteristic institutional 
form, the black ghetto—are the key structural factors responsible for the perpetuation of black 
poverty in the United States.”); James C. King, The Biology of Race 146 (2d ed.1981) (“estimates of 
the proportion of genetic material from white ancestry in American blacks range all the way from a 
few percent to more than 50 percent”). 
An anthropologist who has written extensively on “race” and its evolution in American society notes: 
“Despite legal and social attempts to prohibit intermarriage or intermating, some genetic mixture 
still occurred. In response, the United States had to resort to a fiction to help preserve the 
distinctiveness of the White/Black racial (and social) dichotomy. North Americans define as Black 
anyone who has known African ancestors, a phenomenon known and introduced by historians over 
half a century ago as the ‘one drop rule.’ There is mounting historical evidence that this modern 
ideology of race took on a life of its own in the latter half of the 19th century…[a]s a paradigm for 
portraying the social reality of permanent inequality as something that was natural.” Audrey 
Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a Social Problem is Real, 60:1 Am. 
Psychologist 16, 20 (2005) (referred to herein as an article by Professor Smedley). Professor Smedley 
finds that “the ideology [of “race”] arose as a rationalization and justification for human slavery at a 
time when Western European societies were embracing philosophies promoting individual and 
human rights, liberty, democracy, justice, brotherhood, and equality.” She cites Robert Moore, a 
sociologist from the University of Liverpool, who “observed that in the mid-1800s, a consensus 
emerged that human cultural differences were of a permanent kind, expressing underlying natural 
differences.” Professor Moore quotes Alexis de Tocqueville, who as an early observer of American 
life was among the first to recognize this conception of “race,” writing that “the existence of innate 
and immutable racial characteristics is to be regarded with skepticism and theories founded upon 
such doctrine are mere rationalizations for slavery and other forms of racial oppression.” 
Professor Smedley cautions against scientific investigations that focus on justifying the 
differences between “racial” groups: “Racialized science, with its emphasis on identifying immutable 
differences between racial groups, can be expected only to maintain and reinforce existing racial 
inequality, in that its adherents indirectly argue that no degree of government intervention or social 
change will alter the skills and abilities of different racial groups. The disproportionate 
representation of some ‘racial’ groups (e.g., African Americans, American Indians) among lower 
socioeconomic tiers can therefore be explained as an unavoidable byproduct of human evolution. 
Yet reinforcing this widely held social stereotype of racial inferiority risks limiting individual human 
potential, in that individuals’ abilities and opportunities would likely be assessed in relation to their 
racial group.” 
DNA technology finds little variation among “races” (humans are genetically 99.9% identical), 
and it is difficult to pinpoint any “racial identity” of an individual through his or her genes. 
International gene mapping projects have only revealed variations in strings of DNA that correlate 
with geographic differences in phenotypes among humans around the world, the reality being that 
the diversity of human biology has little in common with socially constructed “racial” categories. 
While “race” may be a social construct, many policymakers and courts insist that it remains a 
significant predictor of access to societal goods and resources. “Racial” and “ethnic” disparities in 
quality of health care, for example, remain substantial across a broad range of medical services. But 
those disparities are associated with socioeconomic differences and tend to diminish significantly 
and, in a few cases, to disappear altogether when socioeconomic factors are controlled. By allowing 
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the use of “race”-based life expectancy tables, which are based on historical data, courts are 
essentially reinforcing the underlying social inequalities of our society rather than describing a 
significant biological difference. 
B. Unreliability of “Racial” Categories 
In 1977, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Statistical Policy Directive 
Number 15, “Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting.” The 
directive established four “racial” categories (“American Indian or Alaskan Native,” “Asian or 
Pacific Islander,” “Black,” and “White”) for federal legislative, programmatic and administrative 
purposes. The OMB revised these standards in October of 1997, creating five groups instead of four 
by splitting “Asian” and “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander.” The 2000 census also added a 
sixth “racial” set, “Some Other Race,” and allowed responders to choose more than one category. 
The catch-all of “Some Other Race,” which was meant to “capture responses such as Mulatto, Creole, 
and Mestizo,” also included a write-in option. 
Despite the 2000 census’ more detailed self-categorization system, demographic studies that use 
pre-2000 census data continue to define “race” by using the 1977 OMB directive. See, e.g., 
Christopher J.L. Murray et al., Eight Americas: Investigating Mortality Disparities across Races, 
Counties, and Race-Counties in the United States, 3:9 PLoS Med. 1513 (2006); Martha Chamallas, 
Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A 
Constitutional Argument, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 73 (1994) (“The tables presented in [a practitioner’s 
text for calculating lost earning capacity] are the P-60 Series (for 1977–90) from the Current 
Population Reports published by the United States Bureau of the Census…. As was the case for most 
government data collections for these periods, race is reduced to either black or white; there is no 
separate breakdown for other racial/ethnic groups.”). 
Life expectancy tables are based on historical data and thus largely rely on the OMB’s former 
archaic “racial” analysis. This means that the tables frequently employed by courts in determining 
tort damages fail to account for the nuanced reality of “racial” heritage in the United States today. 
After hundreds of years of sexual mixings, there continues to be no socially sanctioned in-
between classification of “race” in America. Even researchers investigating the differences between 
the life expectancies of “Black” and “White” Americans admit that the “presently available summary 
measures such as age-adjusted mortality and estimated life expectancy are crude” and “may mask 
special successes and/or problems for specific age categories/diseases or in specific local 
populations.” Robert S. Levine et al., Black–White Inequalities in Mortality and Life Expectancy, 
1933–1999: Implications for Healthy People 2010, 116 Pub. Health Rep. 474 (Sept.-Oct. 2001); see 
also Murray, supra, at 1521 (“The most important limitation of the data used for our analysis is that 
reported race in the census, used for population estimates, may be different from race in mortality 
statistics, where race may be reported by the family, the certifying physician, or the funeral 
director.”). Even if reliance on “race”-based statistical projections made factual sense in the United 
States, available statistics do not appear to account for what might be called “blood ratios,” in view 
of the American reality of long-term “racial” mixing. 
C. Socio-Economic Status and “Race” 
Putting aside the question of the fallacy of treating all “dark-skinned” Americans as completely 
different from “light-skinned” Americans in predicting life expectancy, socio-economic factors have 
a large role in influencing length of life. While many sociologists, epidemiologists, and other 
researchers have noted “[t]he broad influence of race/ethnicity and socioeconomic position on 
functional status, active life expectancy, and mortality,” Arline T. Geronimus et al., Inequality in Life 
Expectancy, Functional Status, and Active Life Expectancy across Selected Black and White 
Populations in the United States, 38:2 Demography 227, 227 (2001), the influence of socio-economic 
factors is often masked by “race.” See Levine, supra, at 482 (“race itself may be largely a surrogate for 
other factors, especially differences in environmental exposures”). Reliable studies have found that 
“[t]he relationships between socioeconomic position or race/ethnicity and health may be modified 
by geographic influence and community conditions that contextualize and structure these 
relationships.” Geronimus, supra, at 227. As one group of researchers has cautioned, “while race-
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based mortality ratios and absolute risks are important, there are clear limitations to their use as 
indicators of health,” including the appropriateness and reliability of the “racial” and “ethnic” 
categories used in statistical analysis. Levine, supra, at 481–82. 
The impact of socio-economic status (SES) on life expectancy has long been recognized. See 
Joseph J. Sudano & David W. Baker, Explaining U.S. racial/ethnic disparities in health declines and 
mortality in late middle age: The roles of socioeconomic status, health behaviors, and health insurance, 
62 Soc. Sci. & Med. 909 (2006) (“Our results are also consistent with previous studies that have found 
large ‘direct’ (or residual) effects of SES on health that were not explained by differences in health 
behaviors.”). Aside from “baseline health,” the next “dominant explanation for the worse health 
outcomes for blacks and Hispanics was SES.” Id. “In contrast, health insurance and health behaviors 
explained little of the racial/ethnic differences in health outcomes.” Id.; see also Murray, supra, at 
1522 (“Important research in the past few decades has illustrated the critical role of individual and 
community-level socio-economic factors, be it in absolute or relative terms, in health outcomes”); 
Lloyd B. Potter, Socioeconomic Determinants of White and Black Males’ Life Expectancy Differentials, 
1980, 28:2 Demography 303 (1991) (“There is a long-standing consensus that a negative relationship 
exists between socioeconomic conditions and the levels of mortality experienced by a population.”). 
More detailed investigations into the life expectancy gap between “White” and “Black” 
Americans have shown that life expectancy varies within “racial” groups by economic characteristics 
and geography. See Geronimus, supra, at 244 (“Our analyses revealed heterogeneity in length and 
quality of life within the black and the white populations with respect to their communities’ 
economic characteristics and, to some extent, the location of their residence.”). Given the significant 
impact of socio-economic factors, it is natural for courts to be concerned with the use of life 
expectancy tables that ignore important distinctions such as education, place of residency, and 
employment, collapsing all members of a “racial” group into a single number. Gross statistical tables 
do not answer the question: how does the life expectancy of well-off or middle-class “African-
Americans” compare to that of poor “African-Americans?” 
In a national study of twenty-three local areas, researchers found that “African American 
residents of advantaged urban areas have substantially higher life expectancies than their poor urban 
counterparts; in some cases their life expectancies approach the white national average.” Geronimus, 
supra, at 241. That study also found that “White residents of urban poor areas have mortality profiles 
comparable to those of black residents of poor rural areas and blacks nationwide,” and “somewhat 
worse than residents of relatively advantaged black urban areas.” In fact, “African-Americans” 
residing “in the advantaged population of New York City fare as well as whites nationwide.” Id. at 
In studies targeting cardiovascular diseases (CVD), researchers found that after controlling for 
risk level, “there was no consistent pattern in CVD mortality differences for Black and White men 
according to income level. As shown in other research, the higher overall CVD mortality rate among 
Black men than among White men was largely explained by differences in zip code area incomes 
and risk factor levels.” Avis J. Thomas et al., Race/Ethnicity, Income, Major Risk Factors, and 
Cardiovascular Disease Mortality, 95:8 Am. J. Pub. Health 1417, 1421 (2005). 
When determining tort damages based upon an injured individual’s future life span and potential 
needs, consideration must be given to the fact that changing a person’s socio-economic status may 
have an impact upon his or her life expectancy. While studies have found that expanding health 
insurance alone would not greatly impact the life expectancy or morbidity of individuals, it may well 
be that elevating a group of individuals from a lower socio-economic class to a higher one would 
change their overall cause-of-death structure and enhance their health and lifespan. Major causes of 
death in “African-American” populations include homicide, HIV, unintentional injuries, and other 
factors associated with poverty and low socio-economic status. See generally Sam Harper et al., Trends 
in the Black–White Life Expectancy Gap in the United States, 1983–2003, 297:11 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 
1224 (2007); see also Potter, supra, at 304 (“Improvement of socioeconomic conditions is associated 
with a change from a cause-of-death structure characterized by infectious and parasitic diseases 
toward one characterized by degenerative disease…such a shift will lead to higher life expectancy.”). 
The findings of the studies cited above reinforce the conclusion that despite a documented gap 
in life expectancy between “Black” and “White” Americans, the simple characterization of 
individuals as “Black” or “White” is not only misleading, it risks masking the complex interactions 
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between a host of genetic and socio-economic factors. While some researchers have suggested that 
higher socio-economic position may not impact “African-American” health as directly as other 
populations (due to stress-related diseases potentially linked to structural racism), this is not reason 
for courts to enforce the negative impacts of lower socio-economic status while ignoring the 
diversity within populations. 
D. Legal Decisions on “Race” 
A 1905 decision by a federal court in New York relied on “race”-based statistics and “racial” 
categories in reducing damages in an admiralty case. The Saginaw and The Hamilton, 139 F. 906 
(S.D.N.Y. 1905); see Jennifer B. Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race and 
Remedies, 1865–2007, 27 Rev. Litig. 37 (2007). Two steamships collided, resulting in the deaths of 
some passengers and crewmembers. See In re Clyde S.S. Co., 134 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1904). Wrongful 
death actions were brought for six “Colored” and two “White” persons killed in the accident. 
Rejecting the use of standard mortality tables to predict the life expectancies of all the deceased, the 
court cited census data summarizing differences in “White” and “Colored” life expectancies in 
justifying its reduction of awards. At that time census respondents did not have the option of 
selecting more than one “race” to identify themselves. Professor Jennifer B. Wriggins found that “on 
average [the Saginaw court] lowered the awards for the deaths of blacks ten percent more than the 
awards for the deaths of whites and [the court] slashed three of the awards for blacks by forty percent 
or more.” Wriggins, supra, at 56; see also Marc Galanter, Bhopals, Past and Present: The Changing 
Legal Response to Mass Disaster, 10 Windsor Yearbook of Justice 151 (1990) (describing the Hawk’s 
Nest Tunnel disaster in early 1930s West Virginia in which over 700 unprotected laborers were 
victims of acute silicosis and settlements ranged from $30 for a single “Black” to $1600 for a “White” 
Family); Monograph, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation 7 (1995) (same). 
It should be noted in assessing The Saginaw that the case was decided shortly after Plessy, 
approving “racial” segregation of “African-Americans.” Plessy’s “racial” basis was entirely rejected 
by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Saginaw has no precedential value. 
1. Future Earnings 
Courts are increasingly troubled by “race”- and gender-based figures for calculating loss of future 
income. The district court in United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp.2d 1285 (D. Utah 2004), noted 
that “surprisingly the reported cases have almost completely neglected the question” of whether to 
use sex- and “race”-neutral statistics. After receiving an expert report (for restitution purposes) that 
reduced the estimate of lost income based on the fact that a victim was “Native American,” that 
court directed recalculation without regard to “race” or gender. Avoiding reaching any 
constitutional questions, the court chose to “exercise its discretion in favor of victims of violent 
crime and against the possible perpetuation of inappropriate stereotypes,” especially “where the 
defendants have deprived their victims of the chance to excel in life beyond predicted statistical 
averages.” The court ultimately utilized gender-and “race”-neutral figures in its findings. 
One court refused to use “racial” statistics in calculating tort damages for loss of future income 
when the plaintiff was half “Black” and half “White.” Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. 
Supp. 427 (D.D.C. 1991). The defendant argued that the wage earnings projections for “Black” men 
were the appropriate figures for the plaintiff, whose mother was “White” and father was “Black.” 
Apparently “race”-based life expectancy figures were not introduced in the case. The court held it 
“inappropriate to incorporate current discrimination resulting in wage differences between the sexes 
or races or the potential for any future such discrimination into a calculation for damages resulting 
from lost wages.” It used “the average earnings of all persons.” See also Laura Greenberg, 
Compensating the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals for Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 429, 447 (2001) (arguing that “race”-based economic statistics “reinforce the 
status quo of racial disparities” and “propel[] race to the forefront of predictions about individual 
achievement”; advocating use of “race”-neutral statistics). 
Canadian courts have refused to use gender-specific wage calculations in determining damages. 
See, e.g., Walker v. Ritchie, 119 A.C.W.S. (3d) (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. Jan. 3, 2003) (using statistical figures 
which reflected the entire population). 
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2. Work-Life Expectancy 
In an action for damages by an injured seaman, the plaintiff presented statistics on work-life 
expectancy modified to exclude “race” as a factor; the defendant challenged the increased work-life 
expectancy that resulted. Theodile v. Delmar Systems, Inc., 2007 WL 2491808 at *8 (W.D. La. 2007). 
The district court refused to upset the jury’s award in the “race”-neutral amount suggested by 
plaintiff’s expert. Another district court rejected an expert calculation that reduced a female tort 
victim’s estimated working life by 40% based on a historical statistic about the number of years 
females average in the workforce. Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1987). 
In administering the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, Special Master Kenneth R. 
Feinberg based estimations of remaining years of work-life on the victim’s age, using statistics for 
the general population of active males in the United States for all claimants and ignoring “racial” 
differences. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,238 (Mar. 
13, 2002); see generally Kenneth R. Feinberg, What is Life Worth? (2005). 
3. Life Expectancy 
In the context of Title VII, the Supreme Court noted that while “actuarial studies could 
unquestionably identify differences in life expectancy based on race or national origin, as well as 
sex,” Congress has outlawed classifications based on “race,” national origin, and sex. City of Los 
Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Thus, “even a true generalization 
about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization 
does not apply.” Id. at 708; see also Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: 
What’s Fair?, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1646, 1659 & n. 86 (collecting state statutes forbidding “race” 
classifications by insurers). “Racial” statistics present an especially strong argument for exclusion, 
since, as already noted, the question of “race” is ambiguous, whereas gender is generally conceded. 
II. Unconstitutionality of “Race” as a Criterion for Assessing Damages 
A. Equal Protection 
For half a century the Supreme Court has rejected on equal protection grounds “race”-based 
discrimination. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701 (2007) (allocating students to particular schools based on “race” unconstitutional); Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (redistricting based on “race” impermissible); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 
429 (1984) (consideration of “race” in child custody decision unconstitutional despite possibility 
that societal “racial” biases might affect child); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (“race”-based 
restrictions on marriage unconstitutional); Brown, supra (abolishing segregation in public schools); 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (applying rationale of Brown to federal government); see also, 
e.g., Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (2d ed. 2004); Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts (1994); 
Jack Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law (1959); Jack B. Weinstein, Benjamin N. Cardozo 
Lecture: The Role of Judges In A Government Of, By, and For the People (2007). 
As Professor Martha Chamallas notes, “when experts rely on race or gender-based statistics to 
calculate tort damages, we tend not to notice the discrimination and to accept it as natural and 
unproblematic.” Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the Calculation of Economic 
Loss, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1435, 1442 (2005). “Racial” classifications of individuals are “suspect 
categories,” see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938), meaning that 
state action in reliance on “race”-based statistics triggers strict scrutiny. Cf. Charleen Hsuan, Note 
Medicaid Coverage for Race-Based Drugs, 41 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 443 (2008) (arguing that 
strict scrutiny under equal protection would apply to state Medicaid agency decisions to deny off-
label coverage for FDA-approved “race”-based drugs). Judicial reliance on “racial” classifications 
constitutes state action. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (permitting 
peremptory jury challenges based on “race” is state action violating equal protection); Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state action in judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants based on 
“race”); see also Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data 
in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, supra, at 106 (“By conceding the relevance of race-
based or gender-based data through its admission into evidence…the judge necessarily leads the 
jury to believe that gender and race are legally permissible factors and thus cannot be said to be 
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neutral on the issue.”) Equal protection in this context demands that the claimant not be subjected 
to a disadvantageous life expectancy estimate solely on the basis of a “racial” classification. 
B. Due Process 
There is a right—in effect a property right—to compensation in cases of negligently caused 
damage to the person under state and federal law. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) 
(“[a]rguably” a tort cause of action created by a State constitutes “a species of ‘property’ protected 
by the Due Process Clause” and there is a federal “interest in protecting the individual citizen from 
state action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational”); see also John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional 
Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 Yale L.J. 524 
(2005) (constitutional right to a body of tort law for the purpose of redressing private wrongs); 
Weinstein, Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture: The Role of Judges In A Government Of, By, and For the 
People, supra, at 495–506 (same). 
By allowing use of “race”-based statistics at trial, a court would be creating arbitrary and 
irrational state action. “The form and content of statistical evidence is shaped by the requirements 
of the substantive law.” David C. Baldus & James W.L. Cole, Statistical Proof of Discrimination 10 
(1980). Were the court to apply an ill-founded assumption, automatically burdening on “racial” 
grounds a class of litigants who seek compensation, there would be a denial of due process. Cf. 
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930) (“federal guaranty of due process 
extends to state action through its judicial branch of government”). 
The legal system does not work fairly and with due process if one class of litigants is unduly 
burdened in litigation through the application of inappropriate “race”-based statistics. Where, as in 
the instant case, no attempt was made to justify the use of “racial” statistics by the City, the due 
process rights of the defendant cannot be said to have been affected. 
III. Application of Law to Facts 
There is no factual basis for discriminating against this claimant by finding a reduced life 
expectancy based upon “race.” That conclusion is particularly sound in the instant case where the 
damages awarded are designed to extend claimant’s life by providing him with the best medical and 
other care—more than the equivalent of what the average American quadriplegic could expect. 
Constitutional normative doctrine also supports excluding “race”-based statistics. “Any decision 
to use a group-based projection into the future as the basis for a damage remedy also involves 
normative judgments about the relevant frame of reference and the rate of future change.” Wriggins, 
supra, at 56. The American reality reflects that “people do not fall naturally into discrete racial 
groupings” and “legal classifications of race tend to be unrefined and often reflect ignorance of 
differences within a given category.” Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-
Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, supra, at 113. 
Reliance on “race”-based statistics in estimating life expectancy for purposes of calculating 
damages in this case is rejected in computing life expectancy and damages. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Kenton Revisited: Now that you’ve read McMillan, should it matter that Kenton was 
planning to be a lawyer before she suffered her injuries? How might giving weight to her 
career choice reinforce past discrimination and reproduce inequality in the future? 
2. Reality Check: If courts refuse to consider a tort victim’s gender, is it fair to the families 
of men who are left unable to work due to their injuries? If, as is factually the case, men 
in many professions earn more than women, is it right to leave families with less income 
if disability means a working father or husband can no longer earn his usual paycheck? 
3. Protected Characteristics: Should race (and gender) always be off-limits in damages 
calculations? What about when calculating life expectancy? And what about other 
characteristics, like someone’s religion or sexual orientation? Finally, can we rely on 
constitutional rules to be an equalizing force when so many tort claims are resolved 
through settlement? 
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B. Punitive Damages 
NATIONAL BY-PRODUCTS, INC. v. SEARCY HOUSE MOVING CO. 
Supreme Court of Arkansas (1987) 
Dudley, Justice: ã 
The sole issue in this tort case is whether an award of 
punitive damages should be upheld. We hold there was no 
substantial evidence to support the award of punitive 
damages, and reverse…. 
On July 11, 1985, Robert Foley was driving a large tractor-
trailer for appellant National By-Products, Inc. from 
Batesville south on Highway 167. At the same time, appellee 
Searcy House Moving Company was moving a house north 
on the same highway. Appellee could not get the house 
through a bridge which was just north of Bald Knob, and, while the house was being adjusted on the 
house moving trailer, traffic was stopped and flagged around in the one lane of traffic still open. 
Stacy McGee and Lorene Staggs were slowly starting to go through the open lane when appellant 
Foley, speeding in an over-weight truck smashed into the rear of their car, knocking it eighty feet 
forward, causing it to hit the house and trailer, and then to hit two bystanders. Appellant National’s 
truck also struck the house and then crashed into another tractor-trailer rig. Lorene Staggs died 
instantly and Stacy McGee died seven hours later. The estates of Lorene Staggs and Stacy McGee 
filed wrongful death actions against Foley and appellant National By-Products, Inc. and appellee 
moving company. Defendants Foley and National By-Products and defendant moving company 
filed cross-complaints against each other, each asking compensatory and punitive damages from the 
other. The cases were tried before a jury which returned compensatory damage awards of $3,000,000 
to the estate of Stacy McGee, $1,400,000 to the estate of Lorene Staggs, and $15,000 to appellee 
moving company. In addition, separate punitive damage awards of $100,000 were given to each 
estate and to appellee moving company. The judgments in the wrongful death cases were satisfied 
and appellee moving company agreed to a remittitur of its compensatory damage award from 
$15,000 to $1,883.14, the stipulated amount of compensatory damages. Therefore, the only damage 
award involved in this appeal is the $100,000 punitive damage award made in favor of appellee 
moving company and against appellant National By-Products Company. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant its motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. The argument is meritorious. An award of punitive damages is justified 
only where the evidence indicates that the defendant acted wantonly in causing the injury or with 
such a conscious indifference to the consequences that malice may be inferred. We have previously 
defined wantonness and conscious indifference to the consequences. In Ellis v. Ferguson, 385 S.W.2d 
154 (Ark. 1964), we said: 
Wantonness is essentially an attitude of mind and imparts to an act of misconduct 
a tortious character, such conduct as manifests a “disposition of perversity.” Such 
a disposition or mental state is shown by a person, when, notwithstanding his 
conscious and timely knowledge of an approach to an unusual danger and of 
common probability of injury to others, he proceeds into the presence of danger, 
with indifference to consequences and with absence of all care. It is not necessary 
to prove that the defendant deliberately intended to injure the plaintiff. It is 
enough if it is shown that, indifferent to consequences, the defendant intentionally 
acted in such a way that the natural and probable consequence of his act was 
injury to the plaintiff…. 
The terms “wilfulness, or conscious indifference to consequences from which malice may be 
inferred,” as used in the decisions of this court, means such conduct in the face of discovered peril. 
In other words, in order to superadd this element of damages by way of punishment, it must appear 
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that the negligent party knew, or had reason to believe, that his act of negligence was about to inflict 
injury, and that he continued in his course with a conscious indifference to the consequences, from 
which malice may be inferred. 
In the case at bar there was proof of gross negligence, but gross negligence is not sufficient to 
justify punitive damages. The facts, when viewed most favorably to appellee, reveal that Foley, 
appellant’s driver, was late leaving Batesville and his truck weighed 80,480 pounds, which is 480 
pounds over the legal limit. Foley had received six citations in the last year for driving an overweight 
truck, and appellant had paid all of the citations. One of appellant’s employees testified that the 
company had a disciplinary procedure for drivers who got an excessive number of overweight 
tickets, and he testified that Foley had an excessive number of such tickets, but admitted that Foley 
had not been cautioned or disciplined for driving an overweight truck. Appellee’s expert witness on 
accident reconstruction testified that the 480 pounds excess weight on the 80,000 pound rig was a 
contributing, but insignificant, factor in the accident. 
Between Batesville and the place of the accident, Foley exceeded the 55 miles per hour speed 
limit while going downhill. He got so close to one car that all the driver of the car could see in his 
rearview mirror was the grill of Foley’s tractor. He got extremely close to another car while 
“tailgating” downhill. Finally, he came around a curve at the crest of a small hill and had 804 feet of 
clear visibility to the bridge structure where the accident occurred. The house, which was sitting on 
the trailer, at the bridge, was 17 feet high, 28 feet wide, and 36 feet long, and because of its added 
height, could be seen from about 900 feet away. Foley either did not apply his brakes, or he applied 
them but they did not function properly. 
Appellee’s witnesses said Foley was going 60 to 70 miles per hour and made no effort to stop 
even though he went past a vehicle with a flashing warning light. They testified his brake lights did 
not come on, the tires did not skid, there was no smoke from either the brakes or tires, and there 
were no skid marks. However, appellee’s expert brake witness testified that Foley probably did apply 
his brakes just before the accident, but the brakes were not working properly. While the expert did 
not testify about standards in the industry, he did testify that the Ryder Truck Company checks 
truck brakes every 8,000 miles. One of the appellant’s employees testified that the company policy 
was to adjust the trailer brakes once a month, but the brakes on this trailer had not been adjusted 
for three and one-half months, and the tractor brakes had not been opened for a complete inspection 
for almost six months, although they were adjusted about 6 weeks before the accident. He further 
testified that appellant conducted an internal inspection of the brakes every 50,000 miles as 
recommended by the American Trucking Association and, in addition, the drivers conducted a daily 
inspection. There was no evidence that appellant had any knowledge that the brakes were faulty. 
As Foley sped downhill at 70 miles per hour, he ran into the rear of the decedent’s car and then 
struck appellee’s rig and the house. 
The foregoing facts do not show that appellant, either by its own policies or through the actions 
of its agent Foley, intentionally acted in such a way that the natural and probable consequence was 
to damage appellee’s property. Nor do the facts show that appellant knew that some act of negligence 
was about to cause damage, but still continued to cause that damage. Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment for punitive damages. 
When we reverse a judgment for punitive damages, we normally must also reverse the award for 
compensatory damages because the issues are so interwoven that an error with respect to one requires 
a retrial of the whole case. In this case, however, the parties have stipulated as to the amount of 
compensatory damages, so we reverse on the punitive damages, but do not remand for new trial…. 
Hays, Justice, dissenting: 
The majority’s opinion has examined the evidence supporting punitive damages more from the 
appellant’s standpoint than the appellee’s. When viewed most favorably to the appellee, and with its 
fullest probative force, I believe there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s refusal to 
grant a motion for a directed verdict. 
We no longer require actual malice as an essential constituent of punitive damages. It is enough 
if the defendant acted recklessly or wantonly, or with a conscious indifference to the safety and 
welfare of others using the highways. In Dalrymple v. Fields, 633 S.W.2d 362 (Ark 1982), we said: 
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Before punitive damages may be allowed it must be shown that in the absence of 
proof of malice or willfulness there was a wanton and conscious indifference for 
the rights and safety of others on the part of the tortfeasor. 
While excessive speed may, in many circumstances, be no more than ordinary negligence, 
actions are not to be viewed in a vacuum, and what may be no more than negligence in one setting 
can readily be seen as wantonness or conscious indifference in another context. Thus driving 85 
m.p.h. on certain stretches of highway may be relatively safe, or it may be negligence, depending on 
the traffic, weather, etc. But driving only 35 or 40 m.p.h. past a school at dismissal hour or close to 
a playground crowded with children with an evident indifference to the known tendencies of 
children could meet even restrictive concepts of wantonness. In Airco, Inc. v. Simmons First National 
Bank, 638 S.W.2d 660 (Ark. 1982), we upheld a monumental award of punitive damages, not on 
proof that Airco had any intent to injure, but because the injury was the natural and probable 
consequence of Airco’s conduct. It seems a fair analogy to me to say that when one knowingly drives 
an overloaded 18-wheeler, with defective brakes, on the highway at speeds of 70 m.p.h. by some 
accounts, oblivious of warning signals and without slowing down and with no apparent effort at 
stopping, approaching congestion on the highway, a collision is the natural and probable 
consequence of such conduct. At least, reasonable minds could differ on the issue of conscious 
indifference and that is enough. 
In sum, the proof was that Robert Foley was several hours late leaving Batesville for Little Rock. His 
truck, an 18-wheeler, was loaded beyond the lawful limit. His truck, by whatever standard one chooses, 
was equipped with brakes that were not functioning properly. For some miles prior to the point of 
impact Mr. Foley drove so fast and so close to preceding vehicles that two of those motorists were 
alarmed by it and described his conduct at trial as speeding and “tailgating.” Rounding a curve bearing 
into a straight, level stretch of highway some 900 feet from the appellee’s house-moving rig, Mr. Foley 
proceeded at a high rate of speed (70 m.p.h. by one account) and with no discernable attempt to reduce 
his speed (some witnesses testified that his speed actually increased as he neared the impact point), 
past one vehicle with a warning light flashing, to strike the Staggs-McGee vehicle, knocking it a 
considerable distance in the air, and resulting in the deaths of the two occupants, before striking 
another vehicle and the house. Photographs of the scene attest to extraordinary force of the impact. 
There was testimony that one of the brake shoes on the truck was not even touching the brake 
drum, rendering it useless as a braking device. There was testimony that none of the four rear brakes 
met Department of Transportation specifications. There was other material evidence from which an 
inference could be drawn that the brakes on the truck were seriously deficient and that fact was 
known by Foley and was in derogation of the policies of National By-Products, Inc. Lastly, there was 
proof from which the jury could quite properly have inferred that National By-Products, Inc., in 
addition to neglecting the safe operation of the truck involved, engaged in practices which promoted 
the overloading of its trucks beyond the legal limit, by routinely paying weight fines rather than 
demanding compliance by its drivers. 
The proof, I believe, was such that a jury had a right under the law to exemplify the conduct of 
both defendants by assessing punitive damages. The judgment should be affirmed. 
QUESTIONS 
1. What’s Tort Law Up To? What are punitive damages supposed to accomplish? Do they 
serve the goals of tort law? Shouldn’t we accomplish punishment through criminal law?  
2. Intentional Torts: National By-Products shows us that punitive damages are sometimes, 
but not always, available in negligence claims. But what about intentional torts? Will a 
plaintiff suing for battery or false imprisonment always be entitled to punitive damages? 
3. You Be the Judge: In Justice Dudley’s view, no reasonable jury could conclude that Foley 
acted with conscious indifference to the imminent risk of injury to others posed by his 
driving. Do you agree? 
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MATHIAS v. ACCOR ECONOMY LODGING, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (2003) 
Posner, Judge:ã 
The plaintiffs brought this diversity suit governed by Illinois law 
against affiliated entities (which the parties treat as a single entity, as shall 
we) that own and operate the “Motel 6” chain of hotels and motels. One 
of these hotels (now a “Red Roof Inn,” though still owned by the 
defendant) is in downtown Chicago. The plaintiffs, a brother and sister, 
were guests there and were bitten by bedbugs…. The plaintiffs claim that 
in allowing guests to be attacked by bedbugs in a motel that charges 
upwards of $100 a day for a room and would not like to be mistaken for 
a flophouse, the defendant was guilty of “willful and wanton conduct” 
and thus under Illinois law is liable for punitive as well as compensatory 
damages. The jury agreed and awarded each plaintiff $186,000 in punitive 
damages though only $5,000 in compensatory damages. The defendant 
appeals, complaining primarily about the punitive-damages award…. 
The defendant argues that at worst it is guilty of simple negligence, and if this is right the 
plaintiffs were not entitled by Illinois law to any award of punitive damages. It also complains that 
the award was excessive—indeed that any award in excess of $20,000 to each plaintiff would deprive 
the defendant of its property without due process of law. The first complaint has no possible merit, 
as the evidence of gross negligence, indeed of recklessness in the strong sense of an unjustifiable 
failure to avoid a known risk, was amply shown. In 1998, EcoLab, the extermination service that the 
motel used, discovered bedbugs in several rooms in the motel and recommended that it be hired to 
spray every room, for which it would charge the motel only $500; the motel refused. The next year, 
bedbugs were again discovered in a room but EcoLab was asked to spray just that room. The motel 
tried to negotiate a building sweep by EcoLab free of charge, but, not surprisingly, the negotiation 
failed. By the spring of 2000, the motel’s manager started noticing that there were refunds being 
given by my desk clerks and reports coming back from the guests that there were ticks in the rooms 
and bugs in the rooms that were biting. She looked in some of the rooms and discovered bedbugs. 
The defendant asks us to disregard her testimony as that of a disgruntled ex-employee, but of course 
her credibility was for the jury, not the defendant, to determine. 
Further incidents of guests being bitten by insects and demanding and receiving refunds led the 
manager to recommend to her superior in the company that the motel be closed while every room 
was sprayed, but this was refused. This superior, a district manager, was a management-level 
employee of the defendant, and his knowledge of the risk and failure to take effective steps either to 
eliminate it or to warn the motel’s guests are imputed to his employer for purposes of determining 
whether the employer should be liable for punitive damages. The employer’s liability for 
compensatory damages is of course automatic on the basis of the principle of respondeat superior, 
since the district manager was acting within the scope of his employment. 
The infestation continued and began to reach farcical proportions, as when a guest, after 
complaining of having been bitten repeatedly by insects while asleep in his room in the hotel, was 
moved to another room only to discover insects there; and within 18 minutes of being moved to a 
third room he discovered insects in that room as well and had to be moved still again. (Odd that at 
that point he didn’t flee the motel.) By July, the motel’s management was acknowledging to EcoLab 
that there was a “major problem with bed bugs” and that all that was being done about it was 
“chasing them from room to room.” Desk clerks were instructed to call the “bedbugs” “ticks,” 
apparently on the theory that customers would be less alarmed, though in fact ticks are more 
dangerous than bedbugs because they spread Lyme Disease and Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever. 
Rooms that the motel had placed on “Do not rent, bugs in room” status nevertheless were rented. 
It was in November that the plaintiffs checked into the motel. They were given Room 504, even 
though the motel had classified the room as “DO NOT RENT UNTIL TREATED,” and it had not been 
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treated. Indeed, that night 190 of the hotel’s 191 rooms were occupied, even though a number of them 
had been placed on the same don’t-rent status as Room 504. One of the defendant’s motions in limine 
that the judge denied was to exclude evidence concerning all other rooms—a good example of the 
frivolous character of the motions and of the defendant’s pertinacious defense of them on appeal. 
Although bedbug bites are not as serious as the bites of some other insects, they are painful and 
unsightly. Motel 6 could not have rented any rooms at the prices it charged had it informed guests 
that the risk of being bitten by bedbugs was appreciable. Its failure either to warn guests or to take 
effective measures to eliminate the bedbugs amounted to fraud and probably to battery as 
well…. There was, in short, sufficient evidence of “willful and wanton conduct” within the meaning 
that the Illinois courts assign to the term to permit an award of punitive damages in this case. 
But in what amount? In arguing that $20,000 was the maximum amount of punitive damages 
that a jury could constitutionally have awarded each plaintiff, the defendant points to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s recent statement that “few awards of punitive damages exceeding a single-digit 
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). The Court went 
on to suggest that “four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of 
constitutional impropriety.” Hence the defendant’s proposed ceiling in this case of $20,000, four 
times the compensatory damages awarded to each plaintiff. The ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages determined by the jury was, in contrast, 37.2 to 1. 
The Supreme Court did not, however, lay down a 4-to-1 or single-digit-ratio rule—it said merely 
that “there is a presumption against an award that has a 145-to-1 ratio”—and it would be 
unreasonable to do so. We must consider why punitive damages are awarded and why the Court has 
decided that due process requires that such awards be limited. The second question is easier to 
answer than the first. The term “punitive damages” implies punishment, and a standard principle of 
penal theory is that “the punishment should fit the crime” in the sense of being proportional to the 
wrongfulness of the defendant’s action, though the principle is modified when the probability of 
detection is very low (a familiar example is the heavy fines for littering) or the crime is potentially 
lucrative (as in the case of trafficking in illegal drugs). Hence, with these qualifications, which in fact 
will figure in our analysis of this case, punitive damages should be proportional to the wrongfulness 
of the defendant’s actions. 
Another penal precept is that a defendant should have reasonable notice of the sanction for 
unlawful acts, so that he can make a rational determination of how to act; and so there have to be 
reasonably clear standards for determining the amount of punitive damages for particular wrongs. 
And a third precept, the core of the Aristotelian notion of corrective justice, and more broadly 
of the principle of the rule of law, is that sanctions should be based on the wrong done rather than 
on the status of the defendant; a person is punished for what he does, not for who he is, even if the 
who is a huge corporation… 
[O]ne function of punitive-damages awards is to relieve the pressures on an overloaded system 
of criminal justice by providing a civil alternative to criminal prosecution of minor crimes. An 
example is deliberately spitting in a person’s face, a criminal assault but because minor readily 
deterrable by the levying of what amounts to a civil fine through a suit for damages for the tort of 
battery. Compensatory damages would not do the trick in such a case, and this for three reasons: 
because they are difficult to determine in the case of acts that inflict largely dignitary harms; because 
in the spitting case they would be too slight to give the victim an incentive to sue, and he might 
decide instead to respond with violence—and an age-old purpose of the law of torts is to provide a 
substitute for violent retaliation against wrongful injury—and because to limit the plaintiff to 
compensatory damages would enable the defendant to commit the offensive act with impunity 
provided that he was willing to pay, and again there would be a danger that his act would incite a 
breach of the peace by his victim. 
When punitive damages are sought for billion-dollar oil spills and other huge economic injuries, 
the considerations that we have just canvassed fade. As the Court emphasized in Campbell, the fact 
that the plaintiffs in that case had been awarded very substantial compensatory damages—$1 million 
for a dispute over insurance coverage—greatly reduced the need for giving them a huge award of 
punitive damages ($145 million) as well in order to provide an effective remedy. Our case is closer to 
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the spitting case. The defendant’s behavior was outrageous but the compensable harm done was slight 
and at the same time difficult to quantify because a large element of it was emotional. And the 
defendant may well have profited from its misconduct because by concealing the infestation it was 
able to keep renting rooms. Refunds were frequent but may have cost less than the cost of closing the 
hotel for a thorough fumigation. The hotel’s attempt to pass off the bedbugs as ticks, which some 
guests might ignorantly have thought less unhealthful, may have postponed the instituting of 
litigation to rectify the hotel’s misconduct. The award of punitive damages in this case thus serves the 
additional purpose of limiting the defendant’s ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection 
and (private) prosecution. If a tortfeasor is “caught” only half the time he commits torts, then when 
he is caught he should be punished twice as heavily in order to make up for the times he gets away. 
Finally, if the total stakes in the case were capped at $50,000 (2 × [$5,000 + $20,000]), the 
plaintiffs might well have had difficulty financing this lawsuit. It is here that the defendant’s 
aggregate net worth of $1.6 billion becomes relevant. A defendant’s wealth is not a sufficient basis 
for awarding punitive damages. That would be discriminatory and would violate the rule of law, as 
we explained earlier, by making punishment depend on status rather than conduct. Where wealth 
in the sense of resources enters is in enabling the defendant to mount an extremely aggressive 
defense against suits such as this and by doing so to make litigating against it very costly, which in 
turn may make it difficult for the plaintiffs to find a lawyer willing to handle their case, involving as 
it does only modest stakes, for the usual 33-40 percent contingent fee. 
In other words, the defendant is investing in developing a reputation intended to deter plaintiffs. 
It is difficult otherwise to explain the great stubbornness with which it has defended this case, 
making a host of frivolous evidentiary arguments despite the very modest stakes even when the 
punitive damages awarded by the jury are included…. 
All things considered, we cannot say that the award of punitive damages was excessive, albeit the 
precise number chosen by the jury was arbitrary. It is probably not a coincidence that $5,000 + 
$186,000 = $191,000/191 = $1,000: i.e., $1,000 per room in the hotel. But as there are no punitive-
damages guidelines, corresponding to the federal and state sentencing guidelines, it is inevitable that 
the specific amount of punitive damages awarded whether by a judge or by a jury will be arbitrary. 
(Which is perhaps why the plaintiffs’ lawyer did not suggest a number to the jury.) The judicial 
function is to police a range, not a point. 
But it would have been helpful had the parties presented evidence concerning the regulatory or 
criminal penalties to which the defendant exposed itself by deliberately exposing its customers to a 
substantial risk of being bitten by bedbugs. That is an inquiry recommended by the Supreme Court. 
But we do not think its omission invalidates the award. We can take judicial notice that deliberate 
exposure of hotel guests to the health risks created by insect infestations exposes the hotel’s owner 
to sanctions under Illinois and Chicago law that in the aggregate are comparable in severity to the 
punitive damage award in this case. 
“A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of an individual by any 
means, commits reckless conduct if he performs recklessly the acts which cause the harm or 
endanger safety, whether they otherwise are lawful or unlawful.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-5(a). 
This is a misdemeanor, punishable by up to a year’s imprisonment or a fine of $2,500, or both…. Of 
course a corporation cannot be sent to prison, and $2,500 is obviously much less than the $186,000 
awarded to each plaintiff in this case as punitive damages. But this is just the beginning. Other guests 
of the hotel were endangered besides these two plaintiffs. And, what is much more important, a 
Chicago hotel that permits unsanitary conditions to exist is subject to revocation of its license, 
without which it cannot operate. We are sure that the defendant would prefer to pay the punitive 
damages assessed in this case than to lose its license. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Don’t Let the Bedbugs Bite: Judge Posner observes that Motel 6’s failure to eliminate 
the bedbugs or warn guests about them probably constituted battery. Do you agree? Did 
Motel 6 intend a harmful or offensive contact? How might the guests establish intent for 
a battery claim? 
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2. Litigation Incentives: Judge Posner thinks punitive damages are warranted to address 
two special types of wrongful conduct. What are they? Which is at issue here? Is it fair 
to say that, in essence, both types seek to remedy the problem of “under-litigation”? 
3. Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? Judge Posner mentions the Supreme Court’s State 
Farm decision, which explored constitutional limits on punitive damages. The Court 
held that due process requires punitive damages to be reasonable and proportionate—a 
standard that involves courts scrutinizing the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct and comparing the punitive damages to both the plaintiff’s compensatory 
damages and civil penalties in other comparable cases. Although the Court said that 
awards “exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages” 
would be constitutionally dubious, it stressed that higher ratios might be warranted “if 
a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.” 
How does this tie into Judge Posner’s justification for punitive damages? And what 
happens if multiple plaintiffs bring separate claims based on the same wrong? Imagine, 
for example, that other Motel 6 guests sue after getting bitten. Should courts prevent 
them from continually recovering punitive damages from Motel 6 based on the same 
conduct? Finally, what can legislators do if they want to rein in punitive awards? 
 
C. Vicarious & Joint Liability 
TABER v. MAINE 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1995) 
Calabresi, Judge: ã 
Twenty-six years ago, in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. 
United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968), this court held 
that the United States Government was vicariously liable 
for damage to a drydock caused by a drunken sailor who 
was returning to ship from a night’s liberty. In his 
celebrated opinion, Judge Henry Friendly described the 
basis of respondeat superior as the “deeply rooted 
sentiment that a business enterprise cannot justly 
disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be 
said to be characteristic of its activities.” Even though the sailor had become drunk while on liberty 
and far off base, we noted that drinking on leave was so common a part of naval life that the sailor’s 
drunken return to ship could fairly be deemed to be characteristic of the military enterprise and, 
hence, that the government should be held liable for the damage that he caused. 
In Bushey, we applied admiralty law. Today—in a case that again involves a seaman who had too 
much to drink—we must apply the law of Guam. This, in turn, points us to California decisions for 
guidance. As it happens, California has taken the lead in developing the modern law of respondeat 
superior even before Bushey. And, so, rounding out the circle, we now reach the same conclusion as 
did Judge Friendly, twenty-six years ago…. 
On the morning of April 13, 1985, Robert S. Maine, a Navy serviceman on active duty at the U.S. 
Naval Ship Repair Facility on the island of Guam, went on liberty after having completed a grueling 
24 hour duty shift. While on liberty he was free to leave the base as he pleased and travel up to 50 
miles away. He could also be recalled for duty at any time. 
Maine decided to have a good time. By noon, he was relaxing at an on-base beach party and 
drinking beer with Navy friends. Later that afternoon, he purchased two six-packs of beer at the base 
PX with his Navy comrade, Karin Conville, and returned with her to his barracks to drink several 
more cans. At dinnertime, Maine accompanied friends to the enlisted men’s club, where he 
consumed two cocktails with his meal. After dinner, he attended a barracks party in the room of a 
superior officer, with several other superior officers present. There, Maine drank three or four more 
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beers and—when he left to return to his own barracks at about 11:00 p.m.—Conville and another 
Navy comrade named Jean Buquet noticed that he seemed to be drunk. At around 11:30 p.m., Maine 
had difficulty sleeping and decided to drive off base to get something to eat. Feeling tired, he aborted 
his snack mission and tried to return to base. On the way back, he caused the accident that injured 
Scott A. Taber. 
Taber was an enlisted Seabee—a construction worker in the United States Navy—and was 
stationed at Camp Covington, Guam. At 6:00 p.m. on Friday, April 12th, he too went on liberty. 
Accordingly, he was free to go off base at any time, to travel anywhere within 50 miles of his base 
and, unless he was recalled for duty, to do as he pleased until his liberty ended at 6:00 a.m. on the 
following Monday.  
Around 2:00 p.m. on Saturday April 13, Taber’s civilian friend, Estelita Stills, met Taber at his 
base in her car. They planned to spend the weekend together at her house, which was located off the 
base. Before going there, however, the two drove to her cousins’ home for dinner at the nearby U.S. 
Naval Station. There, Taber enjoyed a meal and, as a friendly gesture in return, helped fix the 
cousins’ car. Shortly before midnight, Stills and Taber left for Stills’s house and their weekend of rest 
and recreation. As fate would have it, they never got there. While they were driving on the public 
roadway toward Stills’s house, Maine crashed into them, injuring Taber severely. 
Two years later, Taber started this action for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(“FTCA”)…. Naming both Maine and the United States Government as defendants, Taber 
complained that he was injured as a result of Maine’s negligent driving and that, because Maine was 
acting within the scope of his Naval employment when he caused the accident, the government was 
liable on a theory of respondeat superior…. [The district court] granted summary judgment to the 
government because “Maine’s drunk driving incident on April 13, 1985, was not in the line of duty 
and therefore the United States is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”… 
The action proceeded against Maine, however. After a bench trial in which Maine appeared pro 
se, the district court found Maine liable for negligence and assessed Taber’s damages at $300,000. A 
final judgment was entered and Taber appealed…. 
The FTCA allows civil actions against the government based on the negligent acts or omissions 
of its employees, including those of members of the Armed Services who are acting “in the line of 
duty.” The courts have uniformly equated the FTCA’s “line of duty” language with the phrase “scope 
of employment,” as that concept is defined by the respondeat superior law of the jurisdiction in 
which the accident occurred. Because the accident in this case happened in Guam, we must follow 
Guam’s law of respondeat superior…. 
Where the law of Guam is unclear, the Ninth Circuit, serving as Guam’s highest appellate court, 
has instructed courts to look to California law for guidance…. It seems clear to us that California 
law (and by implication the law of Guam) would hold the government vicariously liable for Maine’s 
actions. California was one of the first states in the nation to adopt an expansive reading of 
the respondeat superior doctrine [that is now] evident in numerous California cases…. For example, 
in Rodgers v. Kemper Construction Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), a subcontractor was 
held vicariously liable for an assault committed by two of its employees who had lounged around 
drinking for several hours in what was, ironically, called the “dry house” (a rest area/locker room 
located on the job site). On a Friday night after their work shift had ended, the employees, though 
free to go home, stayed in the dry house and got drunk. Later they went outside and got in a fight 
with the plaintiffs. In finding respondeat superior liability, the court stated that “the inquiry should 
be whether the risk was one that may be fairly regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the 
enterprise undertaken by the employer.” The court further noted that under California law, 
where social or recreational pursuits on the employer’s premises after hours are 
endorsed by the express or implied permission of the employer and are 
‘conceivably’ of some benefit to the employer or, even in the absence of proof of 
benefit, if such activities have become ‘a customary incident of the employment 
relationship,’ an employee engaged in such pursuits after hours is still acting 
within the scope of his employment. 
CASES & CRITIQUE    251 
In Rodgers, the subcontractor “customarily permitted employees to remain on the premises in 
or about the dry house long after their work shift had ended” and it was also “customary, particularly 
on Friday evenings, for employees to sit around the dry house after their work shift and talk and 
drink beer, often joined by their supervisors.” Because it “was neither unusual nor unreasonable” 
for the assailants to be on the job site drinking before the assault, and because such drinking in the 
dry house “was a customary incident of the employment relationship,” the court ruled that their 
related tortious actions fell within the scope of their employment. Not surprisingly, the court 
in Rodgers relied heavily on our decision in Bushey. 
Similarly, in Childers v. Shasta Livestock Auction Yard, Inc., 235 Cal. Rptr. 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987), Shasta’s foreman gave Childers and Abbott (both Shasta employees) the keys to his office at 
the end of the day and told them to go have a beer. The two employees were later joined by a 
customer, and the three of them drank both beer and hard liquor for several hours, getting quite 
drunk. At around 10:00 p.m., Abbott suggested to Childers that they drive off to feed Abbott’s 
horses. Abbott drove her truck off the road, killing herself and injuring Childers. In addressing 
Childers’s claim against Shasta, the court made clear that the fact that Childers’s injuries occurred 
away from the work site did not bar the employer’s vicarious liability for Abbott’s drunk driving. 
The court said: 
respondeat superior liability is properly applied where an employee undertakes 
activities within his or her scope of employment that cause the employee to 
become an instrumentality of danger to others even where the danger may 
manifest itself at times and locations remote from the ordinary workplace…. 
The district court below tried to distinguish these authorities on the ground that the drinking 
in Rodgers and Childers took place at the work site while Maine’s supposedly did not. We disagree. 
The drinking in both Rodgers and Childers occurred at worksite rest areas (the “dry house” and the 
business office, respectively)—not on the assembly line. Similarly, although Maine did not drink 
while working at the Naval Ship Repair Facility, he drank at an on-base beach party, at the enlisted 
men’s club, and in the barracks—all of which were located on his base. These places were as much 
on-site rest areas as the ones involved in both Rodgers and Childers. 
The government understandably seeks to rely on an older conception of respondeat 
superior. This view of the doctrine required a close link between the acts of the “agent” and “profit” 
accruing to the master before vicarious liability attaches to the latter. But today this position is in 
hasty retreat, if not rout. Thus Rodgers and Childers held that the employer-benefit requirement is 
met whenever broad potential effects on morale and customer relations exist, or where the employer 
has implicitly permitted or endorsed the recreational practices that led to the harm…. 
Of course drinking by servicemembers can be viewed as important to military morale, just as 
drinking was apparently instrumental to good employee morale and customer relations 
in Rodgers and Childers. Hence, “employer-benefit” can be adduced in all these cases. But in the end, 
“employer-benefit” is significant only because it is one way of showing that the harm that drinking 
causes can properly be considered a cost of the employer’s enterprise. 
California courts have said that the doctrine of respondeat superior is concerned with the 
allocation of the cost of industrial injury. The issue is simply whether the employee’s conduct is not 
so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other 
costs of the employer’s business. Thus, our focus must be on the relationship between the 
servicemember’s behavior and the costs of the military enterprise. 
Here, it is undisputed that drinking on base during off-duty hours was a commonplace, if not an 
officially condoned activity. It certainly was a customary incident of Maine’s employment 
relationship with the Navy, as that element is described in Rodgers. And in the context of the military 
mission, an occasional drunken servicemember who leaves government premises and causes 
damage is a completely foreseeable event, in the sense that it is a reasonably obvious risk of the 
general enterprise. As such, we do not think that it would be either “unfair” or the slightest bit 
unreasonable to impose that cost on the government. To the contrary, given the pervasive control 
that the military exercises over its personnel while they are on a base, it is totally in keeping with the 
doctrine of respondeat superior to allocate the costs of base operations to the government. 
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See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 Ga. L. 
Rev. 851 (1981) (discussing respondeat superior as an incentive for employers to exert their control 
over employees to induce careful conduct). And this is so quite apart from whether or not the 
military benefits from the boost in morale achieved through fairly lenient on-base drinking policies.1 
As the leading Torts treatise has put it, “the integrating principle” of respondeat superior is “that 
the employer should be liable for those faults that may be fairly regarded as risks of his business, 
whether they are committed in furthering it or not.” Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar 
S. Gray, The Law of Torts § 26.8 (1986). Judge Friendly made the same point most elegantly 
in Bushey. “The proclivity of seamen to find solicitude by copious resort to the bottle,” he wrote, 
“has been noted in opinions too numerous to warrant citation. Once all this is granted, it is 
immaterial that the coastguardsman’s precise action was not to be foreseen.” After all, the 
government “cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be 
characteristic of its activities.” We believe the law of Guam reaches the same conclusion. 
Accordingly, we hold that the government is vicariously liable for Maine’s conduct….ã 
QUESTIONS 
1. Let the Master Answer: Did anyone in the Navy pressure Maine to get drunk and go 
hunting for snacks while on liberty? Did his actions benefit the Navy? Why is the Navy 
on the hook for his actions? 
2. Semper Fortis… et Ebrius! Judge Calabresi ties an employer’s liability to conduct that’s 
“characteristic” of the employer’s enterprise. Is getting drunk characteristic of the Navy’s 
activities? Would the Navy be liable if Maine had been boozing in a bar in Hagåtña? 
3. Role Reversal: Imagine that Taber had instead driven carelessly and crashed into Maine. 
Would the Navy be liable under a theory of respondeat superior? How about if Maine 
had punched Taber in a bar fight? 
 
 
1 We make no pronouncement on drunkenness in general. Our point here is simply that drinking on base during off-
duty hours was a customary incident of Maine’s employment relationship with the Navy. This “on-base” drinking included 
an on-base beach party, cocktails at the enlisted personnel club, and drinking at a barracks party in the room of a superior 
officer, all on the day of the off-base accident. It is these on-base activities that bring this case within the ambit 
of Rodgers and Childers, and therefore impose respondeat superior liability on the government. We find instructive the 
example offered by Judge Friendly, albeit in an admiralty context in Bushey, indicating that employer liability would not be 
imposed for an off-base tort resulting from drinking at an off-base bar. Like Judge Friendly, we would not deem such an 
activity incident to the employment relationship. 
ã Wela Quan, Respondeat Superior, NY Bar Picture Book (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). 
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RAVO v. ROGATNICK 
Court of Appeals of the State of New York (1987) 
Alexander, Judge: 
In this medical malpractice action, defendant, Dr. 
Irwin L. Harris, appeals from an order of the Appellate 
Division unanimously affirming an amended judgment of 
Supreme Court, entered on a jury verdict, finding him 
jointly and severally liable with Dr. Sol Rogatnick for 
injuries negligently inflicted upon plaintiff, Josephine 
Ravo, and resulting in brain damage that has rendered her 
severely and permanently [disabled]. The issue presented 
is whether joint and several liability was properly imposed 
upon defendant under the circumstances of this case 
where, notwithstanding that the defendants neither acted in concert nor concurrently, a single 
indivisible injury—brain damage—was negligently inflicted. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
Uncontroverted expert medical evidence established that plaintiff, Josephine Ravo, who at the 
time of trial was 14 years of age, was severely and permanently [disabled] as a result of brain damage 
she suffered at birth. The evidence demonstrated that the child was born an unusually large baby 
whose mother suffered from gestational diabetes which contributed to difficulties during delivery. 
The evidence further established that Dr. Rogatnick, the obstetrician who had charge of the ante 
partum care of Josephine’s mother and who delivered Josephine, failed to ascertain pertinent medical 
information about the mother, incorrectly estimated the size of the infant, and employed improper 
surgical procedures during the delivery. It was shown that Dr. Harris, the pediatrician under whose 
care Josephine came following birth, misdiagnosed and improperly treated the infant’s condition 
after birth. Based upon this evidence, the jury concluded that Dr. Rogatnick committed eight separate 
acts of medical malpractice, and Dr. Harris committed three separate acts of medical malpractice. 
Although Dr. Rogatnick’s negligence contributed to Josephine’s brain damage, the medical 
testimony demonstrated that Dr. Harris’s negligence was also a substantial contributing cause of the 
injury. No testimony was adduced, however, from which the jury could delineate which aspects of 
the injury were caused by the respective negligence of the individual doctors. Indeed, plaintiff’s 
expert, Dr. Charash…concluded that neither he nor anybody else could say with certainty which of 
the factors caused the brain damage. Similarly, Dr. Perrotta, testifying on behalf of plaintiff, opined 
that she could not tell whether [Dr. Harris’s carelessness] contributed “10 percent, 20 percent, or 
anything like that” to the injury. Nor, as the Appellate Division found, did Dr. Harris adduce any 
evidence that could support a jury finding that he caused an identifiable percentage of the infant 
plaintiff’s brain damage. Indeed, Dr. Harris’s entire defense appears to have been that he was not 
responsible for the plaintiff’s injury to any degree. 
The trial court instructed the jury [on comparative fault and joint and severable liability.]… 
[T]he jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the total amount of $2,750,000 attributing 80% of the 
“fault” to Dr. Rogatnick and 20% of the “fault” to Dr. Harris. 
In a post-verdict motion, Dr. Harris sought an order directing entry of judgment limiting the 
plaintiff’s recovery against him to $450,000 (20% of the $2,250,000 base recovery—the court having 
setoff $500,000 received by plaintiff in settlement of claims against other defendants) based upon 
his contention that his liability was not joint and several, but rather was independent and successive. 
This motion was denied. [The Appellate Division affirmed.] 
When two or more tort-feasors act concurrently or in concert to produce a single injury, they 
may be held jointly and severally liable. This is so because such concerted wrongdoers are considered 
“joint tort-feasors” and in legal contemplation, there is a joint enterprise and a mutual agency, such 
that the act of one is the act of all and liability for all that is done is visited upon each. On the other 
hand, where multiple tort-feasors neither act in concert nor contribute concurrently to the same 
wrong, they are not joint tort-feasors; rather, their wrongs are independent and successive. Under 
successive and independent liability, of course, the initial tort-feasor may well be liable to the 
plaintiff for the entire damage proximately resulting from his own wrongful acts, including 
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aggravation of injuries by a successive tort-feasor. The successive tort-feasor, however, is liable only 
for the separate injury or the aggravation his conduct has caused. 
It is sometimes the case that tort-feasors who neither act in concert nor concurrently may 
nevertheless be considered jointly and severally liable. This may occur in the instance of certain 
injuries which, because of their nature, are incapable of any reasonable or practicable division or 
allocation among multiple tort-feasors. We had occasion to consider such a circumstance in Slater 
v. Mersereau, 64 N.Y. 138 (N.Y. 1876), where premises belonging to the plaintiff were damaged by 
rainwater as a result of the negligent workmanship by a general contractor and a subcontractor. We 
held that where two parties by their separate and independent acts of negligence, cause a single, 
inseparable injury, each party is responsible for the entire injury:  
Although they acted independently of each other, they did act at the same time in 
causing the damages, each contributing towards it, and although the act of each, 
alone and of itself, might not have caused the entire injury, under the 
circumstances presented, there is no good reason why each should not be liable 
for the damages caused by the different acts of all. The water with which each of 
the parties were instrumental in injuring the plaintiffs was one mass and 
inseparable, and no distinction can be made between the different sources from 
whence it flowed, so that it can be claimed that each caused a separate and distinct 
injury for which each one is separately responsible. The contractor and 
subcontractors were separately negligent, and although such negligence was not 
concurrent, yet the negligence of both these parties contributed to produce the 
damages caused at one and the same time. 
Our affirmance in Hawkes v. Goll, 24 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 1939), demonstrates that simultaneous 
conduct is not necessary to a finding of joint and several liability when there is an indivisible injury. 
In that case, the decedent was struck by the vehicle driven by the defendant Farrell and was thrown 
across the roadway, where very shortly thereafter he was again struck, this time by the vehicle driven 
by the defendant Goll, and dragged some 40 to 50 feet along the highway. He was taken to the 
hospital where he expired within the hour. The Appellate Division stated:  
As the result of his injuries the plaintiff’s intestate died within an hour. There 
could be no evidence upon which the jury could base a finding of the nature of the 
injuries inflicted by the first car as distinguished from those inflicted by the second 
car. The case was submitted to the jury upon the theory that if both defendants 
were negligent they were jointly and severally liable. While the wrongful acts of 
the two defendants were not precisely concurrent in point of time, the defendants 
may nevertheless be joint tort feasors where, as here, their several acts of neglect 
concurred in producing the injury…. 
Similarly, here the jury was unable to determine from the evidence adduced at trial the degree to 
which the defendants’ separate acts of negligence contributed to the brain damage sustained by 
Josephine at birth. Certainly, a subsequent tort-feasor is not to be held jointly and severally liable for 
the acts of the initial tort-feasor with whom he is not acting in concert in every case where it is 
difficult, because of the nature of the injury, to separate the harm done by each tort-feasor from the 
others. Here, however, the evidence established that plaintiff’s brain damage was a single indivisible 
injury, and defendant failed to submit any evidence upon which the jury could base an 
apportionment of damage. 
Harris argues, however, that since the jury ascribed only 20% of the fault to him, this was in reality 
an apportionment of damage, demonstrating that the injury was divisible. This argument must fail. 
Clearly, the court’s instruction, and the interrogatory submitted in amplification thereof, called upon 
the jury to determine the respective responsibility in negligence of the defendants so as to establish a 
basis for an apportionment between them, by way of contribution, for the total damages awarded to 
plaintiff. In that respect, the jury’s apportionment of fault is unrelated to the nature of defendants’ 
liability (i.e., whether it was joint and several or independent and successive)…. 
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Here, the jury determined that the defendants breached duties owed to Josephine Ravo, and that 
these breaches contributed to her brain injury. The jury’s apportionment of fault, however, does not 
alter the joint and several liability of defendants for the single indivisible injury. Rather, that aspect 
of the jury’s determination of culpability merely defines the amount of contribution defendants may 
claim from each other, and does not impinge upon plaintiff’s right to collect the entire judgment 
award from either defendant….  
The right to seek equitable apportionment based on relative culpability is not one intended for 
the benefit of the injured claimant. It is a right affecting the distributive responsibilities of tort-
feasors inter sese. It is elementary that injured claimants may still choose which joint tort-feasors to 
include as defendants in an action and, regardless of the concurrent negligence of others, recover 
the whole of their damages from any of the particular tort-feasors sued. This being so, in light of the 
evidence establishing the indivisibility of the brain injury and the contributing negligence of Dr. 
Harris, and of the manner in which the case was tried and submitted to the jury, we conclude that 
joint and several liability was properly imposed…. Order affirmed, with costs. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Hunt Revisited: When the jury attributed 80% of the fault to Dr. Rogatnick and 20% of 
the fault to Dr. Harris, was it effectively dividing their relative causal contributions to 
Ravo’s injury? Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 8, 
what role does causation play in apportionment for purposes of comparative fault? Is 
causation the whole ballgame? 
2. Causation Conundrums: What’s the difference between a single indivisible injury and 
an independent and successive wrong? What liability consequences flow from each? 
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 23 
Contribution (2000) 
(a) When two or more persons are or may be liable 
for the same harm and one of them discharges 
the liability of another by…discharge of 
judgment, the person discharging the liability is 
entitled to recover contribution from the other, 
unless the other previously had a valid 
settlement and release from the plaintiff. ã 
(b) A person entitled to recover contribution may 
recover no more than the amount paid to the 
plaintiff in excess of the person’s comparative 
share of responsibility. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Apportionment and Contribution: The jury found that Dr. Harris was 20% at fault for 
Ravo’s injury. May Ravo recover the entire $2.25 million judgment from Dr. Harris? Is 
there anything he can do to limit his financial exposure under § 23 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts? What if Dr. Rogatnick is insolvent or has fled to an unknown location? 
Are the underlying rules here fair to defendants? 
2. Posecai Revisited: Should the jury in Posecai have been allowed to assign some 
percentage of fault to the mugger? Does your answer depend on whether the mugger 
can be identified and made a party to Shirley Posecai’s lawsuit? When the plaintiff suffers 
a single indivisible injury caused by multiple tortfeasors, how should the rules of 
comparative fault, apportionment, and contribution deal with so-called “phantom 
tortfeasors” to whom defendants attempt to shift some blame?  
 
ã Alex Griffioen, Pointing the Finger (CC BY 2.0). 
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CHAPTER 7:  INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS  
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
DICKENS v. PURYEAR 
Supreme Court of North Carolina (1981) 
Exum, Justice: ã 
Plaintiff’s complaint is cast as a claim for intentional infliction of 
mental distress. It was filed more than one year but less than three years 
after the incidents complained of occurred…. Defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment were allowed on the ground that plaintiff’s claim 
was for assault and battery; therefore it was barred by the one-year 
statute of limitations applicable to assault and battery…. We hold 
that…plaintiff’s claim is not altogether barred by the one-year statute 
because plaintiff’s factual showing indicates plaintiff may be able to 
prove a claim for intentional infliction of mental distress—a claim 
which is governed by the three-year statute of limitations…. 
For a time preceding the incidents in question plaintiff Dickens, a 
thirty-one year old man, shared sex, alcohol and marijuana with 
defendants’ daughter, a seventeen year old high school student. On 2 
April 1975 defendants, husband and wife, lured plaintiff into rural Johnston County, North Carolina. 
Upon plaintiff’s arrival defendant Earl Puryear, after identifying himself, called out to defendant Ann 
Puryear who emerged from beside a nearby building and, crying, stated that she “didn’t want to see 
that SOB.” Ann Puryear then left the scene. Thereafter Earl Puryear pointed a pistol between 
plaintiff’s eyes and shouted “Ya’ll come on out.” Four men wearing ski masks and armed with 
nightsticks then approached from behind plaintiff and beat him into semi-consciousness. They 
handcuffed plaintiff to a piece of farm machinery and resumed striking him with nightsticks. 
Defendant Earl Puryear, while brandishing a knife and cutting plaintiff’s hair, threatened plaintiff 
with castration. During four or five interruptions of the beatings defendant Earl Puryear and the 
others, within plaintiff’s hearing, discussed and took votes on whether plaintiff should be killed or 
castrated. Finally, after some two hours and the conclusion of a final conference, the beatings ceased. 
Defendant Earl Puryear told plaintiff to go home, pull his telephone off the wall, pack his clothes, and 
leave the state of North Carolina; otherwise he would be killed. Plaintiff was then set free.  
Plaintiff filed his complaint on 31 March 1978. It alleges that defendants on the occasion just 
described intentionally inflicted mental distress upon him. He further alleges that as a result of 
defendants’ acts plaintiff has suffered “severe and permanent mental and emotional distress, and 
physical injury to his nerves and nervous system.” He alleges that he is unable to sleep, afraid to go out 
in the dark, afraid to meet strangers, afraid he may be killed, suffering from chronic diarrhea and a 
gum disorder, unable effectively to perform his job, and that he has lost $1,000 per month income….  
Defendants contend, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that this is an action grounded in assault 
and battery. Although plaintiff pleads the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress, the Court 
of Appeals concluded that the complaint’s factual allegations and the factual showing at the hearing 
on summary judgment support only a claim for assault and battery. The claim was, therefore, barred 
by the one-year period of limitations applicable to assault and battery. Plaintiff, on the other hand, 
argues that the factual showing on the motion supports a claim for intentional infliction of mental 
distress—a claim which is governed by the three-year period of limitations.1 At least, plaintiff argues, 
 
ã Joaquin Villaverde, Injury (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0). 
1 Although defendants argue that even the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress is governed by the one-year 
statute of limitations, we are satisfied that it is not. The one-year statute, G.S. 1-54(3), applies to “libel, slander, assault, battery, 
or false imprisonment.” As we go to some length in the opinion to demonstrate, the tort of intentional infliction of mental 
distress is none of these things…. No statute of limitations addresses the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress by 
name. It must, therefore, be governed by the more general three-year statute of limitations, G.S. 1-52(5), which applies to 
“any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not hereafter enumerated.”… 
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his factual showing is such that it cannot be said as a matter of law that he will be unable to prove 
such a claim at trial…. 
The interest protected by the action for battery is freedom from intentional and unpermitted 
contact with one’s person; the interest protected by the action for assault is freedom from 
apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with one’s person. The apprehension created must 
be one of an immediate harmful or offensive contact, as distinguished from contact in the future…. 
A mere threat, unaccompanied by an offer or attempt to show violence, is not an assault…. This 
is true even though the mental discomfort caused by a threat of serious future harm on the part of 
one who has the apparent intention and ability to carry out his threat may be far more emotionally 
disturbing than many of the attempts to inflict minor bodily contacts which are actionable as assaults. 
Any remedy for words which are abusive or insulting, or which create emotional distress by threats 
for the future, is to be found [through other torts.]… Threats for the future are simply not present 
breaches of the peace, and so never have fallen within the narrow boundaries of assault. Thus threats 
for the future are actionable, if at all, not as assaults but as intentional inflictions of mental distress. 
The tort of intentional infliction of mental distress is recognized in North Carolina. Liability 
arises under this tort when a defendant’s conduct exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent 
society and the conduct causes mental distress of a very serious kind. In Stanback v. Stanback, 254 
S.E.2d 611 (N.C. 1979), plaintiff alleged that defendant breached a separation agreement between 
the parties. She further alleged…that defendant’s conduct in breaching the contract was “wilful, 
malicious, calculated, deliberate and purposeful” and that she has suffered great mental anguish and 
anxiety as a result of defendant’s conduct in breaching the agreement and that defendant acted 
recklessly and irresponsibly and with full knowledge of the consequences which would result…. 
[T]hese allegations were sufficient to state a claim for what has become essentially the tort of 
intentional infliction of serious emotional distress…. 
The tort alluded to in Stanback is defined in the Restatement § 46 as follows: 
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes 
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional 
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm…. 
There is, however, troublesome dictum in Stanback that plaintiff, to recover for this tort, “must 
show some physical injury resulting from the emotional disturbance caused by defendant’s alleged 
conduct” and that the harm she suffered was a “foreseeable result.” Plaintiff in Stanback did not 
allege that she had suffered any physical injury as a result of defendant’s conduct. We noted 
in Stanback, however, that “physical injury” had been given a broad interpretation in some of our 
earlier cases, e.g., Kimberly v. Howland, 55 S.E. 778 (N.C. 1906), where the Court said, 
The nerves are as much a part of the physical system as the limbs, and in some 
persons are very delicately adjusted, and when “out of tune” cause excruciating 
agony. We think the general principles of the law of torts support a right of action 
for physical injuries resulting from negligence, whether wilful or otherwise, none 
the less strongly because the physical injury consists of a wrecked nervous system 
instead of lacerated limbs. 
We held in Stanback that plaintiff’s “allegation that she suffered great mental anguish and 
anxiety is sufficient to permit her to go to trial upon the question of whether the great mental anguish 
and anxiety (which she alleges) has caused physical injury.” We held, further, that plaintiff’s 
allegation that defendant acted with full knowledge of the consequences of his actions sufficiently 
indicated that the harm she suffered was a foreseeable result of his conduct…. [W]e are satisfied that 
the dictum in Stanback was not necessary to the holding and in some respects actually conflicts with 
the holding. We now disapprove it. 
If “physical injury” means something more than emotional distress or damage to the nervous 
system, it is simply not an element of the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress…. In Wilson 
v. Wilkins, 25 S.W.2d 428 (Ark. 1930), defendants came to the home of the plaintiff at night and 
accused him of stealing hogs. They told him that if he did not leave their community within 10 days 
they “would put a rope around his neck.” Defendants’ threats caused the plaintiff to remove his 
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family from the area. Plaintiff testified that he was afraid they would kill him if he did not leave and 
that he suffered great mental agony and humiliation because he had been accused of something of 
which he was not guilty. In sustaining a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, the Arkansas Supreme 
Court rejected defendants’ contention that plaintiff was required to show some physical injury 
before he could recover. The Court said:  
The defendants rely upon the rule that in actions for negligence there can be no 
mental suffering where there has been no physical injury. The rule is well settled 
in this state, but it has no application to willful and wanton wrongs and those 
committed with the intention of causing mental distress and injured feelings. 
Mental suffering forms the proper element of damages in actions for willful and 
wanton wrongs and those committed with the intention of causing mental 
distress. 
Similarly, the question of foreseeability does not arise in the tort of intentional infliction of 
mental distress. This tort imports an act which is done with the intention of causing emotional 
distress or with reckless indifference to the likelihood that emotional distress may result. A 
defendant is liable for this tort when he desires to inflict severe emotional distress or knows that 
such distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct or where he acts 
recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will 
follow and the mental distress does in fact result. The authorities seem to agree that if the tort is 
wilful and not merely negligent, the wrong-doer is liable for such physical injuries as may 
proximately result, whether he could have foreseen them or not…. 
Stanback, in effect, was the first formal recognition by this Court of the relatively recent tort of 
intentional infliction of mental distress. This tort, under the authorities already cited, consists of: 
(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause and does cause (3) severe 
emotional distress to another. The tort may also exist where defendant’s actions indicate a reckless 
indifference to the likelihood that they will cause severe emotional distress. Recovery may be had 
for the emotional distress so caused and for any other bodily harm which proximately results from 
the distress itself…. 
The question [raised by defendants’ motion for summary judgment], then, is whether the 
evidentiary showing demonstrates as a matter of law that plaintiff’s only claim, if any, is for assault 
and battery. If plaintiff, as a matter of law, has no claim for intentional infliction of mental distress 
but has a claim, if at all, only for assault and battery, then plaintiff cannot surmount the affirmative 
defense of the one-year statute of limitations and defendants are entitled to summary judgment…. 
Although plaintiff labels his claim one for intentional infliction of mental distress, …the nature 
of the action is not determined by what either party calls it. The nature of the action is determined 
by the issues arising on the pleading and by the relief sought, and by the facts which, at trial, are 
proved or which, on motion for summary judgment, are forecast by the evidentiary showing. 
Here much of the factual showing at the hearing related to assaults and batteries committed by 
defendants against plaintiff. The physical beatings and the cutting of plaintiff’s hair constituted 
batteries. The threats of castration and death, being threats which created apprehension of 
immediate harmful or offensive contact, were assaults. Plaintiff’s recovery for injuries, mental or 
physical, caused by these actions would be barred by the one-year statute of limitations. 
The evidentiary showing on the summary judgment motion does, however, indicate that 
defendant Earl Puryear threatened plaintiff with death in the future unless plaintiff went home, 
pulled his telephone off the wall, packed his clothes, and left the state. The Court of Appeals 
characterized this threat as being “an immediate threat of harmful and offensive contact. It was a 
present threat of harm to plaintiff.” The Court of Appeals thus concluded that this threat was also 
an assault barred by the one-year statute of limitations. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ 
characterization of this threat. The threat was not one of imminent, or immediate, harm. It was a 
threat for the future apparently intended to and which allegedly did inflict serious mental distress; 
therefore it is actionable, if at all, as an intentional infliction of mental distress. 
The threat, of course, cannot be considered separately from the entire episode of which it was 
only a part. The assaults and batteries, construing the record in the light most favorable to the 
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plaintiff, were apparently designed to give added impetus to the ultimate conditional threat of future 
harm. Although plaintiff’s recovery for injury, mental or physical, directly caused by the assaults and 
batteries is barred by the statute of limitations, these assaults and batteries may be considered in 
determining the outrageous character of the ultimate threat and the extent of plaintiff’s mental or 
emotional distress caused by it.2  
Having concluded, therefore, that the factual showing on the motions for summary judgment was 
sufficient to indicate that plaintiff may be able to prove at trial a claim for intentional infliction of mental 
distress, we hold that summary judgment for defendants based upon the one-year statute of limitations 
was error and we remand the matter for further proceedings against defendant Earl Puryear…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Spousal Support: The court focuses on whether Earl Puryear may be liable for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. But could his wife, Ann Puryear, be liable 
under any theory? And could she also be liable for assault and battery if those claims 
weren’t barred by the statute of limitations? 
2. Slicing and Dicing: Take a close look at footnote 2. What exactly will it require of the 
jury on remand? Do you think such delicate parsing is possible?  
3. Time Is of the Essence: Is there a reason to give plaintiffs an extra two years to bring 




LITTLEFIELD v. McGUFFEY 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (1992) 
Wood, Judge:  
Susanne Littlefield sued Malcolm McGuffey, also 
known as Wally Mack among other persona, claiming he 
denied her rental housing because her boyfriend, the father 
of her daughter, was not of the same race as she. She sought 
relief under the Equal Opportunity in Housing provision 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fair Housing Act as 
amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. 
In addition she claimed he committed numerous, 
outrageous acts of harassment…[and] raised a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois 
common law. The jury found Mr. McGuffey liable and 
awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. 
McGuffey thereupon moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, for a 
new trial. [The district court] denied both motions[,] entered judgment on the verdict, awarded 
attorney’s fees…, and imposed Rule–11 sanctions on Mr. McGuffey’s attorneys for offering a motion 
which was based on “inadequate legal inquiry and which was being used to harass, delay or increase 
the costs of litigation.” Defendant McGuffey appeals…. For the reasons stated below we affirm. 
On September 14, 1988, Ms. Littlefield, who was then 23 years old, met Malcolm McGuffey at 
one of his apartment buildings. After viewing the advertised apartment she completed a rental 
application form and gave him a $280 check as a security deposit, leaving the name of the payee 
 
2 We note in this regard plaintiff’s statement in his deposition that “it is not entirely the future threat which caused me 
all of my emotional upset and disturbance that I have complained about. It was the ordeal from beginning to end.” If plaintiff 
is able to prove a claim for intentional infliction of mental distress it will then be the difficult, but necessary, task of the trier 
of fact to ascertain the damages flowing from the conditional threat of future harm. Although the assaults and batteries serve 
to color and give impetus to the future threat and its impact on plaintiff’s emotional condition, plaintiff may not recover 
damages flowing directly from the assaults and batteries themselves. 
The following case involves racism and includes redacted racist slurs. 
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blank at McGuffey’s request. Later, McGuffey filled in the name of the payee with the fictitious 
“Santa Maria Realty,” claiming at trial to have chosen that name because it had been close to 
Columbus Day. He endorsed the check first as “Santa Maria Realty” then as “Osvaldo Kennardo,” 
another persona of his. At their meeting McGuffey and Ms. Littlefield had agreed she, her younger 
sister Sandra, and her daughter Shaunte would occupy the two-bedroom apartment and that 
McGuffey would purchase and install a carpet with Ms. Littlefield paying the cost of installation. 
McGuffey gave Ms. Littlefield a key to the apartment, and between then and September 27 she, 
members of her family, and friends cleaned and painted the apartment and moved various 
belongings into it. 
On September 27, 1988, Bruce Collins, accompanied by Shaunte, the two-year old daughter of 
Collins and Littlefield, took a check to McGuffey to pay for the carpet installation. When McGuffey 
realized Mr. Collins was not the same race as Ms. Littlefield but was the father of her daughter, he 
became quite agitated and exclaimed “the old man” had rented the apartment to someone else. At 
trial McGuffey admitted he sometimes referred to himself as “the old man.” 
After Collins left, McGuffey called Ms. Littlefield at work and told her she could not rent the 
apartment because “the boss” (another of McGuffey’s persona) had rented it to someone else. He 
also told her he had changed the locks and had put her belongings out on the porch. This was but 
the first of many phone calls McGuffey made to Ms. Littlefield. That evening he called her at home, 
identified himself as Walley Luther, and, mimicking a stereotypical black manner of speaking, told 
her he wanted to move in with her and “six black guys, quit work and take welfare and drugs with 
her, and swap wives with Bruce.” He called her at least two more times that night and several other 
times that week with similar, degrading messages. 
Ms. Littlefield was not the only recipient of McGuffey’s harassing, insulting and racist phone 
calls. Her sister, Kathleen Gutierrez, was called many times over the next week or so. McGuffey told 
her he was a member of the Ku Klux Klan and regularly asked how her sister, Susanne, “could have 
gone to bed with a n****r and how she could have a n****r baby.” On one occasion McGuffey 
attempted to lure Ms. Gutierrez outside on the pretext that she had to move her car because the 
church lot where it was parked was being caulked. 
The phone calls did not suffice. In early November McGuffey tracked down Ms. Littlefield’s new 
residence and left a note, written on a napkin taped to her door, threatening the life of Bruce Collins 
and repeating racist slurs. When she arrived home that evening, Ms. Littlefield found her sister, 
Sandra, hiding behind the door, clutching a broom. 
Ms. Littlefield and her witnesses…testified to all these events and more. Additionally, Ms. 
Littlefield testified to numerous episodes of severe emotional distress. She became hysterical upon 
receiving McGuffey’s call at work, went to the restroom, and cried; the rest of the day she suffered 
from stomach upset and diarrhea. She experienced numerous episodes of disquiet and fright, being 
particularly fretful because she feared for her daughter’s safety. Ms. Littlefield also testified that when 
she came home at night with Shaunte, she would run from her car to her apartment, clutching her 
daughter in one arm, with her keys in one hand and a can of mace in the other. 
McGuffey denied Ms. Littlefield’s allegations, claiming he had not refused her rental housing on 
the basis of race and that he had not harassed her. He asserted, instead, he had learned from various 
businesses and prior landlords that she was a poor credit risk and had a history as an undesirable 
tenant. He presented no witnesses, however, that confirmed having given him the negative rental-
history or credit information. On the other hand, Ms. Littlefield presented witnesses from credit 
departments of various businesses McGuffey claimed to have contacted. They generally testified the 
credit information McGuffey claimed to have acquired would not be given out and that, anyway, 
Ms. Littlefield’s credit history was respectable. The testimony of Brice Fawcett, Ms. Littlefield’s 
former landlord, was notably damaging for the defendant. He contradicted everything McGuffey 
claimed to have been told by him; he stated Ms. Littlefield had been a good tenant; and he testified 
McGuffey did not interview him until October 1, four days after McGuffey evicted Ms. Littlefield. 
As the district court observed, “Mr. McGuffey’s story therefore depended almost entirely on his own 
credibility, and he was, to put it mildly, a witness with credibility problems.” 
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…Mr. McGuffey raises [three] issues: [1] whether the district court erred in admitting or refusing 
to admit certain items of evidence…, [2] whether there was sufficient evidence to support the 
damage awards, and [3] whether the award of attorney’s fees was excessive…. 
Admission of Evidence  
McGuffey…asserts it was error for the district court to admit Ms. Littlefield’s testimony about 
episodes of fear and anxiety not accompanied by medically significant, physical manifestations. This 
claim of error fails because in Illinois physical manifestation of emotional distress is not an element 
of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
 Under Illinois common law the tort comprises three elements. First, the conduct involved must 
be truly extreme and outrageous. Second, the actor must either intend that his conduct inflict severe 
emotional distress, or know that there is at least a high probability that his conduct will cause severe 
emotional distress. Third, the conduct must in fact cause severe emotional distress. These are the 
only elements enunciated by the court. Medically significant, physical manifestation of emotional 
distress in not among them…. 
Jury Instructions 
…A court of review should proceed cautiously when asked to set aside a jury’s verdict and order 
a new trial, bound to consume substantial judicial resources, on the ground that the instructions 
contained erroneous or confusing passages…. McGuffey finds fault with Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 
21 regarding her state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. He raises numerous 
allegations, the essence of which is that there was insufficient evidence of past, present, or future 
damages to justify giving the challenged instruction…. There is sufficient evidence in the record to 
support giving the challenged instruction. A perusal of the facts recited above shows Ms. Littlefield 
presented evidence of her having suffered severe emotional distress. Additionally, there was some 
evidence of that distress continuing through the time of trial. Thus, the district court was not without 
justification for giving the instruction with respect to past, present, and future damages….  
Sufficient Evidence 
…McGuffey’s next two claims of error are that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
verdict awarding, on the one hand, $50,000 in compensatory damages and, on the other, $100,000 
in punitive damages. A damage award will not be vacated for excessiveness unless it is monstrously 
excessive or there is no rational connection between the evidence on damages and the verdict…. 
 McGuffey claims the compensatory-damage award must be reduced, if not reversed, because 
the plaintiff “presented no evidence of out-of-pocket loss” and no evidence of economic damage, 
but only “intangible elements of emotional distress.” He further claims the amount of the award was 
the result of the jury’s being carried away by passion and prejudice, due in large part to Ms. 
Littlefield’s testimony about her emotional feelings. 
But it is precisely the testimony about her emotional feelings and response to his terror tactics 
which supports the award for the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and racial 
discrimination. For example, Ms. Littlefield testified that after Mr. McGuffey called her at work to 
tell her she could not move into the apartment, she became scared, went to the washroom, cried for 
a half hour, and left work for the day without explaining to her boss why because she was too 
embarrassed. She also testified that in late October or early November 1988, after moving into an 
apartment with her daughter and sister, a terrifying note was discovered taped to her door. The note 
read: “By THE Time you read this message Kiss your N***r [sic] friend goodbye Bitch > he’s dead!!!” 
Plaintiff’s Exhibit A. Plaintiff’s handwriting expert testified the note had been written by McGuffey, 
but the defendant’s expert was equivocal. All death threats are heinous and would support a finding 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. This one all the more because it employs the most 
venomous and loathsome of racist epithets. 
In addition, Ms. Littlefield testified she purchased cleaning, repair, and painting supplies, that she, 
members of her family, and friends cleaned and painted the apartment she was never allowed to 
occupy, and that she moved numerous personal items into it. This testimony belies McGuffey’s 
appellate argument that Ms. Littlefield suffered no out-of-pocket loss. Lastly, the jury’s award is not 
out of line with other, similar awards…. We, therefore, affirm the jury’s compensatory-damage award. 
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 McGuffey’s other complaint is about the amount of the punitive-damage award…. [W]e, like 
the district court, conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s punitive-damage 
award…. Initially, McGuffey rejected Ms. Littlefield as a tenant because of the race of her boyfriend 
and their daughter. McGuffey’s subsequent acts of harassment and intimidation were entirely 
gratuitous and did not begin until after his initial act of racial discrimination. These later acts, as 
Judge Williams noted, included the following: (a) he immediately removed her belongings from the 
apartment, exposing them to theft and vandalism and her to public ridicule and humiliation; (b) he 
made numerous, blatantly racist, harassing phone calls to Ms. Littlefield; (c) he made similar racist, 
harassing phone calls to members of Ms. Littlefield’s family who did not live with her; (d) he went 
to her sister’s home and physically intimidated her; and (e) there is, of course, the death threat to 
Bruce Collins posted on Ms. Littlefield’s door. Not only is the evidence sufficient to support the 
award of punitive damages, it also supports the award of compensatory damages for the federal and 
state law claims. We, therefore, affirm the jury’s punitive-damage award…. 
Attorney’s Fees 
 In his final claim of error McGuffey asserts the fees awarded Ms. Littlefield’s attorneys should 
be reduced to reflect what he claims are the reasonable hours spent on the litigation…. A district 
court’s rulings on attorney’s fees will rarely be reversed on appeal, and then only for abuse of 
discretion…. McGuffey, nonetheless, asks us to reduce the fee awarded from approximately 
$140,000 to nearly $50,000 by scrutinizing and excising some 473 individual time-charges, the 
largest of which is for 9.5 hours and the smallest of which is for 0.1 hours. This we shall not do….. 
McGuffey also argues the amount of the fees awarded is disproportionately large compared to 
the damages awarded: approximately $140,000 versus $150,000. The size of a damage award, 
however, is not the gauge of a plaintiff’s victory. Rather, value is gauged more broadly…. Ms. 
Littlefield prevailed on her federal law claims, receiving both compensatory and punitive damages. 
The latter certainly will punish McGuffey and, one hopes, deter him from further violations. The 
award is also likely to deter others. Therefore, we find the attorney’s fees awarded are not 
unreasonable, and the award stands…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Proving Distress: What proof did Littlefield offer about her emotional distress? How 
did McGuffey challenge her on this issue? In general, how should plaintiffs have to 
substantiate their distress? What would you expect or want to see as a judge or juror? 
2. Extreme and Outrageous: Would McGuffey’s racist refusal to rent the apartment—
without his campaign of intimidation—suffice on its own to establish liability for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress? What if his only act was to leave the racist 
and threatening napkin note on Littlefield’s door? 
3. Racist Speech: Richard Delgado’s powerful 1982 article, Words That Wound: A Tort 
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, examines how law often fails to 
protect people from racial insults. After documenting the severe and extensive harm that 
racism imposes on society, Delgado advocates for an independent tort to counter racial 
slurs. Do you think such a tort should exist? What counterarguments might you expect 
to this kind of proposal? Is a standalone tort necessary if victims of racist speech can 
bring claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress? 
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JONES v. CLINTON 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas (1998) 
Webber Wright, Judge: 
The plaintiff in this lawsuit, Paula Corbin Jones, seeks 
civil damages from William Jefferson Clinton, President of 
the United States, and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas 
State Police Officer, for alleged actions beginning with an 
incident in a hotel suite in Little Rock, Arkansas. This case 
was previously before the Supreme Court of the United 
States to resolve the issue of Presidential immunity but was 
remanded to this Court following the Supreme Court’s 
determination that there is no constitutional impediment 
to allowing plaintiff’s case to proceed while the President is 
in office…. The matter is now before the Court on motion of both the President and Ferguson for 
summary judgment…. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the President’s and 
Ferguson’s motions for summary judgment should both be and hereby are granted. 
This lawsuit is based on an incident that is said to have taken place on the afternoon of May 8, 
1991, in a suite at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Arkansas. President Clinton was Governor of 
the State of Arkansas at the time, and plaintiff was a State employee with the Arkansas Industrial 
Development Commission (“AIDC”)…. Ferguson was an Arkansas State Police officer assigned to 
the Governor’s security detail. 
According to the record, then-Governor Clinton was at the Excelsior Hotel on the day in 
question delivering a speech at an official conference being sponsored by the AIDC. Plaintiff states 
that she and another AIDC employee, Pamela Blackard, were working at a registration desk for the 
AIDC when a man approached the desk and informed her and Blackard that he was Trooper Danny 
Ferguson, the Governor’s bodyguard. She states that Ferguson made small talk with her and 
Blackard and that they asked him if he had a gun as he was in street clothes and they “wanted to 
know.” Ferguson acknowledged that he did and, after being asked to show the gun to them, left the 
registration desk to return to the Governor. The conversation between plaintiff, Blackard, and 
Ferguson lasted approximately five minutes and consisted of light, friendly banter; there was 
nothing intimidating, threatening, or coercive about it. 
Upon leaving the registration desk, Ferguson apparently had a conversation with the Governor 
about the possibility of meeting with plaintiff, during which Ferguson states the Governor remarked 
that plaintiff had “that come-hither look,” i.e. “a sort of sexually suggestive appearance from the look 
or dress.”1 He states that “some time later” the Governor asked him to “get him a room, that he was 
expecting a call from the White House and had several phone calls that he needed to make,” and 
asked him to go to the car and get his briefcase containing the phone messages. Ferguson states that 
upon obtaining the room, the Governor told him that if plaintiff wanted to meet him, she could 
“come up.” 
Plaintiff states that Ferguson later reappeared at the registration desk, delivered a piece of paper 
to her with a four-digit number written on it, and said that the Governor would like to meet with 
her in this suite number. She states that she, Blackard, and Ferguson talked about what the Governor 
could want and that Ferguson stated, among other things, “We do this all the time.” Thinking that 
it was an honor to be asked to meet the Governor and that it might lead to an enhanced employment 
opportunity, plaintiff states that she agreed to the meeting and that Ferguson escorted her to the 
floor of the hotel upon which the Governor’s suite was located. 
 
1 Ferguson states that plaintiff informed him that she would like to meet the Governor, remarking that she thought the 
Governor “was good-looking and had sexy hair,” while plaintiff states that Ferguson asked her if she would like to meet the 
Governor and that she was “excited” about the possibility. 
The following case discusses sexual assault. 
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Plaintiff states that upon arriving at the suite and announcing herself, the Governor shook her 
hand, invited her in, and closed the door. She states that a few minutes of small talk ensued, which 
included the Governor asking her about her job and him mentioning that Dave Harrington, 
plaintiff’s ultimate superior within the AIDC and a Clinton appointee, was his “good friend.” 
Plaintiff states that the Governor then “unexpectedly reached over to her, took her hand, and pulled 
her toward him, so that their bodies were close to each other.” She states she removed her hand from 
his and retreated several feet, but that the Governor approached her again and, while saying, “I love 
the way your hair flows down your back” and “I love your curves,” put his hand on her leg, started 
sliding it toward her pelvic area, and bent down to attempt to kiss her on the neck, all without her 
consent. Plaintiff states that she exclaimed, “What are you doing?,” told the Governor that she was 
“not that kind of girl,” and “escaped” from the Governor’s reach “by walking away from him.” She 
states she was extremely upset and confused and, not knowing what to do, attempted to distract the 
Governor by chatting about his wife. Plaintiff states that she sat down at the end of the sofa nearest 
the door, but that the Governor approached the sofa where she had taken a seat and, as he sat down, 
“lowered his trousers and underwear, exposed his penis (which was erect) and told her to ‘kiss it.’”2 
She states that she was “horrified” by this and that she “jumped up from the couch” and told the 
Governor that she had to go, saying something to the effect that she had to get back to the 
registration desk. Plaintiff states that the Governor, “while fondling his penis,” said, “Well, I don’t 
want to make you do anything you don’t want to do,” and then pulled up his pants and said, “If you 
get in trouble for leaving work, have Dave call me immediately and I’ll take care of it.” She states 
that as she left the room (the door of which was not locked), the Governor “detained” her 
momentarily, “looked sternly” at her, and said, “You are smart. Let’s keep this between ourselves.” 
Plaintiff states that the Governor’s advances to her were unwelcome, that she never said or did 
anything to suggest to the Governor that she was willing to have sex with him, and that during the 
time they were together in the hotel suite, she resisted his advances although she was “stunned by 
them and intimidated by who he was.” She states that when the Governor referred to Dave 
Harrington, she “understood that he was telling her that he had control over Mr. Harrington and 
over her job, and that he was willing to use that power.” She states that from that point on, she was 
“very fearful” that her refusal to submit to the Governor’s advances could damage her career and 
even jeopardize her employment. 
Plaintiff states that when she left the hotel suite, she was in shock and upset but tried to maintain 
her composure. She states she saw Ferguson waiting outside the suite but that he did not escort her 
back to the registration desk and nothing was said between them. Ferguson states that five or ten 
minutes after plaintiff exited the suite he joined the Governor for their return to the Governor’s 
Mansion and that the Governor, who was working on some papers that he had spread out on the 
desk, said, “She came up here, and nothing happened.” 
Plaintiff states she returned to the registration desk and told Blackard some of what had 
happened. Blackard states that plaintiff was shaking and embarrassed. Following the Conference, 
plaintiff states she went to the workplace of a friend, Debra Ballentine, and told her of the incident 
as well. Ballentine states that plaintiff was upset and crying. Later that same day, plaintiff states she 
told her sister, Charlotte Corbin Brown, what had happened and, within the next two days, also told 
her other sister, Lydia Corbin Cathey, of the incident. Brown’s observations of plaintiff’s demeanor 
apparently are not included in the record. Cathey, however, states that plaintiff was “bawling” and 
“squalling,” and that she appeared scared, embarrassed, and ashamed. 
Ballentine states that she encouraged plaintiff to report the incident to her boss or to the police, but 
that plaintiff declined, pointing out that her boss was friends with the Governor and that the police 
were the ones who took her to the hotel suite. Ballentine further states that plaintiff stated she did not 
want her fiance to know of the incident and that she “just wanted this thing to go away.” Plaintiff States 
that what the Governor and Ferguson had said and done made her “afraid” to file charges. 
Plaintiff continued to work at AIDC following the alleged incident in the hotel suite. One of her 
duties was to deliver documents to and from the Office of the Governor, as well as other offices 
 
2 Plaintiff states in her amended complaint that the Governor “asked” her to “kiss it” rather than telling her to do so. She 
states in her deposition that the Governor’s specific words to her were, “Would you kiss it for me?” 
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around the Arkansas State Capitol. She states that in June 1991, while performing these duties for 
the AIDC, she encountered Ferguson who told her that Mrs. Clinton was out of town often and that 
the Governor wanted her phone number and wanted to see her. Plaintiff states she refused to provide 
her phone number to Ferguson. She states that Ferguson also asked her how her fiance, Steve, was 
doing, even though she had never told Ferguson or the Governor his name, and that this 
“frightened” her. Plaintiff states that she again encountered Ferguson following her return to work 
from maternity leave and that he said he had “told Bill how good looking you are since you’ve had 
the baby.” She also states that she was “accosted” by the Governor in the Rotunda of the Arkansas 
State Capitol when he “draped his arm over her, pulled her close to him and held her tightly to his 
body,” and said to his bodyguard, “Don’t we make a beautiful couple: Beauty and the Beast?” Plaintiff 
additionally states that on an unspecified date, she was waiting in the Governor’s outer office on a 
delivery run when the Governor entered the office, patted her on the shoulder, and in a “friendly 
fashion” said, “How are you doing, Paula?”… 
Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her employment with AIDC on February 20, 1993, in order to 
move to California with her husband…. She states that in January 1994, while visiting family and 
friends in Arkansas, she was informed of an article in The American Spectator magazine that she 
claims referred to her alleged encounter with the Governor at the Excelsior Hotel and incorrectly 
suggested that she had engaged in sexual relations with the Governor. Plaintiff states that she also 
encountered Ferguson in a restaurant during this same time and that he indicated he was the source 
for the article and that he knew she had refused the Governor’s alleged advances because, he said, 
“Clinton told me you wouldn’t do anything anyway, Paula.” 
On February 11, 1994, at an event attended by the media, plaintiff states that she publicly asked 
President Clinton to acknowledge the incident mentioned in the article in The American Spectator, 
to state that she had rejected his advances, and to apologize to her, but that the President responded 
to her request for an apology by having his press spokespersons deliver a statement on his behalf 
that the incident never happened and that he never met plaintiff. Thereafter, on May 6, 1994, 
plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Plaintiff’s amended complaint…asserts a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress or outrage against Governor Clinton, based primarily on the alleged incident at 
the hotel but also encompassing subsequent alleged acts. 
The President [argues that]…plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress or 
outrage fails because (a) by plaintiff’s own testimony, the conduct at issue does not constitute 
intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage under Arkansas law,[3] and (b) plaintiff did not 
as a result of the alleged conduct suffer emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could 
endure it…. 
To establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that: 
(1) the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known that 
emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous 
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the 
plaintiff’s distress; and (4) the plaintiff’s emotional distress was so severe in nature that no 
reasonable person could be expected to endure it. 
The President argues that the alleged conduct of which plaintiff complains was brief and isolated; 
did not result in any physical harm or objective symptoms of the requisite severe distress; did not result 
in distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; and he had no knowledge 
of any special condition of plaintiff that would render her particularly susceptible to distress. He argues 
that plaintiff has failed to identify the kind of clear cut proof that Arkansas courts require for a claim 
of outrage and that he is therefore entitled to summary judgment. The Court agrees.  
One is subject to liability for the tort of outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress if 
he or she wilfully or wantonly causes severe emotional distress to another by extreme and outrageous 
conduct…. [B]y extreme and outrageous conduct, we mean conduct that is so outrageous in 
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. Whether conduct is “extreme and 
 
3 Under Arkansas law, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the tort of outrage are essentially the 
same causes of action and are governed by the same standards. 
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outrageous” is determined by looking at the conduct at issue; the period of time over which the 
conduct took place; the relation between plaintiff and defendant; and defendant’s knowledge that 
plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional distress by reason of some physical or mental 
peculiarity. The tort is clearly not intended to provide legal redress for every slight insult or indignity 
that one must endure. The Arkansas courts take a strict approach and give a narrow view to claims 
of outrage, and merely describing conduct as outrageous does not make it so. 
Plaintiff seems to base her claim of outrage on her erroneous belief that the allegations she has 
presented are sufficient to constitute criminal sexual assault. She states that “Mr. Clinton’s 
outrageous conduct includes offensive language, an offensive proposition, offensive touching 
(constituting sexual assault under both federal and state definitions), and actual exposure of an 
intimate private body part,” and that “there are few more outrageous acts than a criminal sexual 
assault followed by unwanted exposure, coupled with a demand for oral sex by the most powerful 
man in the state against a very young, low-level employee.” 
While the Court will certainly agree that plaintiff’s allegations describe offensive conduct, the 
Court, as previously noted, has found that the Governor’s alleged conduct does not constitute sexual 
assault. Rather, the conduct as alleged by plaintiff describes a mere sexual proposition or encounter, 
albeit an odious one, that was relatively brief in duration, did not involve any coercion or threats of 
reprisal, and was abandoned as soon as plaintiff made clear that the advance was not welcome. The 
Court is not aware of any authority holding that such a sexual encounter or proposition of the type 
alleged in this case, without more, gives rise to a claim of outrage. Cf. Croom v. Younts, 913 S.W.2d 
283 (Ark. 1996) (use of wine and medication by a vastly older relative to foist sex on a minor cousin 
went “beyond a mere sexual encounter” and offended all sense of decency). 
Moreover, notwithstanding the offensive nature of the Governor’s alleged conduct, plaintiff 
admits that she never missed a day of work following the alleged incident, she continued to work at 
AIDC another nineteen months (leaving only because of her husband’s job transfer), she continued 
to go on a daily basis to the Governor’s Office to deliver items and never asked to be relieved of that 
duty, she never filed a formal complaint or told her supervisors of the incident while at AIDC, she 
never consulted a psychiatrist, psychologist, or incurred medical bills as a result of the alleged 
incident, and she acknowledges that her two subsequent contacts with the Governor involved 
comments made “in a light vein” and nonsexual contact that was done in a “friendly fashion.” 
Further, despite earlier claiming that she suffered marital discord and humiliation, plaintiff stated 
in her deposition that she was not claiming damages to her marriage as a result of the Governor’s 
alleged conduct, and she acknowledged the request to drop her claim of injury to reputation by 
stating, “I didn’t really care if it was dropped or not personally.” Plaintiff’s actions and statements in 
this case do not portray someone who experienced emotional distress so severe in nature that no 
reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Cf. Hamaker v. Ivy, 51 F.3d 108 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(no claim of outrage where plaintiff, who had a speech impediment and an I.Q. of between 75 and 
100, was “red-faced and angry,” had an “increased heart rate and blood pressure,” and had trouble 
sleeping four days after incident involving “rather nasty” practical joke). 
Nevertheless, plaintiff submits a declaration from a purported expert with a Ph.D. in education 
and counseling, Patrick J. Carnes, who, after a 3.5 hour meeting with plaintiff and her husband a 
mere four days prior to the filing of President Clinton’s motion for summary judgment, opines that 
her alleged encounter with Governor Clinton in 1991, “and the ensuing events,” have caused 
plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress and “consequent sexual aversion.” The Court does not 
credit this declaration. 
In Angle v. Alexander, 945 S.W.2d 933 (Ark. 1997), the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that 
absent physical harm, courts look for more in the way of extreme outrage as an assurance that the 
mental disturbance claimed is not fictitious. In that case, the plaintiffs offered their own testimony 
that they had experienced emotional distress, thoughts of death, fear, anger, and worry, but little 
else. In concluding that there was no evidence of extreme emotional distress required to prevail on 
an outrage claim, the Court found it significant that none had seen a physician or mental health 
professional for these concerns. The Court did not allow the fact that one plaintiff “on the advice of 
her attorney, spoke to a psychologist” to overcome her failure of proof on this point…. 
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[T]he opinions stated [in the Carnes’ declaration] are vague and conclusory and, as in Angle, do 
not suffice to overcome plaintiff’s failure of proof on her claim of outrage. Cf. Crenshaw v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., 915 F. Supp. 93 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (affidavit prepared after opposing motion for 
summary judgment filed detailing symptoms of weight loss, lack of sleep, headache, worry, and 
nausea, failed to present sufficient evidence of emotional distress). 
In sum, plaintiff’s allegations fall far short of the rigorous standards for establishing a claim of 
outrage under Arkansas law and the Court therefore grants the President’s motion for summary 
judgment on this claim…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Fojtik Revisited: Could Paula Jones have sued President Clinton for false imprisonment? 
What about assault? Would she have been more successful with those claims?  
2. Mens Rea: If you were Paula Jones’s lawyer, which facts would you highlight to establish 
that President Clinton intended to cause your client emotional distress? If you were 
President Clinton’s lawyer, which facts would you use in your defense? How might both 
parties address the question of whether President Clinton was at least reckless? 
3. #MeToo: Do you think this case would have come out differently if it had been litigated 
after the #MeToo movement? 
 
HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC. v. FALWELL 
Supreme Court of the United States (1988) 
Rehnquist, Chief Justice: ã 
Petitioner Hustler Magazine, Inc., is a magazine of 
nationwide circulation. Respondent Jerry Falwell, a 
nationally known minister who has been active as a 
commentator on politics and public affairs, sued 
petitioner and its publisher, petitioner Larry Flynt, to 
recover damages for invasion of privacy, libel, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District 
Court directed a verdict against respondent on the 
privacy claim, and submitted the other two claims to a 
jury. The jury found for petitioners on the defamation 
claim, but found for respondent on the claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and awarded 
damages. We now consider whether this award is 
consistent with the [First Amendment]. 
The inside front cover of the November 1983 issue 
of Hustler Magazine featured a “parody” of an 
advertisement for Campari Liqueur that contained the 
name and picture of respondent and was entitled “Jerry 
Falwell talks about his first time.” This parody was 
modeled after actual Campari ads that included 
interviews with various celebrities about their “first times.” Although it was apparent by the end of 
each interview that this meant the first time they sampled Campari, the ads clearly played on the 
sexual double entendre of the general subject of “first times.” Copying the form and layout of these 
Campari ads, Hustler’s editors chose respondent as the featured celebrity and drafted an alleged 
“interview” with him in which he states that his “first time” was during a drunken incestuous 
rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. The Hustler parody portrays respondent and his 
mother as drunk and immoral, and suggests that respondent is a hypocrite who preaches only when 
he is drunk. In small print at the bottom of the page, the ad contains the disclaimer, “ad parody — 
 
ã Jerry Falwell Talks About His First Time, HUSTLER (Nov. 1983). 
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not to be taken seriously.” The magazine’s table of contents also lists the ad as “Fiction; Ad and 
Personality Parody.”… 
The jury…found against respondent on the libel claim, specifically finding that the ad parody 
could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [Falwell] or actual events in 
which he participated.” The jury ruled for respondent on the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim, however, and stated that he should be awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages, 
as well as $50,000 each in punitive damages from petitioners…. 
This case presents us with a novel question involving First Amendment limitations upon a State’s 
authority to protect its citizens from the intentional infliction of emotional distress. We must decide 
whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused by the publication of an 
ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most. Respondent 
would have us find that a State’s interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is 
sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended 
to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as 
stating actual facts about the public figure involved. This we decline to do. 
At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the 
free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern. The freedom to speak 
one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is 
essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole. We have therefore 
been particularly vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from 
governmentally imposed sanctions. The First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a “false” idea. 
As Justice Holmes wrote, “when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616 (1919) (dissenting opinion). 
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is bound to produce 
speech that is critical of those who hold public office or those public figures who are intimately 
involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in 
areas of concern to society at large. Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly in Baumgartner v. United 
States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944), when he said that “one of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the 
right to criticize public men and measures.” Such criticism, inevitably, will not always be reasoned 
or moderate; public figures as well as public officials will be subject to “vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)…. 
Of course, this does not mean that any speech about a public figure is immune from sanction in 
the form of damages. Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, we have consistently ruled that a public 
figure may hold a speaker liable for the damage to reputation caused by publication of a defamatory 
falsehood, but only if the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not. False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they 
interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an 
individual’s reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or 
effective. But even though falsehoods have little value in and of themselves, they are nevertheless 
inevitable in free debate, and a rule that would impose strict liability on a publisher for false factual 
assertions would have an undoubted “chilling” effect on speech relating to public figures that does 
have constitutional value. Freedoms of expression require “breathing space.” This breathing space 
is provided by a constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover for libel or defamation only 
when they can prove both that the statement was false and that the statement was made with the 
requisite level of culpability. 
Respondent argues, however, that a different standard should apply in this case because here the 
State seeks to prevent not reputational damage, but the severe emotional distress suffered by the 
person who is the subject of an offensive publication. In respondent’s view, and in the view of 
the Court of Appeals, so long as the utterance was intended to inflict emotional distress, was 
outrageous, and did in fact inflict serious emotional distress, it is of no constitutional import whether 
the statement was a fact or an opinion, or whether it was true or false. It is the intent to cause injury 
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that is the gravamen of the tort, and the State’s interest in preventing emotional harm simply 
outweighs whatever interest a speaker may have in speech of this type. 
Generally speaking the law does not regard the intent to inflict emotional distress as one which 
should receive much solicitude, and it is quite understandable that most if not all jurisdictions have 
chosen to make it civilly culpable where the conduct in question is sufficiently “outrageous.” But in 
the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable 
are protected by the First Amendment. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), we held that 
even when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill will his expression was protected by the 
First Amendment: “Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk 
that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, 
utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of 
truth.” Thus while such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in 
other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public 
debate about public figures. 
Were we to hold otherwise, there can be little doubt that political cartoonists and satirists would 
be subjected to damages awards without any showing that their work falsely defamed its subject. 
Webster’s defines a caricature as “the deliberately distorted picturing or imitating of a person, 
literary style, etc. by exaggerating features or mannerisms for satirical effect.” The appeal of the 
political cartoon or caricature is often based on exploitation of unfortunate physical traits or 
politically embarrassing events—an exploitation often calculated to injure the feelings of the subject 
of the portrayal. The art of the cartoonist is often not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-
sided. One cartoonist expressed the nature of the art in these words: “The political cartoon is a 
weapon of attack, of scorn and ridicule and satire; it is least effective when it tries to pat some 
politician on the back. It is usually as welcome as a bee sting and is always controversial in some 
quarters.” Long, The Political Cartoon: Journalism’s Strongest Weapon, The Quill (Nov. 1962). 
Several famous examples of this type of intentionally injurious speech were drawn by Thomas 
Nast, probably the greatest American cartoonist to date, who was associated for many years during 
the post-Civil War era with Harper’s Weekly. In the pages of that publication Nast conducted a 
graphic vendetta against William M. “Boss” Tweed and his corrupt associates in New York City’s 
“Tweed Ring.” It has been described by one historian of the subject as “a sustained attack which in 
its passion and effectiveness stands alone in the history of American graphic art.” M. Keller, The Art 
and Politics of Thomas Nast (1968). Another writer explains that the success of the Nast cartoon was 
achieved “because of the emotional impact of its presentation. It continuously goes beyond the 
bounds of good taste and conventional manners.” C. Press, The Political Cartoon (1981). 
Despite their sometimes caustic nature, from the early cartoon portraying George Washington 
as an ass down to the present day, graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent 
role in public and political debate…. Lincoln’s tall, gangling posture, Teddy Roosevelt’s glasses and 
teeth, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s jutting jaw and cigarette holder have been memorialized by 
political cartoons with an effect that could not have been obtained by the photographer or the 
portrait artist. From the viewpoint of history it is clear that our political discourse would have been 
considerably poorer without them. 
Respondent contends, however, that the caricature in question here was so “outrageous” as to 
distinguish it from more traditional political cartoons. There is no doubt that the caricature of 
respondent and his mother published in Hustler is at best a distant cousin of the political cartoons 
described above, and a rather poor relation at that. If it were possible by laying down a principled 
standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse would probably suffer little or no harm. 
But we doubt that there is any such standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative description 
“outrageous” does not supply one. “Outrageousness” in the area of political and social discourse has 
an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the 
jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An 
“outrageousness” standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be 
awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience. 
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected 
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character…simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action.”). And, as we stated 
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978): 
The fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for 
suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that 
consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a 
central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral 
in the marketplace of ideas…. 
Admittedly, these oft-repeated First Amendment principles, like other principles, are subject to 
limitations. We recognized in Pacifica Foundation, that speech that is “vulgar, offensive, and 
shocking” is “not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances.” In 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), we held that a State could lawfully punish an 
individual for the use of insulting “‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” These limitations are but recognition of 
the observation…that this Court has long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment 
importance. But the sort of expression involved in this case does not seem to us to be governed by 
any exception to the general First Amendment principles stated above. 
We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without 
showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with 
“actual malice,” i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to 
whether or not it was true. This is not merely a blind application of the New York Times standard, it 
reflects our considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate “breathing 
space” to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment. 
Here it is clear that respondent Falwell is a “public figure” for purposes of First Amendment 
law.1 The jury found against respondent on his libel claim when it decided that the Hustler ad parody 
could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [Falwell] or actual events in 
which he participated.” The Court of Appeals interpreted the jury’s finding to be that the ad parody 
“was not reasonably believable,” and in accordance with our custom we accept this finding. 
Respondent is thus relegated to his claim for damages awarded by the jury for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress by “outrageous” conduct. But for reasons heretofore stated this claim 
cannot, consistently with the First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages when the 
conduct in question is the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody involved here. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Reversed. 
White, Justice, concurring: 
As I see it, the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan has little to do with this case, for here 
the jury found that the ad contained no assertion of fact. But I agree with the Court that the judgment 
below, which penalized the publication of the parody, cannot be squared with the First Amendment. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Kitchen-Sink Complaints: Intentional infliction of emotional distress is sometimes 
patronizingly pitched as a “gap-filler” claim when other veteran torts might not do the 
trick. Why couldn’t Falwell confidently rely on defamation or public disclosure of private 
facts? How does parodic or satirical speech pose challenges for both of those torts?  
2. Freeing Our Speech: Chief Justice Rehnquist tells us that “freedom to speak one’s mind 
is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is 
essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.” In this 
single sentence, he condenses three dominant justifications for free speech. How is each 
justification arguably served in this case by immunizing Hustler Magazine for 
 
1 Neither party disputes this conclusion. Respondent is the host of a nationally syndicated television show and was the 
founder and president of a political organization formerly known as the Moral Majority. He is also the founder of Liberty 
University in Lynchburg, Virginia, and is the author of several books and publications. 
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intentional infliction of emotional distress? And what standard does the Court establish 
to ensure this constitutional respect in future cases? Does it seem like an appropriate 
standard for the tort interest at issue? 
3. Actually Malicious: Is there any doubt that Larry Flynt, in publishing the ad parody, 
acted intentionally or recklessly to inflict emotional distress on Falwell? Consider this 
colloquy between Falwell’s lawyer and Flynt: “Q. Did you want to upset Reverend 
Falwell? A. Yes…. Q. Do you recognize that in having published what you did in this ad, 
you were attempting to convey to the people who read it that Reverend Falwell was just 
as you characterized him, a liar? A. He’s a glutton. Q. How about a liar? A. Yeah. He’s a 
liar, too. Q. How about a hypocrite? A. Yeah. Q. That’s what you wanted to convey? 
A. Yeah. Q. And didn’t it occur to you that if it wasn’t true, you were attacking a man in 
his profession? A. Yes. Q. Did you appreciate, at the time that you wrote ‘okay’ or 
approved this publication, that for Reverend Falwell to function in his livelihood, and in 
his commitment and career, he has to have an integrity that people believe in? A. Yeah. 
Q. And wasn’t one of your objectives to destroy that integrity, or harm it, if you could? 
A. To assassinate it.” Setting aside Flynt’s intentions, do you believe that Falwell actually 
suffered severe distress? Testifying about his reaction to seeing the ad, Falwell said: “I 
think I have never been as angry as I was at that moment…. I somehow felt that in all of 
my life I had never believed that human beings could do something like this. I really felt 
like weeping. I am not a deeply emotional person; I don’t show it. I think I felt like 
weeping.” Even Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that the ad was “doubtless gross and 
repugnant in the eyes of most.” With facts like these, is free speech a good enough reason 




SNYDER v. PHELPS 
Supreme Court of the United States (2011) 
Roberts, Chief Justice:ã 
 …Fred Phelps founded the Westboro Baptist Church in 
Topeka, Kansas, in 1955. The church’s congregation believes that 
God hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of 
homosexuality, particularly in America’s military. The church 
frequently communicates its views by picketing, often at military 
funerals. In the more than 20 years that the members of Westboro 
Baptist have publicized their message, they have picketed nearly 
600 funerals…. 
[The church picketed the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal 
Matthew Snyder, who was killed in Iraq. The picketers were 
within a few hundred feet of the funeral procession, but they did 
not yell profanity, use violence, or violate police instructions. 
Instead, for about thirty minutes before the funeral, they sang 
hymns, recited Bible verses, and displayed signs featuring various 
offensive messages. Matthew’s father could see the tops of the signs as he drove to the funeral, but 
he did not see what was written on them until he watched a news broadcast later that night.]1 
 
ã Westboro Baptist Church © 1955-2021. 
1 A few weeks after the funeral, one of the picketers posted a message on Westboro’s Web site discussing the picketing 
and containing religiously oriented denunciations of the Snyders, interspersed among lengthy Bible quotations. Snyder 
discovered the posting, referred to by the parties as the “epic,” during an Internet search for his son’s name. The epic is not 
properly before us and does not factor in our analysis. Although the epic was submitted to the jury and discussed in the courts 
below, Snyder never mentioned it in his petition for certiorari…. Snyder devoted only one paragraph in the argument section 
The following case includes discussion of sexual assault and homophobic slurs. 
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Snyder [Matthew’s father] filed suit against Phelps, Phelps’s daughters, and the Westboro Baptist 
Church [for state-law tort claims, including] defamation, publicity given to private life, [and] 
intentional infliction of emotional distress…. The District Court awarded Westboro summary 
judgment on Snyder’s claims for defamation and publicity given to private life, concluding that 
Snyder could not prove the necessary elements of those torts. A trial was held on the remaining 
claims. At trial, Snyder described the severity of his emotional injuries. He testified that he is unable 
to separate the thought of his dead son from his thoughts of Westboro’s picketing, and that he often 
becomes tearful, angry, and physically ill when he thinks about it. Expert witnesses testified that 
Snyder’s emotional anguish had resulted in severe depression and had exacerbated pre-existing 
health conditions. A jury found for Snyder on the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
[claim]…and held Westboro liable for $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in 
punitive damages. Westboro filed several post-trial motions, including a motion contending that 
the jury verdict was grossly excessive and a motion seeking judgment as a matter of law on all claims 
on First Amendment grounds. The District Court remitted the punitive damages award to $2.1 
million, but left the jury verdict otherwise intact…. 
To succeed on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Maryland, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous 
conduct that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. The Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment—“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech”—can serve as 
a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Whether 
the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on 
whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the 
case. Speech on matters of public concern is at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection. The 
First Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). That is because speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence 
of self-government. Accordingly, speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy 
of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection. 
Not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance, however, and where matters of purely 
private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous. That is 
because restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional 
concerns as limiting speech on matters of public interest: There is no threat to the free and robust 
debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas; and 
the threat of liability does not pose the risk of a reaction of self-censorship on matters of 
public import. 
We noted a short time ago, in considering whether public employee speech addressed a matter 
of public concern, that “the boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined.” San Diego v. 
Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam). Although that remains true today, we have articulated some 
guiding principles, principles that accord broad protection to speech to ensure that courts 
themselves do not become inadvertent censors. 
Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate 
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public. The 
arguably inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether 
it deals with a matter of public concern. 
Our opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), on the 
other hand, provides an example of speech of only private concern. In that case we held, as a general 
matter, that information about a particular individual’s credit report “concerns no public issue.” The 
content of the report, we explained, “was speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and 
its specific business audience.” That was confirmed by the fact that the particular report was sent to 
only five subscribers to the reporting service, who were bound not to disseminate it further. To cite 
 
of his opening merits brief to the epic. Given the foregoing and the fact that an Internet posting may raise distinct issues in 
this context, we decline to consider the epic in deciding this case. 
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another example, we concluded in San Diego v. Roe that, in the context of a government employer 
regulating the speech of its employees, videos of an employee engaging in sexually explicit acts did 
not address a public concern; the videos did nothing to inform the public about any aspect of the 
employing agency’s functioning or operation. 
Deciding whether speech is of public or private concern requires us to examine the content, 
form, and context of that speech, as revealed by the whole record. As in other First Amendment 
cases, the court is obligated to make an independent examination of the whole record in order to 
make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. 
In considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all 
the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it was said, and how it was said. 
The “content” of Westboro’s signs plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large, 
rather than matters of “purely private concern.” The placards read “God Hates the USA/Thank God 
for 9/11,” “America is Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Fag Troops,” 
“Semper Fi Fags,” “God Hates Fags,” “Maryland Taliban,” “Fags Doom Nations,” “Not Blessed 
Just Cursed,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “You’re Going 
to Hell,” and “God Hates You.” While these messages may fall short of refined social or political 
commentary, the issues they highlight—the political and moral conduct of the United States and its 
citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic 
clergy—are matters of public import. The signs certainly convey Westboro’s position on those 
issues, in a manner designed, unlike the private speech in Dun & Bradstreet, to reach as broad a 
public audience as possible. And even if a few of the signs—such as “You’re Going to Hell” and “God 
Hates You”—were viewed as containing messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders 
specifically, that would not change the fact that the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s 
demonstration spoke to broader public issues…. 
Apart from the content of Westboro’s signs, Snyder contends that the “context” of the speech—
its connection with his son's funeral—makes the speech a matter of private rather than public 
concern. The fact that Westboro spoke in connection with a funeral, however, cannot by itself 
transform the nature of Westboro’s speech. Westboro’s signs, displayed on public land next to a 
public street, reflect the fact that the church finds much to condemn in modern society. Its speech 
is fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, and the funeral setting 
does not alter that conclusion. 
Snyder argues that the church members in fact mounted a personal attack on Snyder and his 
family, and then attempted to “immunize their conduct by claiming that they were actually 
protesting the United States’ tolerance of homosexuality or the supposed evils of the Catholic 
Church.” We are not concerned in this case that Westboro’s speech on public matters was in any 
way contrived to insulate speech on a private matter from liability. Westboro had been actively 
engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in its picketing long before it became aware of 
Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that Westboro’s picketing did not represent its 
honestly believed views on public issues. There was no pre-existing relationship or conflict between 
Westboro and Snyder that might suggest Westboro’s speech on public matters was intended to mask 
an attack on Snyder over a private matter. 
Snyder goes on to argue that Westboro’s speech should be afforded less than full First 
Amendment protection “not only because of the words” but also because the church members 
exploited the funeral “as a platform to bring their message to a broader audience.” There is no doubt 
that Westboro chose to stage its picketing at…Matthew Snyder’s funeral to increase publicity for its 
views and because of the relation between [the funeral] and its views—in the case of the military 
funeral, because Westboro believes that God is killing American soldiers as punishment for the 
Nation’s sinful policies. 
Westboro’s choice to convey its views in conjunction with Matthew Snyder’s funeral made the 
expression of those views particularly hurtful to many, especially to Matthew’s father. The 
record makes clear that the applicable legal term—“emotional distress”—fails to capture fully the 
anguish Westboro’s choice added to Mr. Snyder’s already incalculable grief. But Westboro 
conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of public concern at a public place adjacent to a public 
street. Such space occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection. We have 
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repeatedly referred to public streets as the archetype of a traditional public forum, noting that “time 
out of mind public streets and sidewalks have been used for public assembly and debate.” Frisby v. 
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
That said, even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times. 
Westboro’s choice of where and when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the Government’s 
regulatory reach—it is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions…. Maryland now 
has a law imposing restrictions on funeral picketing, as do 43 other States and the Federal 
Government. To the extent these laws are content neutral, they raise very different questions from 
the tort verdict at issue in this case. Maryland’s law, however, was not in effect at the time of the 
events at issue here, so we have no occasion to consider how it might apply to facts such as those 
before us, or whether it or other similar regulations are constitutional….  
Simply put, the church members had the right to be where they were…. The protest was not 
unruly; there was no shouting, profanity, or violence. The record confirms that any distress 
occasioned by Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, 
rather than any interference with the funeral itself. A group of parishioners standing at the very spot 
where Westboro stood, holding signs that said “God Bless America” and “God Loves You,” would 
not have been subjected to liability. It was what Westboro said that exposed it to tort damages. 
Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is 
entitled to special protection under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply 
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt. If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. Indeed, the point of all speech protection is to 
shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful. 
The jury here was instructed that it could hold Westboro liable for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress based on a finding that Westboro’s picketing was “outrageous.” 
“Outrageousness,” however, is a highly malleable standard with an inherent subjectiveness about it 
which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on 
the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. In a case such as this, a jury is unlikely to be 
neutral with respect to the content of the speech, posing a real danger of becoming an instrument 
for the suppression of vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasant expression. Such a risk is 
unacceptable; in public debate we must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to 
provide adequate “breathing space” to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment. What 
Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, is entitled to special 
protection under the First Amendment, and that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding 
that the picketing was outrageous. 
For all these reasons, the jury verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress must be set aside…. 
Westboro believes that America is morally flawed; many Americans might feel the same about 
Westboro. Westboro’s funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its contribution to public discourse 
may be negligible. But Westboro addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful 
manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials. The speech was indeed planned to 
coincide with Matthew Snyder's funeral, but did not itself disrupt that funeral, and Westboro’s choice 
to conduct its picketing at that time and place did not alter the nature of its speech. 
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—
as it did here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing 
the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public 
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro 
from tort liability for its picketing in this case…. 
Breyer, Justice, concurring: 
…While I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the picketing addressed matters of public 
concern, I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point…. [S]uppose that 
A were physically to assault B, knowing that the assault (being newsworthy) would provide A with 
an opportunity to transmit to the public his views on a matter of public concern. The constitutionally 
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protected nature of the end would not shield A’s use of unlawful, unprotected means. And in some 
circumstances the use of certain words as means would be similarly unprotected. 
The dissent recognizes that the means used here consist of speech. But it points out that the 
speech, like an assault, seriously harmed a private individual…. The dissent requires us to ask 
whether our holding unreasonably limits liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress—
to the point where A (in order to draw attention to his views on a public matter) might launch a 
verbal assault upon B, a private person, publicly revealing the most intimate details of B’s private 
life, while knowing that the revelation will cause B severe emotional harm. Does our decision leave 
the State powerless to protect the individual against invasions of, e.g., personal privacy, even in the 
most horrendous of such circumstances? 
As I understand the Court’s opinion, it does not hold or imply that the State is always powerless 
to provide private individuals with necessary protection…. 
Alito, Justice, dissenting: 
Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal 
assault that occurred in this case. 
Petitioner Albert Snyder is not a public figure. He is simply a parent whose son, Marine Lance 
Corporal Matthew Snyder, was killed in Iraq. Mr. Snyder wanted what is surely the right of any 
parent who experiences such an incalculable loss: to bury his son in peace. But respondents, 
members of the Westboro Baptist Church, deprived him of that elementary right. They first issued 
a press release and thus turned Matthew’s funeral into a tumultuous media event. They then 
appeared at the church, approached as closely as they could without trespassing, and launched a 
malevolent verbal attack on Matthew and his family at a time of acute emotional vulnerability. As a 
result, Albert Snyder suffered severe and lasting emotional injury. The Court now holds that the 
First Amendment protected respondents’ right to brutalize Mr. Snyder. I cannot agree. 
Respondents and other members of their church have strong opinions on certain moral, 
religious, and political issues, and the First Amendment ensures that they have almost limitless 
opportunities to express their views. They may write and distribute books, articles, and other texts; 
they may create and disseminate video and audio recordings; they may circulate petitions; they may 
speak to individuals and groups in public forums and in any private venue that wishes to 
accommodate them; they may picket peacefully in countless locations; they may appear on television 
and speak on the radio; they may post messages on the Internet and send out e-mails. And they may 
express their views in terms that are “uninhibited,” “vehement,” and “caustic.” 
It does not follow, however, that they may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private 
persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal attacks that make no 
contribution to public debate. To protect against such injury, most if not all jurisdictions permit 
recovery in tort for the intentional infliction of emotional distress (or IIED).  
This is a very narrow tort with requirements that are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy…. 
Although the elements of the IIED tort are difficult to meet, respondents long ago abandoned any 
effort to show that those tough standards were not satisfied here…. They did not dispute that Mr. 
Snyder suffered wounds that are truly severe and incapable of healing themselves. Nor did they 
dispute that their speech was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond 
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community. Instead, they maintained that the First Amendment gave them a license to engage in 
such conduct. They are wrong…. When grave injury is intentionally inflicted by means of an attack 
like the one at issue here, the First Amendment should not interfere with recovery….2 In order to 
have a society in which public issues can be openly and vigorously debated, it is not necessary to 
allow the brutalization of innocent victims like petitioner. I therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
2 The Court refuses to consider the epic because it was not discussed in Snyder’s petition for certiorari. The epic, however, 
is not a distinct claim but a piece of evidence that the jury considered in imposing liability for the claims now before this 
Court. The protest and the epic are parts of a single course of conduct that the jury found to constitute intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. The Court’s strange insistence that the epic “is not properly before us,” means that the Court has not 
actually made an independent examination of the whole record…. 
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QUESTIONS 
1. Sullivan and Sidis Revisited: Given the facts we’re given here, do you see why the district 
court rejected Snyder’s claims for defamation and public disclosure of private facts? 
Would the same result be due if Matthew Snyder (or his estate) had brought the claims? 
2. Brooker Revisited: Justice Alito calls Westboro’s conduct a “verbal assault.” Is this purely 
rhetorical? What’s the minimum change you could make to the facts that would provide 
Snyder with a viable assault claim?  
3. The Epic: The Court tells us that deciding whether speech is of public or private concern 
requires examining the “content, form, and context” of that speech. In an intriguing 
exchange buried in the footnotes, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito spar over the 
relevance of the “epic” posted on Westboro’s website. This epic, titled “The Burden of 
Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder. The Visit of Westboro Baptist Church to Help 
the Inhabitants of Maryland Connect the Dots!,” addressed the Snyders directly: “God 
blessed you, Mr. and Mrs. Snyder, with a resource and his name was Matthew. He was 
an arrow in your quiver! In thanks to God for the comfort the child could bring you, you 
had a DUTY to prepare that child to serve the LORD his GOD—PERIOD! You did JUST 
THE OPPOSITE—you raised him for the devil…. Albert and Julie RIPPED that body 
apart and taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to divorce, and to commit adultery. They 
taught him how to support the largest pedophile machine in the history of the entire 
world, the Roman Catholic monstrosity. Every dime they gave the Roman Catholic 
monster they condemned their own souls…. Then after all that they sent him to fight 
for the United States of Sodom, a filthy country that is in lock step with his evil, wicked, 
and sinful manner of life, putting him in the cross hairs of a God that is so mad He has 
smoke coming from his nostrils and fire from his mouth! How dumb was that?” Imagine 
that the Snyders had sued based solely on Westboro’s publication of the epic, not their 
funeral protest. Would their actions satisfy the elements of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress? Did the epic constitute speech of public or private concern? What 
other facts might you want to know? Would it matter, for example, that Westboro posted 
the epic on its publicly accessible website instead of its invitation-only Facebook group? 
Do the all-caps portions help or hurt the Snyders? And does the binary public–private 
standard make any sense now that the internet allows us freely to publish lengthy prose 
to the world—prose that might blend “private” commentary about little-known people 
with “public” discourse on weighty political issues? 
 




BEUL v. ASSE INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (2000)  
Posner, Judge: ã 
In this diversity suit for negligence, governed (so far as 
the substantive issues are concerned) by Wisconsin law, the 
jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff Kristin Beul’s 
damages were $1,100,000 and that she was 41 percent 
responsible for them; in accordance with the verdict, 
judgment was entered against defendant ASSE 
International for $649,000 (59 percent of $1.1 million)…. 
 
ã Russell Street, Foreign Exchange (CC BY-SA 2.0). 
The following case discusses suicide and sexual assault. 
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The defendant is a nonprofit corporation that operates international student exchange 
programs. For a fee of $2,000 it placed Kristin, a 16-year-old German girl who wanted to spend a 
year in the United States, with the Bruce family of Fort Atkinson, Wisconsin. The family, which 
consisted of Richard Bruce, age 40, his wife, and their 13-year-old daughter, had been selected by 
Marianne Breber, the defendant’s Area Representative in the part of the state that includes Fort 
Atkinson. Breber is described in the briefs as a “volunteer,” not an employee; the only payment she 
receives from ASSE is reimbursement of her expenses. Nothing in the appeal, however, turns either 
on her “volunteer” status or on ASSE’s nonprofit status. Charities are not immune from tort liability 
in Wisconsin, and ASSE does not deny that if Breber was negligent it is liable for her negligence 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, even though she was not an employee of ASSE. The 
doctrine is nowadays usually described as making an employer liable for the torts of his employees 
committed within the scope of their employment, but strictly speaking the liability is that of a 
“master” for the torts of his “servant” and it extends to situations in which the servant is not an 
employee, provided that he is acting in a similar role, albeit as a volunteer. 
There is also no argument that the contract between ASSE and Kristin’s parents is the exclusive 
source of ASSE’s legal duties to Kristin. Negligence in the performance of a contract that foreseeably 
results in personal injury, including as here emotional distress, is actionable under tort law… [T]ort 
law is a field largely shaped by the special considerations involved in personal-injury cases, as 
contract law is not. Tort doctrines are, therefore, prima facie more suitable for the governance of 
such cases than contract doctrines are even when victim and injurer are linked by contract. 
As the sponsor of a foreign exchange student, ASSE was subject to regulations of the United 
States Information Agency that require sponsors to train their agents, “monitor the progress and 
welfare of the exchange visit,” and require a “regular schedule of personal contact with the student 
and host family.” These [federal] regulations are intended for the protection of the visitor, and the 
jury was therefore properly instructed, under standard tort principles not challenged by ASSE, that 
it could consider the violation of them as evidence of negligence. There is no argument that the 
regulations create a private federal right of suit that would allow the plaintiffs to sue ASSE under the 
federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts (and we have found no case suggesting there is 
such a right), or that Wisconsin is legally obligated to use the regulations to define the duty of care 
of a sponsor sued under state tort law…. But the district court was entitled to conclude that a state 
court would look to the regulations for evidence of the sponsor’s duty of care. Courts in tort cases 
commonly take their cues from statutes or regulations intended to protect the safety of the class to 
which the tort plaintiff belongs. 
ASSE is also a member of a private association of sponsors of foreign exchange students, the 
Council on Standards for International Educational Travel, which requires members to “maintain 
thorough, accurate, and continual communication with host families and school authorities.” A jury 
could reasonably consider the Council’s statement as additional evidence of the standard of care 
applicable to sponsors and it could also accept the plaintiff’s argument that due care required Breber 
to try to develop rapport with Kristin so that Kristin would trust and confide in her and so that 
Breber could pick up any signals of something amiss that Kristin might be embarrassed to mention 
unless pressed. 
Kristin Beul arrived in Wisconsin from Germany on September 7, 1995, and was met at the 
airport by Richard Bruce and his daughter. Marianne Breber did not go to the airport to meet 
Kristin. In fact, apart from a brief orientation meeting at a shopping mall in September with Kristin 
and one other foreign exchange student, at which Breber gave Kristin her phone number, she didn’t 
meet with Kristin until January 21 of the following year—under unusual circumstances, as we’ll see. 
She did call the Bruce home a few times during this period and spoke briefly with Kristin once or 
twice, but she made no effort to make sure that Kristin was alone when they spoke. She would ask 
in these calls how Kristin was doing and Kristin would reply that everything was fine. Breber did not 
talk to Mrs. Bruce, who would have told her that she was concerned that her husband seemed to be 
developing an inappropriate relationship with Kristin. 
Kristin had led a sheltered life in Germany. She had had no sexual experiences at all and in fact 
had had only two dates in her life. On November 17, 1995, Richard Bruce, who weighed almost 300 
pounds and who was alone at home at the time except for Kristin, came into the loft area in which 
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she slept and raped her. This was the start of a protracted sexual relationship. In the months that 
followed, Bruce frequently would call the high school that Kristin was attending and report her ill. 
Then, with Mrs. Bruce off at work and the Bruce’s daughter at school, Bruce would have sex with 
Kristin. By February 22, Kristin had been absent 27 days from school. Bruce brandished a gun and 
told Kristin that he would kill himself if she told anyone what they were doing together. 
Curiously, in January Bruce and Kristin called Marianne Breber and told her that Mrs. Bruce 
appeared to be jealous of the time that her husband was spending with Kristin. Bruce invited Breber 
to dinner on January 21. Breber did not meet privately with either Kristin or Mrs. Bruce on that 
occasion, and she observed nothing untoward. In February, however, Mrs. Bruce told Breber that 
she and her husband were getting divorced, and Breber forthwith found another host family to take 
in Kristin. Kristin didn’t want to leave the Bruce home, but on February 22 Breber came with a 
sheriff’s deputy to remove Kristin. The deputy asked Kristin in the presence of Richard Bruce and 
his daughter whether there was any inappropriate sexual activity between Richard and Kristin, and 
Kristin answered “no.” The same day Breber, upon calling Kristin’s school to tell them that Kristin 
would be out for a few days in connection with her change of residence, learned for the first time of 
Kristin’s many absences. 
Kristin lived with Breber for a few days between host families, but Breber didn’t use the occasion 
to inquire about any possible sexual relationship between Kristin and Bruce. Breber told the new 
host family that Kristin was not to contact Bruce for a month, but she did not tell Bruce not to have 
any contact with Kristin. They continued to correspond and talk on the phone. Kristin had decided 
that she was in love with Bruce and considered herself engaged to him. 
In April, Mrs. Bruce discovered some of Kristin’s love letters and alerted the authorities. A 
sheriff’s deputy interviewed Bruce. The next day Bruce, who had committed a misdemeanor by 
having sex with a 16 year old, killed himself, leaving a note expressing fear of jail. It is undisputed 
that the events culminating in Bruce’s suicide inflicted serious psychological harm on Kristin; the 
jury’s assessment of her damages is not claimed to be excessive. 
The defendant argues that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively to a new 
trial because of trial error. The first argument divides into three: there was insufficient proof of a 
causal relationship between the defendant’s negligence in failing to keep closer tabs on Kristin Beul 
and her sexual involvement with Bruce culminating in his suicide; Bruce’s criminal activity was the 
sole, or superseding, cause of her harm; and the harm was too “remote” in a legal sense from the 
defendant’s lack of due care to support liability. 
Since Kristin was determined to conceal her relationship with Bruce, the defendant argues, no 
amount of care by Breber would have warded off the harm that befell Kristin; she would have 
stonewalled, however pertinacious Breber had been in her questioning. This is conceivable, and if 
true would let ASSE off the hook; if there was no causal relation between the defendant’s negligence 
and the plaintiff’s harm, there was no tort. 
But it is improbable, and the jury was certainly not required to buy the argument. Suppose Breber 
had inquired from the school how Kristin was doing—a natural question to ask about a foreigner 
plunged into an American high school. She would have learned of the numerous absences, would 
(if minimally alert) have inquired about them from Kristin, and would have learned that Kristin had 
been “ill” and that Richard Bruce had been home and taken care of her. At that point the secret 
would have started to unravel. 
As for the argument that Bruce’s misconduct was so egregious as to let ASSE off the hook, it is 
true that the doctrine of “superseding cause” can excuse a negligent defendant. Suicide by a sane 
person, unless clearly foreseeable by the tortfeasor, for example a psychiatrist treating a depressed 
person, is a traditional example of the operation of the doctrine. So if Bruce’s boss had refused him 
a raise and Bruce had responded by killing himself, the boss even if somehow negligent in failing to 
give him the raise would not be considered the legal cause of the death. Or if through the carelessness 
of the driver a truck spilled a toxic substance and a passerby scraped it up and poisoned his mother-
in-law with it, the driver would not be liable to the mother-in-law’s estate; the son-in-law’s criminal 
act would be deemed a superseding cause. 
Animating the doctrine is the idea that it is unreasonable to make a person liable for such 
improbable consequences of negligent activity as could hardly figure in his deciding how careful he 
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should be. The doctrine is not applied, therefore, when the duty of care claimed to have been violated 
is precisely a duty to protect against ordinarily unforeseeable conduct, as in our earlier example of a 
psychiatrist treating depression. The existence of the duty presupposes a probable, therefore a 
foreseeable, consequence of its breach. (All that “foreseeable” means in tort law is probable ex ante, 
that is, before the injury that is the basis of the tort suit.) Thus a hospital that fails to maintain a 
careful watch over patients known to be suicidal is not excused by the doctrine of superseding cause 
from liability for a suicide, any more than a zoo can escape liability for allowing a tiger to escape and 
maul people on the ground that the tiger is the superseding cause of the mauling. 
So Kristin’s high school would not have been liable for the consequences of Bruce’s sexual 
activity with Kristin even if the school should have reported her frequent absences to Breber; the 
criminal activities with their bizarre suicide sequel were not foreseeable by the school. But part of 
ASSE’s duty and Breber’s function was to protect foreign girls and boys from sexual hanky-panky 
initiated by members of host families. Especially when a teenage girl is brought to live with strangers 
in a foreign country, the risk of inappropriate sexual activity is not so slight that the organization 
charged by the girl’s parents with the safety of their daughter can be excused as a matter of law from 
making a responsible effort to minimize the risk. Sexual abuse by stepfathers is not uncommon, and 
the husband in a host family has an analogous relationship to a teenage visitor living with the family. 
It is true (we turn now to the issue of remoteness) that when through the negligence of an alarm 
company, to which ASSE in its role as protector of foreign students from the sexual attentions of 
members of host families might perhaps be analogized, a fire or burglary is not averted or controlled 
in time, the company is generally not liable for the consequences; the consequences are deemed too 
remote. There are two related considerations. One is that so many factors outside the alarm 
company’s control determine the likelihood and consequences (whether in property loss or personal 
injury) of a failure of its alarm to summon prompt aid on a particular occasion that the company is 
bound to lack the information that it needs to determine what level of care to take to prevent a failure 
of its system. This basis of the doctrine is the same as that of the doctrine of superseding cause. A 
harm is not foreseeable in the contemplation of the law if the injurer lacked the information he 
needed to determine whether he must use special care to avert the harm. The second point is that 
the alarm company is not the primary accident avoider but merely a backup, and the principal 
responsibility for avoiding disaster lies with the victim. The points are related because both involve 
the difficulty a backup or secondary protector against disaster has in figuring out the consequence 
of a lapse on its part. Neither point supports ASSE, which was standing in the shoes of the parents 
of a young girl living in a stranger’s home far from her homeland and could reasonably be expected 
to exercise the kind of care that the parents themselves would exercise if they could to protect their 
16-year-old daughter from the sexual pitfalls that lie about a girl of that age in those circumstances. 
ASSE assumed a primary role in the protection of the girl…. 
The defendant…complains about the following instruction to the jury: “You’re instructed that 
the law of Wisconsin does not allow a child under the age of 18 to consent to an act of intercourse.” 
This was a reference to the state’s statutory rape law, but it was not elaborated further. The jury was 
instructed to consider the instructions as a whole and another instruction was that it was to consider 
Kristin’s comparative fault. The jury assessed that fault at 41 percent, so obviously it did not think 
the age-of-consent instruction prevented it from considering Kristin’s responsibility for the harm 
that befell her as a consequence of her sexual relationship with Bruce. 
But should the jury have been told what the age of consent is in Wisconsin and, if so, was the 
information conveyed to the jury in the right way? The answer to the first question is yes. The age 
of consent fixed by a state represents a legislative judgment about the maturity of girls in matters of 
sex. Eighteen is a pretty high age of consent by today’s standards and of course the law was not fixed 
by reference to German girls; but it is nonetheless a reminder that teenage children are not 
considered fully responsible in sexual matters, and this was something relevant to the jury’s 
consideration of Kristin’s share of responsibility for the disaster. The criminal law is frequently used 
to set a standard of care for civil tort cases—…and that was essentially the use made of it here. It 
would have been error to instruct the jury that because Kristin was below the age of consent her 
comparative fault must be reckoned at zero. That would have given too much force to the criminal 
statute in this civil case, for the statute cannot be considered a legislative judgment that minors are 
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utterly incapable of avoiding becoming ensnared in sexual relationships. A comparative-fault rule, 
moreover, requires gradations of victim responsibility that are alien to the normal criminal 
prohibition. Victim fault is not a defense, either partial or complete, to criminal liability. It is not a 
defense to a charge of rape that, for example, the victim was dressed provocatively, or drunk, or 
otherwise careless in the circumstances in which the rape occurred. 
It would have been better, though, if the jury had been told how it should take the age of consent 
into account in their deliberations. It should have been told that in deciding how much responsibility 
to assign to Kristin for the events that gave rise to the harm for which she was suing, it could consider 
that the state had made a judgment that girls below the age of 18 should be protected by the criminal 
law from sexual activity even if they agree to it. As it was, the jury was left to tease out the relation 
between the age-of-consent instruction and the comparative-fault instruction for itself. But we 
cannot think that it was other than a harmless error. Indeed, we are surprised that the jury assigned 
so large a responsibility to this young foreign girl virtually abandoned by the agency that was 
standing in for her parents. The jury verdict was rather favorable to the defendant than otherwise…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Fast Eddie’s Revisited: Why does Judge Posner think that Kristin’s school wouldn’t also 
be liable for negligence? Is it a matter of duty or causation, or both? 
2. Causation Complexities: How are both components of the causation element satisfied 
here? Do causation concerns explain why Kristin’s claim primarily rests on the 
emotional injury she suffered in 1996, rather than any bodily injury she might have 
experienced from the sexual assault in 1995? 
3. Victimization and Victim Blaming: Judge Posner remarks that it’s “not a defense to a 
charge of rape that, for example, the victim was dressed provocatively, or drunk, or 
otherwise careless in the circumstances in which the rape occurred.” Though he’s 
discussing criminal liability in that particular sentence, what might he be implying about 
how these facts could be relevant in determining tort liability? Do you agree? Judge 
Posner also repeatedly mentions that Kristin was a “foreign” girl. Is that relevant? 
 
WAUBE v. WARRINGTON 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin (1935) 
Wickhem, Justice:ã 
[While Susie Waube looked out of her window and 
watched her daughter Dolores cross the road, she witnessed 
defendant Amber Warrington negligently run over Dolores, 
killing the child. According to the complaint, Susie was 
already frail at the time of the accident and died two weeks 
later, in part because of her anguish. Plaintiff, Susie’s husband, 
brought a survival action against Amber Warrington, Amber’s 
husband who owned the car, and the car’s insurer. The action 
proceeded on the theory that Susie would have been able to 
recover compensation for her anguish via a cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court 
granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the Court of the 
Appeals reversed. We now reverse and remand.]… 
[T]he question presented is whether the mother of a child who, although not put in peril or fear 
of physical impact, sustains the shock of witnessing the negligent killing of her child, may recover 
for physical injuries caused by such fright or shock. 
The problem must be approached at the outset from the view-point of the duty of defendant and 
the right of plaintiff, and not from the view-point of proximate cause. The right of the mother to 
 
ã Aphrodite, Despair (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0). 
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recover must be based, first, upon the establishment of a duty on the part of defendant so to conduct 
herself with respect to the child as not to subject the mother to an unreasonable risk of shock or 
fright, and, second, upon the recognition of a legally protected right or interest on the part of the 
mother to be free from shock or fright occasioned by the peril of her child. It is not enough to find 
a breach of duty to the child, follow the consequences of such breach as far as the law of proximate 
cause will permit them to go, and then sustain a recovery for the mother if a physical injury to her 
by reason of shock or fright is held not too remote. 
Upon this point we adopt and follow the doctrine of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 
99 (N.Y. 1928)…: 
Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected 
interest, the violation of a right…. The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong 
personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to 
another…. The passenger far away, if the victim of a wrong at all, has a cause of 
action, not derivative, but original and primary. His claim to be protected against 
invasion of his bodily security is neither greater nor less because the act resulting 
in the invasion is a wrong to another far removed…. 
The right of a plaintiff to recover damages for nervous shock caused by negligence without actual 
impact has had an interesting history. In Victoria Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222 
(1888), it was held that plaintiff was not entitled to recover such damages…. This became the 
prevailing doctrine in this country. This doctrine, however, was repudiated in a number of 
jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, in situations where fright without impact produced physical 
injuries…. [Courts in Wisconsin and elsewhere have now held] that in order to give rise to a right 
of action grounded on negligent conduct, the emotional distress or shock must be occasioned by 
fear of personal injury to the person sustaining the shock, and not fear of injury to his property or 
to the person of another. 
Thus it may be said that the doctrine most favorable to plaintiff is not sufficiently broad to entitle 
him to recover. The question presented is whether there should be an extension of the rule to cases 
where defendant’s conduct involves merely an unreasonable risk of causing harm to the child or 
spouse of the person sustaining injuries through fright or shock…. 
The only case squarely dealing with this problem is Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., 1 K.B. 141 (1925). 
[There, the defendant’s employee parked the defendant’s truck at the top of a hill without taking 
reasonable care to ensure it would not roll away. It did roll and ran over the plaintiff’s daughter while 
she was walking to school. The plaintiff was nearby but not endangered herself. She soon learned 
that a young girl had been run over and, upon arriving at the hospital, discovered it was her 
daughter. The court determined that plaintiff “sustained a severe shock and consequent physical 
injuries from which she died.”]… Viewing the matter from the standpoint of proximate cause rather 
than duty, the court held that…defendant ought to have anticipated that if the unattended truck ran 
down this narrow street it might terrify some woman to such an extent, through fear of some 
immediate bodily injury to herself, that she would receive a mental shock with resultant physical 
injuries, and that defendant ought also to have anticipated that such a shock might result from the 
peril to the child of such a woman.  
While the majority, mistakenly, as it seems to us, approach this problem from the standpoint of 
proximate cause, the dissenting opinion of Sargant, L.J., approaches it from the standpoint of duty. 
The dissenting opinion concedes that since it was defendant’s duty to exercise due care in the 
management of his vehicle so as to avoid physical injury to those on or near the highway, this duty 
cannot be limited to physical injuries caused by actual physical impact. The dissenting opinion, 
however, states that…“it would be a considerable and unwarranted extension of the duty of owners 
of vehicles towards others in or near the highway, if it were held to include an obligation not to do 
anything to render them liable to harm through nervous shock caused by the sight or apprehension 
of damage to third persons.” The dissenting opinion concludes that there is no sound reason for 
erecting an exception in favor of the mother of a child, and points out that once the defendant’s duty 
is held to extend to those outside the field of physical peril, a doctrine is stated to which no rational 
boundaries can be erected…. 
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Fundamentally, defendant’s duty was to use ordinary care to avoid physical injury to those who 
would be put in physical peril, as that term is commonly understood, by conduct on his part falling 
short of that standard. It is one thing to say that as to those who are put in peril of physical impact, 
impact is immaterial if physical injury is caused by shock arising from the peril. It is the foundation 
of cases holding to this liberal ruling, that the person affrighted or sustaining shock was actually put 
in peril of physical impact, and under these conditions it was considered immaterial that the physical 
impact did not materialize. It is quite another thing to say that those who are out of the field of 
physical danger through impact shall have a legally protected right to be free from emotional distress 
occasioned by the peril of others, when that distress results in physical impairment. The answer to 
this question cannot be reached solely by logic, nor is it clear that it can be entirely disposed of by a 
consideration of what the defendant ought reasonably to have anticipated as a consequence of his 
wrong. The answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain 
how far defendant’s duty and plaintiff’s right may justly and expediently be extended. It is our 
conclusion that they can neither justly nor expediently be extended to any recovery for physical 
injuries sustained by one out of the range of ordinary physical peril as a result of the shock of 
witnessing another’s danger. Such consequences are so unusual and extraordinary, viewed after the 
event, that a user of the highway may be said not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of them 
by the careless management of his vehicle. Furthermore, the liability imposed by such a doctrine is 
wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor, would put an unreasonable 
burden upon users of the highway, open the way to fraudulent claims, and enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point. 
It was recognized by the court in the Hambrook Case that had the mother there merely been told 
of the injury to her child, instead of having been virtually a witness to the transaction, there would 
have been no liability. The court thus selected at least one arbitrary boundary for the 
extension…. [I]f the mother may recover, why not a child whose shock was occasioned by the peril 
of the mother? It is not necessary to multiply these illustrations. They can be made as numerous as 
the varying degrees of human relationship, and they shade into each other in such a way as to leave 
no definite or clear-cut stopping place for the suggested doctrine, short of a recovery for every person 
who has sustained physical injuries as a result of shock or emotional distress by reason of seeing or 
hearing of the peril or injury of another. No court has gone this far, and we think no court should 
go this far. It is our view that fairness and justice, as well as expediency, require the defendant’s duty 
to be defined as heretofore stated…. Human wrong-doing is seldom limited in its injurious effects 
to the immediate actors in a particular event. More frequently than not, a chain of results is set up 
that visits evil consequences far and wide. While from the standpoint of good morals and good 
citizenship the wrong-doer may be said to violate a duty to those who suffer from the wrong, the law 
finds it necessary, for reasons heretofore considered, to attach practical and just limits to the legal 
consequences of the wrongful act….  
The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint do not bring the interest of Susie Waube within the field 
of legally protected rights…. Order reversed, and cause remanded with directions to sustain the 
demurrer.  
QUESTIONS 
1. Palsgraf Revisited: Why does the court draw from Palsgraf? What’s its relevance here? 
2. The Buck Stops Here: Despite acknowledging previous expansions of negligence 
liability in similar cases, the court offers multiple reasons to explain its refusal to “bring 
the interest of Susie Waube within the field of legally protected rights.” What are those 
reasons? Are you persuaded? 
 
DILLON v. LEGG 
Supreme Court of California (1968) 
Tobriner, Justice:ã 
That the courts should allow recovery to a mother who 
suffers emotional trauma and physical injury from 
witnessing the infliction of death or injury to her child for 
which the tortfeasor is liable in negligence would appear 
to be a compelling proposition. As Prosser points out, “All 
ordinary human feelings are in favor of her action against 
the negligent defendant. If a duty to her requires that she 
herself be in some recognizable danger, then it has 
properly been said that when a child is endangered, it is 
not beyond contemplation that its mother will be 
somewhere in the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock.” 
Nevertheless, past American decisions have barred the 
mother’s recovery. Refusing the mother the right to take 
her case to the jury, these courts ground their position on an alleged absence of a required “duty” of 
due care of the tortfeasor to the mother. Duty, in turn, they state, must express public policy; the 
imposition of duty here would work disaster because it would invite fraudulent claims and it would 
involve the courts in the hopeless task of defining the extent of the tortfeasor's liability…. We have 
concluded that feared dangers excuses the frustration of the natural justice upon which the mother’s 
claim rests…. 
[P]laintiff’s first cause of action alleged that…defendant’s negligent operation of his vehicle 
caused it to “collide with the deceased Erin Lee Dillon resulting in injuries to decedent which 
proximately resulted in her death.” Plaintiff, as the mother of the decedent, brought an action for 
compensation for the loss. Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleged that she, Margery M. Dillon, 
“was in close proximity to the collision and personally witnessed said collision.” She further alleged 
that “because of the negligence of defendants…plaintiff sustained great emotional disturbance and 
shock and injury to her nervous system” which caused her great physical and mental pain and 
suffering…. [Plaintiff’s third cause of action asserted a claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress on behalf of Erin’s sister Cheryl, who was alleged to have been standing nearby when Erin 
was hit.]… 
[Defendant] moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that “No cause of action is stated 
in that allegation that plaintiff sustained emotional distress, fright or shock induced by apprehension 
of negligently caused danger or injury or the witnessing of negligently caused injury to a third 
person. Even where a child, sister or spouse is the object of the plaintiff’s apprehension no cause of 
action is stated, unless the complaint alleges that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress, fright or 
shock as a result of fear for his own safety.” The court granted a judgment on the pleadings against 
the mother’s count, the second cause of action, and denied it as to the sister’s count, the third cause 
of action…. The trial court apparently sustained the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the 
second cause…because [Mrs. Dillon] was not within the zone of danger and denied that motion as 
to the third cause involving Cheryl because of the possibility that she was within such zone of danger 
or feared for her own safety. Thus we have before us a case that dramatically illustrates the difference 
in result flowing from the alleged requirement that a plaintiff cannot recover for emotional trauma 
in witnessing the death of a child or sister unless she also feared for her own safety because she was 
actually within the zone of physical impact…. 
The case thus illustrates the fallacy of the rule that would deny recovery in the one situation and 
grant it in the other…. [W]e can hardly justify relief to the sister for trauma which she suffered upon 
apprehension of the child’s death and yet deny it to the mother merely because of a happenstance 
that the sister was some few yards closer to the accident. The instant case exposes the hopeless 
artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule…. 
 
ã x1klima, Woman and Grief (CC BY-ND 2.0). 
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We turn then to an analysis of the concept of duty, which, as we have stated, has furnished the 
ground for the rejection of such claims as the instant one. Normally the simple facts of plaintiff’s 
complaint would establish a cause of action: the complaint alleges that defendant drove his car 
(1) negligently, as a (2) proximate result of which plaintiff suffered (3) physical injury. Proof of these 
facts to a jury leads to recovery in damages; indeed, such a showing represents a classic example of 
the type of accident with which the law of negligence has been designed to deal. 
The assertion that liability must nevertheless be denied because defendant bears no “duty” to 
plaintiff begs the essential question—whether the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection 
against the defendant’s conduct. Duty is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid 
to analysis in itself. But it should be recognized that “duty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an 
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection…. 
We have noted that this negation of duty [in cases similar to this one] emanates from the twin 
fears that courts will be flooded with an onslaught of (1) fraudulent and (2) indefinable claims. We 
shall point out why we think neither fear justified. 
1. This court in the past has rejected the argument that we must deny recovery upon a legitimate 
claim because other fraudulent ones may be urged.  
The denial of “duty” in the instant situation rests upon the prime hypothesis that allowance of 
such an action would lead to successful assertion of fraudulent claims. The rationale apparently 
assumes that juries, confronted by irreconcilable expert medical testimony, will be unable to 
distinguish the deceitful from the bona fide. The argument concludes that only a per se rule denying 
the entire class of claims that potentially raises this administrative problem can avoid this danger. 
In the first instance, the argument proceeds from a doubtful factual assumption. Whatever the 
possibilities of fraudulent claims of physical injury by disinterested spectators of an accident, a 
question not in issue in this case, we certainly cannot doubt that a mother who sees her child killed 
will suffer physical injury from shock…. In the second instance, and more fundamentally, the 
possibility that fraudulent assertions may prompt recovery in isolated cases does not justify a 
wholesale rejection of the entire class of claims in which that potentiality arises. The contention that 
the rule permitting the maintenance of the action would be impractical to administer is but an 
argument that the courts are incapable of performing their appointed tasks, a premise which has 
frequently been rejected…. The possibility that some fraud will escape detection does not justify an 
abdication of the judicial responsibility to award damages for sound claims…. 
Indeed, we doubt that the problem of the fraudulent claim is substantially more pronounced in 
the case of a mother claiming physical injury resulting from seeing her child killed than in other 
areas of tort law in which the right to recover damages is well established in California. For 
example, a plaintiff claiming that fear for his own safety resulted in physical injury makes out a well 
recognized case for recovery.1 Moreover, damages are allowed for “mental suffering,” a type of 
injury, on the whole, less amenable to objective proof than the physical injury involved here; the 
mental injury can be in aggravation of, or “parasitic to,” an established tort. In fact, fear for another, 
even in the absence of resulting physical injury, can be part of these parasitic damages. And 
emotional distress, if inflicted intentionally, constitutes an independent tort. The danger of 
plaintiffs’ fraudulent collection of damages for nonexistent injury is at least as great in these 
examples as in the instant case. 
In sum, the application of tort law can never be a matter of mathematical precision. In terms of 
characterizing conduct as tortious and matching a money award to the injury suffered as well as in 
fixing the extent of injury, the process cannot be perfect…. [D]efendants have [long] argued that 
 
1 …[I]t is incongruous and somewhat revolting to sanction recovery for the mother if she suffers shock from fear for her 
own safety and to deny it for shock from the witnessed death of her own daughter. To the layman such a ruling must appear 
incomprehensible; for the courts to rely upon self-contradictory legalistic abstractions to justify it is indefensible. We concur 
with Judge Magruder’s observation in 49 Harvard Law Review 1033: “Once accepting the view that a plaintiff threatened with 
an injurious impact may recover for bodily harm resulting from shock without impact, it is easy to agree with Atkin, L.J., 
Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., 1 K.B. 141 (1925), that to hinge recovery on the speculative issue whether the parent was shocked 
through fear for herself or for her children ‘would be discreditable to any system of jurisprudence.’” 
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plaintiffs’ claims of injury from emotional trauma might well be fraudulent. Yet we cannot let the 
difficulties of adjudication frustrate the principle that there be a remedy for every substantial wrong. 
2. The alleged inability to fix definitions for recovery on the different facts of future cases does not 
justify the denial of recovery on the specific facts of the instant case; in any event, proper guidelines can 
indicate the extent of liability for such future cases. 
In order to limit the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow every negligent 
act, the law of torts holds defendant amenable only for injuries to others which to defendant at the 
time were reasonably foreseeable. In the absence of overriding policy considerations foreseeability 
of risk is of primary importance in establishing the element of duty. As a classic opinion states: “The 
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.” Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 
N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Defendant owes a duty, in the sense of a potential liability for damages, only 
with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous, 
and hence negligent, in the first instance….2  
Since the chief element in determining whether defendant owes a duty or an obligation to 
plaintiff is the foreseeability of the risk, that factor will be of prime concern in every case. Because it 
is inherently intertwined with foreseeability such duty or obligation must necessarily be adjudicated 
only upon a case-by-case basis. We cannot now predetermine defendant’s obligation in every 
situation by a fixed category; no immutable rule can establish the extent of that obligation for every 
circumstance of the future. We can, however, define guidelines which will aid in the resolution of 
such an issue as the instant one. 
We note, first, that we deal here with a case in which plaintiff suffered a shock which resulted in 
physical injury and we confine our ruling to that case. In determining, in such a case, whether 
defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to plaintiff, or, in other terminology, whether 
defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care, the courts will take into account such factors as the 
following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one 
who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact 
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted 
with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim 
were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a 
distant relationship. 
The evaluation of these factors will indicate the degree of the defendant’s foreseeability: 
obviously defendant is more likely to foresee that a mother who observes an accident affecting her 
child will suffer harm than to foretell that a stranger witness will do so. Similarly, the degree of 
foreseeability of the third person’s injury is far greater in the case of his contemporaneous 
observance of the accident than that in which he subsequently learns of it. The defendant is more 
likely to foresee that shock to the nearby, witnessing mother will cause physical harm than to 
anticipate that someone distant from the accident will suffer more than a temporary emotional 
reaction. All these elements, of course, shade into each other; the fixing of obligation, intimately tied 
into the facts, depends upon each case. 
In light of these factors the court will determine whether the accident and harm was reasonably 
foreseeable. Such reasonable foreseeability does not turn on whether the particular plaintiff as an 
individual would have in actuality foreseen the exact accident and loss; it contemplates that courts, 
on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will decide what the ordinary man under 
such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen. The courts thus mark out the areas of liability, 
excluding the remote and unexpected. 
In the instant case, the presence of all the above factors indicates that plaintiff has alleged a 
sufficient prima facie case. Surely the negligent driver who causes the death of a young child may 
 
2 The concept of the zone of danger cannot properly be restricted to the area of those exposed to physical injury; it must 
encompass the area of those exposed to emotional injury. The courts, today, hold that no distinction can be drawn between 
physical injury and emotional injury flowing from the physical injury; indeed, in the light of modern medical knowledge, any 
such distinction would be indefensible. As a result, in awarding recovery for emotional shock upon witnessing another’s 
injury or death, we cannot draw a line between the plaintiff who is in the zone of danger of physical impact and the plaintiff 
who is in the zone of danger of emotional impact. The recovery of the one, within the guidelines set forth infra, is as much 
compelled as that of the other. 
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reasonably expect that the mother will not be far distant and will upon witnessing the accident suffer 
emotional trauma. As Dean Prosser has stated: “when a child is endangered, it is not beyond 
contemplation that its mother will be somewhere in the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock.” 
We are not now called upon to decide whether, in the absence or reduced weight of some of the 
above factors, we would conclude that the accident and injury were not reasonably foreseeable and 
that therefore defendant owed no duty of due care to plaintiff. In future cases the courts will draw 
lines of demarcation upon facts more subtle than the compelling ones alleged in the complaint 
before us…. 
We do not believe that the fear that we cannot successfully adjudicate future cases of this sort, 
pursuant to the suggested guidelines, should bar recovery in an otherwise meritorious cause…. 
[T]he history of the [negligent infliction of emotional distress] cases does not show the development 
of a logical rule but rather a series of changes and abandonments. Upon the argument in each 
situation that the courts draw a Maginot Line to withstand an onslaught of false claims, the cases 
have assumed a variety of postures. At first they insisted that there be no recovery for emotional 
trauma at all. Retreating from this position, they gave relief for such trauma only if physical impact 
occurred. They then abandoned the requirement for physical impact but insisted that the victim fear 
for her own safety, holding that a mother could recover for fear for her children’s safety if she 
simultaneously entertained a personal fear for herself. They stated that the mother need only be in 
the “zone of danger.” The final anomaly would be the instant case in which the sister, who observed 
the accident, would be granted recovery because she was in the “zone of danger,” but the mother, 
not far distant, would be barred from recovery. The successive abandonment of these positions 
exposes the weakness of artificial abstractions which bar recovery contrary to the general rules. As 
the commentators have suggested, the problem should be solved by the application of the principles 
of tort, not by the creation of exceptions to them….  
[F]or some artificial reason [ordinary principles of negligence] liability [are] alleged to be 
unworkable in the most egregious case of them all: the mother’s emotional trauma at the witnessed 
death of her child. If we stop at this point, however, we must necessarily question and reject not 
merely recovery here, but the viability of the judicial process for ascertaining liability for tortious 
conduct itself…. To deny recovery would be to chain this state to an outmoded rule of the 19th 
century which can claim no current credence. No good reason compels our captivity to an 
indefensible orthodoxy. The judgment is reversed. 
Burke, Justice, dissenting: 
…Every one of the arguments advanced in today’s opinion was considered by this court and 
rejected, expressly or by fair implication, in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 
(Cal. 1963)…. [T]he majority’s “guidelines” are simply a restatement of those suggested earlier by 
Professor Prosser [and] have already been discussed and expressly rejected by this court in Amaya. 
Upon analysis, their seeming certainty evaporates into arbitrariness, and inexplicable distinctions 
appear. As we asked in Amaya: What if the plaintiff was honestly mistaken in believing the third 
person to be in danger or to be seriously injured? What if the third person had assumed the risk 
involved? How “close” must the relationship be between the plaintiff and the third person? I.e., what 
if the third person was the plaintiff’s beloved niece or nephew, grandparent, fiance, or lifelong friend, 
more dear to the plaintiff than her immediate family? Next, how “near” must the plaintiff have been 
to the scene of the accident, and how “soon” must shock have been felt? Indeed, what is the magic 
in the plaintiff’s being actually present? Is the shock any less real if the mother does not know of the 
accident until her injured child is brought into her home? On the other hand, is it any less real if the 
mother is physically present at the scene but is nevertheless unaware of the danger or injury to her 
child until after the accident has occurred? No answers to these questions are to be found in today’s 
majority opinion. Our trial courts, however, will not so easily escape the burden of distinguishing 
between litigants on the basis of such artificial and unpredictable distinctions…. 
[N]o fallacy or incongruity appears in the rule permitting recovery to one within the physical 
zone of danger for trauma suffered from fear of impact, but denying it to a person outside that zone. 
The impact feared must be to oneself, and it must be an objective fear—not merely that of an 
excessively imaginative or timid plaintiff…. [T]o permit recovery by every person who might 
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adversely feel some lingering effect of the defendant’s conduct would throw us into “the fantastic 
realm of infinite liability.” Yet the majority opinion in the present case simply omits to either 
mention or discuss the injustice to California defendants flowing from such a disproportionate 
extension of their liability—an injustice which plainly constituted a “prime hypothesis” for rejection 
of the liability sought to be imposed by the plaintiffs in Waube and in Amaya…. 
QUESTIONS 
1. California versus Wisconsin: In what ways is Dillon a departure from Waube? 
2. Fantastical Negligence: Are you convinced by the majority’s arguments for permitting 
Margery Dillon’s claim to proceed? Are Justice Burke’s rebuttals in dissent persuasive? 
Are we now in the “the fantastic realm of infinite liability”? 
3. Highway to the Danger Zone: Was there any logic to the narrower zone-of-danger rule? 
Is Margery’s sister Cheryl basing her negligence claim on a meaningfully different theory 
of emotional distress than Margery?   
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APPENDIX:  ADDITIONAL MATERIALS  
A. Writing for Exams
By Jean Mangan, Courtney Hogan, and Thomas Kadri* 
There are different strategies that you will use when writing an essay for an exam in law school 
or for the bar. Many law school exams consist of short answers, essays on directed topics, and “issue-
spotters.” In law school, issue-spotters are exams featuring a long hypothetical—usually referred to 
as a fact pattern—in which there are several potential claims, defenses, and/or other scenarios to be 
analyzed under the rules you have learned in the course. When you are responding to an issue-
spotter question, your goal is to demonstrate to the reader (usually your professor) that you both 
know the legal rules and understand how to apply them to a given set of facts. Depending on the 
particular fact pattern and prompt, you might also need to tell the reader every possible way a 
situation could resolve, often by applying the same rule and showing how your conclusion might 
change depending on how you interpret different facts. This ability to explore the legal issues in 
depth demonstrates your mastery of the rules and their nuances. Remember, your law professors 
assume you can regurgitate the rules, but they really want to see that you know how to apply the 
rules. 
First, pay careful attention to the “call of the question” or prompt—what the professor has asked 
you to explain about the fact pattern. Many questions will not have a “right” answer as to whether a 
certain claim will succeed or fail, so the best practice is typically to explain both sides of the argument 
then commit to what you believe to be the stronger conclusion (e.g.: “The judge is likely to grant the 
motion for summary judgment in this case.”), unless instructions indicate otherwise or additional 
facts are necessary to make a reasonable conclusion. To maximize the points you earn, show the 
professor the steps you took to reach your conclusions by using the traditional IRAC structure for 
issue-spotter answers. Exams are designed for you to demonstrate to your professor that you can 
both find and articulate the legal Issue; identify the relevant Rule(s); conduct the appropriate 
Analysis or application, including the consideration of counterarguments; and clearly state the 
Conclusion. Put another way, for each section of your exam answer, you want to tell the professor 
what that particular section discusses; what past sources of law tell us about this issue; explain how 
this rule applies to the scenario and why the rule leads to a certain outcome; and then summarize 
for the reader the purpose of the section by restating your conclusion. 
The primary benefits to sticking to an IRAC format are that (1) you present your thoughts in a 
logical sequence; (2) you are more likely to include all the components needed to show your thought 
process; and (3) your professor will be able to read your answers easily. All three of these benefits 
combine to create yet another benefit: you enhance your credibility with the reader. 







down the page. As you come across an issue, write it next to the I. You will repeat IRAC down 
the page for each issue you have. 
In Torts, an “issue” is a possible legal question—whether claim or defense—raised by a fact 
pattern and prompt. Although many fact patterns are quite long, every word has been carefully 
selected and warrants your full attention. To borrow another professor’s metaphor, think of issue-
spotting as a pinball game: the fact pattern is riddled with issues, and you gain more points for each 
issue you find and discuss. To ensure you catch as many issues as possible, read the fact pattern 
carefully and multiple times, marking up the page as much as possible. Analyze every word and keep 
 
* This essay was originally prepared by Jean Mangan, Courtney Hogan, and me for publication in JEAN MANGAN ET 
AL., LEGAL WRITING MANUAL (2021), https://alg.manifoldapp.org/projects/legal-writing-manual. 
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an eye out for important relationships between parties, as well as specific indications of the parties’ 
thoughts or actions that could suggest their mindset or explain their conduct. Do not add facts to 
the problem or make broad assumptions about facts given. If more facts are necessary, explain their 
necessity in your analysis. In short, active reading is your best friend in a law school exam. 
For example, say you encounter the following prompt on your Torts exam: 
Early one Sunday morning, Arthur went over to Henry’s house to ask to borrow 
some eggs. When Arthur knocked on the door, Henry threw open the door, striking 
Arthur in the face and giving him a bloody nose. Henry sticks his head out, sees 
Arthur with blood streaming down his face, and laughs. Arthur screams, “I’m going 
to go after you for everything you’ve got!” Henry slams the door in his face. Can 
Arthur sue Henry for his bloody nose? 
 
I - Can A sue H for bloody nose under a theory of battery? 
 
R - Battery occurs when a defendant (1) acts (2) intending to cause contact that is 
(3) harmful or offensive; and (4) harmful or offensive contact results. The contact 
does not have to be directly from a part of the defendant’s body; it is enough that 
the defendant intentionally uses an object to cause a harmful or offensive contact 
with the plaintiff such that the contact can be attributed to the defendant. 
 
A - Here, we know that Henry caused a harmful contact to Arthur by swinging 
the door open and striking Arthur in the face and injuring his nose, which means 
that three elements of a battery claim are satisfied. What remains to be determined 
is whether Henry intended for the door to strike Arthur in the nose. On the one 
hand, the fact that Henry stuck his head out and laughed afterwards might suggest 
that Henry meant to strike Arthur with the door; in that case, Henry would be 
liable for battery. On the other hand, if Henry did not mean to strike Arthur and 
was actually laughing about something else, then Henry would not have had the 
intent to strike Arthur, and Henry could not be found liable for battery. 
 
C - Henry’s liability for battery will depend on whether Arthur can prove Henry 
intended to open the door in a way that would strike Arthur. 
(You could then use the same format to explore whether Arthur can sue Henry under a theory 
of negligence.) 
Notice how stating the issue helps you recall the appropriate rules. Once you have stated the rule, 
you then go through and connect a fact from the prompt to each piece of the rule. Where an 
important fact is unknown or ambiguous, like whether Henry had the requisite intent, that tells you 
to show how the facts could be interpreted to allow for either outcome. Then, you bring it all together 
by answering the question posed in I with the likely conclusion or the specific fact or portion of the 
rule that the outcome turns on. 
As you are studying for your exams, practice putting your answers to practice problems in the 
IRAC format when you write out your responses. You should always try to answer the problems on 
your own before you read the sample answer! Having to recall the information and put it in your 
own words will help make the material stick in your long-term memory, which is better both for 
your exam-taking and for learning the material thoroughly. 
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B. Sample Exam 
Please write clearly, concisely, and unpretentiously. Answer the questions. Part of good 
lawyering, and good exam-writing, is identifying the key resources you need to tackle a given 
problem, so don’t discuss irrelevant points of law that won’t support your answer. Still, do consider 
points that are reasonably relevant and deserving of analysis, even if you think the argument 
wouldn’t succeed, and explain why such an argument would fail. The less colorable the point, the 
less attention you should give it. If you know case names that are on point, you may cite them, but I 
care much more that you make the right points than that you cite controlling authority for them. 
The exam has two parts. Part One has one question and Part Two has one question. You must 
answer both questions. Please start your answer for each part on a new page with the titles “Part 
One” and “Part Two.” There are word limits noted at the beginning of each part. The word limits 
aren’t the same, so pay careful attention to them. If your answer to either part exceeds the word 
limit, I’ll stop grading your answer well before that limit. If you write more than 600 words in Part 
One, for instance, I’ll grade only the first 400 words of your answer in that part. So, please don’t 
exceed the word limit, and remember that the word limits are maximums, not minimums. A good 
answer might not approach the limit. 
You have three hours to work on the exam. Although you have three hours, you’ll notice that 
the times I’ve recommended for each part amount to only two hours. This leaves you one hour for 
reading, outlining, and editing. Ultimately, it’s up to you to decide how you allocate your time, but 
you should know that the recommended times are proportional to the weight I’ll assign each part 
when grading. As the recommended times suggest, the parts aren’t weighted evenly. 
Now, take a deep breath and give it your best shot. Good luck!  
 
Part One (30 minutes, 600 words) 
A wise law professor once said: “Tort law sometimes endorses and entrenches social norms, 
while sometimes it undermines and challenges them.” Pick one topic of tort law that we’ve studied—
a particular tort, element, defense, doctrine, or concept—and discuss how that topic might relate to 
the professor’s words. 
 
Part Two (90 minutes, 2400 words)  
Tensions were running high in the town of Athenia. After a bitterly contested race in November 
in which no candidate won a majority of votes, the two leading candidates for county coroner were 
gearing up for a January run-off election. Each candidate secured the endorsement of their party’s 
presidential nominee, Ronald Grump and Moe Widen, who quickly joined the campaign trail to 
build support. At huge rallies held in the town’s colossal football stadium, the candidates and their 
endorsers urged their supporters to make their own yard signs and display them proudly on their 
front lawns—the bigger and more sensationalist the sign, the better. “This race could be won or lost 
based on those signs,” said one local commentator.  
Maria Perez and Monica Cruz lived on the same street in the Athenian neighborhood of Two 
Points. Their political views couldn’t be more polarized, with each convinced that their preferred 
candidate for coroner was the only person who could save this country from decay. Perez and Cruz 
began enthusiastically making yard signs. Perez, an electrician, fitted her sign with lightbulbs that 
flashed her candidate’s name for all her neighbors to see. Cruz, a party-planner, was no less creative, 
decorating her sign with patriotic symbols to catch everyone’s eye. 
When Perez’s candidate fell behind in the polls, she concluded that her lightbulb sign wasn’t 
enough. One night, she snuck over to the edge of Cruz’s property and, making sure not to step on 
Cruz’s lawn, used a long stick to yank the patriotic sign onto the street. She then burned the sign 
before posting a photo of the ashes on Twitter along with the hashtag #CrematetheCoroner. 
Unfortunately for Perez, Cruz spotted this act of partisan passion (even in the darkness, Perez had 
something of a glow to her). When Cruz saw Perez leaving for work the next morning, she walked 
across Perez’s driveway and smashed every light bulb on the illuminated sign with a baseball bat. 
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Undeterred, Perez and Cruz spent the weekend making new signs. Perez made a metal sign in 
the shape of a nectarine, while Cruz went old school with a cardboard sign featuring her candidate’s 
name. But the two neighbors went one step further this time. Perez wired her metal sign to deliver 
a sharp electric shock to anyone or anything that touched it. Cruz put her own vocation to good use, 
attaching some string to her cardboard sign to detonate a glitter bomb if the sign were pulled out of 
the ground.  
Sure enough, the booby traps came in handy. On election week, with pollsters confidently 
claiming that the candidates were neck and neck, Perez and Cruz made a last-ditch effort to clinch 
the contest for their side. When Perez walked onto Cruz’s front lawn and grabbed the cardboard 
sign, the glitter bomb exploded, showering her from head to toe in sparkly bits of plastic. She 
coughed, spluttered, and sneezed, gasping for air as the glitter did its work. 
Perez returned home utterly distraught, but she didn’t have to wait long for revenge. Later that 
day, Cruz decided to steal the metal sign. As she tugged it, she suffered an electric shock that stung 
her hand so sharply that she immediately let go and ran home. Unbeknownst to anyone, Cruz had 
an undiagnosed heart condition, and she suffered a heart attack later that day while sitting on her 
porch. Peering out of her window, Perez saw Cruz fall to the ground and clutch her chest, but she 
was too busy scrubbing the glitter off her face to care. It was hours before Cruz was found. 
Perez is outraged. Election day is around the corner, yet she’s still finding glitter in her hair and 
clothing despite her repeated efforts to bathe and do laundry. She wants to sue. What claims could 
she bring and why? What counterarguments would you expect? And, briefly, who do you think will 
prevail and why? 
Cruz remains in hospital. The doctors think she’ll eventually recover, but it looks like she might 
not make it out of hospital in time to attend any election-night parties. What claims could she bring 
and why? What counterarguments would you expect? And, briefly, who do you think will prevail 
and why? 
 
<< END OF EXAM >>
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C. Sample Syllabus 
To see the “liquid” syllabus accompanying this casebook, including online materials not included 
here, please visit www.thomaskadri.com/torts. Instructors using this casebook might roughly divide the 
material up as follows (based on a 4-credit class meeting three times a week): 
Week 1: Battery 
Week 2: Assault; Consent 
Week 3: Defense of People & Property; False Imprisonment; Trespass to Land 
Week 4: Conversion; Trespass to Chattels; Consent; Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
Week 5: Defamation; Injury; Duty (Unqualified Duties) 
Week 6: Duty (Qualified Duties) 
Week 7: Breach (Reasonable Person) 
Week 8: Breach (Custom & Cost/Benefit) 
Week 9: Breach (Res Ipsa Loquitor); Cause (Actual Causation) 
Week 10: Cause (Proximate Causation) 
Week 11: Negligence Per Se; Comparative Fault; Assumption of Risk (Express) 
Week 12: Assumption of Risk (Implied); Ultrahazardous Activities; Compensatory Damages 
Week 13: Punitive Damages; Vicarious & Joint Liability; IIED 
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